The McCarthy Hearings - Volume 3
Submitted by William Finck on Sun, 04/10/2011 - 11:51
[107 Senate Committee Prints]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:83871.wais]
S. Prt. 107-84
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
=======================================================================
VOLUME 3
__________
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
1953
MADE PUBLIC JANUARY 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
________
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83-871 WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
107th Congress, Second Session
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Richard A. Hertling, Minority Staff Director
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois TED STEVENS, Alaska
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
Elise J. Bean, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Kim Corthell, Minority Staff Director
Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
83rd Congress, First Session
JOSEPH R. McCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan ALTON A. LENNON, North Carolina
Francis D. Flanagan, Chief Counsel
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk
------
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
JOSEPH R. McCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas \1\
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington \1\
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri \1\
Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel
Francis P. Carr, Executive Director
Ruth Young Watt, Chief Clerk
assistant counsels
Robert F. Kennedy Donald A. Surine
Thomas W. La Venia Jerome S. Adlerman
Donald F. O'Donnell C. George Anastos
Daniel G. Buckley
investigators
Robert J. McElroy
Herbert S. Hawkins James N. Juliana
G. David Schine, Chief Consultant
Karl H. W. Baarslag, Director of Research
Carmine S. Bellino, Consulting Accountant
La Vern J. Duffy, Staff Assistant
----------
\1\ The Democratic members were absent from the subcommittee from
July 10, 1953 to January 25, 1954.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Volume 3
Security--United Nations, September 14........................... 1807
Testimony of Julius Reiss; and Florence Englander.
Security--United Nations, September 15........................... 1833
Testimony of Paul Crouch; Dimitri Varley; Abraham Unger; and
Alice Ehrenfeld.
Security--United Nations, September 16........................... 1877
Testimony of Frank Cerny; and Helen Matousek.
Security--United Nations, September 17........................... 1889
Testimony of Abraham Unger; Vachel Lofek; and David M.
Freedman.
Communist Infiltration in the Army, September 21................. 1899
Testimony of Igor Bogolepov; Vladimir Petrov; Gen. Richard C.
Partridge; and Samuel McKee.
Communist Infiltration in the Army, September 23................. 1913
Testimony of Louis Budenz; Harriett Moore Gelfan; and Corliss
Lamont.
Korean War Atrocities, October 6................................. 1923
Testimony of Edward J. Lyons, Jr.; Lt. Col. Lee H. Kostora;
Maj. James Kelleher; Lt. Col. J. W. Whitehorne, III; Gen.
Fenn; and John Adams.
Korean War Atrocities, October 31................................ 1943
Korean War Atrocities, November 30............................... 1965
Testimony of 1st Lt. Henry J. McNichols, Jr.; Sgt. Barry F.
Rhoden; Capt. Linton J. Buttrey; Sgt. Carey H. Weinel; Col.
James M. Hanley; Pfc. John E. Martin; Capt. Alexander G.
Makarounis.
Korean War Atrocities, December 1................................ 2043
Testimony of Lt. Col. John W. Gorn; Lt. Col. James T. Rogers;
Cpl. Lloyd D. Kreider; Sgt. Robert L. Sharps; William L.
Milano; Sgt. Wendell Treffery; Sgt. George J. Matta; Cpl.
Willie L. Daniels; Sgt. John L. Watters, Jr.; Sgt. Orville
R. Mullins; and Donald R. Brown.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 8........... 2119
Statements of Paul Siegel; Jerome Corwin; Allen J.
Lovenstein; Edward J. Fister; William P. Goldberg; and
Jerome Rothstein.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 9........... 2201
Statements of Alan Sterling Gross; Dr. Fred B. Daniels;
Bernard Lipel; James Evers; Sol Bremmer; Murray Miller;
Sherwood Leeds; Paul M. Leeds.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 12.......... 2275
Statements of Louis Volp; William Patrick Lonnie; Henry F.
Burkhard; Marcel Ullmann; and Herbert F. Hecker.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 12.......... 2303
Testimony of Marcel Ullmann; Morris Keiser; Seymour
Rabinowitz; Rudolph C. Riehs; and Carl Greenblum.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 13.......... 2329
Testimony of Joseph Levitsky; William Ludwig Ullman; Bernard
Martin; Louis Kaplan; Harry Donohue; Jack Frolow; Bernard
Lewis; and Craig Crenshaw.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 14.......... 2389
Testimony of Harold Ducore; Aaron H. Coleman; Samuel
Pomerentz; and Haym G. Yamins.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 14.......... 2457
Testimony of Harold Ducore; Jack Okun; and Maj. Gen. Kirke B.
Lawton.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 15.......... 2487
Testimony of Vivian Glassman Pataki; Eleanor Glassman Hutner;
Samuel I. Greenman; Ira J. Katchen; Max Elitcher; Eugene E.
Hutner; Col. John V. Mills; Maj. James J. Gallagher; Marcel
Ullmann; Benjamin Zuckerman; and Benjamin Bookbinder.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 16.......... 2563
Testimony of Maj. Gen. Kirke Lawton; Maj. Gen George I. Back;
Maj. Jenista; Col. Ferry; John Pernice; Karl Gerhard; Carl
Greenblum; Markus Epstein; and Leo M. Miller.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 17.......... 2625
Testimony of Alfred C. Walker; Joseph Levitsky; and Louis
Antell.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 22.......... 2649
Testimony of Fred Joseph Kitty; Jack Okun; Aaron Coleman; and
Barry S. Bernstein.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 22.......... 2697
Testimony of Benjamin Wolman, Harvey Sachs, Leonard E. Mins,
and Sylvia Berke.
SECURITY--UNITED NATIONS
[Editor's note.--With the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee already conducting an investigation of American
Communist infiltration of the United Nations, the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations confined its inquiry to ``an
employee of the United Nations not attached to that part of the
United Nations scrutinized by the Internal Security
Subcommittee.'' Julius Reiss (1907-1979) was an American
employed by the Polish Delegation to the United Nations. He had
also been an instructor for the U.S. Army during the Second
World War. In both this executive session and in a public
session on September 17, 1953, Reiss declined to answer
questions relating to Communist party membership and
activities. Florence Englander (1907-1981), who also testified
on September 14, did not testify in public.]
----------
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, NY.
The subcommittee met at 10:40 a.m., in room 128 of the
United States Court House, Foley Square, Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; G. David Schine, chief consultant; Baline
Sloan, member, Legal Department, U.N.
The Chairman. Mr. Remes, will you stand and be sworn.
Mr. Reiss. My name is Reiss.
The Chairman. In this matter now in hearing before the
committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Reiss. I do.
TESTIMONY OF JULIUS REISS (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ROYAL W.
FRANCE)
Mr. Cohn. Can we get the name of counsel for the record.
Mr. France. Royal W. France, 104 East 40th Street.
Mr. Reiss. Excuse me, sir. I didn't quite get the name you
used when you asked me.
The Chairman. You give us your name, will you?
Mr. Reiss. Julius Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. What is your address, sir?
Mr. Reiss. 741 Westminister Road, Brooklyn, New York.
Mr. Cohn. Where are you employed?
Mr. Reiss. At the Polish Delegation to the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. What is that address?
Mr. Reiss. 151 East 62 Street.
The Chairman. I wonder if you would try and speak louder,
please.
Mr. Reiss. 161 East 62 Street. New York City.
Mr. Cohn. And what is the telephone up there?
Well, that is all right. Let me ask you this, sir. For how
long a period of time have you been employed at the Polish
Delegation to the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. Approximately three years.
Mr. Cohn. Approximately three years?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. In other words, you went there in 1950, is that
right?
Mr. Reiss. At the end of 1950 sometime.
Mr. Cohn. End of ?
Mr. Reiss. Sometime.
Mr. Cohn. Will you just tell us generally what you do
there?
Mr. Reiss. I am a documentation clerk.
Mr. Cohn. What does that mean?
Mr. Reiss. I handle United Nations documents, file them. I
make abstracts, digests of them. I handle press end periodicals
and books and do research in the press, periodicals and books.
Mr. Cohn. Did you generally work along those lines?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Is your salary paid by the Polish Delegation?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What is your salary?
Mr. Reiss. It is about $3900 a year. I think about $325 a
month.
Mr. Cohn. Is that net of taxes or----
Mr. Reiss. That is before taxes.
Mr. Cohn. What do you do, pay your own income tax?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Is that reimbursed to you in any way by----
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. In other words, you are paid a straight salary?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You are. Are you paid in United States currency?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What did you do immediately prior to going with
the Polish Delegation?
Mr. Reiss. Directly prior to that?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. I was out of work.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time? Just
approximately?
Mr. Reiss. May I ask my counsel a question?
Mr. Cohn. Sure, you can ask your counsel anything you want.
Mr. Reiss. I think it may have been about two months or so.
Two or more, I am not sure.
Mr. Cohn. Directly prior to that, what did you do?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds of the Fifth
Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. On the grounds the answer may tend to incriminate
you, on the Fifth Amendment?
Mr. Reiss. On the grounds the answer may tend to
incriminate me, on the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time will you claim a
privilege as to your employment? In other words, we are back to
two months prior to the time you went with the Polish
Delegation.
You can consult with counsel if you want. I don't want to
go back month after month.
Mr. Reiss. I think back to about 1935.
Mr. Cohn. Back to 1935?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever worked for the United States
government?
Mr. Reiss. I was in the army.
Mr. Cohn. As a soldier?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. During what years?
Mr. Reiss. 1942 to 1945.
Mr. Cohn. Did you serve in this country and overseas?
Mr. Reiss. Just in this country.
Mr. Cohn. Just in this country. Where were you stationed?
Mr. Reiss. I was stationed in Aberdeen, Maryland.
Mr. Cohn. Aberdeen, Maryland?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Aberdeen Proving Ground?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir. It had nothing to do with it.
Mr. Cohn. What was the particular assignment in the army
that you had?
Mr. Reiss. I was--I taught pedagogy.
Mr. Cohn. You taught pedagogy in the army?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What the hell is that?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. Would you expand on that just for a
little bit?
Mr. Reiss. Yes. You have a lot of men who went through
cadre school and who you had to teach how to repair machine
guns and ammunition clerical work and so forth. They had to
teach. Well, I taught these men the technique of teaching.
Nothing to do with the material.
Mr. Cohn. I understand.
Mr. Reiss. Just the pure technique.
Mr. Cohn. All right, now, are you today a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you--in 1950, were you secretary of the
National Youth Commission of the Communist party of the United
States?
Mr. Reiss. May I consult with my counsel?
I refuse to answer on the grounds previously stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been known by the name of Julius
Remes?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been assistant editor of the
Political Affairs Monthly, theoretical publication of the
Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer, on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr Cohn. Have you been a paid functionary of the Communist
party of the United States?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you served on the enlarged National
Committee of the Communist party of the United States?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Do you contribute any of the salary that you
receive now to the Communist party?
You can consult with counsel any time you want.
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You do not?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do you contribute any money to the Communist
party of the United States?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You do not. Did you ever?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you last year?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever taught at the Jefferson School?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Now, were you in 1937 and 1938 an organizer for
the Communist party in Michigan and Louisiana?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Is it a fact that when you went to--is it not a
fact that when you joined the Polish Delegation to the United
Nations, became associated with it, you were instructed by the
Communist party not to continue in open association with the
party but to go in the underground?
Do you want to read that back, if the witness has
difficulty understanding the question?
[Question read.]
Mr. Cohn. Again, I say--I see you hesitate--you can consult
with counsel any time you want.
Mr. Schine. Proceed.
Mr. Reiss. I am just thinking.
Mr. Cohn. What?
Mr. Reiss. Thinking.
Mr. Cohn. Are you prepared to answer?
Mr. Reiss. I am just thinking for a minute.
Mr. Cohn. You want to think for a minute?
Mr. Reiss. Just for a minute.
Mr. Cohn. Oh, sure. Take all the time you want.
Mr. Reiss. Could I smoke?
Mr. Cohn. Oh, certainly.
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. That is not true. Do you know a man by the name
of Andy Remes?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. He is your brother, is he not?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Can you tell us whether or not he is in the
Communist party underground?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Can you state where he is today?
The Chairman. May I interrupt, Mr. Counsel? I do not
believe he can refuse to answer as to personal relationship,
whether he is his brother or not.
Mr. Cohn. All right.
Mr. Reiss. I can't refuse?
The Chairman. Uh-huh.
Mr. Cohn. Do you have any brothers?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the same grounds.
The Chairman. Mr. Counsel, I think that the chair will
order the witness to answer. There can be nothing incriminating
about the fact he has or has not brothers.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever worked for----
The Chairman. He was ordered to answer the question.
Mr. Cohn. I am sorry. You were directed to answer the
question as to whether or not you have any brothers.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You do have brothers. How many?
Mr. Reiss. Living?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. Two.
Mr. Cohn. And what are their first names?
Yes, sir?
Mr. Reiss. I was asked the question before and I refused to
answer.
The Chairman. I understand the witness refuses to answer as
to the names of his brothers.
Mr. Reiss. Sir----
The Chairman. I think in view of the fact----
Mr. Reiss. No, sir, I am just thinking.
Mr. Cohn. He is just hesitating.
The Chairman. Oh.
Mr. Cohn. Senator McCarthy, this is Mr. Sloan.
The Chairman. I am glad to know you, Mr. Sloan.
Mr. Sloan. How do you do, sir. I am just here as an
observer.
The Chairman. I understand. You are not responsible for
anything we do here.
Mr. Reiss. Well, I have one brother whom I haven't seen for
many years.
Mr. Cohn. What is his first name?
Mr. Reiss. Many years. Solomon Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. What about the other brother? What is his name?
And Solomon, what is his last name?
Mr. Reiss. Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. Reiss, yes. And what is your other brother's
first name, Mr. Reiss? Sir?
Mr. Reiss. I have a--yes.
Mr. Cohn. What is his first name?
Mr. Reiss. Andrew Remes.
Mr. Cohn. Andrew Remes?
Mr. Reiss. His legal name.
Mr. Cohn. His legal name?
Mr. Reiss. His legal name as far as I know.
Mr. Cohn. Where is your brother?
Mr. Reiss. May I just--Mr.----
Mr. Cohn. Sure.
Mr. Reiss. On purely--well, I hesitated speaking--may I say
this and then can I stop, and then I will repeat the same thing
word for word to----
Mr. Cohn. You want to say something off the record?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Go ahead.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. Have the record show the witness, on his own
request, was allowed to give the committee some information off
the record. He desires not to have it on the record. It will
not be on the record in this case; but this will be the only
case in which we will go off the record.
Mr. Reiss. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cohn. Where is your brother, Andrew Remes, now?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. When did you see him last?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Is it not a fact he is a member of the Communist
underground and out of circulation at the moment?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds stated.
Mr. Cohn. Now, you draw any pay from the Communist party at
this time?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do you have any identification entitling you to
admission to the United Nations zone and grounds and building?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir. I have an identification card.
Mr. Cohn. Could we examine that, please?
Mr. Reiss. I do not have it with me.
Mr. Cohn. You haven't got it with you?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do your duties ever take you over to the United
Nations building?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, of course.
Mr. Cohn. About how frequently?
Mr. Reiss. There is no regularity involved. I may go down
three times in one week. I think in the last three months I
have been down there--I really don't know--maybe once or twice.
Mr. Cohn. It hasn't been in session a good deal of the
time.
Mr. Reiss. But I don't go down there just during sessions.
Mr. Cohn. When you go down there, do you confer with
various people?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You do. Now, do you know any member--do you know
any persons employed by the secretariat of the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know any American citizens employed by the
secretariat?
Mr. Reiss. I know some people there.
Mr. Cohn. Could you name the ones you know?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know any Americans employed by the United
Nations secretariat who are members of the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. May I just ask a couple of questions?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you believe that the Communist party is
dedicated to the overthrow of this government by force and
violence?
Mr. Reiss. I do not.
The Chairman. You do?
Mr. Reiss. I do not.
The Chairman. You do not. Let me ask you the question again
in a slightly different form. Do you believe it is dedicated--
strike that.
Do you believe the Communist party is dedicated to the
overthrow of this government by force and violence if a
Communist government cannot be imposed on this nation by
peaceful means?
Mr. Reiss. Will you repeat that, please?
Mr. Cohn. Would you read it?
[Question read.]
Mr. Reiss. Seems to me that the answer to that was embraced
in the question that I just answered.
The Chairman. I am going to ask you to answer this
question. It is in slightly different form.
Mr. Reiss. Uh-huh!
Mr. France. Do you understand the question?
Mr. Reiss. It is a question of some difficulty for me to
grasp. I am not quite sure.
Mr. France. I wonder if the----
Mr. Cohn. I don't agree with that. You have taught at the
Workers School, haven't you?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. You have taught courses in Marxism and Leninism.
You can answer the question.
The Chairman. It is a very simple question. You can take
all the time you want, but it is a question I am going to order
you to answer.
Mr. France. Would you like the question repeated?
Mr. Reiss. No.
The Chairman. If you want the question read again, you may
have it read to you.
Mr. Reiss. Would you read the question to me?
[Question read.]
Mr. Cohn. Is that so difficult?
The Chairman. I will be back in a minute. Let the witness
think it over, and I will be back.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
[Whereupon, the chairman withdrew from the hearing room.]
Mr. Cohn. Do you want to answer?
Mr. Reiss. I will, yes.
Mr. Cohn. You are still meditating?
Mr. Reiss. Yes. Not as easy as it sounds. Do you mean----
[Whereupon, the chairman returned to the hearing room.]
Mr. Cohn. He is still thinking. Still thinking of the
answer to that question. Huh.
Mr. Reiss. You see, I am trying to envision the possible
circumstances involved in this question.
Mr. Cohn. Let me ask you this preliminary question.
The Chairman. I think he should answer now.
Mr. Cohn. I want to know how much they paid you at the
Workers School to teach Marxism and Leninism.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated. I have been trying to envision the possible
circumstances under which that question would arise and----
The Chairman. We will give you until 2:30 this afternoon
and you think it over and----
Mr. Reiss. I can answer.
Mr. Cohn. We have other witnesses and can't sit here all
day for you to think it out.
Mr. Reiss. I think my attorney won't be here, and I would
like to answer the question now.
Mr. Cohn. We will have to have you back this afternoon
anyway.
The Chairman. Okay. If he wants to answer now----
Mr. Reiss. If I have to be back this afternoon, I will wait
until this afternoon.
Mr. Cohn. Let me ask you this question. Who obtained your
job for you at the Polish Delegation to the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Was that obtained for you through the
intercession of the American Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Was it obtained by you--for you through the
intercession of any functionary of the American Communist
party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
The Chairman. Was there anything illegal in connection with
your obtaining that job, as far as you know?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. Was--to your knowledge, did you do anything
in connection with your obtaining that job that was either
directly or indirectly in violation of the laws of the United
States?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. You are then ordered to answer the question
propounded by counsel. If there was nothing illegal in
connection with your getting the job, if you are guilty of no
illegal activities in connection with your getting the job, you
are not entitled to the privilege under the Fifth Amendment, so
you answer the question.
You can discuss the matter with counsel at any time you
care to, Mr.----
Mr. Cohn. Sir?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. Now.
The Chairman. Have the record show--I believe it is clear,
and if I am incorrect in this, counsel, you correct me. I
believe the record now shows the witness has stated that he is
aware of nothing illegal in connection with his obtaining the
job, that he feels he does not know of any law of the United
States which he violated either directly or indirectly in
obtaining the job. Have the record show that after that
appeared I turned and ordered the witness to answer; that the
witness consulted with counsel and has again refused to answer
the question.
We will let you go until 2:30 this afternoon. We had hoped
to finish up with your testimony this morning, but it has taken
so much time to get answers to very, very simple questions from
you that we will have to let you go now and take some of the
other witnesses whom we promised to handle this morning.
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. 2:30 this afternoon, and in case we are late
in that, we have other matters which we have to take care of,
you will be instructed to wait until we get to you.
Mr. Cohn. I would like to have you answer one last
question. I don't know whether I asked it before or not. Did
you work for Abraham Unger in 1950?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you--were you engaged in any activities
connected with the defense of the indicted Communist leaders?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. Were you paid money for those activities by the
Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. Okay.
Mr. France. It appears that all these refusals are based on
the same reason as before.
Mr. Cohn. The answers--the ground the answers might tend to
incriminate him.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes. I think, just off the record----
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Reiss. I should like to state that all my refusals have
been on the basis of my privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF FLORENCE ENGLANDER
The Chairman. Will you raise your right hand.
This matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Miss Englander. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Could we have your full name?
Miss Englander. Florence Englander.
Mr. Cohn. Where are you employed?
Miss Englander. At the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. In what capacity?
Miss Englander. My title is social affairs officer.
Mr. Cohn. Social affairs officer. And for how long a period
of time have you been employed at the United Nations?
Miss Englander. Exactly seven years.
Mr. Cohn. Seven years?
Miss Englander. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. What is your salary?
Miss Englander. I think it is $6200. I am not exactly sure.
Mr. Cohn. Is that net of taxes?
Miss Englander. That is my gross salary.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been a member of the Communist
party?
Miss Englander. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. During what years?
Miss Englander. I think 1935 to 1940.
Mr. Cohn. 1935 to 1940?
Miss Englander. Yes. The----
Mr. Cohn. Did you have any associations with the Communist
party after 1940?
Miss Englander. None at all.
Mr. Cohn. None whatsoever?
Miss Englander. None whatsoever.
Mr. Cohn. Have you had any association with any Communists
since 1940?
Miss Englander. On one occasion.
Mr. Cohn. What was the name of that Communist?
Miss Englander. Louise Schatz.
Mr COHN. Will you spell that?
Miss Englander. S-c-h-a-t-z.
Mr. Cohn. When was that?
Miss Englander. In 1940. Well, she mentioned to me in
1947----
Mr. Cohn. What was the nature of your association with her?
Miss Englander. Well, I didn't know at the time, you see,
we shared an apartment together, and one day she just felt
inclined to tell me this.
Mr. Cohn. With that one exception, have there been any
other Communists with whom you have been associated?
The Chairman. May I interrupt off the record?
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Cohn. Will you be back at 3:30?
Miss Englander. Here?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
[Witness excused.]
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m. a recess was taken until 2:30
p.m.]
afternoon session
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m. this day, the hearing was resumed
pursuant to the taking of the recess.]
TESTIMONY OF JULIUS REISS (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ROYAL W.
FRANCE) (RESUMED)
Mr. Reiss. Mr. Senator, I would like to make a statement.
The Chairman. Will you please try to speak louder?
Mr. Reiss. I would like to make a statement on one of the
questions I answered this morning.
The Chairman. You may.
Mr. Reiss. I would like that answer, that I did not know
anything illegal about my appointment--I wish to make it clear
that I know of nothing illegal about an American citizen
obtaining a position with any delegation to the United Nations
and in so stating, I did not state that discussions of any
associations which may have led to my being recommended to the
Polish Delegation might not tend to incriminate me, and that
was the basis for my refusing to answer, as to who recommended
me.
The Chairman. I don't understand. I frankly don't
understand what you said at all.
Mr. Reiss. I can just repeat it.
The Chairman. Read it a little louder.
Mr. Cohn. Let's see if I can explain it off the record.
The Chairman. Let's take it on the record. Everything
should be on the record.
Mr. Cohn. All right.
Is this what you are trying to say, that you did state
there was nothing illegal about your obtaining employment, the
manner in which you obtained it, or about your continuing the
employment, you said in your knowledge, you had no knowledge
about anything illegal; but you went on and claimed a Fifth
Amendment privilege on whether or not your job was obtained for
you by a top functionary of the American Communist party. You
are now saying your claiming of the privilege as to which
individual got the job for you and what discussion preceded
getting the job was not meant in any way to indicate there was
anything illegal about your obtaining the job. You decline to
answer who got the job for you because of the possibility of
Communist associations tending to incriminate you; is that
substantially accurate?
You may confer with counsel.
Mr. France. May I make a statement?
The position that the witness takes is, as I understand it,
that in stating that he knew nothing illegal about his being
appointed as an employee of the Polish Delegation, he did not
state that there might not have been recommendations made which
would involve associations which might tend to incriminate him
and, therefore, when the question came about the
recommendations, he felt that that was a different question.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this question: Do you know of
anything illegal on your part in connection with your getting
this job--any illegal activities on your part, not on the part
of someone else?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the ground of the Fifth
Amendment.
The Chairman. Do you feel that if you told the truth, that
answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. I think that in the light of the----
The Chairman. Will you try to speak louder? I can't----
Mr. Reiss. Yes, in the light of the situation and the
connotations thereof, I would have to refuse to answer on the
ground that it might tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. The question is, are you refusing because you
think a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. No. I would like to repeat the answer that in
the light of the present general political situation I feel
that any answer that I might give might tend to incriminate or
degrade me.
The Chairman. You will not be allowed the privilege under
those circumstances. If you say any answer, that means you
commit perjury. You know that. The question is: Do you think
that a truthful answer to the question would tend to
incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. I say that in the answer--that I included in the
answer the idea of the truth of the answer.
The Chairman. I can't hear.
Mr. Reiss. I say that I included the idea of the truthful
answer.
The Chairman. I am asking the question: Do you feel that a
truthful answer would tend to incriminate you? The answer is
yes or no.
Mr. Reiss. I think that as I said before, that the answer
might tend to incriminate me under present circumstances.
The Chairman. A truthful answer.
Mr. Reiss. That a truthful answer might tend to incriminate
me under the present circumstances.
The Chairman. Then you are entitled to the privilege.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Reiss, may I ask you this?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You are employed by the----
The Chairman. Can I ask one question?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
The Chairman. What was your baptismal name?
Mr. Reiss. Julius Reiss.
The Chairman. Julius Reiss?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I believe you refused to answer this
question, I am not sure. Did you later change your name to Joel
Remes?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
The Chairman. Has Julius Reiss always been your legal name?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Pardon me.
Mr. Cohn. Joel Remes was and is your Communist party name,
is it not?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Now, sir, you work for the Polish Delegation.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. The Polish government is of course under
Communist domination today; is that correct? That is a
historical fact, is it not?
Mr. Reiss. I would like to ask a question: what you mean by
Communist?
Mr. Cohn. What do you think?
Mr. Reiss. As far as I know, there is a legally elected
government.
Mr. Cohn. I see.
Mr. Reiss. In which members of the Communist party
represent, and I think also other parties. I can't remember the
names exactly, but there are other parties.
Mr. Cohn. I see.
The Chairman. I just recall one of the reasons we gave this
morning for the recess was to let him consider his answer to
the question which had been propounded this morning. Have you
arrived at an answer to that yet?
Mr. Reiss. Could you repeat that?
Mr. France. Wants to know whether you are ready to answer.
The Chairman. The question was--I will re-ask the question.
Do you believe that the Communist party advocates the overthrow
of this government by force and violence if a Communist form of
government cannot be imposed upon this nation by peaceful
means?
Mr. Reiss. I said I do not feel that that question can be
answered yes or no. To discuss it would lead me into a long
discussion of Communist theory, which might involve questions
as to the basis of my knowledge or beliefs, and that might tend
to incriminate me. I also feel that that question that you ask
is outside the scope of the congressional committee, and in my
refusal to answer that question and other refusals, I invoke
the protection of the First and Fifth Amendments.
The Chairman. In other words, you refuse to answer on the
grounds that a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You are entitled to the privilege.
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Now, let me ask you this, Mr. Reiss: In your opinion, who
was responsible--who was the aggressor in the Korean War?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. I see. If you were called upon--If you had been
called upon during the Korean War to fight in opposition to the
Communist forces, would you have done so?
You can consult with counsel.
Mr. Reiss. I am an American citizen. I did serve before and
I think if called upon, I will naturally serve.
Mr. Cohn. Including bearing arms against the Communists?
Mr. Reiss. That would have been my--necessary under the
Constitution of the United States.
The Chairman. If you could try to speak up.
Mr. Reiss. I am sorry, sir.
The Chairman. I can't hear you.
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir. As I did previously in the other war,
I would have done it here.
The Chairman. In other words--if I may, counsel--do I
understand then that if today or tomorrow we get into a war
with Communist Russia and you were called upon to bear arms
against Communist Russia and fight for the United States, your
testimony is that you would do that?
Mr. Reiss. I am sorry, sir. Could you repeat that question
once more?
Mr. Cohn. Would you read the question?
[Question read.]
The Chairman. Note for the record that the witness consults
with counsel.
Mr. Reiss. Senator, it seems to me that involves a great
many hypothetical questions.
The Chairman. Uh-huh!
Mr. Reiss. But I think it is clear that since I am an
American citizen subject to the laws of the United States, if I
were called into the army of the United States and to serve in
it, I would have to do so.
The Chairman. Would you be willing to do so if we were
fighting Communist Russia?
Mr. Reiss. On the question, I am not sure I know what you
mean by the word ``willing.''
The Chairman. Would you refuse to do so?
Mr. Reiss. I have already stated if I were called upon to
enter the United States Army, I would do so.
The Chairman. Even if we were fighting Communist Russia?
Mr. Reiss. I believe that that, again I believe that
involves so many hypothetical questions as to a possible war
between the United States and Russia, a war which I certainly
do not hope will take place and which I personally feel
peaceful desires both of the United--American people and the
Russian people will prevent from coming into existence because
It would be certainly a disaster for the entire world. But I
think it is clear that if in the event of such a war as in the
case of a war against Germany, when I was drafted into the
army, I entered into the army and performed my duties. If I
were drafted into the army, I would perform my duties there.
Mr. Cohn. Do you believe in our form of government or do
you believe in communism?
Mr. Reiss. Seems to me that--is that one or two questions?
Mr. Cohn. Let's break it down. Do you believe in communism?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the basis of the Fifth
Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Do you believe in our form of government? Do you
believe in a capitalistic democracy?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the basis of the First and
Fifth Amendments.
Mr. Cohn. I see. Have you--when were you last in
consultation with any functionaries of the Communist party of
the United States?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated--on the ground of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Were you in consultation within the last six
weeks with any functionaries of the Communist party of the
United States concerning the forthcoming meetings of the United
Nations General Assembly?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Very specifically, within the last two weeks were
you in consultation with any functionaries of the Communist
party of the United States concerning the General Assembly of
the United Nations which was to commence this month?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Specifically, were you in consultation with any
functionaries of the American Communist party concerning the
formulation of policy concerning an issue which was to arise in
the General Assembly of the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. I will ask the same question specifying were you
in consultation with functionaries of the American Communist
party concerning formulation of policy on the handling of the
Korean peace issue at the meeting of the General Assembly?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Now, have you ever been in Poland, by the way?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been abroad?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You have not. Now, let me ask you this question:
Do you know----
Mr. Reiss. May I interrupt?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sure.
Mr. Reiss. When you say abroad, do you mean Canada, for
example?
Mr. Cohn. Any place outside the Continental United States.
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir. I was. I was in about 1925 or 1926. I
went to Canada.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever had any connection with the United
States Treasury Department in any way?
Mr. Reiss. United States Treasury Department? So far as I
know, no.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know William Z. Foster, national chairman
of the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you held any position in the United States
government in any agency other than your army service at any
time?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Whether or not you ever worked for any agency of
the United States government? I don't understand that, you
refuse to answer that.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. What agency?
Mr. Reiss. I was on relief for WPA.
Mr. Cohn. You were on relief, drawing relief funds?
Mr. Reiss. Of WPA.
Mr. Cohn. Were you an employee?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. And what--during what years?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. When you were with the WPA, were you a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. Do I understand the witness refuses to tell
what years he worked for the WPA?
Mr. Cohn. Apparently.
The Chairman. Are you refusing to tell us what years you
worked for the WPA?
Mr. Reiss. That was the answer.
The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer that question.
I will be glad to hear, if your counsel thinks you are entitled
to the privilege.
Mr. France. I understand the position the witness has
stated, that he feels that to answer about his employment from
the years--what was it? From 1936 on--might tend to incriminate
him.
Mr. Reiss. 1934.
Mr. France. And that any employment that he had during that
period might lead to questions about other matters or
associations which might tend to incriminate him even though
the mere fact of being on relief with WPA itself would not tend
to do. That is what I understand to be his position.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
The Chairman. I may say that while the Fifth Amendment, Mr.
Counsel, is very broad and very liberally interpreted, it is
the position of the chair that he is not entitled to refuse to
tell us what dates he worked for the government.
If we start questioning him about any activities which
might be considered illegal, he could refuse to answer, but as
far as the dates and the agency, I believe he would not be
entitled to the Fifth Amendment privilege. It is all a matter
of record. I am going to order him to answer the question.
I may say for counsel's benefit it will lead to other
questions as to what other agencies of the government he worked
for.
Mr. Reiss. Well, sir, I can't remember the exact dates. It
was sometime--sometime in 1935 and 1936, and as far as I can
recollect, it was sometime in 1939 and 1940.
The Chairman. In other words, from 1935 or 1936 until 1939
or 1940.
Mr. Reiss. No, no. It was during 1935 and 1936 and during
1939 and 1940.
The Chairman. In other words, two periods of time?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you work for any other government agency?
Mr. Reiss. Outside of the army, let's see. No, sir. Except
the army, of course.
The Chairman. You were drafted into the army. You spent how
many years in the army?
Mr. Reiss. From May 1942 to June--to September of 1945.
The Chairman. And you were teaching the technique of
teaching at that time?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you ever attempt to indoctrinate your
students with the philosophy of communism?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir. That was a purely technical subject,
and I taught nothing except the subject itself.
The Chairman. Did you ever solicit any of your students to
join the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. We are not discussing your testimony.
Mr. Reiss. This isn't that funny.
Mr. Cohn. No. It certainly isn't.
I had asked you originally about William Z. Foster. You
claimed the privilege.
The Chairman Can I ask one more question?
Mr. Cohn. Sure.
The Chairman. At the time you were teaching the technique
of teaching in the army, did you attend Communist party
meetings?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds of the
Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Did you during that period of time attend any
Communist party meetings which were attended by your students
also?
Mr. Reiss. I think that since I have already invoked the
privilege on the question of whether or not I attended any
other--any Communist meetings, I would have to invoke it here,
too.
The Chairman. In other words, you feel if you told us the
truth as to whether you attended Communist party meetings which
were attended by your students while you were teaching in the
army, that truthful answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. I think I would like to repeat just what I said
a moment ago, that since I have already invoked the Fifth
Amendment in regard to the question of whether or not I
attended any Communist meetings during that period, I would
have to invoke it also on this same question.
The Chairman. May I say you can only invoke it if you think
a truthful answer would tend to incriminate you. This is an
entirely different question. The other question is whether or
not you attended Communist meetings. You refused to answer
that. The question is now, did you attend Communist meetings in
that period of time which were also attended by your students?
If you did not attend such meetings, of course, the answer
could not incriminate you.
If you did attend, such meetings, then it is possible that
your answer might tend to incriminate you. So when you say you
are invoking the privilege because you refused to answer a
previous question, that is not sufficient ground. The only
ground upon which you can invoke it is if you feel a truthful
answer might tend to incriminate you. If you feel that a
truthful answer might tend to incriminate you, you can refuse
to answer.
So the pending question is: Do you feel that a truthful
answer to that question might tend to incriminate you?
May I say for counsel's benefit that the chair takes the
position that you are not entitled to the privilege if you feel
that perjury might incriminate you; that you are only entitled
to the privilege if you honestly feel that a truthful answer
might tend to incriminate you. That is why I asked the
question, so we can determine whether or not he is entitled to
the privilege.
Mr. Reiss. On that basis, I would say that I have no
knowledge of any student of mine having attended a Communist
meeting.
The Chairman. Did you ever attempt to--strike ``to.''
Did you ever discuss the Communist philosophy--strike that
again, I am sorry, Mr. Reporter.
Did you ever try to in effect sell the Communist philosophy
or sell communism or indoctrinate the young men who were your
students outside of the classroom? You already said you did not
try to indoctrinate them in the classroom. The question is, did
you try to do it outside the classroom?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds of the Fifth
Amendment.
Mr. Chairman. You are entitled to it.
Mr. Cohn. Now, you are--I asked you about Mr. Foster. Now,
did you at any time serve as aide to William Z. Foster in the
Communist party.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you accompany him constantly during any
period of time?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Eugene Dennis?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Simon Gerson?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been arrested or convicted of a
crime?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you in the year 1936 in the state of
Michigan?
Mr. Reiss. 1936?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you there in 1937?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you a Communist party organizer in the year
1937?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you a Communist party organizer in Louisiana
during part of the year 1937?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you arrested on May 26, 1937 in New Orleans,
Louisiana, for Communist activities?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you at that time, secretary of the Communist
party in Louisiana?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. At 130 Chartres Street?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you give your New York address as the
headquarters of the Communist party of the United States on
12th Street?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you convicted of a violation of Section 1436
of the Michigan Penal Code in 1937? Sir?
Mr. Reiss. Just trying to rack my brain.
Mr. Cohn. Or Act 1--rather Section 902 of Act 107, both?
Mr. Reiss. What was that? I don't know what those----
Mr. Cohn. Section 107--the charge was no visible means of
support and vagrancy and specifically--well, let's say that is
the charge.
Mr. Reiss. Where was this?
Mr Cohn. New Orleans, Louisiana.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. I will show you a document, which I will deem
marked Exhibit 1, and ask you to examine that and then tell us.
Mr. Reiss. I have read it.
Mr. Cohn. Does that refresh your recollection? I will ask
you the question again: Is your answer the same?
Mr. Reiss. The answer is the same.
Mr. Cohn. I will now show you a picture which I will deem
marked Exhibit 2 and ask you whether or not that is your
picture.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated. On the same grounds. Pretty.
The Chairman. Is 35 East 12th Street, New York City, the
headquarters of the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr Cohn. Interpreting this question broadly, Mr. Reiss,
have you ever engaged in any espionage activities against the
United States?
Mr. Reiss. What do you mean, ``broadly''?
Mr. Cohn. I will just ask the question: Have you ever
engaged in any espionage activities against the United States
in connection with the Polish Delegation to the United Nations
or to the Polish Government?
Mr. Reiss. Never.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Reiss. Never.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever engaged in sabotage?
Mr. Reiss. What do you mean by sabotage?
Mr. Cohn. You know what sabotage is.
The Chairman. May I?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
The Chairman. Mr. Cohn, you asked whether or not he engaged
in espionage or--was it for the Polish Government? I would like
to reframe that and say: Have you ever engaged in any espionage
activities in this country?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you aware of any espionage activities on
the part of anyone in this country?
Mr. Reiss. Shall I answer that now or wait for the senator?
Mr. Cohn. No. You can answer.
Mr. Reiss. I will say I am aware of the--from the press--
that people----
Mr. Cohn. No, no. Have you any personal knowledge?
Mr. Reiss. Personal knowledge of espionage activities?
Mr. Cohn. That is right.
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you any personal knowledge of activities
seeking to bring about the establishment or a Communist
government in the United States?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you in cooperation with any member or anyone
connected with the Polish Delegation engaged in any activities?
Mr. Reiss. To establish a Communist----
Mr. Cohn. That is right, toward establishing the Communist
government in the United States?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You say you have not?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Would you read that last question and answer,
please, Mr. Reporter?
[Record read.]
Mr. Cohn. Have you----
The Chairman. What did the witness have to say about it?
About what activities, espionage activities--
Mr. Cohn. He says he has no knowledge of that.
The Chairman. In other words, do I understand you are not
aware of any espionage activities on the part of anyone?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever discussed, Mr. Reiss, either
past or potential espionage activities on the part of any
members of the Communist party with other members of the
Communist party, that is? If you don't understand----
Mr. Reiss. Yes, I don't quite understand that.
The Chairman. Let me rephrase it. Have you ever discussed
with any members of the Communist party or heard discussed at
any Communist party meetings any espionage activities on the
part of any individuals?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In public testimony on September 17, Julius Reiss answered:
``As I have stated, I have never been at any meeting where I have heard
espionage advocated.'' Senator McCarthy then read Reiss' refusal to
answer the question in his executive session testimony, and said: ``The
grounds previously stated were that a truthful answer might tend to
incriminate you. You tell us today that you did not here discussed any
espionage activities. Therefore when you appeared in executive session
and told us that a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you, you
were not properly invoking the fifth amendment, which of course makes
you in contempt of the committee. This is a very important
constitutional right which you nor any other Communist can play around
with, and you don't play around with it with this committee.
I will ask the committee to cite you for contempt or perjury
because you were not telling the truth when you told us that a truthful
answer would tend to incriminate you. Today you said you were not
present when such activities were discussed.
I may say there will be some delay in getting the citation. Can't
take it up until the Senate meets. But I am getting very sick of you
men engaged in the Communist conspiracy who come before this committee
and abuse the privilege granted under the fifth amendment. It is a very
important privilege. You are not going to use it to cover up your
conspiracy, if I can help it. You will be entitled to use the privilege
wherever you have the right.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever transmitted any information from
the American Communist party to any official of the Polish
Delegation of the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever transmitted any information from
any member of the Polish Delegation to the United Nations to
the American Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Who is your immediate superior up at the Polish--
--
Mr. Reiss. My superior? The permanent representative of the
delegation.
Mr. Cohn. Who is that?
Mr. Reiss. Mr. Henryk Birecki.
Mr. Cohn. Is he a member of the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I have no knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. You have no knowledge?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever discussed communism?
The Chairman. May I just off the record----
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Cohn. Were you born here or a naturalized citizen?
Mr. Reiss. I was born here.
Mr. Cohn. What is your date of birth?
Mr. Reiss. October 24, 1907.
Mr. Cohn. Where were you born?
Mr. Reiss. New York City.
Mr. Cohn. Are you married, by the way?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Is your wife a member of the party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. What is your wife's maiden name?
Mr. Reiss. Gertrude Weixel.
Mr. Cohn. Gertrude what?
Mr. Reiss. W-e-i-x-e-l.
Mr. Cohn. By the way, what was your rank when you were
discharged from the army?
Mr. Reiss. Technical sergeant.
The Chairman. Were you under--pardon me, counsel.
Mr. Cohn. Go right ahead.
The Chairman. Were you under orders from the Communist
party at the time you were teaching in the army?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I am going to show you a number of copies of
the Daily Worker. The first one is dated April 12, 1947, page
5, and there is an ad here which reads:
Tonight. Tonight 8:15 p.m. Joel Remes, Secretary National
Youth Committee, Communist Party, Assistant Editor Political
Affairs, speaks on Marxism and Liberalism. Admission 25 cents.
201 Second Avenue. Henry Forbes
--is that the section? ``Henry Forbes section.'' I believe
the other word is.
I am going to show this to you and see if--and then ask
whether this Joel Remes described in that ad is you.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds of the
Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. I wonder if you would hand it back? I have
some other questions I want to ask you.
I call your attention to the Daily Worker of May 3, 1946,
page 13, an article entitled ``New Pamphlet on Socialism,
Weapons for Same,''and the subhead, ``Socialism: What's In It
For You?'' by A. B. Magill, New Century Publisher, 10 cents.''
The next subhead, ``Reviewed by Joel Remes.''
I want to hand that to you and ask you if that Joel Remes
is you.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I have several other questions to ask you
about articles in the Daily Worker, and I perhaps could
dispense with asking them; you would repeat your answer. But to
make the record complete, I will go through the motion of
asking. I also----
Mr. Reiss. Do you want to ask them all and then give them
back to me?
The Chairman. I think that is a good suggestion. One dated
November 5, 1946, page 11:
Communist Party on Theory and Practice, reviewed by Joel
Remes.
Another one is dated--another issue of the Daily Worker
dated June 25, 1941, page 5.
I believe I will have to ask you about each one
individually because the matter is different.
May I ask whether the Joel Remes referred to in the
November 5, 1946 articles, ``Communist Party on Theory and
Practice reviewed by Joel Remes'' is that Joel Remes is you?
I assume you refuse to answer that?
Mr Reiss. Yes. I wanted to look at it. I refuse to answer.
Just let me take a look at the others.
The Chairman. The next one has no significance. The one
after that.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I may say, Mr. Counsel, just off the record--
--
[Discussion off the record]
The Chairman. Have the record show the witness indicates
that he merely refuses, unless he states some other ground, the
ground is the Fifth Amendment.
I have page five of the Daily Worker dated June 25, 1941,
an article entitled, ``Workers School offers course in world
politics.'' This is in the nature of a news story, and it
states that Joel Remes will conduct the class which will be one
of twenty classes offered during that summer.
Number one: Did you conduct such a class and are you the
Joel Remes referred to therein?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I have the Daily Worker dated June 14, 1941,
page--I believe it is page eight--an article entitled
``Registration opened for special Marxist summer courses to
begin July 7.'' Is this Joel Remes referred to in here?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
The Chairman. This story also refers to Joel Remes of the
Workers School faculty.
Question: Is this Joel Remes referred to herein you, and,
No. two, did you conduct such classes?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I wonder if you will stay here a second and
save the trouble of passing it back and forth.
I also have the Daily Worker dated Tuesday, September 30,
page three, an article entitled, ``Keep on your toes at Workers
School,'' subhead, ``Special course for outstanding teachers
and additions to curriculum,'' and Joel Remes is referred to
again in this. Is that Joel Remes you?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. One final question on this Daily Worker of
September 24, 1941, page three. ``Workers School course to
study Socialist State.''
I don't see----
Will you strike the last one, Mr. Reporter. I think that is
all.
Mr. Counsel, have you any further questions?
Mr. Cohn. No, Mr. Chairman.
I was saying to the senator we will definitely want Mr.
Reiss back probably sometime in the course of tomorrow. There
is no use making him sit around all day, so the best thing for
him to do. We are hearing other witnesses concerning his case,
and there will come a point where we will have to call him back
to get additional information.
Mr. France. I wonder, Senator, if I might ask this favor. I
am engaged with out of town people tomorrow morning. I wonder
if this could be tomorrow afternoon?
Mr. Cohn. We will certainly try to accommodate you.
The Chairman. I think we will give you the definite promise
he will not be called tomorrow morning.
Mr Cohn. You know at all times where you can get him. We
will wait until we need him and then we will get in touch with
you. We will skip tomorrow morning in deference to your
request.
The Chairman. You understand, Mr. Reiss, instead of having
you sit around in the outer room waiting until you are called,
we will leave it that when we need you, we will call your
counsel.
Mr. France. Thank you.
The Chairman. And let him know where you are at all times
so he can get you in a half hour's notice.
Mr. Reiss. In terms of time, it will be in the daytime?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. Between what hours?
The Chairman. Never be before ten; never be after at the
very latest 4:30. In other words, you need not worry about it
before ten o'clock and need not be worried after 4:30. In fact,
I would say four o'clock. Let's make it four o'clock. After
four o'clock we won't be calling you.
Mr. France. Excuse me. For your information, my telephone
number is MU 6-0450.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Reiss, I forgot to ask you this. Confirmatory
of something. How many other American citizens work in the
Polish Delegation?
Mr. Reiss. How many others?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. I really can't answer that, I am sorry.
Mr. Cohn. Will you name the ones? Would you name the ones
that you know of?
Mr. Reiss. You mean the ones I actually know on the
permanent staff there?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. I don't know their names. Right now I think
there is a chauffeur named Sal.
Mr. Cohn. How do you spell it?
Mr. Reiss. S-a-l. That is a chauffeur.
Mr. Cohn. Who else?
Mr. Reiss. Employed there now?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. There is a cleaning woman who comes in there and
I don't know who she is employed by.
Mr. Cohn. Let's forget about the cleaning woman for the
moment.
Mr. Reiss. Employed in the office of the permanent
delegation?
Mr. Cohn. I don't know about permanent or temporary or
anything like that; but any other American citizen working for
the Polish Delegation.
Mr. Reiss. The only one I know of is this fellow Sal.
Mr. Cohn. You know of no others?
Mr. Reiss. No.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know of any Americans employed by any
other foreign delegations?
Mr. Reiss. By my other office?
Mr. Cohn. Specifically, do you know of any American
employed by the Czechoslovakian Delegation?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir, I don't know whether they employ them
or not.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know of any other American employed by
another foreign delegation to the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. Any other American employed by foreign
delegations?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. Frankly, I don't know. I might have bumped into
somebody, any of the other delegations, and it is possible I
might know, but at the moment it doesn't strike me.
Mr. Cohn. Okay. Thank you.
The Chairman. One final question. Did you ever make
arrangements for or accompany any Polish delegate to the
Communist headquarters where he spoke to a group?
You are not clear on that?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, I understand the question.
No, sir.
The Chairman. I have nothing further.
Mr. Cohn. Okay.
Mr. France. Good night.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF FLORENCE ENGLANDER (RESUMED)
The Chairman. Just one or two questions.
Miss Englander. Yes.
The Chairman. I understand from our chief of staff that you
are willing to give the FBI any information you have about
the----
Miss Englander. Yes.
The Chairman. [continuing]. Communist activities?
Miss Englander. Yes.
The Chairman. I think, Frank, what you ought to do is
inform Mr. Hoover and tell him if they want to have a young
lady drop in on this young lady, she will give any information
she can, and you can arrange if possible at her convenience----
What hours do you work?
Miss Englander. 9:30 to 6:00, five days a week.
The Chairman. Have you any further questions?
Mr. Cohn. No. I think what we can do, Mr. Chairman, in view
of the fact the witness desires to be cooperative, we can work
with her on this and go over everything and we won't have to
bother.
The Chairman. Your name will not be given to the press,
incidentally, unless you give it to them. No one will know you
are here unless you tell the press.
The young man here from the United Nations, Mr. Sloan----
Miss Englander. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And he has been told he has the freedom to
discuss it with you as your superior but not any member of the
public. I merely mention to clear you on it, your name will not
be given out publicly unless you give it out.
Let me ask this. I assume, having worked some five years in
the Communist party having attended meetings and that sort of
thing, you will be able to give the FBI a sizeable number of
names?
Miss Englander. Yes, I will, whatever I recall.
The Chairman. I don't think we should go into that now, if
she is willing to give that to the FBI. That should be
sufficient.
You are not excused yet from the subpoena. I don't think we
will want you further, but consider yourself under the subpoena
in case we need you for some further information.
Miss Englander. Goodbye.
The Chairman. Good luck to you.
Miss Englander. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
SECURITY--UNITED NATIONS
[Editor's note.--Paul Crouch (1903-1955) had been court-
martialed by the U.S. Army in 1925 for attempting to form a
Communist League among soldiers in Hawaii. In his defense he
testified: ``I am in the habit of writing letters to my friends
and imaginary persons, sometimes to kings and other foreign
persons, in which I place myself in an imaginary position. I do
that to develop my imaginary powers. That is why this letter
was written. Part of it is true and part of it is not.''
Convicted, he served two years at Alcatraz. On his release, he
became active in the Communist party and remained a member
until 1942, after which he served as an expert witness in
numerous judicial and congressional proceedings against alleged
Communists. Crouch's memorandum on ``Communist Infiltration of
the American Armed Forces'' was one of the factors leading to
the subcommittee's investigation at Fort Monmouth.
In 1954, the newspaper columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop
branded Crouch as a ``powerful imaginer,'' who fabricated many
of his allegations. They asserted that ``the Government has a
duty to investigate the reliability of the informers it
hires.'' After the Justice Department launched an
investigation, Crouch was dropped as a paid consultant in
deportation cases for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Crouch then wrote to J. Edgar Hoover, demanding that
the FBI investigate the attorney general and his staff for the
``frame-up conspiracy'' against him. He also filed a libel suit
against the Alsops, claiming that his reputation ``as an expert
witness, writer, lecturer, and researcher into communism and
Communist infiltration in the Untied States had suffered.'' The
case never went to trial. Crouch testified in public session on
September 17, 1953.
Abraham Unger (1899-1975), a founder of the National
Lawyers Guild, had appeared as counsel for Communist party
leaders accused of violating the Smith Act, and Jacob Reiss had
worked as a researcher for that case. In his testimony,
Although Unger did not invoke the Fifth Amendment, he adopted a
strategy that the chairman compared to filibustering. During
Unger's appearance at a public session on September 18, Senator
McCarthy ordered him removed from the hearing room. On August
16, 1954, the Senate cited Unger for contempt for his failure
to answer questions on the grounds that the the subcommittee
had ``no authority to inquire into the political beliefs and
opinions of any other person.'' On July 27, 1955, Judge Edward
Weinfeld dismissed the charges against Unger. The U.S. Court of
Appeals unanimously upheld the dismissal, finding that the
subcommittee lacked legislative authority to investigate
subversive activities by individuals outside the government.
Speaking to reporters after this executive session, Senator
McCarthy said that a $12,000-a-year American ``high official''
of the UN secretariat had admitted friendship with Communists
and had contributed to organizations listed by the attorney
general as Communist fronts. Despite the chairman's demands
that the UN dismiss this ``high official,'' Dimitry Varley
(1906-1984) remained in his position as an economist at the UN;
nor were any charges of perjury brought against him. Alice
Ehrenfeld [Weil] (1925-1996) later became the first woman
assistant secretary general at the United Nations, and director
of the UN's General Legal Division. Neither Varley nor
Ehrenfeld testified in public.]
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, N.Y.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:30 a.m., in room 128, of the
United States Court House, Foley Square, New York, Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; and G. David Schine, chief consultant.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL CROUCH
The Chairman. Will you stand and raise your right hand,
please?
In the matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Crouch. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Crouch, were you at one time a member of the
Communist party.
Mr. Crouch. I was.
Mr. Cohn. During what years?
Mr. Crouch. From 1925 until early 1942.
Mr. Cohn. Were you a top functionary of the party?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I was a top functionary throughout that
period, and a full-time organizer for fifteen years.
Mr. Cohn. What were some of the positions you held in the
Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. I was a representative of the Young Communist
League and the Communist party of the United States to the
meetings of the executive committee of the Communist
International, Young Communist International, Moscow; I was a
student and lecturer at the Frunze Military Academy and an
honorary officer of the Red Army; I was the head of the
Communist party's National Department for Infiltration of the
Armed Forces in the United States, national editorial director
of the Young Communist League, member of the editorial staff of
the Daily Worker, district organizer for the Communist party in
Virginia, New York and South Carolina, Tennessee and Utah;
member of the district bureau of the Communist party in the
Alabama district and the California district, Alameda County
organizer, 1941.
I was editor of the New South, Communist organ for the
southern States, 1937 to '39, and had been a member of the
editorial board of its predecessor paper, the Southern Worker,
since 1934.
I was a member of the Negro Trade Union Agricultural Anti-
Imperialist, Anti-Militarist Commissions of the Central
Committee of the Communist party of the United States, and
participated in the work of the Central Committee from 1927
until 1941. Those are some of the major positions.
Mr. Cohn. I don't know how you could have had time for
more. Now, Mr. Crouch, since the time you have left the party,
particularly in recent years, you have, under subpoena and at
the request of the United States government, testified at
various trials held in this courthouse and elsewhere throughout
the country for the government, and have given them what
information you have as a result of your membership and
activity in the party; is that right?
Mr. Crouch. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Cohn. I recall, of course, you were a witness in the
trial in which Mr. [William] Remington was convicted in this
building.
Now, Mr. Crouch, when you were in the Communist party, did
you know a man named Joel Remes?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I knew him from about 1934 until 1940 or
'41.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Remes, when you knew him, was he a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, he was.
Mr. Cohn. Was he more than a member of the party?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, he was an official of the party throughout
the period I knew him, including such positions as
organizational secretary of the Communist party for the
Louisiana district, headquarters at New Orleans, and was----
Mr. Cohn. About when was that?
Mr. Crouch. That was, as nearly as I can recall, from about
late 1936 until 1948, approximately, and he was at that time in
charge of the Communist book store called the People's Book
Store at 130 Chartres Street in New Orleans, and in that
capacity he handled the distribution of the New South, of which
I was editor, and I had correspondence with him from time to
time regarding the distribution of the New South and regarding
supplying editorial material in it.
Mr. Cohn. Now I am going to show you a picture, Mr. Crouch,
and ask you if you can identify that as Mr. Remes.
Mr. Crouch. Yes, this is the Joel Remes I knew in the
Communist party.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Crouch, at that time, around 1937, in those
years, did you have any connection with the Communist party
counterpart of the Daily Worker down South?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I was the editor of it.
Mr. Cohn. What was that called?
Mr. Crouch. It was first called the Southern Worker, and
then the New South, changing its name to the New South in 1937.
Mr. Cohn. Now, were you in charge of subscriptions to that
Communist publication?
Mr. Crouch. I was.
Mr. Cohn. And you kept a little cardboard box containing
the cards with names of subscribers throughout the years; is
that right?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, a box that I brought in and was introduced
as evidence in the trial of William Remington.
Mr. Cohn. That is the box in which you produced the card
showing William Remington was a subscriber to this Communist
publication, received at the official post office box of the
Communist party; right?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. And in that same box, did you find a card
indicating that you had shipped twenty-five copies of this
Communist publication to the People's Book Store, at 110
Chartres Street, New Orleans, Louisiana?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. The original is in a box which is in
the custody of the government, and I have a photostat prepared
at the time of the Remington trial, and one of the photostats
shows the bundle order going to the People's Book Store at 130
Chartres Street, of twenty-five copies per month.
Mr. Cohn. Was Remes the man you were dealing with there?
Mr. Crouch. He was.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know any relatives of Remes in the
Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, his brother, Andy Remes, was one of my
closest friends in the Communist party over many years. I had
long, detailed discussions on many matters--and incidentally,
his brother, Andy Remes, played a very important role both in
my decision to leave the party and increasing my fear of the
consequences of leaving, as a result of his connections with
the whitewash of what was unquestionably a G.P.U. murder of
Laura Law, of Aberdeen, Washington, about January 4, 1940.
Mr. Cohn. Was Laura Law any relation to Joel Remes and
Andrew Remes?
Mr. Crouch. No, she was--she and her husband had been
members of the Communist party under Andy Remes' jurisdiction
as secretary for the Northwest district. She broke with the
Communist party in the fall of 1939 and informed the party that
she was going to the government and tell what she knew about
the party. Shortly thereafter her body was found with her head
crushed in, and her chest and back covered with brutal stab
wounds--unquestionably a G.P.U. murder to silence her, to
prevent her from telling her extensive knowledge of the party
apparatus throughout the northwest.
Andy Remes played a leading part in the whitewash of this
case, and as he described it to me, by taking the offensive and
charging that industrialists had Laura Law murdered because of
her husband's union activities.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, will you receive this photostatic
copy of this card in evidence and have it deemed marked as
Exhibit 1?
The Chairman. Yes, it is received.
Mr Cohn. And the picture of Remes which was identified by
Mr. Crouch we will have deemed marked as Exhibit 2.
And this criminal record, a certified copy of which we
received, we will have deemed marked Exhibit 3. We received a
certified copy from the police department at New Orleans,
Louisiana.
The Chairman. Mr. Crouch, there is something we have often
wondered about, and maybe you can enlighten us. In the trial of
this Scientist X, as I recall, you had considerable information
and evidence on him. Why weren't you called by the Justice
Department in that case, if you know?
Mr. Crouch. I was called as an expert witness in rebuttal,
but was not permitted to describe my knowledge of him as a
member of the party, or to describe the closed meetings of the
Communist party I had attended. And my wife [Sylvia Crouch],
who was under subpoena in the trial, was not called at all, and
I was advised informally to the effect that it was impossible
for us to give our testimony without bringing in the name of an
internationally famous scientist who was also a member of the
Communist party, who had been present at the meetings with
Scientist X.
The Chairman. Who in the Justice Department told you you
could not be used to testify about your knowledge of Scientist
X, his Communist activities?
Mr. Crouch. Mr. Cunningham, of the Justice Department, and
Mr. Hitz, assistant United States attorney, advised me that I
would not be questioned because our testimony would bring in
his name.
The Chairman. Bring in the name of Robert Oppenheimer?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer.
The Chairman. Both you and your wife, I understand, then,
were available; the Justice Department knew you had attended
Communist party meetings with Scientist X, and one of the
issues was whether or not he was a Communist?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And the jury found him not to be a Communist,
ultimately?
Mr. Crouch. They found him not guilty due to lack of
sufficient identifying witnesses who had been in closed
meetings with him, that is, witnesses who could testify to that
effect.
The Chairman. Just for the record, was he being tried for
perjury?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And one of the counts was that he committed
perjury when he said he was not a Communist?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And because of lack of evidence, he was
acquitted?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And both you and your wife, when members of
the Communist party, had attended these closed Communist party
meetings with him, and you were informed by two Justice
Department lawyers that you would not be used because if you
were used and you were examined as to who else was there, you
would have had to identify Robert J. Oppenheimer; is that it?
Mr. Crouch. To that effect, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did they say who had given them those
instructions?
Mr. Crouch. No, sir, they did not, they did not indicate it
in any way.
The Chairman. When was this trial held?
Mr. Crouch. Last year.
The Chairman. What was the date of that trial, Roy?
Mr. Cohn. I don't know the exact date.
The Chairman. And Scientist X, who has been identified, as
Scientist X, what is his name again?
Mr. Crouch. Dr. Joseph Weinberg.
The Chairman. Is there any doubt in your mind that
Oppenheimer was a member of the Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. No, sir, none whatever. I met him in a closed
meeting of the Communist party in a house which was
subsequently found to have been his residence at the time,
although I did not know it then, and following that I met him
at quite a number of Communist party affairs in Alameda County.
The Chairman. I noticed with some interest Oppenheimer's
articles in regard to the H-bomb, for example; he vigorously
opposed our proceeding with any experimentation in the
development of the H-bomb. When he lost out in that, he now has
taken the position that we should not have an air force capable
of delivering that bomb. Maybe I am simplifying it a bit, but
in fact that is his argument. His argument has been that we
should build a screen of defense around this nation.
From your knowledge of the working of the Communist party,
do you know whether or not that was the policy of the Communist
party at that time?
Mr. Crouch. His position, in substance, his efforts have
corresponded with the efforts of the Communist press throughout
this period. The Communist press has sought to prevent the
development of the H-bomb. They have sought to obtain a U.S.
pledge not to use the atomic bomb, first in time of war, and
their policy has coincided with the public statements of Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer and the authoritative press accounts of J.
Robert Oppenheimer's position as appeared recently in Fortune
magazine, Life, and others.
The Chairman. Just to refresh my recollection and to get
the record straight on this, is it correct that after you
notified the FBI that you had attended a closed Communist
meeting with Oppenheimer that they drove you around the city of
Los Angeles to find the house in which you had attended that
meeting?
Mr. Crouch. Not Los Angeles--in Berkeley, California.
The Chairman. In Berkeley?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. FBI Agent Brush, and another FBI
agent----
The Chairman. Brush?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. B-r-u-s-h?
Mr. Crouch. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you know his first name?
Mr. Crouch. I don't recall.
The Chairman. Do you know the other agent's name?
Mr. Crouch. Modehouse, or a similar name.
The Chairman. In any event, they drove you around Berkeley
to see if you could find the house in which you had attended
the meeting with Oppenheimer; is that correct?
Mr. Crouch. That's right.
The Chairman. And you drew a diagram for them of the inside
of the house?
Mr. Crouch. Exterior and interior, before the house was
located.
The Chairman. So that before the house was located you gave
them a drawing of the interior of the house in which you
attended the meeting, and you described the exterior of the
house; you didn't know the address, so they drove you around
until you found the house?
Mr. Crouch. That's correct. All I knew was the house was in
the hills around Berkeley, overlooking the bay. That's all I
knew. I gave these drawings to the FBI and to the California
Un-American Activities Committee.
The Chairman. Now, when someone from the FBI later went
into this house, did they find that your drawing of the
interior was an accurate drawing of the house?
Mr. Crouch. I don't know whether the FBI went into the
interior or not, but they told me they had obtained information
regarding the interior, and that the interior corresponded to
my drawings and description.
The Chairman. Was it discovered then also that at the time
the meeting was held in this house, the meeting which you
attended, that he was living in that house?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. In other words, that was his home?
Mr. Crouch. That was the first information I obtained that
that was the home of J. Robert Oppenheimer, was from the FBI,
from Agent Brush.
The Chairman. How many Communist meetings would you say you
attended with Oppenheimer?
Mr. Crouch. I attended one closed meeting restricted only
to party members, where I gave an official report. I attended a
number, at least six, social affairs arranged by the Communist
party, where he was present, one being at the home of Kenneth
May, one being an affair arranged to raise funds for the
Spanish Communists.
Incidentally, I talked with Dr. Oppenheimer last year in
the presence of Justice Department officials and Dr.
Oppenheimer recalled one of these occasions, the one to raise
funds for Spain, and placed the date of it as the night before
Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Mr. Cunningham and Mr. Hitz.
As for the other affairs, he said, in substance, he attended so
many Communist-arranged affairs, he couldn't recall how many;
he might well have been at the one at Kenneth May's home. He
could not recall the closed meeting at his own home or my
report there. He did recall one meeting at which Mr. William
Schneiderman was present in 1941.
The Chairman. Now, there are two Oppenheimers, both rather
famous, and I think we should have the record clear that you
are speaking about the Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I knew both. I knew his brother, Frank as
a Communist, also, and identified Frank as a Communist in
testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities
in May of 1949.
The Chairman. Did your wife attend the closed meetings with
Oppenheimer?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, she did.
The Chairman. Do you know of anyone besides you and your
wife who can testify as to Oppenheimer's membership in the
Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. Not offhand.
The Chairman. I might say it is important beyond words, and
dangerous, of course--I am sure you will agree with me--if our
top atomic scientist is a member of the Communist conspiracy.
It would be extremely important if we could get additional
witnesses who were present physically and knew he was a member
of the party.
Mr. Crouch. I might say, Senator, that in my work with the
California Un-American Activities Committee I learned that
military intelligence has a vast amount of evidence regarding
his membership in the Communist party and his Communist
activities, and that the California Un-American Activities
Committee has a great deal of information which, of course,
would be at the disposal of this committee.
The Chairman. Do you know why the Justice Department and
the California committee have apparently shied off at the
exposure of Oppenheimer?
Mr. Crouch. The California committee has tried to go into
this. They brought out a great deal of information, including
testimony by both myself and my wife, Sylvia, in their
published report for the year--reported in 1951, covering the
year 1950. They gave a great deal of information in this report
on the background of both J. Robert Oppenheimer and his wife,
who--one of whose husbands was killed in Spain while fighting
with the Communist forces there, and during the California
hearing the state committee out there in California issued a
public invitation to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer to appear before
the committee, as an invitation to both Dr. Oppenheimer and his
wife, Katherine, to appear before the committee, and both Dr.
Oppenheimer and his wife ignored the invitation. The California
committee had no power of subpoena and has been unable to
follow up on the matter.
The Chairman. Do I understand you to say that his wife's
former husband was killed in Spain fighting on the Communist
side?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I might say further, so there should be no
confusion, that his wife, Katherine, was born Katherine
Puening, in Germany; came to the United States and is a citizen
by virtue of her father's naturalization while she was a minor.
She was first married to a man named Ranseyer. According to
many people in intelligence, her second husband was the one
killed in Spain, named Joseph Dallet, who had been a Young
Communist League organizer in Ohio. Her third husband, after
this husband was killed in Spain in 1936 or early 1937, her
third husband was Richard Stewart-Harrison, of Great Britain,
from whom she was divorced in January 1940, and married Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer in November of 1940.
The Chairman. I missed your last few words. Did you say
that this husband was a Communist?
Mr. Crouch. Yes.
The Chairman. The third husband?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, the one killed in Spain. I don't know
whether the other two previous husbands were Communists, or
not, but the one killed in Spain was a Communist and a very
close friend of Steve Nelson.
Incidentally, according to many public statements, Mrs.
Oppenheimer introduced her friend, Steve Nelson, to J. Robert
Oppenheimer, who was a frequent guest at the Oppenheimer home
during the 1940 to 1942 period when Dr. Oppenheimer was in
charge of work on the atomic bomb.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this: Is there any doubt in
your mind but what Oppenheimer was under Communist party
discipline at the time you were attending these Communist
meetings with him?
Mr. Crouch. No, sir, none whatever.
The Chairman. And if he were under Communist party
discipline, he, of course, would be bound to turn over any
atomic secrets to them that he had available?
Mr. Crouch. That the party directed.
The Chairman. And naturally they would be interested in any
atomic information he had?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. Just as a matter of fact, the
Communist party might have chosen to direct him to turn over
the information; they might have chosen to direct him to
appoint other Communists to key positions who would in turn
turn over the information. It is a matter of record that Dr.
Oppenheimer has appointed many Communists to key positions in
the atomic energy program. For example, Lloyd Lehman, who had
been associated with Dr. Oppenheimer, in the Communist party
around 1940, was given a job at Dr. Oppenheimer's
recommendation in the radiation laboratory in California around
1942. Later, Lloyd Lehman left the laboratory and became the
open Communist party organizer for Alameda County in
California.
Another man who has admitted former membership in the
Communist party, Dr. Hawkins, was brought from California to
Los Alamos, although he was not a physicist, made historian for
the project, and given access to virtually all classified and
confidential matters there.
There are many other Communists who were employed by Dr.
Oppenheimer and also, according to the California committee's
information, Dr. Oppenheimer was active in urging atomic
scientists to join a Communist espionage apparatus called the
FAECT--Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and
Technicians--headed by Marcel Scherer, who had been trained in
the espionage schools in Moscow and who had been in charge of
infiltration of scientists since 1928, to my personal
knowledge.
The Chairman. This FAECT was headed by a man who went to
the Moscow School of Espionage and Sabotage?
Mr. Crouch. Yes.
The. Chairman. That is the Lenin school?
Mr. Crouch. Yes.
The Chairman. Where is he now, do you know?
Mr. Crouch. He is in New York City at the present time.
The Chairman. Is he connected with atomic work now, do you
know?
Mr. Crouch. I don't know.
The Chairman. What is his name?
Mr. Crouch. Marcel Scherer.
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
Mr. Crouch. I personally participated in discussions that
set up this apparatus for scientific espionage in 1928 and was
present at discussions between Scherer and William Z. Foster,
and Scherer and Communist international representatives from
Moscow, when this project was approved.
The Chairman. That will be all, then, for today.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF DIMITRY VARLEY (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, HERMAN
A. GRAY)
The Chairman. Will you stand up and raise your right hand,
please?
In this matter now on hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Varley. I do.
The Chairman. Mr. Varley, you have the right to consult
with your counsel at any time you care to, advise with him
whenever you think it is necessary. If you care to, I will be
glad to give you a private room in which to have a conference,
if anything comes up of sufficient importance that you think
you require that. Counsel is not allowed to take part in the
proceedings other than that.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Varley, what is your position?
Mr Varley. I am employed by the United Nations as an
economist.
Mr. Cohn. Talk a little louder, and tell us specifically
what your position is.
Mr. Varley. I am a senior economic affairs officer in the
Department of Economic Affairs in the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. What is your salary?
Mr. Varley. Gross salary is $12,000.
Mr. Cohn. $12,000 a year?
Mr. Varley. I think $12,000 and a few odd dollars.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, $12,000 and some odd dollars.
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. How long have you been with the United Nations?
Mr. Varley. Since the fall of 1946.
Mr. Cohn. Where were you before that?
Mr. Varley. I was with UNRRA.
Mr. Cohn. You were with UNRRA before that?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Who was director general of UNRRA when you were
appointed?
Mr. Varley. Mr. Lehman.
Mr. Cohn. Was Mr. Weintraub in UNRRA when you came there?
Mr. Varley. He was.
Mr. Cohn. Did you work with him in UNRRA?
Mr. Varley. I was working with him in the same bureau.
Mr. Cohn. And Mr. Lehman was the director general?
Mr. Varley. Right.
Mr. Cohn. Or director-whatever you call it?
Mr. Varley. I think it is director general.
Mr. Cohn. Director general.
Now, where were you before you went with UNRRA?
Mr. Varley. I was in the army.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time were you in the
army?
Mr. Varley. For approximately one year and six months.
Mr. Cohn. What were your duties in the army?
Mr. Varley. I started with the air force, and then I was
attached to the Office of Strategic Services.
Mr. Cohn. OSS? What did you do with OSS?
Mr. Varley. I was attached to the research branch, which I
believe was called Russian Economic Analysis. I am not sure
about the exact title of the branch.
Mr. Cohn. What rank did you hold in the army, by the way?
What was your rank in the army?
Mr. Varley. I was a sergeant in the army.
Mr. Cohn. A sergeant. Now, have you ever contributed any
money to any Communist front organization?
Mr. Varley. Will you explain your question? May I ask my
lawyer?
Mr. Cohn. Surely. You can ask anything you want.
[Whereupon, Mr. Varley consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Varley. Could you tell me what you mean by ``Communist
front organization''?
Mr. Cohn. Surely. For one example, I will give you an
organization listed by the attorney general as subversive.
Mr. Varley. I never saw or consulted the list. I know some
of them.
Mr. Cohn. Let me ask you this: Did you and your wife ever
contribute to the American Committee for the Protection of
Foreign Born?
Mr. Varley. I did.
Mr. Cohn. When? In 1950?
Mr. Varley. Yes, I think last time I did was in 1950.
Mr. Cohn. How about the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade?
Mr. Varley. I might have. I am not sure.
Mr. Cohn. Isn't it a fact that you did in 1947 contribute
to the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?
Mr. Varley. Well, I don't clearly remember whether I did.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever hear of the Veterans of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade?
Mr. Varley. I did.
Mr. Cohn. Do you think you gave them any money?
Mr. Varley. I might have, but----
Mr. Cohn. Now, is 1950 the last time when you contributed
to the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign
born?
Mr. Varley. I think so. That is, to my best recollection,
yes. Might have been 1950--I mean, it might have been, let us
say, first month of 1951.
Mr. Cohn. Well, around '50, '51?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You are clear you did not contribute in '52?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Were you ever a member of the State, County, and
Municipal Workers Union, Local 28?
Mr. Varley. I was.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know that was under Communist domination?
Mr. Varley. No.
Mr. Cohn. When did you find that out?
Mr. Varley. Pardon me? Will you repeat the question?
Mr. Cohn. Read the question, please.
[Whereupon, the last question was read by the reporter.]
Mr. Varley. To my best knowledge, it never was under
Communist domination.
Mr. Cohn. You have never heard that?
Mr. Varley. I heard subsequently, after I left the union,
that it was referred as left wing CIO union.
The Chairman. Who got you your job originally? Mr.
Weintraub?
Mr. Varley. Where?
The Chairman. In the UN.
Mr. Varley. The UN? Yes, he recommended me to the United
Nations.
The Chairman. Did you know that Weintraub was a Communist?
Mr. Varley. No.
The Chairman. When did you first hear that he was?
Mr. Varley. I never heard that he was a Communist.
Mr. Cohn. You never heard that he was?
Mr. Varley. Well, I have seen the reference in the papers,
accusations, but that is--even there I am not sure he was--he
said that he was a Communist.
Mr. Cohn. Did you read Whittaker Chambers' testimony?
Mr. Varley. No.
The Chairman. Did you and he ever talk over the affairs of
the Communist party?
Mr. Varley. Excuse me, may I just come back to that
question?
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Varley. Did I read Whittaker Chambers' testimony?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Varley. Well, I have seen some bits of it, I mean here
and there in the papers, but I haven't seen his testimony about
Mr. Wetntraub.
The Chairman. Did you and Mr. Weintraub ever discuss the
work or the objectives of the Communist party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never did?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never had any reason to believe he was a
Communist?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Now, have you ever been a registered member of
the American Labor party?
Mr. Varley. I was.
Mr. Cohn. Up through what year?
Well, the election records show you were a registered
member of the American Labor party in 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940,
'41, '43, '44, '49, '50, '51; is that right?
Mr. Varley. I couldn't have possibly registered in 1951,
because I think I wasn't in the country in 1951, at that time.
Mr. Cohn. At what time?
Mr. Varley. Well, last time I could have registered would
be at the time of primary registrations or elections. It would
be '49 or '50.
Mr. Cohn. Well, the last time you did register, say in
1950, did you register American Labor party?
Mr. Varley. Yes, I did, last time.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know the American Labor party had been
named as a Communist front by the House committee?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't you know it was----
Mr. Varley. You mean that was named as a Communist
organization?
Mr. Cohn. Did you know that that was under Communist
domination and had been officially listed as a Communist front
by the House committee?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You did not. Hadn't you heard that it was under
Communist control?
Mr. Varley. May I consult----
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
[Whereupon, Mr. Varley consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Varley. I have seen reference to that fact in the
newspapers, particularly during the election campaign.
The Chairman. Did you think it was Communist-controlled?
Mr. Varley. No, sir. My whole contact with American Labor
party amounted to my registering with American Labor party.
The Chairman. The question is: Did you think it was
Communist-controlled?
Mr. Varley. I really don't know.
The Chairman. Did you have any reason to believe that you
were registering in a front for the Communist party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You did not think it was Communist-
controlled?
Mr. Varley. Senator, if I would have thought it was
Communist-controlled, I wouldn't have registered.
The Chairman. The question is: Did you think it was
Communist-controlled? It is a very simple question.
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You did not?
Mr. Varley. No.
The Chairman. You appeared before the grand jury, didn't
you?
Mr. Varley. I did appear before the grand jury.
The Chairman. Several times?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And you know there is a recommendation to the
UN that your services be dispensed with; is that correct?
Mr. Varley. I don't know of this.
The Chairman. Didn't you hear that there was a
recommendation that you be fired? You were told that, weren't
you?
Mr. Varley. The grand jury recommended that I would be
fired? No, sir.
The Chairman. It was in the presentment of the grand jury,
was it not, that you should be removed from the UN?
Mr. Varley. No, sir, I never heard that.
The Chairman. You never heard that?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never knew anything about it?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. No one ever told you that?
Mr. Varley. The grand jury recommended that I would be
fired? No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you know they made a recommendation
concerning you?
Mr. Varley. The grand jury?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Never heard it?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. No one ever told you that?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Did you read the presentment?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't you see any reference to yourself in the
presentment?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You didn't?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You understand, the grand jury presentment did
not mention names. Didn't you see a very clear description of
yourself in there? I mean, can you tell us honestly that you
read that presentment and didn't see any portion which you
thought referred to you?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Oh, really?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. What was the occasion of your reading the
presentment? Were you looking for references to yourself?
Mr. Varley. Well, I read the presentment when it appeared
in the newspapers.
The Chairman. Were you looking for references to yourself?
Mr. Varley. I can't answer that question in that way, sir,
because I just read whatever was in there, and now the counsel
asks me a question whether I found any----
The Chairman. When you read the presentment--you say you
read it--my question is very simple: Were you looking for
references to yourself, you having appeared before that grand
jury?
Mr. Varley. Could I put it this way--that I did not expect
to find reference to myself, and therefore I didn't look for
reference to myself.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Varley, as a matter of fact, to put it
frankly here, you are not very careful about telling the truth,
are you?
Mr. Varley. I think I do tell the truth.
Mr. Cohn. Well, now, you were before a grand jury, and I
asked you, before the grand jury, whether or not you had ever
been arrested or convicted, and you denied it at first and then
admitted it later; isn't that a fact?
Mr. Varley. I don't know what--[consulting with counsel].
Would you mind repeating the question?
Mr. Cohn. Read the question, please.
[Whereupon, the last question was read by the reporter.]
Mr. Varley. I never admitted that I was arrested.
Mr. Cohn. You never admitted that you were arrested?
Mr. Varley. No.
Mr. Cohn. You still don't think you were arrested?
Mr. Varley. That's right.
Mr. Cohn. I see. You got some good legal opinions about
that; is that right?
The Chairman. Is it your testimony that you had never been
arrested?
Mr. Varley. That's right, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What do you think, the records of the New York
Police Department are forged?
Mr. Varley. Well, I asked my lawyer to consult the records
and also tried to recollect the matter, and all my recollection
was that I was summoned before the court of magistrates.
Mr. Cohn. Isn't it a fact that--I regret the necessity of
going into this again--but isn't it a fact that you were found
by members of the New York City Police Department in the men's
room and 50-something Street and Lexington Avenue on December,
29, 1941, arrested on a morals charge, and that you pleaded
guilty and paid the fines, or you were given an alternative of
a fine or a jail sentence and you paid the fines, not only for
yourself but for the other man who was taken in along with you,
a man named Leonardo Boronek? Isn't that a fact?
Mr. Varley. Would you give me the question?
[Whereupon, the last question was read by the reporter.]
Mr. Cohn. Before you get to that, would you please add
this, Mr. Stenographer: the names of the policemen were
Valentine Piccirilli and William Vogel. Now, would you answer
that question?
Mr. Varley. This is not a fact.
Mr. Cohn. Tell me where it isn't a fact.
Mr. Varley. I was never arrested, and I was never convicted
on a morals charge.
Mr. Cohn. Tell us what happened.
The Chairman. Were you picked up by the policemen?
Mr. Varley. I was.
The Chairman. You were picked up by the policemen?
Mr. Varley. The policemen did talk to me, but I was not
arrested.
The Chairman. Did they take you along with them?
Mr. Varley. The policemen told me that----
The Chairman. Did they take you along with them?
Mr. Varley. No, they didn't. The policemen told me, as I
recollect it, that after we had very brief discussion, ``Let
the magistrate's court figure that out,'' words to that effect.
The Chairman. Did they take you down to the magistrate?
Mr. Varley. We went to the magistrate's court, all
together.
The Chairman. The policemen picked you up, they took you
down to the magistrate; is that right?
Mr. Varley. He didn't pick me up. He said that ``Well, let
all of us go to the magistrate court.''
The Chairman. All right. When I say ``picked you up,'' what
do you understand that I mean?
You said he didn't pick you up. What do you think it means
to get picked up?
Mr. Varley. What the counsel says, to be arrested.
The Chairman. And the policeman came in and took you to the
magistrate; is that right?
Mr. Varley. He said, ``Let's go to the magistrate.'' He
didn't say, ``You are arrested.'' I didn't resist----
The Chairman. Did he take you down in a police car? Did
they take you down in a police car?
Mr. Varley. I think it was an ordinary automobile.
The Chairman. They took you down in their car, did they?
Mr. Varley. We went in their car.
The Chairman. All right. They took you to the magistrate?
Mr. Varley. We went down to the magistrate's court.
The Chairman. They took you in their car to the magistrate,
is that correct?
Mr. Varley. May I say how I remember what happened?
The Chairman. No, you answer my questions. I may say that
if the policeman's testimony is correct, you have perjured
yourself about three times now. You can keep on if you want to,
or you can tell us the truth.
I will repeat the question: Did they take you in their car
to the magistrate? Either yes or no?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. They did, all right. Did they file charges
against you?
Mr. Varley. Yes, there was a summons by a policeman.
The Chairman. All right. And were you found guilty?
Mr Varley. I pleaded guilty.
The Chairman. You pleaded guilty?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. You paid a fine?
Mr. Varley. I paid a fine.
The Chairman. And did you pay the other man's fine, too?
Mr. Varley. I did.
The Chairman. You say you were never arrested?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Cohn, I want this transmitted to the U.S.
attorney, a clear case of perjury.
Have you ever been arrested at any other time?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did the policemen ever pick you up at any
other occasion?
Mr. Varley. In the same sense as in that case, in
connection with automobile incidents, yes.
The Chairman. How many times?
Mr. Varley. Several times.
The Chairman. On the same type of charge?
Mr. Varley. Well, the charge dealt with some violation of
traffic, but I do not recall what exactly was the nature of the
charge. It was some kind of an offense, similar charge.
The Chairman. How many times did policemen pick you up on
any other charges? How many times?
Mr. Varley. You mean bring me to the magistrate's court
directly?
The Chairman. Do you understand what I mean? You can keep
on perjuring yourself, if you want to.
Mr. Varley. I am trying to do my best and not to try to
evade the question, but in the first case you said, did the
policeman pick me up and bring me to the magistrate's court.
Well, I had summons given to me before by the policemen.
The Chairman. All right. How many times?
Mr. Varley. Well, I recall at least one case in the state
of Connecticut, when there was minor traffic accident and we
went to a police station.
The Chairman. And what were you charged with?
Mr. Varley. I know I paid a fine of about, around $15, I
think.
The Chairman. What were you charged with?
Mr. Varley. I don't remember the charge, sir.
The Chairman. You don't remember?
Mr. Varley. No. It was some kind of offense in the state of
Connecticut.
The Chairman. Were you charged with drunkenness?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You were not?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you sure of that?
Mr. Varley. I am positive.
The Chairman. Have you ever been charged with drunkenness?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever been found guilty on a morals
charge?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. No?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever pleaded guilty on a morals
charge?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never have?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never have been either convicted or
pleaded guilty to any charge involving morals?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Your answer is no?
Mr. Varley. That's right.
The Chairman. You are sure of that?
Mr. Varley. I am sure of that, sir.
Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cohn, we want the magistrate's record and
the policeman in here who arrested him before he was found
guilty. This is a clear case of perjury.
Mr. Cohn. What do you think you were picked up for by the
policemen at the time you were taken down to court in the
policemen's car? Didn't they tell you?
Mr. Varley. It was a charge of loitering.
Mr. Cohn. With another man; is that right?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. No? Was there another man there? You paid another
man's fine, didn't you?
Mr. Varley. I paid the other man's fine.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, you paid your own fine and you paid his
fine, too, didn't you?
Mr. Varley. When he pleaded guilty and he said he had no
money to pay, I felt sorry for the guy, and paid his fine.
Mr. Cohn. How long had you known this other man?
Mr. Varley. How long what?
Mr. Cohn. How long had you known the other man? You know,
you make it very difficult, Mr. Varley. This isn't the kind of
thing----
Mr. Varley. I didn't know the man.
Mr. Cohn. You met him in the men's room, then, didn't you?
Mr. Varley. I didn't meet him. He was in the men's room.
The Chairman. So it was a man whom you never knew, whom you
never met, and you paid his fine; is that correct?
Mr. Varley. That's right.
The Chairman. You will return at 2:30 this afternoon. You
are excused until 2:30.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., a luncheon recess was taken
until 2:30 p.m.]
afternoon session
TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM UNGER (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BERNARD
JAFFE)
The Chairman. Will you stand and raise your right hand,
please?
In this matter now on hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Unger. I do.
Mr. Jaffe. May I ask the senator something?
Mr. Unger. I was served with this subpoena yesterday. I
haven't had a chance to talk to him until about noon or so
today, and I was wondering whether or not we could possibly
adjourn this hearing so that I could have an opportunity to
look into the matter.
The Chairman. Well, how much time would you want?
Mr. Jaffe. Well, I would like a week, if possible.
Also, whom am I speaking to? I know you; you are Mr. Cohn.
Who is this gentleman?
Mr. Cohn. I am Mr. Cohn, counsel for the committee. This is
Senator McCarthy.
This is Frank Carr, executive director of the committee.
This gentleman here is from the legal division of the United
Nations.
Mr. Unger. I see. I make that same request. I think it is a
reasonable request which should be granted, if at all possible.
But in addition, I think you ought to indicate to me what the
purpose of the examination is so that I might have some idea
why it is that you are calling me as a witness. What is the
object of this inquiry by this senatorial committee? Those are
the two things we address to you.
The Chairman. I think your second request is certainly
reasonable, that you be notified why you are called. Obviously,
you are entitled to that. I believe until you know why you are
called and what information the committee wants from you, it
will be impossible for you to know from you whether you need a
day, or a week, or how much adjournment you need. You are
called in connection with an investigation of Communist
influence in the UN and in connection with alleged Communists
working there, one of whom, Mr. Remes, or Mr. Reiss. I think
his name now is Mr. Reiss--according to our information, worked
either for you or in your office, and I think the information
we want to get from you principally is with regard to this
fellow Remes. Now, I would suggest----
Mr. Unger. You are off on the wrong track, I want to tell
you that right now.
The Chairman. May I say this, that after Roy starts
questioning you, if you feel that you need a week's time to
discuss the matter with your lawyer, that is something that can
certainly be considered. I am inclined to think that the
questions will be of such a very simple nature that you won't
need any additional time on them.
Let me say this: I will let counsel proceed, and if after
he asks certain questions you think that you need additional
time, I am sure we can work that out.
Mr. Jaffe. Let me say this, Senator: I am a lawyer; I don't
know anything about the questions you are going to ask or
anything else. As far as I am concerned, whatever the problem
is, I would need time, because I don't know what the entire
situation is. Now, it may be that Mr. Unger wants to go ahead
without that. I mean, as far as I am concerned, you tell me
this; the names that you refer to don't mean anything to me.
Whether they mean anything to Mr. Unger, I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. You are not the witness.
Mr. Jaffe. I understand that. What I would like to do is to
have an opportunity to consult with him before I can advise him
about anything.
The Chairman. I think that is a reasonable request. You can
use the private office to discuss the matter, and then we will
take----
Mr. Cohn. There is only one name, Joel Remes, also known as
Julius Reiss.
Mr. Unger. I certainly would defer to counsel in the
suggestion that you make to confer together, and as we are told
here, it can be done privately.
But I will say this, so that there will be no question
about it. We are being given representation here that is the
purpose of the inquiry in so far as this witness is concerned.
On that representation, I see no reason why we can't ascertain
what it is that they are inquiring about as indicated here, and
then if any situation arises which requires conferring, we will
confer.
The Chairman. I think that is a good suggestion. If
something arises which makes you feel it is necessary to have a
conference, or a postponement, we can work it out. I am sure.
We will have no trouble about that.
Mr. Cohn. Could we have your full name, please?
Mr. Unger. I gave it to the stenographer--Abraham Unger.
Mr. Cohn. And you gave your address?
Mr. Unger. I did.
Mr. Cohn. Fine. What is your profession, Mr. Unger?
Mr. Unger. Lawyer.
Mr. Cohn. You practice in New York?
Mr. Unger. I do.
Mr. Cohn. You are admitted to the bar in New York?
Mr. Unger. I am admitted to the bar in New York.
Mr. Cohn. And to the federal court?
Mr. Unger. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Have you practiced before any government
agencies?
Mr. Unger. Do I practice? Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Which one?
Mr. Unger. Immigration. I don't recall that I practiced
before any other at this time--workmen's compensation,
perhaps--one being federal, one being state.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Unger, we have had testimony here that a man
by the name of Joel Remes, also known as Julius Reiss, has
worked under your supervision; is that true?
Mr. Unger. It is not.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Joel Remes?
Mr. Unger. If it is the person referred to in the press, in
the newspaper yesterday, I assume it is the same person who is
identified as Mr. Reiss----
Mr. Cohn. That's right.
Mr. Unger. I know who he is, yes.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever met him?
Mr. Unger. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Under what circumstances?
Mr. Unger. He has come to our office, consulted with us. He
has also done some research work in or about or out of the
office of a perfectly innocent nature, such as of a kind that I
would consider not even important enough to remember, the sort
of thing that anyone--that you might do, that you might come to
the office and ask to look at a file--rather at a record on
appeal, or a case, and I would show it to you, and I wouldn't
even remember whether you had been there or not.
Mr. Cohn. I don't quite understand that. Was he in your
employ?
Mr. Unger. He was not. I have answered that question
already.
Mr. Cohn. I don't quite understand the situation as you
give it to me.
Mr. Unger. I said to you he came to my office to consult
with us on occasion.
Mr. Cohn. About what?
Mr. Unger. As a client.
Mr. Cohn. As a client?
Mr. Unger. I have no recollection what matter it was.
Again, it was of no significance, absolutely of no
significance.
Mr. Cohn. You say he came to your office to consult with
you on an attorney-client basis concerning a legal matter; is
that right?
Mr. Unger. That's right.
Mr. Cohn. Concerning how many legal matters did he consult
with you?
Mr. Unger. I have no recollection.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Unger. I have no recollection.
Mr. Cohn. Did he ever work for you?
Mr. Unger. He did not.
Mr. Cohn. He did not work for you in any respect?
Mr. Unger. I answered that.
Mr. Cohn. I know you answered it, but how does that square
with the fact he told us that he has reported income received
from your law firm for the year of 1950?
Mr. Unger. I say he did not work for me. I have never--I
never recall employing him. If he worked for our office he
certainly wasn't working there with my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Well, would you have knowledge of someone working
in your office? Do you know which people are employed by your
office?
Mr. Unger. No. The fact might be--well, what might be the
case is that in some matter that he was working on, not under
my supervision, he may have been on the payroll in the office
for the purpose of a case, possibly, I wouldn't know.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know that?
Mr. Unger. No, I wouldn't know.
Mr. Cohn. Will you check that for us?
Mr. Unger. I probably can.
Mr. Cohn. All right.
Mr. Unger. Probably can.
Mr. Cohn. That is as to the year 1950, particularly. As far
as your testimony, as far as you know, he retained your office,
he consulted your office as a client, in a legal matter, the
nature of which you didn't recall at all?
Mr. Unger. That's right. It is of no significance. And
beyond that, he has been to the office, I am sure that goes
back a number of years, in the course of doing some research
work of a nature that didn't concern me.
Mr. Cohn. What do you mean by research work?
Mr. Unger. He might have looked at a file in the office--
that is to say, a case on appeal, a record.
Mr. Cohn. Did he----
Mr. Unger. I don't know. What specific one? I haven't the
faintest idea.
Mr. Cohn. That is pure conjecture on your part, as to
whether he did or not?
Mr. Unger. As to whether he did, it is not conjecture; it
isn't actually knowledge in the sense that I actually saw him
sit down and do it, but I know that he was a person who was
doing research work.
Mr. Cohn. You have no idea as to the nature of the work?
Mr. Unger. No, it was of no importance to me. It was
insignificant.
Mr. Cohn. Did it have anything to do with the preparation
of the defense of any persons indicted under the Smith Act?
Mr. Unger. It may have.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether or not it did, Mr. Unger?
Mr. Unger. I don't.
Mr. Cohn. You have no knowledge?
Mr. Unger. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you do any such work?
Mr Unger. Did I do any such----
Mr Cohn. Did you do any such work concerning the
preparation of the defense of persons indicted under the Smith
Act?
Mr. Unger. I think that is irrelevant to the subject of
inquiry. That has to do with the question of attorney-client
relationships, which obviously are not something which you
should inquire into.
Mr. Cohn. In other words, your testimony is whether or not
you did any work of that nature is a confidential communication
from a client to you; is that right?
Mr. Unger. That's right.
Mr. Cohn. Is that your testimony?
Mr. Unger. Yes, of course. It is self-evident, Mr. Cohn.
Mr. Cohn. Well, let us not argue. Just try to answer the
questions.
Mr. Unger. I have.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know him by the name of Remes or Reiss?
Mr. Unger. Actually, I don't think I ever heard the name
Remes, only Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. Then it was the name Reiss?
Mr. Unger. Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. All right. Now, is Mr. Reiss, to your knowledge,
a member of the Communist party?
Mr. Unger. On that subject, I would say to you I object to
the question on the grounds of principle. I think, for one, on
the basis of what you have already represented here, that is
not a relative question to the inquiry; and secondly, I object
on the ground it is not within the purview of a congressional
committee, this one, to inquire into the political beliefs and
opinions of persons. And thirdly, that it is proper on my part
to identify any person--to describe, rather, the political
opinions or beliefs of any person. That is a matter between
himself and yourself, if he decides to state it.
The Chairman. If the refusal is on that ground, you will be
ordered to answer.
Mr. Unger. I didn't hear you.
The Chairman. If, I say, if the refusal is on that ground,
you will be ordered to answer.
Mr. Unger. I see.
Mr. Cohn. You are free, of course, to consult any time you
want with counsel.
Mr. Unger. I understand. I want you to understand, I said
to you I believe as a matter of principle you have no right to
make such inquiry.
Mr. Cohn. I heard what you said, sir.
Mr. Unger. You have indicated very plainly that the purpose
of your inquiry to me--you have represented to me was to find
out whether or not this man was working for me. I have stated
to you what I do know about him.
The Chairman. And what you know about him?
Mr. Unger. What?
The Chairman. And what you know about him.
Mr. Unger. You haven't asked me what I know about him. You
asked me what I know about his political beliefs, and opinions.
That is an entirely different subject.
The Chairman. Counselor didn't ask you about his political
beliefs and opinions?
Mr. Unger. Yes, he did.
The Chairman. He asked you whether he was a Communist.
Mr. Unger. That is a political belief or opinion.
The Chairman. That is whether or not he belongs to a
conspiracy that is dedicated to overthrow this government. You
will be ordered to answer the question.
Mr. Unger. Senator, I want to say to you again that your
statement as to what the Communist party is is simply a
volunteered personal comment which you make, and while there is
no one to stop you from doing so, you can hardly consider that
it is acceptable as either evidence or as a basis for a
question within the purview of the examination. You have
indicated what you were concerned with here is this man's
connection with me or my office.
Mr. Cohn. And with the Communist party.
The Chairman. You are here to give up any information which
you have about this man. Counsel asked you a very simple
question, whether or not he is a Communist. You will be ordered
to answer the question.
Mr. Unger. I have stated to you----
The Chairman. I have heard what you stated.
Mr. Unger [continuing]. That I think you are not giving it
sufficient consideration, Senator. I understand what your
purpose is. I know that you are going after Communists, and
that is a fairly well-known activity on your part, and it is
not my purpose here to debate that question with you. You have
the power to do so at present, and you seem to be exercising it
for your own purposes. But the point that I make to you is that
as a legal question you have no right to inquire into the
political beliefs and opinions of people, as in this instance
as to ask anyone concerning the political beliefs and opinions
of another, just as you wouldn't have the right to ask me
concerning your own political beliefs and opinions or your own
religious beliefs and opinions, and I have tried to state that
to you as fully and as fairly as I can.
The Chairman. I understand your position, but you will be
ordered to answer the question.
Mr. Unger. All right, I shall confer.
The Chairman. What did you say?
Mr. Unger. I said I shall confer with counsel.
Mr. Jaffe. You have called Mr. Friedman as a witness----
Mr. Cohn. He is Mr. Unger's partner, is that right?
Mr. Jaffe. Yes, and I am here with him as well, under the
same difficult conditions.
Mr. Cohn. Talk to him as well.
All right, it is the same facts, and everything else.
The Chairman. Incidentally, your client will be ordered not
to leave the building. He is under subpoena.
[Whereupon, the witness was temporarily excused.]
TESTIMONY OF ALICE EHRENFELD
The Chairman. Will you please stand and raise your right
hand?
In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Miss Ehrenfeld, what is your occupation?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I am an attorney.
Mr. Cohn. You are an attorney. When were you admitted to
practice?
Miss Ehrenfeld. November '47.
Mr. Cohn. You graduated from Yale Law School?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. What do you do now? Where were you employed?
Miss Ehrenfeld. The United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. In what capacity?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I am in the social affairs department,
social affairs office.
Mr. Cohn. Social affairs office up at the United Nations.
When did you go to work for the United Nations?
Miss Ehrenfeld. In July 1951.
Mr. Cohn. Miss Ehrenfeld, have you ever been a Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. You have not?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know a man by the name of Sol Newman?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. You don't. Have you ever been in New Haven,
Connecticut?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You went to Yale, didn't you?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Were you up there around '44?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes, it was my first year.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know a man by the name of Sol Newman
there?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know a man by the name of Sid Silverman?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know a man by the name of Sid Taylor?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever know any member of the Communist
party?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No, not to my knowledge, no one I knew as a
member of the Communist party.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been a member of the National
Lawyers Guild?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a member now?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. What is the period of your membership?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I think the last time I paid dues was '48.
Mr. Cohn. 1948 was the last time you paid dues?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. When was the last time you had any connection
with the National Lawyers Guild?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I think it was some time in '48. I went to
a meeting in Washington.
Mr. Cohn. You haven't attended any meetings since then?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you regard the National Lawyers Guild as
under Communist domination?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't you?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever consider that question?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No, I didn't consider it to be under
Communist domination.
Mr. Cohn. Don't you know that the entire roster of officers
in the National Lawyers Guild resigned from it some time ago--
Justice Jackson, Justice Pecora, and a number of others--and
called it an organization completely under the domination of
the Communist party? You were familiar with that, weren't you?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I knew it had been under attack for that.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't that give you some pause as to whether or
not you ought to belong to it?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I thought it was a reasonable professional
association at the time I belonged to it.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know of any policy it ever adopted which
was contrary to that followed by the Communist party?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No. To be absolutely honest, I didn't keep
very close track on it. I just went to a couple of meetings.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know anybody by the name of Abraham
Ehrenfeld?
Miss Ehrenfeld. That is my father.
Mr. Cohn. Is he teaching in a high school in New York?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No, he is an assistant superintendent.
Mr. Cohn. Assistant superintendent of schools?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Has he ever been a Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Is he a registered member of the American Labor
party, do you know?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't think so. He is a registered
Democrat.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether your father was ever a
sponsor or connected with the Carver School?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. You don't know that. Do you have a brother named
Robert Louis Ehrenfeld?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether or not he has been a
registered member of the American Labor party?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I think he once registered in ALP.
Mr. Cohn. When was the last time he registered in ALP, do
you know?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. Has he ever been active in the American
Association of Scientific Workers, which is listed as a
Communist front?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. Was one of your references for application at the
United Nations Thomas Emerson?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Is that Professor Emerson of Yale Law School?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Professor Emerson was a member of the
Communist party?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't think so.
Mr. Cohn. You don't think to this day he was?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Would you regard him as a Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know Professor Emerson rather well?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes, he was my reference.
Mr. Cohn. I see. Had you ever discussed communism and
related subjects with him?
Miss Ehrenfeld. We had political discussions.
Mr. Cohn. As a result of those political discussions, did
you not gain the impression that Mr. Emerson was a Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. You did not?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you regard him as anti-Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. In some ways, yes.
Mr. Cohn. In what ways?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Well, I do remember his--I remember he took
issue on the Korean----
Mr. Cohn. That was quite a bit after you knew him as your
professor?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I really don't know too much about it, but
I do remember some things about left--Progressive party, or
something, on Korea. I really don't remember.
Mr. Cohn. Why did you drop out of the National Lawyers
Guild?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I just--I had never been very active, and I
went to a meeting in Washington and there didn't seem to be
anything very much, and I just didn't go any more, I just
didn't pay my dues any more.
Mr. Cohn. It had nothing to do with the question of
Communist control?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Would it bother you if the organization were
under Communist domination?
Miss Ehrenfeld. If I thought it was Communist dominated, I
probably wouldn't belong to it.
Mr. Cohn. Is there any doubt about that in your mind?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I didn't think it was Communist dominated.
Mr. Cohn. You said you wouldn't belong to it. Is there any
doubt that if it were under Communist domination you wouldn't
belong to it?
Miss Ehrenfeld. If there was no doubt in my mind that it
was under Communist domination, I would not belong to it.
Mr. Cohn. What evidence did you secure to indicate that it
was not under Communist domination, in view of the resignation
of the top officers?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I didn't go looking. I am not sure even
what time the top officers resigned.
Mr. Cohn. I see. And you are quite sure you don't know Mr.
Newman, or Mr. Silverman, who is also known as Mr. Taylor up in
New Haven; is that right?
Miss Ehrenfeld. The names don't mean anything to me now.
Mr. Cohn. One of those persons said that you had been a
member of a professional group of the Communist party up there,
they would not be telling the truth; is that so?
Miss Ehrenfeld. They would not be telling the truth.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever attend a Communist meeting?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. In New Haven?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever attend a meeting that you now think
might have been a Communist meeting?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. You have any doubt about that?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. None whatsoever?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. All right, that will be all for this afternoon.
We will let you know when we want you back.
The Chairman. We may not want you back. Incidentally, your
name will not be given to the press by the committee, so that
the only way that anyone will learn that you were here is if
you decide to tell them yourself. We just want you to know that
there will be no publicity as to the fact that you were here,
unless you decide to give it out yourself.
Miss Ehrenfeld. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I doubt very much we will want you back, I
wish you would consider yourself still under subpoena, and in
case there is any further information we want we will let you
know. Thank you very much.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM UNGER (ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, BERNARD
JAFFE) (RESUMED)
Mr. Unger. During the recess I conferred with my partner,
and he has reminded me that we were the attorneys of record in
the original Smith Act trial, and that in the course of that
time a number of people were employed for various tasks, among
which was the job of research, and among whom was Mr. Reiss,
who was on a payroll which was handled by him, by my partner,
whose name is David M. Friedman, and I think that is the
complete story. How long a period of time he worked there,
whether it was months or weeks, I have no recollection.
Mr. Cohn. So the specific matter on which Mr. Reiss was
working was research in connection with the defense of the
Communist leaders, your firm having been attorneys of record
for them?
Mr. Unger. That is the employment to which you refer.
Mr. Cohn. All right, sir, fine. That clears that up. Now,
can we get back to the question as to whether or not you knew--
--
Mr. Unger. I restate my objection, and also add the further
fact that I do not know.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Unger. I do not know.
Mr. Cohn. You don't know?
Mr. Unger. I don't.
Mr. Cohn. You have no knowledge as to whether he is or is
not a Communist?
Mr. Unger. Precisely.
Mr. Cohn. Or whether he was or was not in the year 1950?
Mr. Unger. That's right.
Mr. Cohn. You have no knowledge of that?
Mr. Unger. Precisely.
Mr. Cohn. Were you yourself at that time the head of the
professional group of the Communist party in this area?
Mr. Unger. I object to the question, and here we are back
again to the original issue raised by the senator's
representation and the representation made by the counsel for
the committee. It has been represented to us that this was an
inquiry into the employment or association of Mr. Remes or
Reiss, myself and my partner. There is no relevancy in the
question now propounded in so far as the nature of the
examination being conducted here, and it is not within the
province of this committee to make such inquiry as to the
political beliefs and opinions of myself. I object, for the
reason that this is an intrusion upon the personal political
rights and freedoms of an individual, and entirely outside the
scope and powers of a congressional committee, having no
relevancy to the subject of an investigation, not being
pertinent or material to the investigation, and intended solely
for ulterior purposes which are improper and unlawful, and I
therefore object to answering that question.
I further would indicate that that is a violation of the
representation already made by the chairman of the committee
and by counsel for the committee.
Mr. Cohn. That is just not accurate.
Mr. Unger. I insist that it is.
The Chairman. You have your position. Let us see. Number
one, Mr. Cohn, you certainly are strictly within the
jurisdiction of the committee when you inquire with regard to
this UN employee, Mr. Reiss, when you inquire as to his
Communist connections, whether he belongs to a conspiracy
against this country. I think that you are within your right
when you inquire as to whether or not he was the employer who
worked in defense of men accused of teaching and advocating the
overthrow of the government by force and violence. I believe to
go into the background of Reiss and to get the full picture of
him you must get the background of anyone associated with him.
Mr. Cohn. Of course, this witness says he doesn't know
whether or not Reiss is a Communist. As you know, Mr. Chairman,
we have some evidence to the contrary, and it appears that Mr.
Reiss was a member of the party.
The Chairman. In other words, you have got information that
shows this witness either knows or should know that Reiss was a
Communist; is that right?
Mr. Cohn. That's right.
The Chairman. And one way to evaluate his testimony is to
find out whether or not he is in a position to know whether or
not he was a member of the Communist party. In addition to
that, he works for government agencies--this witness himself
does.
Mr. Unger. Who does?
The Chairman. Practices before government agencies. I think
there is no question about that. Don't you think so?
Mr. Cohn. There is not.
The Chairman. The witness will be ordered to answer the
question.
Mr. Jaffe. May I say this, Senator----
The Chairman. No. I may say that you may advise with your
client fully, but the rules of the committee, that have been
adopted by the several members of the committee, are that a
lawyer can advise with his client as freely as he cares to at
any time, but the lawyer is not allowed to take part in the
proceedings. Therefore, you can advise with your client as much
as you care to. If there are any questions in mind that you
care to ask Mr. Cohn and myself, we will be glad to try and
answer them for you
Mr. Jaffe. That is what I mean. Can I ask you a question?
The Chairman. Oh, certainly.
Mr. Jaffe. See, when we first started, and I suggested that
an adjournment would be desirable, you indicated that the scope
of the inquiry would be about this man Riess.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Jaffe. And, well, as far as I am concerned, as a
lawyer, if somebody wants to answer a few questions about a
particular individual, he can go ahead.
But are you now indicating that this man's whole
activities, just like Reiss' whole activities, were open for
your inquiry, now this man's whole life, and his opinions, and
his activities, become open for inquiry?
The Chairman. I am not concerned with his opinions at all.
One of the questions is whether or not Reiss was a high
functionary of the Communist party. This witness says he
doesn't know. It is very pertinent to find out whether he is in
a position to know or not. He has been asked a very simple
question, whether or not he himself is high in the party. If
so, he would know whether Reiss is a member. He will be ordered
to answer that, unless he wants to take advantage of the Fifth
Amendment, of course.
Mr. Jaffe. Well, I wonder whether I might act upon your
earlier suggestion, then, and request an adjournment of this so
that I can discuss this with him fully, because this opens up
an entirely new area of inquiry, if I am to participate in it.
The Chairman. I think that is a reasonable request.
Mr. Unger. I should like to state for the record that the
witness has been misled by representations made by the senator
and a member of the bar in this inquiry, that after carefully
thinking over the problem, no reasonably minded person can come
to the conclusion that the questions presently propounded, or
the line of inquiry that seems to be indicated has any
relevancy to, has any bearing upon what was represented to be
the subject of the inquiry.
I have thought very carefully in the few minutes concerning
that matter, and I say, therefore, that the inquiry is not now
within the purview set down by the--within the purview of the
subject matter of the investigation or represented by the
senator and the counsel.
The Chairman. Do you want an adjournment? I won't hear any
statement, if you want an adjournment. I am not going to spend
any more time with you. Are you asking for an adjournment?
Mr. Unger. I concur with the request of counsel for an
adjournment.
The Chairman. All right. You will be given a recess until
tomorrow morning at 10:30. I may say, for your benefit, under
the rules of the committee, this committee has absolute
jurisdiction if we wanted to go into any subversive activities
on your part, in view of the fact that you are admitted to
practice before a United States agency. That is not the
principal purpose of this hearing. What we are interested in
are the subversive activities of Mr. Reiss. We will give you
adjournment until 10:30 tomorrow morning.
Mr. Unger. I will be in court at 10:30 tomorrow morning. I
have a court engagement set before this.
Mr. Cohn. What is the engagement?
Mr. Unger. The case of People vs Vitale and two others.
Mr. Cohn. Where is that? What court?
Mr. Unger. In felony court, youth term.
Mr. Cohn. Here in Manhattan?
Mr. Unger. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. How long do you imagine that is going to take?
Mr. Unger. Maybe twelve, one o'clock.
Mr. Jaffe. May I request your indulgence, Senator, for my
own purposes? As I say, I was called into this on very, very
short notice. My own schedule today is disrupted and it is very
crowded tomorrow. As a result, I wonder whether or not you
could indulge me in some additional time beyond that, so that I
can really have an opportunity to talk to him and know whether
or not I can go ahead or should represent him.
The Chairman. Well, here is our only problem. I certainly
would like to give you all the time that you think you need to
examine this legal question. We have the entire staff up here;
we have other work set for next week and the week after. Our
schedule calls for disposing of this this week. I don't think
we should disrupt your client's legal work that he is planning
on doing tomorrow morning. If he is going to be in court until
one o'clock, he shouldn't be asked to come here and testify. I
frankly don't think it is unreasonable if we gave him instead
of 'til 10:30 in the morning, in view of this court work, that
we give him until some time tomorrow afternoon.
We can do this: We can try and suit your convenience as to
the time we set for tomorrow afternoon. In other words, if it
will be easier for you to come in at 2:30, or 3:30, or 1:30, we
will try and accommodate you as to that.
Mr. Unger. You said at the outset that you will put it off
until next week.
Mr. Cohn. No, Mr. Unger, please.
Mr. Unger. Was I mistaken?
The Chairman. No, you asked for a week's adjournment and I
said if the matter came up and we needed additional time, we
would try and work it out.
Mr. Jaffe. This is an inquiry into Mr. Unger himself. Now,
I don't know what is involved personally, again. I am a lawyer.
I would like to inquire into it. I have heard Mr. Unger object
to this statement. I would like to discuss that with him, and
frankly, Senator, I realize that you are taking Mr. Unger's
convenience into consideration, but I want you to take into
consideration my own convenience.
Mr. Unger. I want to say, Senator--to aid you in forming a
judgment--I want to say to you, you have been told everything
there is to know concerning the relation of Mr. Unger or Mr.
Friedman with Mr. Remes, or Mr. Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. You say that now, Mr. Unger.
Mr. Unger. What?
Mr. Cohn. I say, you say that now. A few minutes ago you
were equally sure that Mr. Reiss had never been paid any money
by your firm, or he had not been employed by your firm.
Mr. Unger. That means nothing inconsistent. When I say
``equally sure,'' I meant just what I said, and as far as I was
concerned, he was not employed by us, and as a matter of fact
you might have asked about ten or fifteen other persons who
were employed in the same manner, and my answer would
undoubtedly have been the same, because in the course of my
practice as an attorney with my partner, I normally would know
the people that we employed. We employed a stenographer, we may
have employed a clerk, and that would be the end of it. This
happened to be a special and a very peculiar kind of
relationship that lasted for a short period of time, and as you
yourself are aware of, it was in connection with one case. That
is an obvious explanation for my having made the statement. I
didn't make the statement out of bravado, or out of a simple
desire to answer your question, but out of a conviction that
that was the fact. I find out that I am in error about it. I
correct that statement. You now have everything, practically
everything--I say practically, because I don't again want to be
held to whether or not I saw him one day on the street. You now
have everything that there is to know which might have any
relevancy to an inquiry by a Congressional committee concerning
the relation of Mr. Friedman or with Mr. Remes or Mr. Reiss,
period.
Mr. Cohn. You see, the senator has to pass judgment on the
question of relevancy. You don't know what we have and what we
want to do.
Mr. Unger. I said to you now, when I say, `` relevancy,''
all that I mean by that is that it excludes such a question as
whether or not I had a drink with him one day. But insofar as
it has anything to do with any business relations of any kind,
you have got the whole story, because that is all there is to
it. There is nothing more to it than that.
Mr. Cohn. The question we have now--I mean we have to ask
the questions we have to ask--the matter of adjournment.
The Chairman. Number one, it is important to know what, if
any, dealings he had with this man as a member of the Communist
party.
Mr. Unger. You have been told what they were.
The Chairman. Please don't interrupt. It is important to
know what dealings he had with this man Reiss, who has been
identified as a top functionary of the Communist party, in
order to pass upon the veracity of this witness, his
credibility, and to know what position he was in, to know
whether or not Reiss was a Communist. It is certainly relevant
to know whether this man was a top member of the party. I think
if counsel makes a point, however, that it is a very important
matter to him. He was subpoenaed yesterday.
Mr. Cohn. Of course, the witness is a member of the bar
himself.
The Chairman. He is a member of the bar and he has been
dealing with this particular type of work, so it is not new to
him at all, in defending these cases.
We will give you your choice, whether you want to come in
at 9:30 Thursday morning--that is a bit early--or if you want
to come in sometime Wednesday afternoon, and tell us what time
you prefer. I might say, we are trying to accommodate you as to
the time on Wednesday afternoon.
Mr. Jaffe. Couldn't you make it at least Thursday
afternoon, Senator, after your public sessions are over?
The Chairman. We cannot, because the public sessions will
last most likely Thursday and Friday.
Mr. Jaffe. At any time that they are over in the
afternoon--you see, it would be so much better for me, frankly.
One of my partners is away right now.
Mr. Unger. Why don't you put it over 'til next weekend?
Mr. Cohn. We can't do it.
Mr. Jaffe. If you put it over 'til Thursday or Friday, any
time.
Mr. Cohn. We can't do it, Mr. Unger. We have to get this
over with. We have a lot of other witnesses.
Mr. Unger. Why don't you take your other witnesses, if your
object is, as you state, or represented to me--or as you state
it in the newspapers--then I don't know why you persist in
saying that you have to have it tomorrow, when you are now told
that there is no more that you can get that has any bearing at
all on this matter in the remotest way?
The Chairman. The information that has a bearing is whether
or not you are a top member of the party.
Mr. Unger. I didn't hear you.
The Chairman. The information that has a very direct
bearing is whether or not you yourself were a top member of the
party.
Mr. Unger. I thought you were making an inquiry into Mr.
Remes, or Reiss.
The Chairman. We are not going to argue with you.
Mr. Unger. The whole point is in reference to the
adjournment.
Mr. Jaffe. If you can't put it over 'til next week,
couldn't you make it the afternoon of Thursday or Friday? Any
time you say; you can give me a call, or give Mr. Unger a call
when you are finished.
Mr. Unger. That's an idea. Give me a call, and give me a
couple of hours notice. Do you want to do it that way, on a
couple of hours notice?
The Chairman. We will make it Thursday afternoon at two
o'clock.
Mr. Jaffe. All right. Now, would the same thing apply to
Mr. Friedman?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Jaffe. Because the same information would be given by
Mr. Friedman.
Mr. Cohn. They are probably in the same boat.
Mr. Jaffe. And you propose to ask Mr. Friedman about his--
--
The Chairman. Yes. Just so there will be no question about
the scope of the examination, we will question both Mr.
Friedman and Mr. Unger on the activities of Mr. Reiss or Mr.
Remes, the capacity in which he worked in the office, the type
of work he was doing, whether he was known to them as a
Communist, anything else about him that would reflect upon that
question, and we will ask both Mr. Unger and Mr. Friedman about
their own activities, if any, within the party. That will be
necessary so that we can determine whether or not they are in a
position to know whether he was a Communist or not, and I may
say, just for the benefit of counsel, we have a rule of the
committee, passed unanimously by the committee, to the effect
that the chair can institute preliminary investigations, call
witnesses on any matter having to do with the business of the
federal government, so that even if Mr. Reiss' United Nations
matter were not up here, my interpretation of the authority of
the committee would be that we could call Mr. Unger anyway, in
view of his having been admitted to practice before a federal
agency. I bring that up because Mr. Unger was questioning the
jurisdiction of the committee.
I think we should subpoena, Roy, the records having to do
with the payments made to Mr. Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. Bring down just whatever you have reflecting
whatever payments were made to Reiss at any time by your firm
or by yourself.
Mr. Unger. I can see no reason offhand for not having them,
but I shall have to discuss that with my partner.
The Chairman. So the record will be clear, the witness is
ordered to produce the records showing payments made to Mr.
Reiss, or showing the type of work that Mr. Reiss did while in
the employ of the witness Unger, or his partner, Mr. Friedman,
or the firm. That will be two o'clock on Thursday. [Witness
excused.]
TESTIMONY OF DIMITRI VARLEY (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, HERMAN
A GRAY) (RESUMED)
The Chairman. The witness is reminded that he is still
under oath.
Mr. Carr. Mr. Varley, do you know a man named Johannes
Steel?
Mr. Varley. I don't believe so. I think I met him at one of
the UN cocktail parties.
Mr. Carr. Would you recall what year you met him?
Mr. Varley. Well, that would be anywhere from '46 on, I
guess.
Mr. Carr. You have no recollection as to the year?
Mr. Varley. No--I mean from '46 on.
Mr. Carr. After you were at the UN?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Carr. Do you know who Mr. Steel is?
Mr. Varley. Yes. He is a journalist.
Mr. Carr. And a commentator. Did you ever subscribe to a
newsletter that he put out?
Mr. Varley. I did.
Mr. Carr. Did you subscribe at the time you met him, or had
you subscribed previous to that?
Mr. Varley. I don't remember the date. I subscribed on the
basis of the ad I received.
Mr. Carr. An ad that you had received?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Carr. Do you think this was prior to the time you went
to the UN?
Mr. Varley. I don't remember clearly. I can check up, but
I----
Mr. Carr. You say you met him at a cocktail party, you
think, at the UN?
Mr. Varley. If I did meet him at all, I think I met him at
one of those receptions.
Mr. Carr. At the UN itself?
Mr. Varley. Not necessarily; at one of the receptions given
by a delegation.
The Chairman. Which delegation?
Mr. Varley. I wouldn't be able to recall. I have very vague
recollections, because I heard the name, I knew he was a
journalist, and I think it was some kind of a thing that so and
so, and you shake hands.
The Chairman. Is it a usual practice for the delegations to
invite well known Communists to their parties, their cocktail
parties?
Mr. Varley. I don't know what their practice is.
The Chairman. At the time you met him, did you have any
idea that he was a Communist?
Mr. Varley. I don't know whether he is a Communist or not.
The Chairman. Do you know now?
Mr. Varley. I don't know anything about him besides except
subscribing to his letters.
The Chairman. How did you pay for the subscription, do you
recall?
Mr. Varley. Mostly by my check.
The Chairman. By a check to him?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you have correspondence with him?
Mr. Varley. No, sir, except sending subscription to whoever
it was.
The Chairman. Did you ever write to him?
Mr. Varley. No, sir, not to my recollection.
The Chairman. Did you think that the material which he sent
you followed the Communist line?
Mr. Varley. I wouldn't clearly remember. I remember much
material he would write on foreign news, and my general
impression--may I continue, or do I make it too long?
The Chairman. You may continue.
Mr. Varley. I felt that it was rather lengthy and uneven
material, but there were some bits of stories that were not in
the daily newspapers it was worth reading.
The Chairman. How much did you pay for the paper, the
newsletter?
Mr. Varley. I think it was four or five dollars.
The Chairman. A year?
Mr. Varley. Yes. The reason why I think that, because I
thought it was expensive, because it was, I think, a monthly
mimeographed letter.
The Chairman. How many years did you subscribe to it?
Mr. Varley. I would think about two years.
Mr. Carr. You renewed the subscription to it?
Mr. Varley. I think so, but I think it folded up, because I
have recollection that it stopped.
The Chairman. It was a strictly Communist sheet, wasn't it,
put out by top Communists?
Mr. Varley. I don't know that he is a Communist, and I
didn't think it was.
The Chairman. Did you have any reason to think he was a
Communist?
Mr. Varley. No.
The Chairman. Did his material follow the Communist line?
You could tell by reading that he was a Communist, couldn't
you?
Mr. Varley. Really, Senator, I am trying to think hard, and
the last thing I remember about Steel was his radio comments
during the war. I don't recall them being Communist material.
The Chairman. You say you don't recall that the newsletter
you got from him appeared to be Communist?
Mr. Varley. I didn't have that impression, Senator.
Mr. Carr. Now tell me, Mr. Varley, did you ever subscribe
to any other newsletter?
Mr. Varley. I can't think offhand. May I ask my lawyer?
Mr. Carr. Certainly.
[Whereupon, the witness consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Varley. I have no clear recollection.
Mr. Carr. The only newsletter you recall ever subscribing
to was the one put out by Johannes Steel?
Mr. Varley. Yes. Since you asked me that question, I recall
that.
Mr. Carr. It is possible there may have been some others,
but that is the only one you recall at this point?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. How about the Daily Worker?
Mr. Varley. I didn't subscribe to Daily Worker.
The Chairman. Did you buy it, or get it?
Mr. Varley. Many years ago I read it, but whether I read it
in the library or bought it on the stand, I don't remember.
The Chairman. How many years ago?
Mr. Varley. I would say it would be at least fifteen years
or so--up to the point when it was easier to get Russian papers
and I was looking for the material on Russian economic news.
The Chairman. Did you ever go to any Communist party
meetings?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Sir?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you know anyone who was a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Carr. Did you ever know a man named Harley Freeman?
Mr. Varley. Harley Freeman? Yes, I know him.
Mr. Carr. Did you know that he was a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Varley. I don't know.
Mr. Carr. Do you know his wife, Vera?
Mr. Varley. I know her, yes.
Mr. Carr. Do you know that she is a member of the Communist
party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did you know at that time that you knew them?
Mr. Varley. I didn't know, and I don't know.
The Chairman. How well do you know them?
Mr. Varley. I know them socially for several years.
The Chairman. You visited their home, did you?
Mr. Varley. I did.
The Chairman. And they visited yours?
Mr. Varley. They did.
The Chairman. You still have that association?
Mr. Varley. I see them infrequently socially, yes.
The Chairman. How many times have you been at their home in
the last six months?
Mr. Varley. I think I was once--that is, to my best
recollection--last six months.
The Chairman. How many times would you say they have been
to your home in the last six months?
Mr. Varley. They haven't been at my home during the last
six months.
The Chairman. Have you met them any place outside of their
home in the last six months?
Mr. Varley. No, sir, not that I can recall.
The Chairman. Did you ever discuss communism with them?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You say you never had any reason to know they
were Communists?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never suspected it?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did you know that Freeman had been associated
with the TASS?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did you know that he had been employed by the
Daily Worker?
Mr. Varley. I might have heard it, that he was employed but
I am not sure that I----
Mr. Carr. You never discussed that with him?
Mr. Varley. No, sir. He is employed by TASS, that I know.
The Chairman. You knew he was employed by TASS?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. And you heard that he worked at the Daily
Worker?
Mr. Varley. I am not sure.
The Chairman. You say you had no reason to think that he
might have been a Communist?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You still say that?
Mr. Varley. I still say that.
The Chairman. That is, a man works for TASS and the Daily
Worker, and you have no reason to think that he might have been
a Communist?
Mr. Varley. I am not sure that I know he worked for Daily
Worker. You mentioned it, and I am----
The Chairman. I might say that you are not even trying to
be truthful with us, when you tell us that this friend of
yours, that you know, whom you visit, who visits your home, you
know he works for the Communist paper from Moscow, and you
heard he worked for the Daily Worker, and then you sit there
and perjure yourself and say, ``I had no reason to know he was
a Communist.'' You know better than that. If you don't then you
shouldn't be holding a $12,000 a year job at the UN. You can go
right ahead and do all of the lying you care to. We will give
you all the chance in the world. I have warned you three or
four times either to tell us the truth or refuse to answer.
Mr. Varley. Senator, I didn't refuse to answer. I am trying
to be as cooperative as I can, and when you ask me whether he
worked, what I know, I did say and I did tell you that I didn't
discuss communism with him, and I have no reason to know that
if he worked for TASS, he must be Communist.
Mr. Carr. Do you know Amy Oppenheimer?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. From Tuckahoe, New York?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. You don't know her?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Are you sure of that, now?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. You have no recollection of having been in
contact with Amy Oppenheimer?
Mr. Varley. Could you tell me who she is? Maybe I can----
Mr. Carr. Amy Oppenheimer was a prominent member of the
tri-county section of the Communist party--tri-county meaning
covering the Tuckahoe area.
Mr. Varley. No, sir, I don't know her.
Mr. Carr. You never had any contact with her that you
recall?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Have you ever contributed to the Veterans of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade financially?
Mr. Varley. That is the question the counsel asked me this
morning, and I might have, but I have no clear recollection.
Mr. Carr. Did you ever contribute to the American Committee
for the Protection of the Foreign Born?
Mr. Varley. I did.
Mr. Carr. You did. When was that, do you recall?
Mr. Varley. This morning, I said '49, '50. I don't recall
the date, but maybe we could----
Mr. Carr. That is all right.
The Chairman. Incidentally, I am not sure if counsel has
identified himself.
Mr. Gray. Yes, I did this morning: Herman A. Gray, G-r-a-y,
551 Fifth Avenue, New York.
The Chairman. All right.
Do you recognize the American Labor party as Communist
controlled?
Mr. Varley. I have no knowledge to believe so, sir.
The Chairman. Did you think it is not Communist controlled?
Mr. Varley. I don't know enough whether it is or not.
The Chairman. When you join a party and register as a
member, don't you first find out whether it is run by the
Communists or not, or are you interested in that?
Mr. Varley. I registered with the party many years ago and
I kept up that registration. At the time when I registered I
remember seeing some material on the aims of the American Labor
party, and it didn't appear to me to be in any way contrary to
it.
The Chairman. You registered again in 1950, didn't you?
Mr. Varley. Yes, I repeated registration, but I didn't
examine their aims--reexamine their aims, and I assumed they
were more or less what they were to start with.
The Chairman. You didn't read the publicity in the paper
about their being Communist controlled?
Mr. Varley. I think I mentioned this morning that I have
seen something, I believe, during election campaign, but I
didn't see any--I mean, nothing to convince me that it was the
case.
The Chairman. Did you ever hear of a publication called In
Fact?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you sell that?
Mr. Varley. No, I did not.
The Chairman. Didn't you ever sell that?
Mr. Varley. Sell In Fact?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Varley. I subscribed to it once.
The Chairman. Did you ever sell it?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge, not to my recollection.
The Chairman. You don't recall ever having sold it?
Mr. Varley. Excuse me, would you repeat that?
The Chairman. You don't recall ever having sold it?
Mr. Varley. I don't recall that. May I just come back to
one question that counsel asked before? In Fact was also a sort
of a kind of a newsletter, if I recall; it was way back, but I
think it was kind of a page or two pages.
The Chairman. A Communist publication, was it not?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge.
The Chairman. Outside of the newsletter by Steel, who has
been named as a Communist, In Fact, which has been described as
a Communist publication, you don't recall having subscribed to
any other newsletters or papers?
Mr. Varley. Well, I subscribed, I recall, to the
information bulletin published by the Soviet embassy, when it
existed, but I didn't consider it--I considered it governmental
publication.
The Chairman. You subscribed to the Soviet embassy
bulletin? How many years did you get that? How many years did
you subscribe to that?
Mr. Varley. I think I started receiving it about 1945,
roughly.
The Chairman. How many years did you, subscribe to it?
Mr. Varley. And I got it until it was--they discontinued
it, or it was stopped.
The Chairman. Did you get bulletins from any of the other
embassies?
Mr. Varley. I do not recall, except that occasionally I
would get newsletters in my office from some countries--maybe
Australian or Brazilian. I wouldn't recall.
Mr. Carr. Do you know a man named Vladimir Kazakvich?
Mr. Varley. I did know him years ago.
Mr. Carr. When?
Mr. Varley. I went to college with him.
Mr. Carr. What college was that?
Mr. Varley. Columbia.
Mr. Carr. Columbia University?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Carr, Were you a fellow student or----
Mr. Varley. We were fellow students.
Mr. Carr. You were fellow students?
Mr. Varley. Yes, at Columbia University.
Mr. Carr. He has been accused of being a Soviet agent?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. When did your acquaintanceship with him end or
does it continue today?
Mr. Varley. I knew him for some time after the college and
saw him occasionally, and stopped seeing him, I would say,
roughly around or before the war.
Mr. Carr. You haven't seen him since before the war, before
1941?
Mr. Varley. I have no recollection. Then I heard that he
left for Russia. That is about all I knew about him.
The Chairman. In other words, you saw him up until he left
for Russia?
Mr. Varley. I didn't see him--I might say that I have seen
him in the college days frequently and quite often after that,
because we both were members of a student organization.
The Chairman. What student organization?
Mr. Varley. It was National Russian Students Christian
Association.
The Chairman. National Russian----
Mr. Varley. Students Christian Association.
The Chairman. Are you of Russian descent, incidentally?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir--excuse me, am I of Russian descent?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Were you born in this country?
Mr. Varley. No, I was born in Russia.
The Chairman. When did you come from Russia?
Mr. Varley. I came here in 1923.
Mr. Carr. Were you a member of a Soviet espionage ring in
conjunction with Mr. Kazahevich?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever speak to you concerning what he was
doing?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever approach you----
Mr. Varley. May I just----
Mr. Carr. Go ahead.
Mr. Varley. When you say was I a member of a ring, that I
don't even know of such a ring, so he never spoke to me about
it.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever speak to you about what he was doing?
When I say ``what he was doing,'' I mean what he was doing in
connection with this Soviet espionage ring.
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever approach you to join with him in this
ring?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever ask any favors of any kind of you?
Mr. Varley. That is more difficult question, because during
the student days he might have borrowed something from me and I
borrowed from him.
Mr. Carr. Following that period, in the period up to when
you last saw him sometime before the war, roughly 1941, did he
ever ask you to furnish him with any information?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever ask your opinion concerning any
information--when I say ``any information,'' I mean on any
subject other than the weather, a ball game, or something like
that.
Mr. Varley. You mean in terms of the espionage?
Mr. Carr. Right.
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Do you know where he is today?
Mr. Varley. No, sir. I heard that he left for Russia.
Mr. Carr. You haven't heard from him since he left?
Mr. Varley. I haven't heard from him. Actually I haven't
seen him for years before he left for Russia.
Mr. Carr. When you were a member of the State, County and
Municipal Workers Union, did you not sell copies of In Fact to
other members of your local?
Mr. Varley. I cannot recall anything of that sort, sir. I
remember, as I told you, that I subscribed myself.
Mr. Carr. You don't remember seeing the man at your local,
Local 28, I believe it was, who distributed the In Fact
magazine letter?
Mr. Varley. I have no recollection.
Mr. Carr. You have no recollection of that whatsoever?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Do you know a man named Kenneth Durant? \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Kenneth Durant served as the chief American representative of
TASS--Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovietskovo Soyuza or Telegraph Agency of
the Soviet Union--from 1919 until 1944.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Varley. I do.
Mr. Carr. Who is he?
Mr. Varley. He is the husband of a woman who is dead now,
who was a teacher of my wife, who was a famous American poet.
Her name was Genevieve Taggard. That is how I met him.
Mr. Carr. When is the last time you saw Kenneth Durant?
Mr. Varley. I stopped at his place this summer about--when
was it--July or August.
Mr. Carr. This year?
Mr. Varley. This year--and that was, I believe, first time
I saw him in about last three years or approximately that.
Mr. Carr. You mean since 1949?
Mr. Varley. Roughly, yes.
Mr. Carr. Did you ever know Durant as a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever approach you to join the Communist
party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did you know that during the period that you were
in contact with him, which now includes up through 1953, that
he has been a liaison between the Soviet Union and the
Communist party of this country?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. You had never heard of that?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Had you ever heard of him being accused of being
such a liaison?
Mr. Varley. I have seen something in the newspapers or a
magazine article, but I don't remember where it was--very
recently, but very vaguely.
Mr. Carr. Well----
Mr. Varley. May I just [consulting with counsel]. I really
don't remember.
Mr. Carr. But it was prior to July or August of this year
when you visited him again?
Mr. Varley. I can't really remember clearly.
Mr. Carr. You don't remember clearly concerning that?
Mr. Varley. No.
Mr. Carr. Where does Durant live? Where did Durant live at
the time you visited him in 1953?
Mr. Varley. In Vermont.
Mr. Carr. In Vermont? What place is that?
Mr. Varley. He lives on a farm. It is either East Jamaica
or Jamaica.
Mr. Carr. Now, just so this will be straight, at the time
you visited him in 1953, was that a social visit?
Mr. Varley. Purely social visit.
Mr. Carr. Did you stay there any length of time?
Mr. Varley. We came very late, I would say about seven
o'clock. They were going to some concert. They didn't expect
us--we were driving by--so they invited us to go to a concert.
We went with them to a concert, and we left early following
morning.
Mr. Carr. Did you stay overnight?
Mr. Varley. We stayed overnight.
Mr. Carr. At his residence?
Mr. Varley. At his residence.
Mr. Carr. Well, prior to this visit, had you heard that he
was a member of the Communist party?
[Whereupon, Mr. Varley consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Varley. No, I did not.
Mr. Cohn. On this fellow Durant, we questioned you about
him before the grand jury a year ago, didn't we, and told you
he was a Communist?
Mr. Varley. You asked me whether I know he was a Communist.
That is my recollection.
Mr. Cohn. I see.
Mr. Varley. To my recollection, I said I didn't know.
Mr. Cohn. Don't you know Whittaker Chambers testified that
Durant was a liaison between Soviet underground and the
Communist party?
Mr. Varley. No.
Mr. Cohn. We told you that before the grand jury.
Mr. Varley. That Whittaker Chambers testified?
Mr. Cohn. Oh, yes.
Mr. Varley. May I look at the grand jury minutes?
Mr. Cohn. No, you can't look at them, and I can't look at
them. Do you remember being questioned about Kenneth Durant
before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. That I remember. Yes, I do.
Mr. Cohn. What did we tell you about Durant?
Mr. Varley. You asked me whether I knew that he was a
foreign agent, I believe, and I said not to my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever asked him whether or not he was?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You haven't. Didn't it interest you?
Mr. Varley. It is difficult to answer yes or no on that
question. I had no reason to believe that he was, and therefore
I didn't believe I should ask him that kind of a question.
Mr. Cohn. You didn't think you should ask him that kind of
a question?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. And after you were questioned about him before
the grand jury and all that, you continued to see him?
Mr. Varley. I saw him, yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. Just one or two questions, Mr. Varley. Do you
know Caroline Flechener?
Mr. Varley. Yes, I do.
Mr. Carr. Was she instrumental in getting you your position
with UNNRA?
Mr. Varley. No, Mr. Weintraub recommended me in UNNRA.
Mr. Carr. In what connection do you know Caroline
Flechener?
Mr. Varley. She was working in UNNRA, and that is how----
Mr. Carr. A fellow worker with you?
Mr. Varley. Yes, and that is how I met her, I believe.
Mr. Carr. Did you know whether or not she was a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Carr. Did you ever attend any social gatherings with
her?
Mr. Varley. I doubt it very much. I mean, I have no
recollection about seeing her at any social events--again,
unless it was those big parties----
Mr. Carr. In connection with your work?
Mr. Varley. Yes, where I am sure she was there, because it
would be, say, a party given by a government.
Mr. Carr. When is the last time you saw her?
Mr. Varley. To the best of my recollection, during UNNRA,
when Governor Lehman was there.
Mr. Carr. She is not in the UN now, is she?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge.
The Chairman. You went up and stayed overnight at Durant's?
Mr. Varley. I did.
The Chairman. After you had been notified that he had been
identified under oath as a liaison in the Communist underground
of the Communist party of this country; is that correct?
Mr. Varley. I stayed at his house overnight, sir, but--
could you repeat the question?
The Chairman. I will repeat it for you. The question is:
Did you go up and stay overnight at the house of Kenneth Durant
after you had been notified that Durant had been named under
oath as a liaison between the Soviet underground and the
Communist party in this country?
Mr. Varley. My recollection was that in the grand jury
proceedings I was asked whether he was a foreign agent, and I
said not to my knowledge.
The Chairman. Did they tell you at that time that he had
been identified under oath as a foreign agent?
Mr. Varley. I have no recollection of that, sir.
The Chairman. You don't remember that?
Mr. Varley. The counsel just said that even name of Mr.
Chambers was brought up in that connection. I just don't
recollect that.
The Chairman. After you had been asked about his being an
underground agent, you went up and spent the night with him; is
that right?
Mr. Varley. I spent a night at his place.
The Chairman. Answer my question.
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The answer is yes?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. How well do you know this man?
Mr. Varley. I knew him socially, because he was the husband
of a woman who was my wife's teacher, an American poet who is
dead now.
The Chairman. How many years have you known him?
Mr. Varley. I can't remember clearly when I met him for the
first time.
The Chairman. About how many years ago?
Mr. Varley. It must have been before the First World War.
The Chairman. Now----
Mr. Varley. I am sorry, not before the First World War
before the Second World War.
The Chairman. When you went up to see him, was that shortly
after your appearance before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. I appeared before grand jury--you mean when I
visited him in the summer?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Varley. Well, I appeared last before grand jury in
1952.
The Chairman. Did you contact him after you appeared before
the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. Before or after I appeared before the grand
jury?
The Chairman. After you appeared before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Didn't you get in touch with him immediately
after that?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you sure?
Mr. Varley. I am positive.
The Chairman. When is the first time you saw him after you
appeared before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. After I appeared before the grand jury?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Varley. This summer.
The Chairman. That is the only time you have seen him?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you tell him that you were asked about
him before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. I don't believe so. I think I mentioned that I
was before the grand jury, but I did not think I mentioned
that.
The Chairman. You didn't tell him he was named as a
Communist agent, or a foreign agent?
Mr. Varley. I don't recall it, sir.
The Chairman. You will be excused for the time being, and
your counsel will be notified when we want you back. You are
informed that you are still under subpoena.
Mr. Varley. Do I do anything with the subpoena? Just hold
it?
The Chairman. Just keep it.
[Whereupon, the hearings were adjourned until Wednesday,
September 16, 1953, at 11:00 a.m. at the same place.]
SECURITY--UNITED NATIONS
[Editor's note.--Neither Frank Cerny (1888-1970) nor Helen
Matousek (1909-1989), a social affairs officer at the United
Nations, testified in public session.]
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, NY.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 11:00 a.m., in room 128, of the
United States Court House, Foley Square, New York, Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; G. David Schine, chief consultant; Donald
O'Donnell, assistant counsel; Harold Rainville, administrative
assistant to Senator Everett M. Dirksen.
TESTIMONY OF DR. FRANK CERNY
The Chairman. Will you stand up and raise your right hand,
please?
In the matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. Cerny. I do.
Mr. O'Donnell. Will you tell us your full name, Doctor?
Dr. Cerny. Frank Cerny.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know a girl by the name of Helen
Matousek?
Dr. Cerny. Personally, no. I only know that she was in
Paris before the war and at the beginning, during the war.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were you in Paris, Doctor, and what was your
particular job at that time?
Dr. Cerny. I was counsel of delegation of Czechoslovakia
Mr. O'Donnell. In what years, Doctor?
Dr. Cerny. From '36 till '40--June, '40.
Mr. O'Donnell. And you left in '41?
Dr. Cerny. I left because the Germans advanced to Paris.
Mr. O'Donnell. Tell us what you know about Helen Matousek.
Dr. Cerny. Being official of the embassy, I was in
communication with the Czechoslovak National Committee, which
was created in Paris. This national committee had several
divisions, and one of these divisions was information division.
This information division was formed before the national
committee was created. It was established, I think, already in
the summer of '39, but the national committee was recognized by
the French government in November '39, and so this information
bureau afterwards became part of Czechoslovak National
Committee.
In this information division, about forty or forty-five
employees, and, among them was Matouskova--that is, the Czech--
in English is Matousek; in Czech Matouskova.
Mr. O'Donnell. Is that Helen or Helena?
Dr. Cerny. Helena.
Mr. O'Donnell. All right. Tell us what you know about her
Communist activity.
Dr. Cerny. I didn't know her personally, but through my
official business I was in contact with special commissioner of
Surete Nationale, Vidal, and he told me--now, I don't know
when--but he told me that Matouskova and another employee of
the Information Division, Czinnereva, were arrested for
Communist activities.
Mr. O'Donnell. When were they arrested for Communist
activities by the French police?
Dr. Cerny. It might have been in spring, '40. I don't
remember. It might have been in spring, '40.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know the disposition?
Do you know what happened to them after they were arrested?
Dr. Cerny. No, I don't know. I thought they were arrested
also in this Kulture House, but they were not. But as I know,
they have been at other times arrested Communists in France,
who have been sent before the advancing Germans to North
Africa, and Matouskova was probably also there.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was this House of Kulture, Doctor?
Dr. Cerny. I couldn't tell, because I was never there and I
was very busy in Paris. I know only that the Communists
gathered there, that they had meetings there.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were any Czech Communists involved in the
House of Kulture Communist activities? Were there any Czech
nationals involved in the House of Kulture?
Dr. Cerny. Sure. Vladimir Clementis was also there.
Mr. O'Donnell. He was a Czech national?
Dr. Cerny. He was also a refugee and an emigrant in Paris,
and he met with other Communists in this Kulture House.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was there any other Czech nationals? How
about Mr. Hofmeister?
Dr. Cerny. Hofmeister was arrested there, and one who
accidentally was there and was Communist was Mr. Sturm, who is
now in New York.
Mr. O'Donnell. Now, you do not know that she was arrested
in the House of Kulture with these Communists?
Dr. Cerny. I don't think so, because I have not it in my
notes.
Mr. O'Donnell. All right. Do you have any notes with you,
Doctor?
Dr. Cerny. Yes, I have.
Mr. O'Donnell. What do those notes say about her arrest as
a Communist by the Paris police in 1940, with this other girl?
What do your notes say?
Dr. Cerny. The Misses Matouskova and Czinnerova, sir,
arrested for Communists, and I am sure I got it--I knew it from
Mr. Vidal.
Mr. O'Donnell. And Vidal was what?
Dr. Cerny. Was special commissioner of the Surete
Nationale--that means of the minister of the interior in Paris.
Mr. O'Donnell. When did you make those notes?
Dr. Cerny. It is an excerpt of my notes in four or five
books. I ought to look in my notes when I did it.
Mr. O'Donnell. These are excerpts of notes from your diary?
Dr. Cerny. From my diary, yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. Well, which you kept from day to day?
Dr. Cerny. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. So these notes, based on your diary, would
have been made right after the arrest in May of 1940?
Dr. Cerny. Or three days, yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. So that you are basing your statement now on
a record that you kept in May of 1940; is that correct?
Dr. Cerny. In spring.
Mr. O'Donnell. In the spring of 1940?
Dr. Cerny. That's right.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know of any other names that she has
ever used?
Dr. Cerny. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was her married name?
Dr. Cerny. Matousek.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know of any Communist activity on the
part of her husband?
Dr. Cerny. No, he wasn't a Communist.
Mr. O'Donnell. As far as you know?
Dr. Cerny. He was not Communist. He was a painter and he
left France also for London, for England.
Mr. O'Donnell. On the basis of what you know concerning
her, Doctor, do you think that she is working against the
interests of the United States and the allied countries?
Dr. Cerny. Having these Communistic ideas, yes, sure.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you think she is a proper employee for
the United Nations, as far as the free world is concerned? Do
you think she is a proper employee, as far as the free world is
concerned?
Dr. Cerny. My personal opinion, no.
Mr. O'Donnell. Your own opinion?
Dr. Cerny. In my own opinion, no.
Mr. O'Donnell. You don't think she should be employed by
the United Nation?
Dr. Cerny. No.
The Chairman. I want to thank you very much, Doctor.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF HELEN MATOUSEK
The Chairman. Will you stand and raise your right hand,
please?
In the matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mrs. Matousek. So help me God.
The Chairman. Will you state your full name, please?
Mrs. Matousek. Helen Matousek, also known as Helen
Matouskova, which is the Slav form of my name, born Helen
Sommerova.
The Chairman. Is that Miss or Mrs.?
Mrs. Matousek. I am divorced, sir.
The Chairman. Mrs. Matousek, counsel here have a couple of
questions they want to ask you. We have several witnesses in
who have testified in regard to your activities. Under our law
you are entitled to refuse to answer any question if you think
the answer in any way might incriminate you. It is very
important to you that you either tell the truth or refuse to
answer. Otherwise, if you give us a false answer, you are
guilty of perjury each time you give an untruthful answer. I
would like to impress that on you all I possibly can, in view
of the fact you haven't got a lawyer.
Again I say it for your own good, either tell the truth, or
refuse to answer, and we have a great deal of testimony in
regard to alleged Communist activities on your part and counsel
will ask you about that.
Have you anything to add to the advice I have given the
witness?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Where are you employed, Mrs. Matousek, at the present time?
Mrs. Matousek. I am working at the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. In what capacity?
Mrs. Matousek. The Department of Social Affairs. I am the
social affairs officer.
Mr. Cohn. How long have you been with the United Nations?
Mrs. Matousek. Since February 1949.
Mr. Cohn. Now, when did you come to the United States?
Mrs. Matousek. September 27, 1941.
Mr. Cohn. Have you petitioned for naturalization?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, I have.
Mr. Cohn. What is the status of your application?
Mrs. Matousek. I have my first papers. I have applied for
citizenship. I had my hearing in, I believe, December '48, and
have not heard any direct result since. I have a number of
times written the Immigration and Naturalization Department to
inquire what the status was. I did not receive a reply. I have
inquired and knew at the occasion of my signing the waiver of
privileges and immunities and I was told that there are
thousands of cases on hand, I have to be patient.
Mr. Cohn. Were you in 1940 arrested in Paris, France, for
Communist activities?
Mrs. Matousek. I was arrested in May 1940, in Paris, for
reasons unknown to me.
Mr. Cohn. What do you mean by ``for reasons unknown to
you''?
Mrs. Matousek. Because there was no trial, there was no
hearing, there was no questioning.
Mr. Cohn. What was the charge?
Mrs. Matousek. There was no charge preferred, that I know
of.
Mr. Cohn. You mean it is your testimony you have no idea
they arrested you, they just came along----
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, I do have an idea.
Mr. Cohn. Well, tell us.
Mrs. Matousek. While I was in Prague, I was secretary of a
committee for political refugees from Germany. That was from
1936 till spring, 1939. Some of these political refugees
obviously were Communists, just as obviously some of them were
not Communists. They were political refugees from Germany. They
were cleared by Czechoslovak police and they were passed on to
the committee for care. I have, therefore, known a great many
refugees, and inasmuch that I was detained in Paris, I was put
in a detention camp for German nationals, the only explanation
I have--and I admit that is my analysis--is that I might have
been mistaken for a German national. That must also have been
the understanding of my then government, which has issued,
therefore, to me an affidavit confirming my Czech nationality.
When I have shown this paper to the camp commander, he released
me immediately.
Mr. Cohn. Isn't it a fact that when you were arrested it
was made very clear to you that you were being arrested with
Communists on a charge of Communist activity?
Mrs. Matousek. No, sir, no such a thing was said to me
ever.
Mr. Cohn. Were you arrested with some Communists?
Mrs. Matousek. I was arrested with a number of people whom
I didn't know. There was one person I did know; there was a
Miss Margaret Zinner, whom I till then didn't know. I have not
known her very well. She was working as a secretary at
Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, where I have been
working. She wasn't any particular friend of mine till then. I
became friendly with her while we were detained together the
two months.
Mr. Cohn. I don't think you understood my question. The
question is: Were any other persons arrested with you
Communists?
Mrs. Matousek. I didn't know the other persons. The only
person I knew was Miss Zinner.
Mr. Cohn. Was she a Communist?
Mrs. Matousek. I don't believe so, but I do not know. I do
not believe so.
Mr. Cohn. You say you don't know; you didn't know any of
the other persons?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. Cohn. Where did they come from?
Mrs. Matousek. They were mostly German refugees, as far as
I have heard from them, but I didn't know them.
Mr. Cohn. You don't know if any of the other people
arrested with you were Communists?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I don't.
Mr. Cohn. Did you find out whether or not any of them were
charged with being Communists?
Mrs. Matousek. I have no idea.
Mr. Cohn. Therefore, during the period of your arrest, you
never heard it said that any of the people arrested with you
were arrested for Communist activity; is that what you want to
tell us?
Mrs. Matousek. That's right. I know that there were a great
many people who were simply German refugees, who at that time
lived in France or in Belgium. If you want me to tell it to you
chronologically, when I was in Paris, when I was arrested, the
night of the 19th of May, and taken to the Paris Prefecture of
Police, the only person I knew was Miss Margaret Zinner. Both
of us were perfectly convinced that this was some kind of a
mistake, and the other persons who were around I didn't know. I
do not know who they were, and there wasn't too much discussion
going on. When I was taken from the Police Prefecture----
Mr. Cohn. Go right ahead.
Mrs. Matousek [continuing]. To the Velodrome Devere, again
that was the detention center for German nationals. I didn't
know any of them until then except Miss Zinner. It didn't
appear to me that these people were political refugees. Some
may have been. I know there were some discussions going on.
There were some people who were violently anti-Nazi and some of
them who were violently anti-Russian. Remember, that was at the
time of the Soviet-Russian Pact. So they were thrown together
on the basis of their German nationality, and they were of all
colors, I believe.
The Chairman. When did you first go to France?
Mrs. Matousek. You mean to say in France or on visits?
The Chairman. On visits, or anything.
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, I believe I went to France first on a
tourist trip; I think it must have been in '35 or '36.
The Chairman. Then when did you go to France to live there?
Mrs. Matousek. That was in April or May 1939, after I have
escaped from Czechoslovakia.
The Chairman. Did you know a Dr. Prochek?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, I did. I didn't know him in Paris. I
knew Dr. Charles Prochek; I met him in UNRRA in Washington in
the spring of 1945. I believe he comes from Minneapolis.
The Chairman. Were you with UNRRA then?
Mrs. Matousek. I was with UNRRA then.
The Chairman. Is that when you first met him, in 1945?
Mrs. Matousek. That was the first time when I met him in
person. However, I was in correspondence with his wife, who was
one of the persons who provided an affidavit for me when I
needed one for the visa. I didn't know about it; I was told
about it by the Czech Consulate when I arrived here, so I wrote
to her thanking her for this kindness, and then we had some,
oh, spotty correspondence here and there. But I didn't know Dr.
Prochek in person until I met him at this College Park in
Maryland with UNRRA in the spring of 1945.
The Chairman. Where did you meet Mrs. Prochek?
Mrs. Matousek. I never met her in person.
The Chairman. How could she give a letter, then,
recommending you, if she had never met you personally, do you
know?
Mrs. Matousek. Well, I assume that she was willing to give
it because I had very good recommendations from the Benes
government, and she was a very ardent Czech.
The Chairman. Were you living in France in 1937?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I was not living in France in 1937. I
may have been there on a short vacation trip. Let me think.
Yes, I believe I spent three weeks in summer of '37 on the west
coast of France in Pontiac.
The Chairman. Now, we have testimony here--and of course
the mere fact that we have testimony does not mean that the
committee considers it true or untrue, we just take all the
testimony in regard to any witness--we have testimony that in
1937 you were an organizer for the Communist party, that you
worked in France. What do you have to say about that? Is that
true or not?
Mrs. Matousek. It is not true. I am very glad that you said
that the mere testimony is not the truth. It isn't true,
unequivocally.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this: Have you ever done any
organizing for the Communist party?
Mrs. Matousek. I have not.
The Chairman. And have you ever joined yourself?
Mrs. Matousek. I have not.
The Chairman. And you are not a member now?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
The Chairman. Did you ever get paid any money by any
representative of Soviet Russia or the Communist party?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
The Chairman. Was your former husband a Communist, if you
know?
Mrs. Matousek. He was not a member of the Communist party
while we were married. I would say he was a sympathizer. He
wasn't a member of the party. I don't believe that he was
anything else but one of these neurotic persons who talk a
great deal and don't do anything.
The Chairman. How about yourself, were you a sympathizer
with the Communist party?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. When you left Prague as an escapee, who
advised you to leave Prague, do you recall?
Mrs. Matousek. Well, in the first place, my own reason--you
see, the fact that I was helping anti-Hitler refugees obviously
could not make me popular with the German authorities, who by
that time occupied Czechoslovakia.
Moreover, I am Jewish, so there was no reason for me to
want to stay on.
Inasmuch as I have been helping other people to get out of
the country, I have done exactly the same thing. I have--since
Munich, my main part of the work for the German refugees, I
would say, was obtaining for them from the Czech government, in
an official capacity, interim passports and by dealing with
various consulates--I would say primarily the British
Consulate, French Consulate, the Norwegian Consulate--visas for
these people to leave the country.
Mr. O'Donnell. May I interrupt for a moment?
Mrs. Matousek. Sure.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know a chap over there by the name
of Mr. Nejedly?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I don't remember to have known him.
Mr, O'Donnell. Did he at any time advise you to leave
Prague?
Mrs. Matousek. Most definitely not. I didn't know him.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know who the present foreign minister
of education is in Prague?
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, you mean Mr. Nejedly?
Mr. O'Donnell. That is correct.
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, sorry, yes, that Mr. Nejedly. I have met
Mr. Nejedly, I would say, oh, two or three times perhaps in my
life, but he certainly did not advise me to leave Prague.
Mr. O'Donnell. He did not advise you to leave Prague?
Mrs. Matousek. That's right.
Mr. O'Donnell. We have evidence from a witness who says
that you told the witness that he advised you to leave Prague.
Mrs. Matousek. That may be the other way around, sir. Mr.
Nejedly, at that time I believe was professor at the University
of Prague, knew that I was helping people to leave the country,
it was he who called me up and asked me if I could help him get
out of the country.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you help him get out?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I did not. I said, ``I am very sorry,
but my mandate is to help the people who are taken care of by
the committee, and I cannot do anything for any other people.''
Mr. O'Donnell. What is his first name?
Mrs. Matousek. Sdenek.
Mr. Cohn. What does he do now?
Mrs. Matousek. I believe that he is part of the Communist
government in--he is the present foreign minister of education
in Prague--minister of education, probably, rather than foreign
minister.
Mr. O'Donnell. He is the minister of education?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, I believe so. So that it was the other
way around, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you ever tell anyone that he suggested
that you should leave Prague at that time?
Mrs. Matousek. I very much doubt it, because it isn't so.
It was the other way around. I may have said to someone that he
asked me to help him get out of the country.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were you very friendly with him?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I met him about two or three times in my
life.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know he was a Communist?
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, yes, I did.
Mr. O'Donnell. Have you had any contact with him?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. While you were with UNRRA, wasn't there a
group in UNRRA who were locating deserters from the Russian
army and having them returned to Russia?
Mrs. Matousek. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you ever contact a Russian deserter and
through indirection have him turned over to the OGPU?
Mrs. Matousek. Me?
Mr. O'Donnell. You?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know of anyone who did?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I don't.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know if that was a common practice at
UNRRA in Germany, to invite these deserters from the Russian
army in under pretexts and then have them turned over to the
OGPU, or to an OGPU agent?
Mrs. Matousek. I have never heard of that practice.
Mr. O'Donnell. You never heard of it?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. You never participated in any activity such
as that?
Mrs. Matousek. Certainly not.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you ever visit Moscow?
Mrs. Matousek. I have never been to Moscow or to Soviet
Russia.
Mr. O'Donnell. Had your former husband ever visited Moscow,
to your knowledge?
Mrs. Matousek. Not to my knowledge, not as long as I was
married to him. I don't know whether he went there afterwards.
Mr. O'Donnell. How long were you interned after your arrest
for Communist activity in Paris?
Mrs. Matousek. I would like to state first that to my
knowledge I was not arrested by Communist activities, but for
reasons unknown to me, and I was detained for approximately two
months.
Mr. O'Donnell. Two months. Were you interned by the----
Mrs. Matousek. By the Vichy police of France, yes.
The Chairman. Was this before or after France was overrun?
Mr. O'Donnell. This was before.
Mrs. Matousek. I was arrested before, about two weeks
before the fall of France, and detained for about six weeks
after.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know Adolph Hofmeister?
Mrs. Matousek. I knew Adolph Hofmeister, who was a lawyer,
painter and writer. I knew him slightly socially in Prague. I
met him, oh, just occasionally in Paris, where he was with the
House of Kulture, and then I met him very slightly again,
without any premeditation or making any appointment with him,
just occasionally and by accident a very few times here in New
York in, oh, I would say in '41, '42. The last time I met him
was when he arrived here in New York. By that time he became
Czechoslovak ambassador to Paris.
Mr. O'Donnell. What year was that?
Mrs. Matousek. That was in 1949, I believe. It might have
been 1950. I am not quite sure. And I met him in the hall of
the United Nations, and he recognized me and invited me for
lunch, which I did have with him. It was an absolutely non-
political lunch, but 1 was eager to hear what he had to say,
and afterward I told him--when he met me the next day he looked
straight through me, and never recognized me.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was he a member of the House of Kulture
group in Paris?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, he was.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was the House of Kulture in Paris?
Mrs. Matousek. I cannot tell you too much about it, sir,
because I was not a member myself and didn't have any real
contact with them. It was a group of painters and artists, but
there were some people who didn't have anything to do with
arts, I believe, who rented together a house and lived there,
probably for reasons of economy. But what other activities they
have adopted, I do not quite know, because, as I said, I didn't
have any contact with them.
Mr. O'Donnell. Wasn't it generally known among your group
that the House of Kulture was a Communist group?
Mrs. Matousek. It was.
Mr. O'Donnell. And Adolph Hofmeister did belong to that
group?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, he did.
Mr. O'Donnell. As a matter of fact, he was arrested as a
member of that group, wasn't he?
Mrs. Matousek. I believe so. There was a whole group of
people who were arrested at the very beginning of the war. I
believe all of the members of the House of Kulture were
arrested.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was Vladimir Clementis a member of the House
of Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. I know whom you are speaking of. I would not
know, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. You would not know?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know Vladimir Clementis. Did you
know him?
Mrs. Matousek. I met him. He came several times to see my
then chief, Mr. Hubert Ripka, who was then President Benes'
representative of the National Council in Paris, and Mr.
Clementis came a couple of times with him. That is how I met
him. But then shortly afterwards I believe Mr. Clementis was
arrested, too, and that was in the fall of '39, and I didn't
have any contact with him since.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was he arrested as a member of the House of
Kulture group, too?
Mrs. Matousek. I wouldn't know, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. But you know he was arrested?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. By the French police?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know if he was arrested for
Communistic activity?
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, I would assume so, but I do not know.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know a Joseph Pelz?
Mrs. Matousek. I have known an Antonin Pelz.
Mr. O'Donnell. Who was Antonin Pelz?
Mrs. Matousek. Antonin Pelz was a cartoonist.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is the same chap.
Mrs. Matousek. Yes. His first name is Antonin. Was a
cartoonist whom I have met. I haven't known him too well, but I
believe he was a member of the House of Kulture, too.
Mr. O'Donnell. Then was he arrested in that group, the
House of Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. I don't quite remember, but I believe so.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was the House of Kulture in existence when
you first arrived in Paris?
Mrs. Matousek. This I do not know, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. How many times did you visit the House of
Kulture yourself?
Mrs. Matousek. About twice, perhaps.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was the reason for your visits to the
House of Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. Having dinner there.
Mr. O'Donnell. Having dinner there?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. With whom?
Mrs. Matousek. Well, with my husband.
Mr. O'Donnell. Your husband. And would anybody else be
present?
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, well, they must have invited us, or we
must have invited ourselves, but I do not recall who would have
been present, because it was no other but social occasion.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did your husband ever belong to the House of
Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. No, he did not, as far as I know.
Mr. O'Donnell. To what extent did your husband attempt to
become affiliated with the House of Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. I believe he felt that they were in a way a
competition. My husband founded in Paris a group--they called
themselves, oh, Czechoslovak Artists in Paris, or some such a
thing, and he was president of this group and arranged for an
exhibition in Paris. He, I had an idea, rather felt that the
House of Kulture was a kind of competition.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did he make any positive effort to join the
House of Kulture, as far as you know?
Mrs. Matousek. He may have, but I am not aware of it. I
really don't recall.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were you ever approached to join the
Communist party by anybody?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I have not; not that I recall. Not in so
many words, I am sure.
The Chairman. That will be all. Incidentally, the committee
does not give the press the names of any witnesses who appear,
so that unless you tell the newspapers that you have been here,
no one will know you were here. I don't think we will want you
back for anything at all, but I wish that you would consider
yourself still under subpoena in case there is any additional
information the staff might want.
Mrs. Matousek. Certainly. I am at your disposition,
Senator.
[Witness excused.]
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned to Thursday,
September 17, 1953, at 10:00 a.m.]
SECURITY--UNITED NATIONS
[Editor's note.--Abraham Unger's executive session
testimony was published in 1953. Vachlav Lofek did not testify
in public session. David M. Freedman testified publicly on
September 18, 1953.]
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, N.Y.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 2:25 p.m., in room 128, of the
United States Court House, Foley Square, New York, Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; Robert Jones, administrative assistant to
Senator Potter; Harold Rainville, administrative assistant to
Senator Dirksen; and Blaine Sloan, legal department, United
Nations.
TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM UNGER (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BERNARD
JAFFE)
[Although taken in executive session, this testimony was
published in 1953 in U.S. Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Security--United Nations (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1953), pages 40-55.]
TESTIMONY OF VACHLAV LOFEK
Mr. Cohn. Are you a citizen of the United States?
Mr. Lofek. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. Naturalized?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. In what year?
Mr. Lofek. 1937, in January.
Mr. Cohn. What is your employment at the present time?
Mr. Lofek. Employment, I work for?
Mr. Cohn. Where do you work?
Mr. Lofek. In the Czech Delegation.
Mr. Cohn. You work for the Czech Delegation?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, for the Czech Delegation.
Mr. Cohn. To the United Nations?
Mr. Lofek. To the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. Is that right?
Mr. Lofek. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a Communist?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir, I never been.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a Communist at the present time?
Mr. Lofek. No.
Mr. Cohn. You work for the Communist government?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, I do.
Mr. Cohn. Do they make a practice of employing people who
are not Communists?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know, but they never asked me to join,
or anything.
Mr. Cohn. Are you sympathetic to the Communist regime in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Are you opposed to it?
Mr. Lofek. Well, just nothing. I don't say nothing.
Mr. Cohn. I don't want to know if you say nothing. Are you
in favor of or opposed to the Communist regime in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. I don't like it the way they do. It now is there
anymore.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Lofek. I don't like the way they do.
Mr. Cohn. You mean in Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. You are opposed then?
Mr. Lofek. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. To the Communist government in Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. Do they know you are opposed to them up there?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know. They never ask. No, I never tell
it.
Mr. Cohn. What kind of work do you do?
Mr. Lofek. I am mostly like a messenger. I have to go all
around. They need something, I have to go get it.
Mr. Cohn. Do you ever carry papers back and forth?
Mr. Lofek. Papers, like the United Nations papers. I go to
the headquarters and pick them up and bring them to the office
and when they assort them they tell me to mail them, you know,
I send them back, you know, what they want to Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Cohn. What is your salary?
Mr. Lofek. $200 a month.
Mr. Cohn. $200 a month. Do you have any other income?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir. Well, I keep just a little bit from
what I saved before I work for them from the bank with
interest.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever carried any papers to the Communist
party headquarters?
Mr. Lofek. To the Communist party--no, I don't. You mean to
the Soviet or----
Mr. Cohn. No. I mean Communist party headquarters of the
United States.
Mr. Lofek. I don't know even where it is.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever carried any papers to the Communist
party headquarters?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Any office of the Communist party?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir. I never know where these office----
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever deliver any to any American
Communist?
Mr. Lofek. No, no.
Mr. Cohn. Who obtained your job for you at the Czech
Delegation?
Mr. Lofek. Who--people?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, who got you the job there?
Mr. Lofek. I got it myself.
Mr. Cohn. How did you go about it?
Mr. Lofek. I got it 1943, you know, they advertised, but
they used to be Czech information office.
Mr. Cohn. After the Communists took over----
Mr. Lofek. Well, they kept me. You know they discharged
lots of people after they closed the consulate, the Czech
consulate two years ago, they discharged most of people, and
they only kept me.
Mr. Cohn. Were you the only one they kept?
Mr. Lofek. That is all.
Mr. Cohn. You are the only one they kept?
Mr. Lofek. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You say they never asked you whether or not you
are a Communist?
Mr. Lofek. No. Never did, never noticed.
Mr. Cohn. When I first asked you if you were in favor of
the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia you were not sure
whether you were in favor or opposed?
Mr. Lofek. No, but I have never been, still never. Never
did anything for them, only this what I am working for now.
Mr. Cohn. Your testimony is that you have never talked with
anybody up there about----
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn [continuing]. Whether or not you favor the regime
in Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Never discussed it?
Mr. Lofek. No.
Mr. Cohn. What do you object to in the regime in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. Well, the way they treat the people, like----
Mr. Cohn. What way do they treat the people?
Mr. Lofek. They took the property away from them, you know,
that is what I think because they did it for my sister, my
brother-in-law, you know.
Mr. Cohn. The Communists?
Mr. Lofek. Yes. Now, after two years ago.
The Chairman. Are your sister and brother-in-law living in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, but they died now. My sister died two years
ago and my brother-in-law died last fall.
The Chairman. Natural deaths?
Mr. Lofek. What is that?
The Chairman. They were not killed by the Communists? They
died natural deaths?
Mr. Lofek. Yes. My sister had a stroke.
The Chairman. Do you know whether they were members of the
Communist party in Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. No, never as far as I know. My brother was
against them. Always against them. And my sister, she never
know anything about politics because she was old.
The Chairman. Who recommended you for the job at the United
Nations?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir, no one, they kept me since I start to
work for the information bureau, you know, the Czech
information in 1943.
The Chairman. You started working for the Czech information
in 1943?
Mr. Lofek. That is right, in January.
The Chairman. That was under the free government in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, yes.
The Chairman. And then when the Communists took over they
kept you on as an employee.
Mr. Lofek. They kept me. First they said have to discharge
me, they have no work for me, but after the--I don't know--
couple of weeks later they said if I want to stay they keep me
because they need somebody to go around and understand a little
English because none of the others, none of them can speak
English, you know.
The Chairman. You are a messenger, you take papers from one
place to another, don't you?
Mr. Lofek. Not from one place to another. I mean I have to
go down to the headquarters, bring them to the office. They,
couple of the guys assort them, and they tell me which the
untied papers I have to wrap up and send to Czechoslovakia, you
know.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Lofek. But I don't carry any other papers any other
place.
The Chairman. In other words, when they tell you to do it,
you wrap up certain mail or papers?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, they give me----
The Chairman. And send them to Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. That is right, they give me, you know, what they
want to send and if they have letters like that they send over
to the states here for this, like United Nation delegations, so
I do that, too, you know. I stamp them, and I sent them out.
The Chairman. How is the stuff sent to Czechoslovakia? By
diplomatic pouch?
Mr. Lofek. No. This papers I send them not through the
diplomatic pouch. I send them through the parcel post. Printed
matter, through the post office; and sometimes if they want
something in a hurry, then I send it through Sabena Air Line,
you know. But that is only maybe once, sometimes only once in
two weeks, sometimes once a week.
The Chairman. Are you the only American citizen working for
the Czech delegation?
Mr. Lofek. There is one lady there, but she minding the
switchboard.
The Chairman. What is her name?
Mr. Lofek. Mrs. Joseph.
The Chairman. Mrs. Joseph?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, Mrs. Joseph.
Mr. Cohn. What is her first name?
Mr. Lofek. Eva. I forgot already, because I don't pay much
attention.
Mr. Cohn. Where does she live?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know where she lives.
Mr. Cohn. Does she live in Manhattan, do you know?
Mr. Lofek. Oh, yes, I guess she lives in Manhattan, but I
don't know.
Mr. Cohn. She is married, isn't she?
Mr. Lofek. That is correct.
Mr. Cohn. What is her husband's first name?
Mr. Lofek. Her husband is Mr. Joseph but he used to, as far
as I understand, he used to work for the UNRRA in Prague.
Mr. Cohn. What is his first name, do you remember?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know. I couldn't tell you.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't you ever meet him over at the office?
Mr. Lofek. I met him, but I never speak to him, but because
he came to see his wife.
The Chairman. Haven't you ever gone to their house for
dinner?
Mr. Lofek. No.
The Chairman. You don't know them well at all?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you married?
Mr. Lofek. I was, but I am divorced already twenty years,
so far about twenty years.
The Chairman. Where is your former wife? In Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. In New York, but I don't know where she lives.
The Chairman. When did you come to this country?
Mr. Lofek. Where?
The Chairman. Yes, when did you come to this country.
Mr. Lofek. In the 13th of March.
The Chairman. When were you naturalized?
Mr. Lofek. In 1937.
The Chairman. Then you worked for UNRRA for a while?
Mr. Lofek. No, not me.
The Chairman. You didn't?
Mr. Lofek. No, not me.
The Chairman. Did you ever work for any other United States
government agency?
Mr. Lofek. No. Only once I worked for the post office, but
in the, you know, for the Christmastime two months, like that,
you know, when they were busy. I got a job in the Morgan Annex
two months only.
The Chairman. Have you ever attended Communist meetings?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir. No, sir, never. I never cared for those
things. I never did.
The Chairman. Never joined the Communist party?
Mr. Lofek. No, no, sir.
The Chairman. Anyone ever ask you to join the party?
Mr. Lofek. No.
The Chairman. It seems rather unusual that the Communist
delegation would hire an American who was against communism.
Mr. Lofek. They don't know about that. They don't know. You
see, if I tell them then I am finished with the job, you know.
And the job sufficient for me, like I am an old guy you know,
and it is not hard, you know, so that is why I am trying to
keep it as long as I could.
The Chairman. How old are you?
Mr. Lofek. Sixty-one, I am going to be next month.
The Chairman. I have no further questions, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Cohn. I have no more.
The Chairman. I may say that the Czech delegation will not
be notified you were called. The newspapers will not be
notified unless you tell them. If you want to tell anyone you
were here, that is up to you.
Mr. Lofek. Only the boss knows about it because I told him
I have to come down here.
The Chairman. I merely want you to know if anyone knows you
were here is because you tell them.
Mr. Lofek Yes.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Lofek. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Who knows about it, you say?
Mr. Lofek. Only my boss, you know, because--I tell him I
come. Mr. Nosek.
Mr. Cohn. What is his name?
Mr. Lofek. Nosek
Mr. Cohn. How do you spell it?
Mr. Lofek. I had to tell him.
Mr. Cohn. How do you spell his name?
Mr. Lofek. N-o-s-e-k.
Mr. Cohn. Is he a Communist?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, I guess he is because he is the boss from
the delegation, you know, so----
The Chairman. Your testimony is that as far as you are
concerned you are not interested in communism?
Mr. Lofek. I never been and I am not.
The Chairman. Your job is merely a messenger?
Mr. Lofek. And like a little shipping clerk, I got to pack
those things and they need something, I have to do everything
for them, especially they come to the delegation.
The Chairman. You never have occasion to read the mail that
comes in or goes out?
Mr. Lofek. Oh, no, because I don't get that. I get the
mail, you know, the mailman gives it to me but I have to take
it right up there, you know.
The Chairman. Did they ever send you as a messenger to
deliver any material to Communist headquarters in New York.
Mr. Lofek. No, sir, no, sir, they never did.
The Chairman. So that you will know, the address is 35 East
12th Street.
Mr. Lofek. No, I never been there.
The Chairman. You never delivered any there?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know where it is, never heard about
that.
The Chairman. That is all. I don't think we will want you
back but consider yourself under subpoena in case we want to
call you.
Mr. Lofek. Yes, if you want to, then I am willing, see, but
the only thing is I got to tell the boss because, you know he
wants to know.
The Chairman. I don't think we will want you.
Mr. Lofek. He wants to know that I go.
The Chairman. This is off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. That is all. If you are discharged, let us
know. Understand, there is nothing we can do about it if you
are, but let the committee know if you are fired, will you?
Mr. Lofek. Thank you.
The Chairman. Your testimony will not be given to the Czech
delegation.
Mr. Lofek. Thank you. Good day.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF DAVID M. FREEDMAN (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL,
BERNARD JAFFE)
The Chairman. In this matter now in hearing before the
committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Freedman. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Freedman, you are a member of the New York
Bar?
Mr. Freedman. I am.
Mr. Cohn. Are you admitted to practice before any agency of
the federal government?
Mr. Freedman. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Which one?
Mr. Freedman. Immigration service.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know a man named Julius Reiss?
Mr. Freedman. I would like to say about that, when we were
here on Tuesday I was informed by my counsel that he had been
told that the purpose for which we were asked to come here----
Mr. Cohn. No, no. I don't think you got the question. Do
you know a man named Julius Reiss?
Mr. Freedman. I heard you.
Mr. Cohn. We were held up so much by Mr. Unger, we would
like to move along.
Mr. Freedman. I heard your question, but I would like to
make a preface to what I want to answer.
The Chairman. There will be no prefaces. Do you know Julius
Reiss?
Mr. Cohn. It is a simple question.
Mr. Freedman. It is not as simple as that.
The Chairman. We will make it simple. Answer the question.
Mr. Freedman. I am answering it, Senator. I am saying when
I was here Tuesday I was told----
The Chairman. Do you know Julius Reiss? I don't care what
happened Tuesday. Do you know him or don't you know him?
Mr. Freedman. I will decline to answer the question.
Mr. Cohn. On what ground?
Mr. Freedman. On the ground in view of the statements made
by the senator to the press which I have seen reported, it
would appear that the attempt to ask me that question is an
attempt to try to besmirch me. I will not allow myself to be
used in that way, and I will therefore decline to answer on the
ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. You are refusing on the ground it will
incriminate you?
Mr. Cohn. He is entitled to that.
The Chairman. Is that the ground?
Mr. Freedman. I am urging that as a ground because of the
fact when you were--made a representation to my attorney on
Tuesday the only purpose for which we were coming here was to
ask questions with relation to this man, you used that as a
means for utilizing this forum with my partner, Mr. Unger, who
was here before, to try and investigate and interrogate him
with matters that had no concern with Reiss or anybody else,
and I refuse to be entrapped in the same way.
The Chairman. I have never met you before, know nothing
about you, never seen you before.
Mr. Freedman. That is mutual, Senator.
The Chairman. When I say I know nothing about you, I know
something about your background. You are now being asked the
question whether or not you knew Mr. Reiss.
Mr. Freedman. I have answered.
The Chairman. Are you refusing on the ground a truthful
answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Freedman. I am answering on the ground that an answer
to that question may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. You are entitled to the privilege.
Mr. Cohn. Now, did Mr. Reiss work for you in connection
with the defense of the twelve Communist members of the
Communist party who were indicted under the Smith Act here in
1948?
Mr. Freedman. For the same reason I refused to answer the
previous question I will refuse to answer this one.
Mr. Cohn. Now, were you in the year 1950 a member of the
Professional Group of the Communist party?
Mr. Freedman. I believe that question is impertinent, and
it has no place in this proceeding. It is no function of this
committee to inquire about such things, if such a thing
existed, and I certainly resent being asked the question. I
think it violates my rights under the Constitution, under the
First Amendment and under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments and it
certainly is----
The Chairman. What is the Ninth Amendment that is violated
by--and the Tenth?
This is off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Freedman. I will therefore not answer the question.
Mr. Cohn. Would you examine this for a moment, please, Mr.
Freedman?
The Chairman. What is the right under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments you think are violated by that question?
Mr. Freedman. The right is all powers not given to the
federal government are reserved in the people in this country,
and one of the powers not delegated to the federal government
was the power to inquire into the political affiliations and
beliefs and aspirations of the people.
The Chairman. You are refusing to answer under your rights
in the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments; is that right?
Mr. Freedman. I am right now.
The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer, then.
Mr. Freedman. I will refuse to answer under the ground any
answer may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. You are refusing--I don't guess there is any
further use questioning him. He has used the Fifth Amendment.
He is entitled to do it.
Mr. Cohn. I want to ask you one or two very short
questions.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Cohn. Can you identify that record here which we
directed to be produced? Sir?
Mr. Freedman. I decline to identify it under the ground
this is simply a repetition of the question you previously
asked me in another form which I have declined to answer on the
ground it may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. On the ground it may tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Freedman. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. For the record we will indicate that is the
exhibit produced by Mr. Unger in response to the request to the
committee.
I don't know if I asked you this or not. Are you a member
of the Communist party today?
Mr. Freedman. You did not ask me that.
Mr. Cohn. Consider it asked now.
Mr. Freedman. My answer to that is the same as my answer to
the previous question. I decline to answer the question because
you have no right to ask me. I think it is impertinent to do
so, and on the further ground I will not answer on the ground
it will tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. Do you think it is a crime to be a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Freedman. I will not answer that question either,
Senator, for the same reasons.
The Chairman. On the ground that the answer might tend to
incriminate you. Is that the ground?
Mr. Freedman. That is the ground.
The Chairman. You are entitled to refuse.
You will be ordered to be here at 10:30 in the morning.
10:30 in room 110. I think I will make it ten o'clock in the
morning in room 110.
Ten o'clock. Incidentally, ten o'clock does not mean
someone will phone you and bring you over.
Mr. Freedman. I am sorry if you were inconvenienced any
this afternoon.
The Chairman. I am telling you about tomorrow, not today.
Mr. Freedman. All right.
The Chairman. Be here about ten. I think I will make it
10:15 in the morning.
Mr. Jaffe. Aren't the hearings going to be held next week,
or some other time? It will be impossible for me to make it. It
really is. I mean, I don't like to request anything like this,
but I had no notion that, you know, my coming here with these
attorneys would involve this much time.
The Chairman. Mr. Jaffe, it is your own clients that make
it difficult, not Mr. Freedman, he has taken very little time,
but your own client took up almost over two hours of the
committee's time, and when we have a witness who goes out of
the way to make trouble for the committee to accomplish its
purpose to get the information it wants and needs to perform
our function, I just don't like to call the entire staff back
here if it costs a lot of money to come back here. We have the
staff of Senator Dirksen and Senator Potter. Have their
investigators.
Mr. Jaffe. I thought you were sitting here next week, in
any event, Senator.
The Chairman. Not that I know of now.
Mr. Jaffe. If you were, I would really appreciate putting
this over.
The Chairman. As far as I know, we are not going to. We
need your man in the morning for the hearing.
Mr. Jaffe. Okay.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY
[Editor's note.--Igor Bogolepov and Vladimir Petrov (1916-
1999) both testified at a public hearing on September 28, 1953.
Additional testimony given in executive session on September 21
by Gen. Richard C. Partridge and Samuel McKee was published by
the subcommittee in Committee on Government Operations,
Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Communist Infiltration of the Army (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1954), pages 85-105.]
----------
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:30 a.m., in room 155, Senate
Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel; and David Surine,
assistant counsel.
Present also from the Department of Army: Hon. Robert T.
Stevens, secretary of the army; Gen. Richard C. Partridge, G-2;
Brig. Gen. C. C. Fenn; and Joseph W. Bishop, acting department
counselor.
TESTIMONY OF IGOR BOGOLEPOV
The Chairman. Would you raise your right hand, please?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
give in the matter now in hearing will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Bogolepov. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Could we get your full name for the record?
Mr. Bogolepov. My first name is Igor. My last name is
Bogolepov.
The Chairman. May I admonish everyone in the room that no
information is to be given out of Mr. Bogolepov's testimony
today. I may say, Secretary Stevens, that he objected very
strenuously to giving this testimony. Mr. Bogolepov is working
for the government himself. He didn't want to testify. He came
here because the committee wanted him to come.
Is that right?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Bogolepov, could you give us a little
background? Where were you born?
Mr. Bogolepov. Born in Siberia in 1904.
Mr. Cohn. Did there ever come a time when you went into the
Soviet Foreign Service?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, I was employed there from 1923 to 1942.
I was first an officer awhile in the legal department; then I
went to the Red Army; then came back to the foreign office in
the League of Nations desk; then I participated in the Civil
War in Spain as interpreter between the Soviet generals and the
Republican general staff. I was arrested in Spain by the secret
police and shipped back to the Soviet Union for trial. Then I
was released in 1938 and restored in the Foreign Service Office
in the Soviet Union.
I have participated in many international talks which took
place between the Soviet Union and Western nations, including
the Soviet-Nazi Pact and President Roosevelt's emissary, Harry
Hopkins, in the summer of 1941.
During the war I was in the Baltic countries and on the
Leningrad Front and come over to the German lines. I deserted
from the Soviet army being in rank of colonel of general staff.
I tried for sometime to convince the Germans to take less
stupid political line towards the Russian people and Russian
soldiers. Because of my stubbornness and perhaps too hot a
defense of the Russian national interests as opposed to
Communists and Nazis they put me in Gestapo jail for a while to
cool me down.
After release I went to a German farm in Bavaria and was
there until the American army came in 1945.
Under American occupation I was obliged first to hide
myself, for a couple of years, due to the western policies of
extradition to the Soviet police of all Russian people,
especially like me who were on the Soviet wanted persons list.
In 1947 I came out and explained to the U.S. Army
intelligence officers in Germany who I was actually and my
political standpoint and I started my work in the United States
Army.
First I worked as instructor in the European Command
Intelligence School in Oberammergau and next year I was
transferred to the General Staff School in Regensburg, Germany,
as an instructor on the matters of the Soviet policies, party
organization and similar matters. In 1952 I was brought by the
army to this country to testify before the Senate Internal
Security Committee against Owen Lattimore.
After my testimony I was dismissed from the army,
unfortunately, and I am living now in this country waiting for
my bill to be decided.
The Chairman. A bill introduced by Senator Karl Mundt
granting Mr. Bogolepov full citizenship.
Mr. Bogolepov. I had forgotten to mention that at the end
of the thirties I was able to join the Communist party of the
Soviet Union. I did it, as many other Russian anti-Communists
do, in order to get in a higher position and to influence in
that way the overthrow of the Communist regime in my country.
That is all.
Mr. Cohn. Were you dismissed from service with the army
after you testified before the McCarran committee?
Mr. Bogolepov. I think in connection with this. If you need
more information about it, when I came here the assistant chief
of G-2, General Bolling was much eager to get me for his
service. He introduced me in the Pentagon to another general
and they discussed my further employment as a lecturer in
various U.S. military colleges. Two days after the talks were
stopped and I got my discharge papers from the army.
The Chairman. What are you working at now?
Mr. Bogolepov. I am not very much happy with work, for
evidently my reputation of a radical Russian anti-Communist is
speaking against me. Neither State Department or Pentagon
wanted to have anything with me. I am working merely on an
informal basis. I have here some former students of mine. I
examine for them various aspects of psychological warfare; also
I am writing for newspapers from time to time, etc., etc.
The Chairman. In the statement I made in the record
originally, I understood you objected to testifying because you
are now working for the army. I gather you don't; that you lost
your job.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, may I ask if you could check
that.
Secretary Stevens. You bet your life.
The Chairman. We would not like Mr. Bogolepov's name used
publicly.
Mr. Bogolepov, the secretary of the army will check into
your discharge after you testified before the McCarran
committee. It seems on the face to be completely unreasonable
that you worked for the army until you were subpoenaed before a
United States Senate committee and then were promptly fired.
The secretary will check into that.
Mr. Bogolepov, you were working in the Foreign Office,
Moscow, and a book entitled A History of Russia, War Department
Educational Manual EM 248 was being written. Is that correct?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is correct.
The Chairman. This book was written by a man in London?
Mr. Bogolepov. Right.
The Chairman. From the information we have, Mr. Secretary,
this has been used as an indoctrination course in the army.
Also I may say one of the sources for the document which we
discussed the other day. They used this as source material.
Mr. Bogelepov, while you were in the Russian Foreign Office
did you see any correspondence either with the man who was
writing this book in London or with the Russian embassy in
London giving instructions as to how propaganda was handled?
Mr. Bogolepov. I have to explain first that starting with
the middle of the thirties, big operation was set for by the
Soviet government in order to infiltrate into the Western
administrations the idea favorable to the Soviet government.
In that connection they used Soviet embassies, the
Komintera channels and emissaries sent from Moscow to various
foreign countries. Contacts were established with prominent
Western lawyers, scholars and especially with the people known
here under the name of Russian experts.
The idea was that in order to get Western politicians to be
confused and influenced--presidents, ministers of foreign
affairs, etc., one has to confuse and to influence their
advisors. The Russian experts in the west--I saw myself in the
secret files of the Soviet foreign office this directive of the
Foreign Commissar Molotov--must be ``won on our side.'' Molotov
said to the Soviet ambassador in London, Maisky, in 1939, that
he has to redouble his efforts in the matter of mobilization of
the people who work on Russian matters in England to get them
``work for us.'' They were supposed merely to supply false
suggestions on Soviet policies to the Western governments and
public opinion rather than to serve as a source of information.
Especially insistent was Moletov to influence members of the
British government in 1939 in the sense which will help the
aims of the Soviet foreign policies.
In one of the letters Ambassador Maisky sent back to Moscow
to the foreign office, it was mentioned that a noted British
scholar, Sir Bernard Pares, make appearances in the Soviet
embassy and ask the Soviet embassy's help in writing chapter of
his history on Russia dealing with Soviet matters. I remember
that report of Maisky was mentioned that the man asked embassy
to give information about Soviet history because he felt
himself incompetent and needed some assistance.
The Chairman. Mr. Bogolepov, just to have the record
straight, this book was originally written in 1926, apparently
revised in 1928 and a final revision in 1937. Now, was it
during the 1937 revision that this London Communist got
instructions from the Soviet embassy?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, that was in the end of the thirties. I
do not remember the exact date--1936 or 1937.
The Chairman. He did not do the original writing but the
final revision?
Mr. Bogolepov. Right, if one will judge by correspondence I
saw.
The Chairman. I may say, Mr. Secretary, that we have
checked and find that this was in use by the army up through
1952.
Secretary Stevens. What is that?
The Chairman. History of Russia.
It was released by the armed forces as a War Department
educational book. I might say also that it was source material
for the document entitled ``Psychological and Cultural Traits
of Soviet Siberia.'' I think I should emphasize for the record
that none of it had its origin under the present regime. It was
all brought in, long before Secretary Stevens took over and
long before President Eisenhower took over as president. I
assume it may still be in use because of the time lag in
getting rid of it. That is why I think our committee might be
of some benefit by giving you a picture of the unusual material
that has been used.
Mr. Bogolepov. Inasmuch as Mr. Secretary is present here, I
think it would be of interest to know that some of my students,
high officers of the intelligence division, were protesting
against use of this book in the Regensburg school and other
U.S. Army installations in Germany. I don't know whether they
succeeded or not but I do know that when I protested myself
against this and other literature and I got in serious trouble
and here I have with me copy of the order from the intelligence
school, Oberammergau, to tell you what kind of mess I got in
because of my protestation.
The Chairman. In other words, when you objected to the use
of Communist propaganda to indoctrinate our troops you were
removed from your job?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. One of the reasons, they said
I was a chronic complainer, signed by J. E. Raymond, Colonel,
U. S. Infantry. In a way I certainly was. I was complaining
about communism for thirty years.
The Chairman. They didn't like you being a chronic
complainer about Communist literature.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
The Chairman. I can understand why you objected so
strenuously to coming here to testify.
When you came to the United States you then worked for army
intelligence for a while?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is correct. I still was employed by the
army one month after arrival to this country.
The Chairman. And you were furnishing the army all the
material you could about Soviet Russia and their potential war
plans, strength, etc.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
The Chairman. When you were discharged after you testified
before the McCarran committee were you given any reason for the
discharge?
Mr. Bogolepov. No. I just got my papers. That is all. When
I asked Colonel Brown, the adjutant to General Bolling, what is
the result of General Bolling's intention to employ me with
army in the United States, I got answer by telephone this issue
wasn't raised anymore.
The Chairman. How long after you testified before the
McCarran committee were you discharged?
Mr. Bogolepov. Immediately after I was released from the
subpoena of the United States Senate.
The Chairman. Getting back to this book, do I understand
your testimony to be that parts of the book, I think you
referred to the last chapter specifically, were written under
the direction of the Russian Foreign Office and instructions
having been submitted through the Russian embassy in London? Is
that correct?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is correct. Through the Soviet embassy
in London.
The Chairman. Have you had an opportunity to read this book
yourself?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, certainly I had.
The Chairman. Would you consider this Communist propaganda?
Mr. Bogolepov. I consider it worse than Communist
propaganda. I was in the army myself, and no worse thing
happens to an officer when intelligence gives him
misinformation and gives false description and evaluation about
enemy. Then the battle would be certainly lost. This book you
have in your hand, together with a lot of other information on
the USSR used by the army in Europe, is evidently calculated
misinformation. That is my sincere belief and impression.
The Chairman. So you consider this much more serious than
propaganda. You consider it important from the standpoint of
giving our officers information about the enemy which is
completely false, which would mislead them and which would
result in losing battles and wars if they relied on this type
of information.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. I may say, from a different source we will
have sworn testimony that the author of this book was a member
of the Communist party under Communist discipline.
Obviously, you know for a fact that he was taking
instructions but you are not in a position to know whether he
is a Communist or not. That information will be supplied by
another witness.
Mr. Surine. Could you furnish the details about the Bernard
Pares situation? You were in the process of testifying about
observing correspondence in the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow
concerning Bernard Pares' contact with the embassy in London.
Could you finish that?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is more or less all. I don't remember
the details.
Mr. Surine. One of the other books which is used in the
bibliography of this report, ``Psychological and Cultural
Traits of Soviet Siberia'' is a book called U.S.S.R., a Concise
Handbook edited by Ernest J. Simmons. I hand you this book and
you will see----
Mr. Bogolepov. I know this book pretty well in six years
with the United States Army.
Mr. Surine. In the time you were in the army you worked on
the book itself, observed the book being used by the army.
Could you furnish the information you know about the various
source material you know in this book?
Mr. Bogolepov. I remember this book by heart. I testified
before the Senate McCarran committee that one of the authors of
the book, a professor at Columbia, John Hazard, spent time in
Moscow in so-called Moscow Institute of Soviet Law, which head
was in those days no other person than Vishinsky himself, and
Professor Hazard got a very good education in the Soviet law
and in time of his being there was graduated from this Soviet
Institute of Law with high praise and it is my opinion after
reading his article and this book that this praise was not
given in vain, he really deserved it. Professor Hazard in his
many writings, in this book as well as in other publications,
is carrying out the idea that the Soviet legal institutions are
more or less like American institutions. It does not help much
when he writes that Americans have a different way, still his
method of comparing Soviet institutions with the American
government administration and judiciary implies the false idea
that the things under communism aren't that bad.
The Chairman. I think the record should show that this is
work edited by Ernest Joseph Simmons, paragraphs were written
by different individuals, one by Corliss Lamont, who has been
identified as a long-time apologist for communism; one by
Harriet Moore, a rather notorious Communist who invoked the
Fifth Amendment in regard to espionage and communism; another
chapter written by Fredrick Schuman, who has been identified
not as a Communist but as a sympathizer.
Mr. Bogolepov, just to have the record clear, this book
which we are now talking about, U.S.S.R., a Concise Handbook by
Ernest J. Simmons, was used to indoctrinate our military while
you were working for the military?
Mr. Bogolepov. Right.
The Chairman. And I understand you objected to the use of
this book at that time?
Mr. Bogolepov. I did.
By the way, Senator, I met Simmons in Moscow. He visited
Soviet Union many times. If my recollections are correct, I
talked to him in Moscow in the Office of the Press Division of
Foreign Office and I was one of those who were obliged to give
him some indoctrination on how to carry out pro-Soviet
propaganda in this country. He was a very friendly, very polite
person. When I came to the West and disclosed that actually I
was an anti-Communist, he didn't want to have contact with me
anymore.
The Chairman. Were you convinced that Simmons was loyal to
the Communist cause?
Mr. Bogolepov. Well, Senator, my English is not very broad.
I don't know perhaps the actual significance of the word loyal.
If a man comes to the Communist Foreign Office and gets advice
on how to carry out pro-Soviet propaganda in this country, to
me that means he is loyal, but I may be wrong. It was my
impression at least.
Mr. Surine. You have finished your comments on the U.S.S.R.
handbook?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
Mr. Surine. You have had an opportunity to analyze the
report which is at issue in this hearing, haven't you?
I might point out for the record that Mr. Bogolepov did not
have an opportunity to look at this report until just a couple
of days ago.
Would you care to analyze that report on the basis of your
study?
Mr. Bogolepov. Right, but may I just make an observation
concerning this business with pro-Communist books in the army.
I wish to emphasize once more that I met a great deal of army
officers, intelligence officers, who were also as much upset as
I was. Some protested. For example, the former chief of
Regensburg Military School, Colonel Martin, was one who was
protesting against, to my knowledge, against the use of all
these books I mentioned here, especially with the special
service of the U.S. Army of occupation in Germany.
I wish to make it completely clear when I am talking about
such sad matters in American army, that it does not mean I
accuse army as a whole. I have only to praise the intellectual
and moral level of the American officers and soldiers as very
high. They resented much all this Communist propaganda stuff in
the army installations.
The Chairman. Your testimony is that a sizeable number of
the officers felt as strongly about this Communist type of
literature as you do?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. They protested.
The Chairman. But you feel the army as a whole has a high
moral standard, anti-Communist, and that their protestations
were of no avail under the past administration?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is exactly what I mean, sir.
Mr. Surine. Proceed on this report.
Mr. Bogolepov. Well, how much time do I have? To talk about
this report and say everything which is really must be said,
requires too much of time.
The Chairman. As much time as you need.
Mr. Bogolepov. I will try to do it in twenty or twenty-five
minutes if such would be your wish.
There are two different methods of pro-Communist propaganda
in the Western world. One is direct and overt when people
simply praise all elements of the Communist regime in the
Soviet Union. That was possible before the war and up to 1948.
Now the Communist sympathizers were obliged to change tactics.
They can't praise the Soviet regime openly. They have to use a
subversive tactic since in general they come over to subversive
activities. The document on Siberia reflects both of these
methods of pro-Communist influence. First of all, I will give
you some examples of open praise of the Communist regime and
ideology.
In many instances the works of Stalin and Lenin and other
pro-Communist propagandists are used with just slightly
changing of the exact wording. For example, on page one of the
Siberian document at the very beginning it is stated: ``Harsh
Soviet government has liquidated or expelled potentially
rebellious elements.''
In this book in Russia, Stalin's Problems of Leninism, page
510, we may read:
Class of land-lords was liquidated during civil war. Other
exploiters shared the fate of the land-lords. All exploiters
became liquidated.
In other words, there is no more Communist opposition in
Russia, which is purely Communist propaganda, which is not
correct. The aim of this document is to make the army believe
that there is no cracks in the Kremlin walls; that there is
only one way to fight against communism; to carry out a total
war against all peoples behind the Iron Curtain.
On pages four and five, there is a long story about how
life is wonderful under the Communist regime.
The toiler was elevated to the highest level of
respectability The laborer is hero now in the Soviet Union. . .
. The farmers status has also risen sharply. . . . Women are
virtually on a par with men in all walks of life. Women have
the right to be employed . . . '' etc.
Exactly the same statement might be found again in the book
of Stalin's on page 518, when Stalin speaks that:
The working class of the Soviet Union who has liquidated
private property and capitalistic exploitations is now the
leading class of Soviet Society. . . . Our Soviet peasantry
also changed completely, became a new peasantry. It is a
peasantry liberated from the bondage. . . . And our working
intelligentsia is also a new intelligentsia, second to none in
the world.
In other words, the analyst of Siberia repeats word for
word the statements of Stalin.
Mr. Surine. In connection with the theme of people being
solidly behind the Communist regime, did you have or hear any
personal conversation by Molotov himself along that line?
Mr. Bogolepov. Along which line?
Mr. Surine. That is must be prevented at all costs--that
the Western world know of the real conditions behind the Iron
Curtain?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, that was the prime objective the
activities of the foreign office.
Mr. Surine. Would you repeat the conversation?
Mr. Bogolepov. Well, there wasn't one conversation. That
was the main line of instructions which Molotov always gave to
us, employees of the Soviet Foreign Office and to the members
of the Soviet embassies abroad, that we would have to do our
best in order to implant in the Western world the idea the
Soviet people would back the Soviet system; that there were no
enemies inside the Soviet Union; that in case of war against
the capitalist world, the whole country would have to fight,
the whole people will raise as one man against the capitalist
enemy. I couldn't refer to any particular talking. That was the
main theme all talks they have in Moscow and in the Soviet
Embassies and agencies abroad.
On page ten, for example, you might find extremely
revolving statement to the effect that in Communist countries
where there is no freedoms, still one freedom is maintained,
that is freedom of self-improvement within occupation.
This statement, again, is taken from this book of Stalin's
when it is said:
Under Soviet regime people works for themselves, not for
the enrichment of exploiters. . . . Our working man feels
himself as a free man. And if he works well, he is a hero of
labor, he is covered with glory.
That is from page five hundred, Problems of Leninism of
Stalin's, which evidently served as a basis for statements in
this document.
On page thirty-seven, it is stated:
Soviet elections generate great interest and enthusiasm.
The average Soviet citizen, whatever his nationality, is apt to
feel that he has full and equal citizenship in the U.S.S.R. and
shares much of the patriotic pride which is so marked in the
Great Russian segment.
Here I have another book which is considered as a Communist
``Bible,'' the Short Course of the Communist Party, which you
might find on the desk of every member of the Communist party
in the Soviet Union as well as abroad. On page 336 you may find
the statement:
The elections were carried out in the atmosphere of great
enthusiasm. Those were more than elections. Those were feated
as a great holiday, as a triumph of the Soviet people. Ninety
millions confirmed the triumph of socialism in the U.S.S.R.
with their votes.
Almost exact wording of Siberian document!
The Chairman. Who is the author of that book?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is the official history made by the
Central Committee of the Communist party in the Soviet Union.
That is the highest authority in the Soviet Union.
The Chairman. And Stalin personally is the author of some
of the chapters?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. That is, as I said, the
Communist Bible in a way.
On page forty-nine of the U.S. Army intelligence report we
read:
National leaders are vitally respected and admired. Stalin
and Molotov are regarded as great men.
I didn't give you any reference to Soviet propaganda
because this statement you might find on every page of this and
other Communist books.
On pages forty-seven and forty-eight, just a very last
observation, we may find one of the new clever, indirect
methods of the fellow travelers and Russian experts in this
country in their work of distorting the truth about Soviet
realities and confusing the American mind. It is an effort to
identify Russian people with present regime, the same method
you might find in all Communist publications. American self-
styled experts say there was never any freedom in Russia and
there is no freedom today, so you haven't to worry about
Russia, and the one way to deal with the mess is the Atomic
bomb. While using this method of putting all Russian
Communists, as well as non-Communists, on the same level, the
author or authors of the Siberian document go as far as to
repeat word for word basic untruths of the Red propaganda.
For example, on page nine we may read: ``Russia, long known
as prison of peoples.'' I open the story of the Communist party
on page six and I read: ``Czarist Russia, known as prison of
peoples.''
So it is a complete quotation from the Soviet book of
historical lies and this is just one example of how authors of
this document simply rewrote most appealing statements of
Communist leaders for influencing American officers, without
criticism or reservation made whatever.
On page forty-seven it is said:
Extreme caution is required in accepting hearsay data. The
opinion of 2,000,000 White Russian refugees and small numbers
of deserters and escapees cannot be taken as representative of
the 200,000,000 who remain in the USSR. Foreign travelers also
tend to distort what they see in terms of their own background,
and are readily misled by the typically human tendency of the
Russian to display deference to his correspondent's viewpoint,
particularly if the acquaintance is casual. The ardent foreign
Communist visiting the U.S.S.R. will attract his own kind, and
receives few negative impressions from those he talks to.
Similarly, Russians wishing to vent grievances will seek out
the American or British official, and casual acquaintances will
seem to agree with his opinions. Moreover, the outsider is
likely to impute his own reactions to the Soviet people,
forgetting that a situation intolerable to an American may be
acceptable as familiar routine to a Soviet citizen.
The idea is very familiar to me. When people of my type
came to Western world with the idea of explaining how dangerous
communism is exactly in the Western world, to make it obvious
that as long as communism exists in Western world, the dangers
of the Soviet Union will grow on, we immediately ran into
opposition of so-called Russian experts who have position
inside administration, publishing houses, newspapers, etc. Take
the books you have before you; take almost any other western
left-wingers writing on Russia and Soviet affairs. You'll have
almost always a hint as to non-reliability of Russian anti-
Communist refugees. Top British expert, Isaac Deutscher,
American fellow travelers, Fredrick Schuman, Harvard people,
they all are much insistent: Don't believe Russian
eyewitnesses. They are emotional and embittered. They don't
tell the truth. They are warmongers, Fascists, Communist,
everything. Believe only us Western experts on Russian affairs.
Mr. Surine. Mr. Bogelepov, isn't the effect of it that
officers reading the Siberian document should disregard
everything Russian defectors may say, and believe this document
allegedly putting out the real facts?
Mr. Bogolepov. In a way, yes. Intelligence officers who
more than often meet refugees from behind the Iron Curtain are
evidently the main target of the effort to deprive them of the
use of information provided by anti-Communist sources.
Mr. Surine. You have reviewed the entire document,
especially the last four or five pages?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.
Mr. Surine. Have you found in the document any statements
retracting the previous seventy pages or any facts in it?
[Off-record discussion.]
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, I paid special attention to this moment
and as I told you in the beginning of my testimony, we have
before us a new method of fellow-travellers and false experts
on Russian affairs. They can't praise openly our common enemy.
They have to put it, as we Russian say, a spoon of tar into
the barrel of honey, I would say, to use a protective cover. If
somebody will say it is a pro-Communist report, they will quote
some sentences that sound objective: Say Soviet worker is
unhappy; there is no freedom in the Soviet Union; that there
certainly should be discontent, etc., etc. But isn't all that
in itself very confusing? It is to contradict all of what was
said before. It looks as a way of getting alibi for the authors
of this document. They say bad things do exist in the Soviet
Union but what matters is the whole impression American
intelligence officers may have after reading the document.
Coming to the end of my testimony about this document, for
I promised to be short, I would say that the picture of the
Soviet Union, of the Communist administration, of relations
between the Russian people and their Red oppressors, and
psychology of the Soviet soldier is strongly biased. For
example, there is a true statement that the average Russian is
not an American hater, has a very high respect towards
Americans, and as a Russian who lived most of his life in the
Soviet Union, I am happy to testify here that we really don't
hate any foreign nation, whereas we have especially high esteem
of the American people, and after my living in this country I
can understand why. I found that--I hope you won't get angry--
there are much similarity between Russians and Americans, in
human character. I found Americans very frank, very friendly to
other men and nations, exactly as an average Russian is.
All is not bad in the paper under our examination, indeed.
There is a very important statement in this document to the
effect that it would be a mistake to over-emphasize the problem
of national minority in the Soviet Union, and it is rightly
suggested that in case of war American army should not place
much emphasis on national minorities to try to use them against
the Russian majority. Nothing good would come out of this. I
agree on that point with the authors of the Siberian paper.
Besides these very few positive moments, I would say, after
reading this document, the impression of an American would be
full of confusion. He would know about the Soviet Union even
less than he did before because his brains would be completely
put out of balance, due to contradictions in documents.
The second impression a reader of the document should get,
in my opinion, that the life in the Soviet Union is not so bad;
that the Russians are accustomed to this life, take life as it
is and, therefore, in case of war, as I guess I mentioned
already, there is no opportunity for American intelligence or
psychological warfare to live a wedge between regime and
Russian people and profit by dividing of enemy camp. This is a
most dangerous thought. It may cost much to all of us.
The Chairman. I have an appointment at a quarter of 12:00.
I would like to have you back here this afternoon.
[Off-record discussion.]
Mr. Bogolepov. May I make one observation. In my opinion,
it seems to me that even if this document has been declassified
it would not be wise to disclose in public hearings the full
text of this document. If the Soviet intelligence would be
informed about the contents of this type of intelligence
documents in American army, it would be very valuable
information for our enemy.
The Chairman. In other words, you feel that if the Soviet
Union knew how badly misinformed our officers are, it would be
a benefit to them?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.
The Chairman. I have weighed that carefully. I think some
damage can be done by that, however, I think the benefit gained
by exposing the complete clear-cut propaganda of the old
administration would put the new administration on its toes.
We will adjourn until two o'clock this afternoon.
afternoon session
The subcommittee reconvened at 2:00 p.m., room 155, Senate
Office Building, with the following additional people present:
Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Karl Baarslag,
Research Director.
Present from the Department of Army: Col. Odis McCormick,
chief, Troop Information and Educational Division; Col. John L.
Chamberlain, asst. chief.
TESTIMONY OF VLADIMIR PETROV
The Chairman. Will you stand and raise your right hand?
In the matter now in hearing before this committee, do you
solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Mr. Petrov. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Give us your full name, please?
Mr. Petrov. Vladimir Petrov. P-e-t-r-o-v.
Mr. Cohn. And what is your occupation at the present time?
Mr. Petrov. Teaching at Yale University.
Mr. Cohn. Can you tell us a little bit about your
background?
Mr. Petrov. I am not a professor in the first place,
instructor. I was born in Russia in 1915. I lived there until
1944. I got my college education in Moscow and Leningrad. From
1935 until 1941 I served a prison sentence in Northern Siberia.
I was released shortly before the war began to turn back to
Europe and Russia, a few months before the area was occupied by
Germany. When the Germans began to retreat from Stalingrad, I
moved westward, first to Austria, Vienna and in 1945 I was in
Italy already. I stayed there for two years before I got a
chance to come over to this country. I have been on the faculty
of Yale University since 1947.
Mr. Cohn. I believe it is correct that since that you are
the author of at least one book?
Mr. Petrov. Two books.
Mr. Cohn. And magazine articles that appeared in national
magazines in this country, based on your experience and
knowledge of the Soviet Union. Is that correct?
Mr. Petrov. That is correct.
Mr. Cohn. Have you examined, Mr. Petrov, this army
indoctrination report?
Mr. Petrov. I certainly did.
Mr. Cohn. Could you give the committee and Secretary
Stevens the benefit of your observation and analysis of this
report based on your great experience concerning the Soviet
Union and the very matters dealt within this report.
Mr. Petrov. I'd be glad to. First, I will give you a
summary of what I think of it.
This is a paper of a scientific character that has little
to do with Siberia in the first place and that, in my opinion,
is a pro-Communist apology. It contains distorted information
about the Soviet Union that tends to mislead and misinform the
reader. If you read it, your inescapable conclusion would be
that the Russians are very content with the Communist
dictatorship; that Communists are admired by the population of
the Soviet Union; that even millions of slave laborers in
Siberian concentration camps are relatively happy. The paper is
trying to prove that there is no bounds to Soviet patriotism
and the Soviet soldier is so devoted to the Communist regime
that the United States will find it next to impossible to win.
So far as the paper is used for information of American
officers, it undoubtedly would spread a defeatist attitude and
a tendency to appease communism and encourage him to surrender
on the battlefield in case of diversities. I can prove every
statement from the text of that manuscript. If American
officers believed what the papers tells them, they can't help
but feel a sense of guilt fighting the happy Russian who
maintains cordial relations with their Communist government and
no matter what leads to war, the American officer is so
indoctrinated he feels they are the target of the United
States.
Needless to say that in order to prove his point, the
author or authors knowingly or unknowingly, impose half-truths
and outright lies. Since he used as bibliography largely so-
called fellow-travelers, there is no wonder it promotes
Communist propaganda lines on most points concerning the Soviet
Russia. It may be that only the army need clean up army
information and education from bias and misleading material,
the use of which, in my opinion, is harmful to the best
interests of this country.
I want to add that least of all I think that the author of
this book is a Soviet agent or an undercover Communist because
I had some experience in the past in this country with this
kind of people and the attitude that I discovered in this paper
is not a rare thing in this country I discovered. As a matter
of fact, the author, quoting himself on page fifty says:
Most Americans are fortunate enough never to have knowingly
had personal contact with a professed communist. In the USSR
the Communist is a patriot, a civic booster, and frequently a
war hero, doing his best to build up his country. In the United
States the communist is at best a fool, and at worst a traitor,
whose primary aim is to destroy his country. Communists in the
USSR enjoy public admiration, while those in the United States
are justly condemned as actual or potential felons.
This sentence, in my opinion, characterizes the whole
approach of the author to the problem. He believes that
communism is probably not good for the United States, but it is
perfectly all right for the peoples of the Soviet Union or
whatever other country it has under its control.
I can also point out that the author in another
unscientific way tries to disqualify the sources that may
disagree with him. On page forty-seven he says:
Extreme caution is required in accepting hearsay data. The
opinion of 2,000,000 White Russian refugees and small numbers
of deserters and escapees cannot be taken as representative of
the 200,000,000 who remain in the USSR.
While I, myself, admit that I am one of these refugees, I
think that this doesn't make me less trustful source of
information.
Everyone, of course, has his opinion and is entitled to his
opinion. One may think that communism is a good thing. Another
may think that communism is a wrong thing. I believe that is a
wrong thing but it doesn't diminish any knowledge of the Soviet
Union so far as facts go. When we discuss that or this event is
good or bad, it is matter of opinion but when we come to the
facts, I believe that after spending thirty years in Russia,
reading more books about Russian than any of the so-called
experts, that were listed in the bibliography in this
manuscript, I can at least claim to be a reliable source of
information.
Do you want me to go into any details of my findings
because I have marked out a number of quotations here.
The Chairman. I think perhaps not at this time. I just read
over your analysis of some of the comments you made on this. I
may say that I disagree with the author when he says disregard
anyone who was there, we should only listen to the Corliss
Lamonts and those others. I'd much rather listen to a man like
yourself who knows the people in Siberia, knows the people of
Siberia. I may say I want to thank you very much for coming
down here today and making this study. What I'd like very much
to do if it does not impose on your time, I would like to have
you continue your analysis of not only this particular document
under consideration but several of the other books used to
indoctrinate our military.
Mr. Petrov. It is a rather ungrateful task, very dull
reading and it makes me mad.
The Chairman. I would like to have you come back Monday, if
you could, for open session.
[Off-record discussion.]
COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY
[Editor's note.--Louis Budenz (1891-1972) and Harriet Moore
Gelfan testified at the public hearing on September 28, 1953.
The executive session testimony of Corliss Lamont (1902-1995)
was published in 1953.]
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, N.Y.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 2:30 p.m., in room 128, United
States Court House, Foley Square, New York, N.Y., Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director.
The Chairman. Show the witness is reminded he has been
sworn previously.
TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ
Mr. Carr. Professor, you have been sworn.
First we would like to have you, extremely briefly, give
your present occupation.
Mr. Budenz. I am assistant professor of economics at
Fordham University and also on the faculty at Seton Hall
University.
Mr. Carr. You were formerly editor of the Daily Worker?
Mr. Budenz. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. Would you briefly recite your positions in the
Communist party very briefly?
The Chairman. May I suggest, Mr. Carr, that this is already
in the record?
Mr. Carr. We can skip that.
The Chairman. The fact Mr. Budenz was a very important
functionary and all his activities have been put in the record
so I don't think it is necessary to go through it again.
Mr. Carr. Fine.
Mr. Budenz, I am going to show you a book entitled A
History of Russia written by Bernard Pares.
Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. Are you familiar with Bernard Pares?
Mr. Budenz. I am. I don't know him personally, but I know
of him by official communications in the Communist leadership.
Mr. Carr. Do you know him as a member of the international
Communist movement?
Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, and as a member of the British
Communist party.
Mr. Carr. In what year was this, sir?
Mr. Budenz. This was during the 1940's, over a period of
time, as a matter of fact. I should say roughly, so far as my
memory can serve now, from 1942 to 1945.
The Chairman. I am going to ask you, Mr. Carr, for the
record, has it been established this book is being used for
indoctrination purposes in the army?
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. We had the man the other day that
testified that as late as 1952 this book was being used.
Professor Budenz, did you have an opportunity to look at
these pages of the book [indicating]?
Mr. Budenz. Rather hastily.
Mr. Carr. Would you care to express your opinion as to
these pages in the last chapter of the book or would you rather
have some time to study them?
Mr. Budenz. No. I think I can express an opinion.
This discussion here on the Soviet Constitution or the
Stalinist Constitution is a Communist interpretation of that
constitution. It is taking at its face value everything the
Constitution says whereas there is plenty of evidence now and
there was plenty of evidence then that this constitution is a
very decided hoax.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this, Professor. This book,
according to the evidence, has been used to indoctrinate the
American military, to teach them what communism is, what it
stands for. Do you think this is an honest description of the
workings of communism, what it stands for, what it is?
Mr. Budenz. It is not. The Constitution of 1936 was written
specifically to deceive the Western world and specifically the
United States. It incorporates provisions such as freedom of
assembly, the right to hold demonstrations, and many other
provisions which do not exist in Soviet Russia. We have ample
evidence of that. I know of that from information through the
Communist international apparatus, but I think that is public
information today. It is impossible to hold a demonstration in
Soviet Russia even for higher wages. And the Constitution
provides many such guarantees on paper which do not exist in
reality and was written in 1936, significantly when Soviet
Russia was seeking to bring about the people's front
arrangement or the means of deceiving the United States.
The Chairman. Here is one of the things that puzzles me and
disturbs me greatly, Professor. We have had many of these books
that we find are being used to indoctrinate our troops, one
being the book by Ernest J. Simmons. He has been identified by
Bogolepov, who was in the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow. He
identified Simmons as the man he knew in the Soviet Foreign
Office and had instructions to write this book.
As I read it, and I am not nearly as such an authority on
this subject as a man like you, but just as I read it, I am of
the impression it is complete Communist propaganda. You have
this one by Pares. I believe the testimony is that the last
chapter was written under instructions from the Soviet Foreign
Office, those instructions being transmitted through the
Russian embassy in London.
Is that right?
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Would you have any idea at this point you may
want to give this more study, I don't know--as to whether this
material is being or rather has been put out to our military as
a result of merely stupidity or do you think that that is being
put out for more sinister reasons?
Mr. Budenz. May I see the book a moment, Senator?
The Chairman. Yes. The book which I hand you now,
Professor, is not only used as an indoctrination source for
other material, it also is being used in its entirety.
I would suggest you turn over and look at the authors that
were used. You will find an unusual group.
Mr. Budenz. The authors in this book indicate it is
Communist propaganda.
Corliss Lamont, to my knowledge, is a Communist.
Harriet L. Moore, to my personal knowledge and I have met
her in national committee meetings of the Communist party, is a
Communist.
Vladimir Kazekavich, though I have not met him, he was a
lecturer also and according to official communications, he was
a Communist.
Frederick L. Schuman has repeatedly and emphatically been
called to my attention by the Communist leaders as a Communist.
He is a member of so many Communist fronts that that should
suffice but I have this official information.
John N. Hazard, though I have never heard him mentioned
specifically as a Communist, has been noted as a close friend
of the Communist party. He helped, I think, Henry Wallace write
Soviet-Asia Mission, and you will observe that he also is an
editor of Vishinsky's Law of the Soviet Union.
The Chairman. I believe Hazard has been identified by Mr.
Bogolopov, who was in the Russian Foreign Office, as a
Communist for some years, was he not?
Mr. Carr. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Budenz. So it wouldn't surprise me, though I had never
heard it specifically mentioned that way.
Sergei Kournakoff is known to me personally--he is dead now
but was known to me personally not only as a Communist but as a
Communist espionage agent. He was a courier from the secret
underground apparatus of the Communist party of the United
States to the Soviet Consulate. He also wrote in the Daily
Worker under the name of The Veteran Commander and was
connected with the Communist Russian paper here--Russian
Communist paper here in New York.
Andrew J. Steiger, he is a Communist, wrote in the Daily
Worker and is also the ghostwriter for Henry A. Wallace's
Soviet-Asia Mission.
Dr. Henry N. Sigerist though I have never met him, was
officially called to my attention on a great number of
occasions and most emphatically because of his outstanding
position as a Communist.
John Somerville may be known to me personally, but at any
rate I know from official communications that he is a
Communist. About 1943 or 1944, he wrote an article on
dialectical materialism either for an encyclopedia or an
anthology on philosophy, and we had a discussion of that in the
cultural commission of the Daily Worker; and while that
discussion is of course no longer too clear in my mind, I do
know that on that occasion V. J. Jerome, who was in charge of
cultural work for the Communist party, declared Mr. Somerville
to be a Communist, and that was the information on which I
proceeded to act while I was managing editor of the Daily
Worker.
I noted here, Senator, also in the bibliography which I
have glanced at very hastily that most of the sources are pro-
Communist sources, some of them open Communist or at least
identified Communist.
For instance, we have here Dr. B. J. Stern who is notorious
as having written under the name of Bennett Stevens for the
Communists; and we have others of that character.
There are one or two references in here that are not
Communists and maybe you would say are even critical of the
Communists, but the overwhelming majority of those cited here
in the bibliography, and I would say without wanting to be too
accurate, almost 90 percent are pro-Communist sources,
including Communists.
The Chairman. Professor, we have another--first, let me ask
you a question, referring to the book that you had before you
written by this man, Simmons, which apparently is a compilation
of the works of a sizeable number of Communist authors, can you
conceive of that being of any benefit whatsoever, being used to
indoctrinate our troops?
Mr. Budenz. Most decidedly, not, and I am astounded to find
that the intelligence service, which is particularly sharp on
this matter, has accepted this book or any part of it.
The Chairman. I may say, in connection with the
intelligence service, we had General Partridge before us the
other day--he is head of G-2 now--and he said he has never read
any of the works of Marx, Lenin, Engels; he couldn't--didn't
know the difference between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism; he
didn't know what happened in the Communist movement from 1945--
that is when, as you know, they had the tremendous turnabout;
he didn't recognize who Harriet Moore was or any of the
Communist authors. And that is the man who is head of our G-2
at this time, so I am not too much impressed with G-2 as an
authority on communism.
We have here also, Professor Budenz, a document entitled
``Psychological and Cultural Traits of Soviet Siberia.'' This
was sent out to various commands--not a great number of the
original documents were sent out, but the command of course had
the right to reproduce it, if they cared to, and the obvious
purpose was to give the various commanders an accurate picture
of communism in action in Siberia.
I wonder if you have had a chance to look this over or not.
Mr. Budenz. I haven't seen this full document, Senator. I
have seen portions of it, and those portions were certainly not
realistic to start with and were not descriptions that should
be conveyed of Soviet Siberia.
The Chairman. I wonder if you would care to take the list
of people who were used as authors or sources for this document
and give us a rundown on it. I am particularly interested today
in Corliss Lamont, who will be here to testify.
Mr. Budenz. Corliss Lamont is known to me as a member of
the Communist party. I say that aware that he has denied this.
But on several occasions I met him as a member of the Communist
party. In official communications among the Communist leaders,
he was held up as being among the first rank of the Communist
concealed leadership. And, of course, the positions of
responsibility to which he was assigned as head of the Friends
of Soviet Russia, which later became the National Council of
Soviet-American Friendship indicates his position. I happen to
know, however, definitely face to face that he is a Communist.
The Chairman. Have you ever personally met him at a
Communist gathering?
Mr. Budenz. No, I have not met him personally, because the
understanding was that he was not to be at Communist gatherings
nor at the headquarters of the Communist party.
But I have met him in connection with the formation of the
People's World, where he represented the party. That is, he
didn't say so, but it was said to me by Frank Palmer and by a
Miss or Mrs. Field, I think it was Alice Field, in his
presence.
Secondly, in 1937 Herb Goldfrank, he is the husband of
Helen K. Colodny, the writer of children's stories and the
Soviet espionage agent, called to my attention the fact that
Corliss Lamont was on the telephone.
He stated that Lamont wanted to know about James Burnham,
then a professor in New York University, and I went to the
phone and talked to Lamont and told Lamont that Burnham was a
Trotskyite in his sympathies, and Lamont said as a Communist he
was pleased to hear that, or at least to get the information
because he had been taken in by Burnham temporarily.
At that same time, in that conversation, he sent word to
Clarence Hathaway, who was in charge of the penetration of a
number of organizations for the Communist party and also in
charge of the control of certain Communist fronts, that he,
Corliss Lamont was sending to Comrade Hathaway, and that was
the phrase he used, a report for the party on his activity
within the organization known as the Friends of the Soviet
Union.
The Chairman. Did he tell you this over the phone,
Professor, or where did you get the information that he was
sending his report?
Mr. Budenz. He told me that over the phone in this same
conversation about James Burnham.
The Chairman. May I ask you this: There is always the
possibility that I could call you and say, ``Professor Budenz,
this is John Jones speaking.'' Unless you recognized my voice,
you wouldn't know whether it was John Jones or Pete Smith or
Joe McCarthy. Do you think if you listened to Lamont testify,
you would be able to state definitely whether or not you would
recognize his voice as the man who admitted he was a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Budenz. Yes, I think I would.
The Chairman. With that in mind, I would like very much if
you could--I know we have imposed on you and taken a tremendous
amount of your time, but we would like it very much if you
would stay in the room and listen to Lamont testify.
Mr. Budenz. Very well.
The Chairman. If you could do that.
[Mr. Budenz shakes head in affirmation.]
The Chairman. Pardon me, Frank, you have more questions.
Mr. Carr. Concerning this book you had before you, there
are other people listed in the bibliography. Would you
recognize any of the others there?
Mr. Budenz. Simmons.
Mr. Carr. Simmons you have spoken of?
Mr. Budenz. Pares, I have spoken of.
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Mr. Budenz. Professor Harper, though I don't know him as a
Communist, he was always considered by the Communists to be
very close to them in his attitude.
There is only one name that I see whom I could say to be a
critic of Soviet Russia and that is David J. Dolan, Forced
Labor in the Soviet Union. There is no doubt his work is
valuable.
The Chairman. Let me ask you----
Mr. Budenz. In criticizing slave labor in Soviet Union.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. As I go through this
document, and I understand you haven't read it over, you may
not be in a position to testify in detail, but as I read it, I
find about 95 percent of it praises either directly or
indirectly the Communist system to the skies, and I find about
5 percent which is highly critical of communism. We have had
witnesses who have identified entire passages as coming
directly from Stalin's book, others that come from--I forgot
the name of the document--one that Bogolepov referred to as the
Communist Bible.
Mr. Carr. History of the CPSU.
The Chairman. History of the CPSU.
Mr. Budenz. That is Stalin's own work. That is what you
might call, if you dared use that language, the Bible of the
Communists.
The Chairman. I think that is the way it was referred to.
I think I understand the modus operandi here myself but for
the record, would you care to discuss the purpose of putting
in, into that document, material highly critical of communism,
3 or 4 or 5 percent of the entire work.
Mr. Budenz. Well, if there weren't something critical in
here, it would be seen to be too clearly a Communist document.
For example, we have some very startling statements: The
toiler was elevated to the highest respectability. That is
utterly false, false in view of the fifteen million slave
laborers in the labor passport system wherein the laborer could
not leave the job without the consent of the bureaucrat; false
measure of respectability is wrong; and it is false in addition
in Stalin's own words, if we had time to quote them from the
Problems of Leninism, where he shows the dictatorship of the
proletariat is actually the dictatorship by the Communist
party, by the vanguard. Just one statement like that
immediately throws the whole picture out of focus.
The Chairman. I wonder if I could ask you to do this,
Professor. I would like to send you the testimony of Bogolepov
and the Yale Professor who was in--what is his name?
Mr. Carr. Petrov.
The Chairman. Petrov, who had been imprisoned in Siberia
for some time and was an important member of the Communist
party in Russia, who has testified this is pure Communist
propaganda. I would like you to go over their testimony and the
passages which they pick up and get at some future time--oh, we
are having a hearing Monday, but I don't think perhaps we could
get around to your testimony then. I am taking Tuesday off. And
be in a position to give us a--oh, your idea of just the extent
to which this is Communist propaganda.
This is off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
[Witness excused.]
Mr. Carr. Mr. Chairman, to further identify one of the
authors mentioned, I would like to just note for the record
that the New York Times, of Wednesday, January 18, 1950, page
seventeen, carries an article in which Vladimir Kazekavich is
identified by Elizabeth Bentley as a Russian agent.
The Chairman. Kazekavich is one of the men being used to
indoctrinate or was used----
Mr. Carr. That is right.
The Chairman [continuing]. To indoctrinate the troops.
Mr. Carr. He is one of the contributors to the book called
USSR, a Concise History.
The Chairman. Which is----
Mr. Carr. Which is being used by the army.
The Chairman. Have we found out whether that is being used
as of this moment? We know it was up to 1952.
Mr. Carr. No. We were to get that.
The Chairman. From Stevens.
Mr. Carr. From Stevens.
The Chairman. We are to get that from Stevens. Good.
TESTIMONY OF HARRIET L. MOORE (HARRIET MOORE GELFAN)
The Chairman. Miss Moore, raise your right hand. In the
matter in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Miss Moore. Yes.
The Chairman. The answer is I do?
Miss Moore. I do.
The Chairman. Your name is Harriet Lucy Moore, is that
correct?
Miss Moore. That is my maiden name, yes.
The Chairman. What is your name today?
Miss Moore. Harriet Moore Gelfan.
Mr. Carr. What is your present address for the record,
please.
The Chairman. May I first inform the witness the principal
reason why you are here is because we found your works are
being used to indoctrinate our military on communism and upon
the Soviet Union. We have been investigating the use of the
works of Communist authors, the works of espionage agents to
indoctrinate our military, and that is the principal reason why
you are here today, to ask you some questions in that respect.
And Mr. Carr will proceed with the questions.
Mr. Carr. What is your present occupation, please?
Miss Moore. I have--housewife.
Mr. Carr. Housewife. Are you the Harriet Moore who assisted
in the preparation of the book entitled USSR, a Concise
Handbook, which was edited by Joseph J. Simmons, excuse me,
Ernest J. Simmons? \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ernest Joseph Simmons, ed., USSR, A Concise Handbook (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miss Moore. Yes. Well, I wrote one section of it.
Mr. Carr. Did you write the section entitled ``Number II,
Physical Features''?
Miss Moore. Yes.
Mr. Carr. Did you contribute in any other way towards the
production of this book?
Miss Moore. Not that I recall.
The Chairman. Do you know Ernest J. Simmons?
Miss Moore. I am in a peculiar position. I was called to
this committee at five o'clock yesterday. I have had no
knowledge of what it was about. I have not had an opportunity
to consult with counsel, and I don't quite understand the
implications of my being called here.
The Chairman. May I say this, that the subpoena has been
issued for some time, we issued it some time ago, and it wasn't
your fault that it wasn't served until last night.
If you feel for your protection you need to confer with
counsel, I think, Mr. Carr, that the witness is entitled to
have time to confer with counsel.
Mr. Carr. All right, sir.
The Chairman. Do you want to have an adjournment so you can
confer with counsel?
Miss Moore. How long an adjournment would I get?
The Chairman. How long do you want?
Miss Moore. As a matter of fact, I would need several days.
The Chairman. I think that is reasonable.
Miss Moore. I called and asked for such a delay, but
couldn't get one.
The Chairman. I think that is a reasonable request. You
have been identified, you see, under oath as an espionage agent
of Communist Russia. You have been identified as a Communist.
You have been identified as an important functionary in the
Amerasia publication, which has been named, I believe, by
intelligence agents as a tool for Soviet espionage.
In view of the seriousness of those charges, I think you
should have whatever time you think you need to consult with
counsel and decide whether or not you want to give us the
information which we want or decide whether you feel giving
such information to us would incriminate you.
Today is Tuesday. How would it be if we give you until next
Monday?
Miss Moore. Well, that's better than nothing.
The Chairman. If you think that isn't enough, we will try
to give you more time. I think that gives enough. That gives a
full week.
Miss Moore. Okay.
The Chairman. One thing that occurs to me is this. We had
some questions to ask you today principally about your alleged
Communist connections, about whether or not you were under the
discipline of the Communist party when you wrote these things,
and we were going into that.
We had hoped it would be unnecessary to call you to
Washington. If we don't hear you today, we will have to ask you
to come to Washington. That is both a hardship upon you and a
hardship on the committee, because we have to pay your way back
down there and back.
Miss Moore. If that is the only question you want to ask
me, I can answer that by declining to answer it, as you know I
do.
The Chairman. Why don't we do this. If it meets with your
approval, we will let Mr. Carr go ahead and ask you questions
and if the situation arises in which you think you want
additional time, then we will give you until Monday.
Miss Moore. It has already arisen.
The Chairman. I see. In other words, you do want additional
time?
Miss Moore. Yes.
The Chairman. We are giving you until Monday.
Miss Moore. All right. I will have to go to Washington?
The Chairman. Yes. Uh-huh! This may seem a hardship to you,
but, you see, and I have never met you before, know nothing
about you personally; all of the evidence about you is that you
were a very, very important functionary of the Communist party,
a party which is dedicated to the destruction of this nation by
force and violence; evidence that you were an espionage
agent.Therefore we are duty bound to try and get that
information from you. And we find your works are being used to
teach our military.
And I may say we do not enjoy this, either, but we will
have to ask you to come down Monday.
Miss Moore. There will no more hearings in New York?
The Chairman. No. I will be leaving--I will be here two
days, but I am tied up completely with the interviewing of
witnesses.
Miss Moore. It is very difficult for me. I have five small
children, and it is not easy for me to go to Washington.
Mr. Carr. It would be a one-day hearing.
The Chairman. It will be; might not get to her Monday. I
wouldn't like to call her down, if we have Budenz. Bogolopov,
and the Yale professor. I have got to take off Monday afternoon
before 3:30. Doubt if we can get to her Monday.
Mr. Carr. Then we would have to have a hearing here?
The Chairman. We will try and arrange so you can be heard
up here.
How old are you children?
Miss Moore. The oldest is 8\1/2\.
The Chairman. We will hold it up. We won't require you to
come to Washington Monday. I wish you would consider yourself
under subpoena, in other words not released from the subpoena.
We will try and hear you in New York. I perhaps won't be here
myself, but have one of the other senators hear your testimony.
Let me ask you this question, and you can either answer or
refuse to answer, using the Fifth Amendment, or ask for an
adjournment on this also.
Would you care to tell us whether or not as of today you
are a member of the Communist party?
I say, if you want to hold that answer up until you have a
chance to consult with counsel, you may do so.
Miss Moore. I would like to hold that up, too, please.
The Chairman. You may. You may. You will be excused, but
you are still under subpoena.
Miss Moore. Yes, sir.
[Witness excused.]
The Chairman. Mr. Lamont.
Mr. Wittenberg. How do you do, Senator? Mr. Lamont is
coming in. I am his attorney.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Wittenberg. Where do you want him?
The Chairman. Raise you right hand, Mr. Lamont.
TESTIMONY OF CORLISS LAMONT (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, PHILIP
WITTENBERG AND IRVING LIKE)
[Although taken in executive session, this testimony was
published in 1953 in U.S. Senate Committee on Government
Operations, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Communist Infiltration in the Army (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1953), page 1-19.]
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
KOREAN WAR ATROCITIES
[Editor's note.--A task force of the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, chaired by Senator Charles E. Potter,
investigated war atrocities committed by Communist forces
against American troops in Korea. Public hearings on the issue
were held on December 2, 3 and 4, 1953. None of the witnesses
who appeared at the executive session on October 6, Edward J.
Lyons, Jr., Lt. Col. Lee H. Kostora, Maj. James Kelleher, and
Lt. Col. J. W. Whithorne, III, testified again during these
public hearings.]
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:00 a.m., room 357, Senate
Office Building, Senator Charles E. Potter, acting chairman,
presiding.
Present: Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; Robert Jones, assistant to Senator Potter;
Harold Rainville, administrative assistant to Senator Dirksen;
Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.
Also in attendance: Mr. John Adams, representing the
secretary of the army, Mr. Stevens; Brig. Gen. C. C. Fenn,
director, legislative and liaison division, Department of the
Army; Lt. Col. J. W. Whitehorne, III, G-2; Lt. Col. Lee H.
Kostora, G-1; Mr. Edward J. Lyons, Jr., Judge Advocate
General's Office; Maj. James Kelleher, Department of Defense,
Psychological Warfare; Mr. Charles A. Haskins, staff department
counselor.
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, first I want to thank you for
coming up here on such short notice to give us the benefit of
what information you can give us. As you probably know, the
chairman has designated me as a task force of one to try to
find out what has happened to the several thousand American
soldiers that the Communists haven't returned and we have
apparently no knowledge what has happened. We have seen in the
papers that many of them have been massacred behind the North
Korean lines. We would like to have that information.
Now, also, I think it would be well for me to say we have
no intention of competing with the military or competing with
United Nations forces in this field, but I do know that a
mother that has a son or a wife who has a husband that is
unaccounted for here desires to get full and accurate
information as to his whereabouts or what has happened to the
person that they are interested in. We solicit your cooperation
and we assure you that we will endeavor to carry out our duties
without any embarrassment to the military or anyone else. We
are not after anyone. We are on the same mission that I am sure
you gentlemen are.
Now, Frank, I assume you have discussed this with the
gentlemen here, so would you go right ahead.
Mr. Carr. I think first, sir, I will have Mr. Lyons give us
a little bit of background of the situation.
In the sense that this is going to be a roundtable
discussion, if at any point some of you other gentlemen find
something you want to put in that might help the senator----
Senator Potter. If you do that, take cognizance of the fact
that our fair young lady is keeping minutes of the meeting.
Mr. Cohn. I think if each person who speaks will identify
himself first.
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD J. LYONS, JR., WAR CRIMES
DIVISION, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Lyons. In the summer of 1950, to be exact, July of
1950, General MacArthur, at that time Far East commander,
ordered his judge advocate to take steps to investigate
atrocities, war crimes, being committed against our soldiers,
South Koreans and civilians. Within a week or ten days, General
MacArthur was appointed United Nations commander in charge of
all forces in Korea and thereafter he appointed his commanding
judge advocate responsible for the collection of war crimes
material, the investigation, interrogation of witnesses, the
collection of evidence in the preparation for trial. In his
capacity as United Nations commanding judge advocate, Colonel
George Hickman prepared what we shall call a ``direction'' to
all judge advocates in the field as to the manner in which they
would conduct interrogations and submit the evidence to him.
A step further, in October of 1950, the United Nations
commander, General MacArthur, ordered the judge advocate of the
United States Eighth Army to establish a war-crimes division in
his command which would gather all of this evidence and which
would interrogate the witnesses for all needs and coordinate
the work of various staff judge advocates in the army and
different commands. That division functioned as such until
August of 1952 when the then United Nations commander, General
Clark, ordered the duties of that division transferred to the
Korean Communications Zone, so as of 1 September 1952, the War
Crimes Division has been operating under the commanding general
of the Korean Communications Zone.
Senator Potter. In order to fully identify that command,
who is the commander?
Mr. Lyons. I am afraid----
Senator Potter. Is that a theater command?
Mr. Lyons. That would be a theater command. I don't know
the name of----
Mr. Adams. The Korean Communications Zone is not a theater
command as it is now known under General Clark. The Korean
Communications Zone was a line of communications to the Eighth
Army in Korea as distinguished from the theater command.
Mr. Lyons. It is headed by a Lt. Col. R. Todd, a judge
advocate lt. colonel.
During the time that the War Crimes Division has been in
operation it has investigated roughly eighteen hundred cases,
with the exception of roughly seventy duplicate files. All of
these case files are in Korea.
Senator Potter. Now, the case files for the entire eighteen
hundred cases are in Korea?
Mr. Lyons. The entire eighteen hundred cases are in Korea.
The case files range from cases that the judge advocate
believes are provable cases, and there are only a small
percentage of those cases which we have nothing more than an
unsupported confession or individual eyewitness testimony. Many
of the roughly eighteen hundred case files are based solely on
confessions of North Korean or Chinese Communists who were
prisoners of war at Koji Island. That was the United States
prisoner-of-war center.
Now, in our office we have at the present time what we call
case status reports of roughly sixteen hundred of these files.
Senator Potter. What do you mean by case status reports?
Mr. Lyons. A case status report is what we call a thumb
nail sketch of the file. It would contain, where possible, the
names of victims; where known, their nationality; whether
military or civilian. It will contain the names of suspects and
their nationality if they are known. It will state where the
incident occurred and then will give a brief description of
what the incident was or is.
It will give where we have the names of survivors and that
is pretty much all.
Senator Potter. Have the survivors been notified at all
that you have this information?
Mr. Lyons. The survivors have been interrogated in Korea.
Senator Potter. You are talking about survivors on the
spot?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, sir.
Now the statements, interrogations or affidavits of the
survivors will be found in the case files that are in Korea,
and in those case files in Korea you will find photographs; you
will find a report of the investigating officer; you will find
medical case histories, identification of bodies and any other
information that in the opinion of the investigating officer
would go to make up a case.
Senator Potter. What are your plans now? What are you
planning to do with this information?
Mr. Lyons. I would say that--let me answer your question by
going back a few months if I may, Senator. The Little Switch
Operation, that was a term of wounded POWs, which took place in
April of this year and was completed in the middle of the
summer. The returnees, both United Nations and our boys, were
interrogated in Korea. The results of those interrogations have
been incorporated, here applicable, in these eighteen hundred
case files. There is continual interrogation of all of the
returnees. As a result of this ``Little Switch'' operation
roughly 140 new cases have been opened. We have not as yet
received any of those case status reports.
Now we come to ``Operation Big Switch.'' There will roughly
be thirty-five hundred interrogations there. I don't know at
the moment what percentage of the thirty-five hundred
interrogations will obtain war crimes information but whatever
there is, whatever number we do extract will have to be
returned to the War Crimes Division in Korea for study and
incorporation in the pending cases or the possibility of an
opening of a great many new cases.
Senator Potter. In other words, your eighteen hundred cases
were discovered prior to the exchange of prisoners?
Mr. Lyons. No, I must say roughly fifteen hundred or
sixteen hundred, in round figures, prior to the exchange of
prisoners. There were roughly 141 new cases as of the 31st of
August as a result of ``Little Switch.''
Senator Potter. What type of a process did you find? Were
they on a mass basis or----
Mr. Lyons. They vary, Senator. You had the mass basis
particularly as regards the South Korean civilians. You did not
have, so far, too many of the mass cases involved in United
Nations. You do, of course, have the three or four cases that
have grown out of the march from Seoul to the border.
Now, we do expect and we have reason to believe that there
will be many more cases opened as a result of ``Little Switch''
and ``Big Switch'' having to do with the march from Seoul. We
have other cases--we have found other cases--we have the murder
of roughly twelve hundred United States soldiers by North
Koreans and there we have only the testimony of one North
Korean who was a participant and eyewitness but the War Crimes
Division in Korea thought that his statement would be accepted.
Senator Potter. I understand that this North Korean
testified or they have a statement from him that twelve hundred
were killed at one time?
Mr. Lyons. In one operation.
We have a large number of cases where the atrocity is two,
three, four, five, six, ten, twelve United Nations prisoners
who were wounded and their bodies were discovered with their
hands tied behind their backs with evidence that they were
beaten, their eyes gouged out, used for bayonet practice and
the like. We have one case where a wounded American, the enemy
Communist threw gasoline on his clothing and ignited him and he
managed to crawl back to the American lines and later died in
the hospital.
Senator Potter. You have his statement, I assume, before he
died?
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Senator Potter. I wonder if from the G-1 section we could
find out what a man's family would be notified when a soldier
is missing in action and then his statement given to the War
Crimes Commission that he has been a victim of Communist
atrocity. I assume that G-1 notified the parents.
TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. LEE H. KOSTORA, G-1, OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
Col. Kostora. We notify, that is, the adjutant general
notifies the family or the next of kin of any change of status
of anyone missing in action or any casualty. If we have the
information on any casualty we report it to the parents. I
don't know of any cases where we reported atrocity cases, that
is, we have told the parents that an atrocity was committed.
Senator Potter. Now, in the cases that Mr. Lyons mentioned
where a majority of them haven't been definitely proven, do you
notify the family that the missing in action son has been
killed?
Col. Kostora. That is right. We have in our records where
we have definitely known that a person was missing in action
and died in a missing status, we have notified the family.
Mr. Adams. I think the Senator's question was: Do you
advise the family that he was murdered?
Col. Kostora. No, sir.
Senator Potter. It is changed from missing in action to
killed in action?
Col. Kostora. It depends on the circumstances. It would
depend on the report we would get from the Far East command.
All of the information that we get concerning a man we do
report to the family of the man.
Senator Potter. I don't know whether you have the
information Mr. Lyons is referring to or not. I assume you
don't.
Col. Kostora. I assume not. We probably have cases where
they died in American hospitals. I am sure the adjutant general
received information through casualty channels. What type of
information he received I couldn't say.
Senator Potter. If they have information from a North
Korean prisoner that he witnessed the massacre of a soldier or
several soldiers, then you wouldn't necessarily have that
information?
Col. Kostora. No, sir. Not necessarily.
Mr. Adams. I would like to say the army never revealed the
names of soldiers who were murdered at Malmedy Massacre
although they have them. They have not made the family aware of
the fact that they were murdered instead of killed in action.
That has been eight or nine years. I expect they will adhere to
that situation. They have photographs, in General Clark's
possession, of numerous soldiers with their hands tied behind
their backs readily identifiable, throats cut and things of
that sort. Obviously, if they are published the face will be
blacked out. That would be a terrible thing for a mother to
see. I don't think the fact that an individual was murdered
instead of killed in action would be revealed. Is that right?
Col. Kostora. That is right.
Senator Potter. I am not an expert on psychological
warfare, but I am just wondering if that might be a pretty good
psychology although it may be hard on the mother, but I am just
thinking out loud.
Mr. Adams. We have Major Kelleher here from the
Psychological Warfare Branch of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense who could describe the program if you'd like to hear
about it.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JAMES KELLEHER, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Maj. Kelleher. That is presently under active
consideration, sir, and on the verge of approval a program
which will really include three different phases. First is the
exposure for the benefit of not only the American public but
the world in general the nature of these atrocities and that
really covers two phases there-domestic and foreign, do the
same thing on a global basis. It has a third phase which I
might say concerns Ambassador Lodge at the United Nations,
which will include the charge of biological warfare. This plan
will probably be kicked off within the next day or so. In fact,
Ambassador Lodge is going to show some film, motion picture
sound interviews with the same air force fliers who were
characterized in the so-called germ warfare charges. Over a
period of the last two years the Communists have produced at
least four or five propaganda films which have been distributed
through different areas of the world and various languages
which are built around their confessions--six people, four air
force fliers and two marine fliers. Also involved is a so-
called International Scientific Commission made up mostly of
Europeans and Asiatics. The British representative is a man
named Neeaam. They went to Korea under the auspices of the
Communists and made a so-called impartial investigation of germ
warfare. The biggest and most powerful propaganda on the
Communist side in the hearing of this commission were the
confessions of the two air force fliers, Lt. Enich and Lt.
Quinn. Oddly enough, we weren't so sure we would get these
individuals back from the Communists on the ``Big Switch.'' We
feel that we got them back because the Communists had put them
on film and gave it global distribution and quite evidently
couldn't hold them, they repatriated them. However, these
people on repatriation have all recounted, stated that
confessions were obtained under various degrees of mental
duress. We got for Ambassador Lodge sound motion picture
interviews with the same individuals and these are now in his
hands. If you will recall, he entered a resolution at the
United Nations last spring asking for an impartial
investigation of this PW thing, and he defied Communists at the
United Nations stating if you will bring the so-called
confessors out of North Korea and give them thirty days rest,
without exception they will recount on their confessions. They
have now recounted and he wants to put it on record. He has
invited members of various delegations and a pretty good press
quorum in New York to view these films. The latest word is that
it will be this afternoon or this evening, in what has to be a
kick-off on this program.
We also feel, if I may bring up this point, that your
committee in making these investigations can be of tremendous
help in the global program that we are trying to get underway
to bring this whole mess to the attention of the world.
To get back to your mention about notifying the mother that
her son was a victim of atrocity, from a psychological
standpoint it will undoubtedly have a powerful effect. It has
to be measured simply against the pain and emotional impact on
the mother and American people. Does that about suffice, sir?
Senator Potter. Yes. I would like to solicit your advice as
to how best we can utilize the information we have.
Maj. Kelleher. All right, sir.
Senator Potter. Since the truce and the switches of
prisoners has there been any interrogation of American PWs
after they returned to the states. Do we have information on
that?
TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. J. W. WHITEHORNE, III, COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION DIVISION, OACS, G-2
Col. Whitehorne. War crimes and atrocities information is
not in itself intelligence. However, during the interrogation
process applied to all returned personnel we do conduct, in
accordance with established EEI, Essential Elements of
Information, questioning for war crimes and atrocities
information as a collateral activity. That information in turn
is received after processing in the Department of the Army
where it is made available to the interested parties, in
particular the adjutant general casualty branch and the JAG
office.
G-2 does not evaluate or process this information. We
merely pass it on to the interested and competent agencies.
Does that answer you question, sir?
Senator Potter. Yes. The reason I asked the question, I
have had several inquiries from people, mothers, whose sons
haven't returned and they claim they have heard from certain
PWs, American PWs, that they saw them in prison camps. They
have no information from the military or they had no
information from the son while in prison camp. I saw some
correspondence where the mother contacted the army and gave the
army the names of some returned PWs who were supposed to have
information concerning her son. I am just wondering if the army
has had the time or facilities to track those individual cases
down by contacting PWs after their return to the states.
Col. Whitehorne. Each returnee is interrogated. They have a
list of questions--who they saw, where they saw them, physical
condition, where he thinks they are now.
Off the record, I can explain the process to you.
Where we receive an indication through the interrogations
that a particular man is alive, that information is passed to
the adjutant general along with the identity of the man who
gave it. In fact, we pass the raw information to them so they
have as much of the story as we do. They cross-check the other
persons who might have seen him. If John Jones is carried as
missing in action on the adjutant general's roster, then three
prisoners come back all of whom said they saw John Jones, that
gives the adjutant general a basis for three checks to see
whether he should be changed from missing in action status to
captured. Comparison of dates involved tell whether or not he
should have been returned on possibly this last exchange.
Senator Potter. How many should have been returned that
haven't been?
Col. Whitehorne. I believe Colonel Kostora----
Col. Kostora. So far we have turned over--the UN Command
has turned over to the Communists a list of 944 American names.
Senator Potter. 944?
Col. Kostora. Yes, sir.
Mr. Adams. That includes army, navy, air force and marines.
Col. Kostora. That includes all of the services.
Senator Potter. How many UN troops have been returned?
Col. Kostora. I think there were about three thousand,
roughly.
Senator Potter. About three thousand have been returned?
Col. Kostora. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Do we have any information at all that some
of our PWs have been sent to labor camps?
Col. Whitehorne. Yes, sir, installations which could be
called labor PW camps where they saw lumber, some mining, but
mostly lumbering.
Senator Potter. Do we have any information that we still
have American troops in labor camps?
Col. Whitehorne. None at present.
Senator Potter. I am thinking now in comparison to World
War II. I think they are still returning German PWs who served
seven or eight years in Russian Labor Camps. I wonder if they
have any Americans as a result of the Korean War. Do we have
any knowledge or information to that effect?
Col. Whitehorne. We have no information that any particular
individuals are held in camps of that nature at this time. We
have a dragnet out now for information and action trying to
ascertain that fact, as to who they are, where they are, why
they are there.
Mr. Cohn. You think there are people there and are looking
for further identification?
Col. Whitehorne. Typical. G-2 pessimism, there probably
are.
Senator Potter. For my own information, I am curious about
the twenty-three Americans who are still over there and
apparently Communist propaganda got the best of them--or maybe
they went into the service as pro-Communists. Is there any
check being made as to the background of the men still there?
Col. Whitehorne. That information is available.
Mr. Cohn. What was the answer on that? Did any of those
people have Communist backgrounds?
Col. Whitehorne. Some of them had leftist leanings.
Mr. Cohn. Would we be able to get some documentation?
Col. Whitehorne. There are some present FBI files of
activity prior to entry in service.
Mr. Cohn. From whom in your shop could we get that? You are
probably going into that pretty thoroughly?
Col. Whitehorne. No, we have not. Our information is fairly
scattered. The adjutant general may have some information in
their 201 files; then on check of the name for security
purposes, you may find that the F.B.I. had some report of
activity on the individual. Now, our security division would be
the people to contact regarding each person.
Senator Potter. Now, that is security division of G-2?
Col. Whitehorne. Yes.
Senator Potter. Could they supply us with a little summary
on each one of those on whom there is any derogatory
information?
Col. Whitehorne. They probably could. I am sure they could.
Mr. Cohn. I think it would be helpful--a summary on the
twenty-three on whom there is any information of leftist
activity before they went in.
Col. Kostora. Actually we have twenty-three names of people
as reported by the Communists at this moment. We don't know
whether the twenty-three men are the twenty-three named, and I
don't suppose there has been any attempt to find out whether or
not they are because I don't believe our people will ask the
identity of any men because of the feeling that we don't want
to reveal the identity of anti-Communist people that we have in
our possession.
Mr. Cohn. They have given us twenty-three names. If we
could have the information on the twenty-three imparted, what
information you have concerning them would be very helpful.
Maj. Kelleher. The twenty-three names were released by
Wilford Burchett, a Communist Korean correspondent for a
Parisian Communist newspaper. The Communists didn't do it--a
pretty neat trick to use a kind of third person.
They don't have to stand behind their lies regardless.
Certainly the UN commander or military never would have given a
list of the twenty-three names to the American press, knowing
the impact on American mothers and not knowing for sure that
they were the same ones. The Communists are only too glad to
help you out.
Mr. Cohn. Of course, you can't tell but I would think they
would try to be accurate. If someone named turned up on our
side they would look pretty sick.
Senator Potter. How many soldiers would you classify in the
so-called progressive group? The ones who played ball with the
commies previous to the war?
Col. Whitehorne. Before answering that I'd like to issue a
caution. The files are not complete as yet. When a man is
interrogated his file is received in the U.S., received in G-2,
Sixth Army, who turns over the file to the service of the
individual, in case of airman, marine, sailor. In case of army
personnel the files move from the Sixth Army to his home army,
what we call gaining command. The gaining command is charged
with the responsibility of reading the file for their own
information. They have the case in their hands summarizing it,
distributing summaries to other armies and back overseas to the
armed forces Far East and then forwarding the summaries, ten
copies of the summaries and original to G-2.
G-2 in turn makes the original and a copy of the summary
available to all interested parties. Unless those files are all
received in G-2, cross indexed and filed centrally, it will be
impossible to say ``yes'' or ``no.''
Senator Potter. How long before that process will be
completed?
Col. Whitehorne. We hope to have it done in about nine
months. Each individual returning has information on upwards of
two hundred others which means a cross indexing to two hundred
other files.
Senator Potter. Would you be in any position to make a
rough estimate to the number indoctrinated with Communist
philosophy here?
Col. Whitehorne. The Communists attempted to indoctrinate
them all. We feel that it has possibly taken on the basis of
``Little Switch'' about 2\1/2\ percent, ``Big Switch'' about 5
percent. However, as a complete group, the figure now--possibly
the overall impression is somewhere around 2\1/2\ percent.
Senator Potter. The major mentioned the air force personnel
who signed confessions concerning germ warfare. Now, I would
assume that the army and the Psychological Warfare Branch has
spent considerable time interviewing the returned PWs who
signed confessions, not only in germ warfare but went on the
radio--We did have some personnel that did that? Has that been
done?
Col. Whitehorne. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Another question that I would like to ask,
who do you think we should talk to? Who do you think we should
contact to get as much information as possible to conduct this
hearing?
Col. Whitehorne. On the, war crimes and atrocities or
overall?
Senator Potter. First, on war crimes, atrocities, then on
the overall--the prisoners of war and we'd like to get
information concerning the Communist methods. I think we should
blow that up. How the Communist used the prisoners of war in
violation of all international agreements as to indoctrination
and the methods used. I think that should be blown up as much
as possible.
Col. Whitehorne. On war, crimes and atrocities, War Crimes
and Atrocities Division, Office of the Judge Advocate; on
indoctrination, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare.
Senator Potter. Mr. Adams, I don't know whether anyone here
would be in a position to say whether the proper defense places
would loan us personnel to work on this case----
Mr. Adams. I am quite sure we can. I am quite sure the
department will lend the committee any assistance which you
required to make preparations for a hearing. I am sure the
secretary of the army would want to and I am sure the secretary
of defense would. The Psychological Warfare Office, under
General Erskine, Office of Secretary of Defense would be
available to assist you. I am sure then both the judge advocate
general, G-1 and G-2 of the army would give you all the
assistance possible.
I would like to make a slight reservation on the request of
Mr. Cohn that the cases on the twenty-three names be made
available to the committee, together with any background of
possible Communist affiliation before they entered the service,
in addition to the problems faced, these individuals would fall
within the terms of the president's directive on--I'd like to
reserve that long enough for us to examine whether or not this
situation would.
Mr. Cohn. That would still come under the Truman black-out
order?
Mr. Adams. I am quite sure it would.
Maj. Kelleher. May I say we were faced with the same thing
in supplying material to Ambassador Lodge at the UN. We have
run across it in one case. Finally--I'd like to mention this to
Mr. Adams--it was down to whether we were dealing with a
personnel loyalty file. We managed to skirt it in this case by
simply dealing with the open testimony given after coming back
from Korea.
Senator Potter. Of course, the names have been made public.
I know of the name of a men mentioned. I assume he is from
Detroit, and I mean Detroit newspapers played it up.
That is something that could be worked out with the staff?
Mr. Adams. That is correct.
Senator Potter. I wonder, Major, if you know whether the UN
have--do they have a committee or commission working on this
problem too?
Maj. Kelleher. With regard, sir, to the exposure of the PW
mess or refuting charges, yes, sir they do. It is, I might say,
a pet project of Ambassador Lodge and a follow through from his
resolution of last spring demanding an impartial investigation
of this thing.
Senator Potter. Would it be your advice to contact
Ambassador Lodge so that our efforts are coordinated?
Major Kelleher. Yes, sir. I believe so. It could be done
very handily right here in Washington. In this particular case
he has a back-stopping group which works out of the formerly
Psychological Strategy Board, now the Operations Coordinating
Board of the National Security Council. This is Mr. C. D.
Jackson's group, sir.
Mr. Adams. I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, you might wish
personally to get on the phone and talk to Ambassador Lodge
about it. It might also be well worth your while to speak to
General Robert Cutler, administrative assistant to the
president on this psychological strategy matter. Both of them
might be able to give you assistance, help the committee.
Senator Potter. That is good advice.
Do you think it desirable at this point to follow through
and talk with some of the returning PWs who you have
information concerning, eyewitnesses of atrocities committed?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, but the report on recent returnees--our men
go back to 1950 and 1951. The recent ones the files are in
Korea. No, some of them would be in the files in Korea, but I
think that a batch of affidavits would be found in the
Pentagon. A great number are still in ``Big Switch,'' which
have not as yet been processed. In the pipeline, sir.
Mr. Adams. There were two points in this Lyons made
yesterday in the meeting I attended you ought to know. One is
that the interrogations of these people developed the fact that
most of the men who had been incarcerated for a long period of
time, during the course of lengthy interrogation dropped two
hundred names of individuals they have known in prison camps.
Those people must be dropped into slots. We have no IBM
machines to do it. It is a hand job. That brings the second
problem. The army doesn't feel these people can be
interrogated, cross-checked and put in the proper place within
eight or nine months. The second point was made by the people
here, I have forgotten which one, but that can be elaborated
on. Some of these returning prisoners on interrogation proved
to be surprisingly inaccurate in the things they may say. I
have forgotten which one.
Col. Whitehorne. Yes. We have found instances where four or
five men had been together for a long period of time. They were
restricted in movement and one saw what everybody else saw.
Yet, we got reports from the four gentlemen and the fifth would
go off on a tangent, and well, we checked it in a couple of
instances--went to the adjutant general's file and found that
he left school in the fourth grade. He put misinterpretations
on things probably as a result of a fairly poor background, not
a trained observer, in fact, a poor observer. We also found
that the stories did not adequately describe the behavior of
individuals. It would take stories of four or five to describe
one--before we got the correct idea. At the present moment all
stories are considered unreliable and will be considered
unreliable until the facility is achieved whereby they can be
cross-checked.
We had one instance, and I would like to put this up as a
warning in dealing with these people, where one gentleman came
back and spoke to another here in Washington and made a
statement to the effect that four men should be decorated for
acts behind the enemy lines while prisoners. We proceeded to
try to build up stories so they could be decorated and found
just the opposite was true.
One of the men whom we know, in the hands of the enemy--in
an army group at the moment--is repeatedly reported as most
helpful to his fellow prisoners. Yet at the same time he has
indulged in all sorts of treasonable acts which amount to trial
of the individual.
Senator Potter. Just a good natured fellow helping both
sides.
Maj. Kelleher. There is a point on that. It goes back to
the basic philosophy of good treatment. In the Communist
indoctrination process good treatment is inducive to
indoctrination. It is not at all unreasonable when you have
studied it. There is a lot of ostensibly good treatment for a
very specific purpose. Good treatment of patients who adhere to
their teachings.
For instance, a fairly smart boy working on an ignorant
farm hand says come over to the indoctrination lecture and just
play along with your captives. They gave those boys a library
loaded with Communist trash and terrific anti-American
propaganda and it is not unreasonable to find the situation
Colonel Whitehorne is talking about.
Senator Potter. Do you have any suspicion that they have
sent some of the men who have been indoctrinated back and they
kept them from being identified too much as progressives so
they come back here and do their work?
Maj. Kelleher. Yes, sir, and I am thinking of your
committee too because I wouldn't say probably but possibly you
put out word that you welcome people to come and testify before
your committee, you might get to it, and they may get up and
give you a harangue with which I am sure Mr. Cohn is familiar.
Mr. Cohn. I gather they don't stock their information
libraries with pro-American books.
Maj. Kelleher. They take care of pro-Communist stuff. Don't
worry about that.
Senator Potter. Major, I assume you also received
information from the air force and navy as well as the army?
Maj. Kelleher. Well, sir, there is nobody involved in this
PW stuff except the air force and marines--this biological
warfare proposition. Obviously, the navy in this case was not
involved.
Senator Potter. When I spoke of navy, I meant it to include
the marines. I would assume that it would be probably desirable
to contact the appropriate officer of the air force and the
marine corps as well.
Maj. Kelleher. Is this with reference to prospective
witnesses?
Senator Potter. Yes. Would you have information?
Maj. Kelleher. We would either have it or could get it,
yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Mr. Adams, I am wondering if somebody could
be designated soon to work as liaison between the committee and
the Department of Defense on this matter.
Mr. Adams. Yes. Secretary Stevens asked me to work as
liaison with the committee on matters such as this; initially
me.
Mr. Cohn. We are going to be keeping you pretty busy on
other things. We would like to get one fellow who could just
keep his fingers on the whole situation all the time.
Senator Potter. I think this afternoon I will call General
Erskine or secretary of defense to see if one person can be
designated to work close liaison with the committee.
General Fenn, do you have anything you'd like to add.
Gen. Fenn. No, sir. I'd like to have Colonel Whitehorne
tell something about the screening process they are going
through, the details.
Col. Whitehorne. When the reports that I mentioned reached
Washington we have a reading panel set up who go through the
reports. Twenty-two different officers are perusing these
reports at the reading panel. They read the summary and the
report and designate whether or not they want the report
circulated to their particular agency. We have set a priority
on these things purely arbitrarily giving the adjutant
general's casualty branch first go. The reason we do that, it
is a life and death matter concerned with the welfare of the
individual and his family.
By using the reading panel system we show everybody what we
have and where we get it. Also, it gives them a chance to come
back and ask for individuals to be re-interrogated here in the
Continental United States by the army commander.
Senator Potter. These reports that are sent to you are from
the theater?
Maj. Whitehorne. The report that came back from overseas
with the individual.
Senator Potter. You say you have a reading panel?
Col. Whitehorne. G-2. My office--what we call our documents
library.
Senator Potter. After reading the reports do they make
recommendations or what happens?
Col. Whitehorne. We are acting there in the capacity of
disseminator of information. We make the information available
to the judge advocate who then takes it and processes it,
brings it forth in trial.
Mr. Lyons. We plan to excerpt from these interrogations any
war crimes information and forward it to our War Crimes
Division in Korea for incorporation in the case files as soon
as possible.
Senator Potter. Then the complete files are still in Korea?
Mr. Lyons. I am leading up to that Senator, if I may.
In the early part of September at the start of this so-
called Department of Army Psychological Warfare plan, we
communicated with the Korean Communications Zone and asked them
to forward to us, on a loan basis, a certain type of case.
Number one, what we would call a referral case. A case we
felt would be recommended for trial. Number two, a case which
had reached the point of proof; that additional evidence would
simply be accumulated. In other words ``Big Switch'' or
``Little Switch'' would add nothing to the merits of the case,
and Number three, those cases which they had which were of
prima facie nature where they had no perpetrator. They didn't
know the perpetrator. To date we have received seventy-eight of
those case files. Some of them are pretty good. Roughly forty
of them involved Americans solely or Americans and South
Koreans as the victims.
Now, we personally would like to offer for your
consideration as a suggestion the idea that you might want to
use some of those better case files and we would offer to you
the JAG officer whose interrogation it was in the field in 1950
and 1951, who saw the victims, talked with survivors,
interrogated eyewitnesses, were present when pictures were
taken, wrote up reports of cases which he submitted to the War
Crimes Division.
Now, we have six or seven officers available at the moment.
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, I think one of the main purposes
of this committee will be to get the greatest psychological
value we can from the hearings and it would seem to me from the
questioning this morning that it would be desirable to work
with yourself, the JAG office and also the others, particularly
Psychological Warfare Division, to get three or four or more
cases where we have eyewitness accounts where the soldiers are
back here. Bring him in for the purpose of a hearing. I think
it will be much better to have a former G.I. himself tell his
eyewitness story than it would be for an officer to relate his
story.
We could get--select four or five of these stories and work
with your people, then contact the eyewitness observer to have
public hearings. Now, can you see anything wrong with that?
Maj. Kelleher. It sounds fine to me.
Mr. Jones. Major, may I ask if the Psychological Warfare
Division has consulted any way General MacArthur or any other
field leaders over there?
Maj. Kelleher. No, sir. We haven't.
Mr. Adam. I think it would be well, Mr. Chairman, to
explain how the Psychological Warfare program was developed.
It generated in the army. It was first conceived by General
Ridgeway and proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
secretary of defense agreed to their proposal and it was
submitted to the National Security Council, which is composed
of the president, the vice president, secretary of state,
director of mutual security, secretary of defense and director,
Office of Defense Mobilization. The National Security Council
made the decision so it is as close to being a national policy
as you can get if the decision is finally made to publication.
It is not something that was ill-considered in the Pentagon. It
started as the public information program and has global
ramifications. The truth--the pure bare facts are such potent
anti-Communist propaganda that it has global ramifications
rather than just domestic.
Mr. Jones. You say the Psychological Warfare Board has been
working as a back-stop to Ambassador Lodge, have you in the
course of your work consulted with General MacArthur?
Maj. Kelleher. Not at my level, sir. If such consultations
have taken place, it would certainly be at a higher level.
Mr. Jones. Have there been such consultations?
Mr. Adams. We don't know. We have no way of knowing.
Mr. Cohn. Could you find out?
Maj. Kelleher. I could raise the question. Ours is purely
an intelligence collection and evaluation job to get ammunition
for Ambassador Lodge.
Mr. Jones. Wouldn't his advice be beneficial, helpful?
Senator Potter. What about General Van Fleet? Has he been
consulted since his return? I assume many of the reports came
while he was in command.
Maj. Kelleher. I am at a little disadvantage, sir. I am at
a little lower level.
Senator Potter. Sometimes word of such consultations gets
around. The fact that you don't know doesn't mean they didn't
take place?
Maj. Kelleher. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. The consultations with General Van Fleet, if we
could check on that too.
Maj. Kelleher. I doubt very much if I could get the answer.
Mr. Adams. I think what you could do would be to ask
General MacArthur and General Van Fleet. You might write them a
letter and get the answer for the record.
Gen. Fenn. I think, Senator Potter, we should go into a
little more detail of the cases that we have reports on north
of the parallel and we are now not able to do anything about.
You put on the record a large number of cases. Tell us
about the investigation.
Mr. Lyons. There were roughly about four hundred, in round
figures, incidents which have occurred in North Korea and you
are never going to be able to get back in the area where the
atrocity took place to check as regarding eyewitness accounts
of people in the neighborhood, local people, and to find the
bodies. A certain number of those case we have the confession
of the North Korean Communist but practically all of those
confessions were at a later date repudiated by the Communists.
Senator Potter. Has this information been submitted to the
United Nations?
Maj. Kelleher. Various portions of it, sir, are in
preparation.
First, our intelligence got together documents and prepared
them on a classified basis. Then they are put back through
intelligence channels for evaluation study and agreement with
conclusion. Then they request declassification and it becomes
an open public document for Ambassador Lodge's use. We use the
psychological vulnerability, which simply means those holes we
can get at.
Senator Potter. Is there any thinking that war criminals
will be prosecuted if we ever have the opportunity?
Mr. Adams. I think that point should be in the record, Mr.
Chairman. The point you should remember is that when the Korean
Truce was signed we did include among the prisoners in United
Nations control a number of individuals accused by one person
or a group of persons. War criminals were all returned just as
the Communist returned to us some people they accused of war
crimes.
Senator Potter. In other words, we returned a prisoner who
we had a case against of war crimes?
Mr. Adams. On whom we may have had cases.
Senator Potter. And in return they sent back people they
were charging with such stuff as germ warfare.
Gen. Fenn. I think we returned two hundred, 199.
Mr. Cohn. How many did we get back?
Mr. Lyons. We received a total of thirty-five hundred.
Mr. Cohn. I was thinking of the 199----
Mr. Lyons. That was the total exchange, ``Big Switch''----
Gen. Fenn. Mr. Cohn was referring to how many we got back
from the Communists charged with war crimes.
Mr. Cohn. Did we give back more than we got?
Mr. Lyons. There was no attempt to tabulate. I just don't
know.
Maj. Kelleher. We were perfectly willing to give one
hundred Commies for one American.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Lyons, you stated earlier that over in Korea
you have approximately eighteen hundred provable cases. Is that
correct?
Mr. Lyons. I can't tell you the exact number of provable
cases. There are roughly eighteen hundred case files. The
majority of them are based on the confession of a Korean or
Chinese Communist, which has since been repudiated--hearsay,
unsupported eyewitness testimony.
Mr. Jones. In other words, eighteen hundred files.
Mr. Lyons. Eighteen hundred files.
Mr. Jones. Have UN officials seen these files?
Mr. Lyons. No. The files are over in Korea.
Mr. Carr. You have sixteen hundred of these summaries of
files here?
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Mr. Carr. Of this sixteen hundred, you must have been
making classification and study of that number. Do you have an
estimate or analysis of these? Narrow it down from sixteen
hundred to some number you think would be a good number of
cases. In other words, we would like to come over and look at
the sixteen hundred cases and not have to go through sixteen
hundred cases. Can you point out forty or fifty?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, from the case status report.
Senator Potter. Are some of these cases possible treason?
Mr. Lyons. I am quite sure not.
Mr. Cohn. I am thinking in terms of the Provoo case.
Col. Whitehorne. I am not a lawyer. I wouldn't know a
treason case if it fell on me except I do know actions inimical
to the best interests of the United States. It is up to the
judge advocate to decide whether a case exists.
Mr. Cohn. About how many cases would you say?
Col. Whitehorne. I wouldn't hazard a guess.
Senator Potter. Any referred to your office?
Mr. Lyons. No, sir, Senator, my understanding of that
procedure is that an army level determination will be made as
to whether a case can be prosecuted and recommendation will be
made at that field level.
Maj. Kelleher. Secretary Wilson made an announcement to the
press to the effect that cases will be considered on an
individual basis and each case will be given sympathetical
consideration.
At what point does a man's physical and mental ability to
withstand his treatment--at what point is he resolved of
responsibility from the standpoint of temporary derangement.
Colonel Enich, the air force confessor reached the point where
he realized later he was thinking like a ten year old child to
the point where he agreed to write and sign the confession.
Mr. Jones. Are both Allen Wington and Wilford Burchett,
wartime correspondents in Korea, are they British subjects?
Maj. Kelleher. They seem to figure in. We have one man who
said Burchett came to him shortly before he was repatriated and
said, ``You are the only American left in North Korea.'' He
signed the confession and was on his way down to Panmunjom.
That was a lieutenant. I don't remember this man's name. I
think he is covered in the U.S. News and World Report. That is
where you have got to decide the amount of psychological
pressure a man can stand.
Mr. Carr. Major, it seems apparent that your department,
psychological warfare, you seem receptive to the committee's
going into this matter. You say it will work out very well from
your standpoint. Now, what kind of concrete suggestion do you
have as to our approach to this thing.
Maj. Kelleher. I think I can answer that fairly clearly. We
would like to help. There are many sides to it. This mind
murder or complete inversion of mentality, if we could do
that--display the methods used in handling all propaganda, the
false conceptions, the distorted stories.
What we should do on a long-range goal is destroy the
credibility of Communist propaganda. Colonel Green would be a
good witness.
Senator Potter. Who was the air force colonel who signed
the confession?
Maj. Kelleher. Evans. I believe Colonel Evans would make a
good witness. Captain Sachden, who was repatriated, exchanged
in the ``Little Switch'' operation, I believe would make a good
witness.
Senator Potter. We have, you say, nine hundred and some
that are still missing?
Mr. Lyons. Nine hundred forty.
Senator Potter. They are not accounted for. Now, I assume
that possibly some of those could be victims of murder by the
Communists? Have the nine hundred and some been checked against
the atrocity file that Mr. Lyons mentioned?
Mr. Lyons. I don't know, sir. The adjutant general would
make that check. The adjutant general is making a check based
on the result of interrogation of returnees. The adjutant
general has put out a plan on gathering information on
casualties and the plan has gone to the field and has placed
the responsibility on local commanders to question all
returnees regardless of whether the returnee is a prisoner of
war. Every man who comes back from Korea who belonged to a unit
is subject to further interrogation for casualty information.
From time to time, as we get word from these returnees that
they saw a certain person in a prisoner of war camp, the
adjutant general sends material out to the field and advice to
contact members of that man's unit or other prisoners who might
have been in the camp for as much information as they possibly
can. The adjutant general is required to make determination
under the Missing Persons Act to finally close out these cases
and he is attempting to get everything he possibly can. Senator
Potter, you mentioned earlier something about mothers who write
in and they had never received any letters or had never
received any information, that is a continuing process and it
won't stop. It is very active.
Senator Potter. I have been swamped by letters from mothers
who have sons who haven't been accounted for as yet, and from
many of them I have a certain amount of evidence that they were
prisoners of war and I know the anxiety they have and we would
like to work with you so we can give them as much information
as possible.
Maj. Kelleher. Undoubtedly, it would hurry things up if we
could talk with them when they get off the ship at San
Francisco. However, under the law everyone coming back from the
Pacific, the first thing they get is a pat on the back and
thirty days leave. It is hard to interrupt that.
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, I have nothing further this
morning. I would appreciate it if somebody could be designated
as liaison with the committee. I think I had better take care
of that myself and call either the secretary of defense or
General Erskine so we would have somebody that would work with
our committee full time and not going off on cross purposes.
Mr. Adams. I am sure General Erskine for the psychological
strategy phase would designate Major Kelleher. As far as the
atrocity matter the secretary of defense would turn it over to
the army, Secretary Stevens and he would turn it over to me and
I would designate Mr. Haskins sitting next to me. I think that
would probably save you the call, unless you want to call
General Erskine.
Senator Potter. I am going to be away on other committee
assignments until the first part of December. That will allow
time for the staff to work liaison with Mr. Lyons' office and
also the Psychological Warfare Division and make other contacts
that might be necessary.
I would think it advisable to get some of your best files,
I think possibly I'd line up about ten cases, Frank. Try to
contact some of the returned PWs, returned soldiers, who were
eyewitnesses to these atrocities. Interview them in light of
the statements that they have given in prior interviews and set
that up for a hearing about the 10th of December. Is that
agreeable with you gentlemen? Can you see any cross purposes to
that? In the meantime I think the committee should go out and
contact Ambassador Lodge. We will also contact previous field
commanders, I think General MacArthur and General Van Fleet.
See if they have any suggestions. As a matter of fact, I think
General Van Fleet should be contacted. I would like to have him
work quite closely with this committee.
Maj. Kelleher. For your information, Ambassador Lodge has
the PW item coming up on his agenda today--anytime after about
the 21st of October--I am thinking only in terms of keeping the
campaign alive. This might just fit in.
Senator Potter. I expect to be on the West Coast the latter
part of the month and if you have any witnesses out there that
you could turn over I would be happy to see them while out
there.
In the meantime, Frank, if you have two or three you'd like
me to see while there it would save time.
Mr. Cohn. There definitely would be some on the West Coast.
Senator Potter. Well, gentlemen, if there is no other
suggestion, I want to thank you again for taking time to meet
with us and I will appreciate your continued cooperation as we
go along. Feel free at any time if you have suggestions as to
how to better operate this committee, we are working for the
same purpose and we will be very happy to receive them.
[Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]
KOREAN WAR ATROCITIES
----------
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953, at 10:00 a.m. in room 357, Senate
Office Building, Francis P. Carr, executive director,
presiding.
Present: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Donald F.
O'Donnell, assistant counsel; Thomas W. La Venia, assistant
counsel; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk; Raymond Anderson,
administrative assistant to Senator Potter; and Robert L.
Jones, executive assistant to Senator Potter.
Present also: Edward J. Lyons, Jr., Judge Advocate
General's Office; Col. Wade M. Fleischer, Office of Secretary
of Defense for Public Relations and Legislative Liaison; Maj.
James Kelleher, Department of Defense, Psychological Warfare.
Mr. Carr. Gentlemen, to get started this morning, I think
we will just have a roundtable discussion as we did the last
time. Let me review briefly the situation as I see it, and as
it stands as of this moment.
It is our purpose this morning to salvage what we can out
of what appears to be an unfortunate situation. It was our
understanding at our last meeting at which some of us were in
attendance here on October 6th, that the hearings projected by
Senator Potter for this fall on the Korean War atrocities were
to be held in full cooperation and conjunction with the army
and Defense Department's projected program in this matter. It
was our understanding and it was quite clear to me, and to all
in attendance, that Senator Potter was extremely anxious that
the committee's work coincide with that of the whole program.
It was my understanding also that the Department of
Psychological Warfare and the Department of Defense were, I
would say, anxious, or at least enthused about having the
committee come in and take part in the program since it was
felt that the committee would be another means of bringing this
situation forcefully to the public's attention.
It seems to have developed to the point where we have hit
sort of an impasse which we will have to overcome this morning.
Mr. Anderson. Do you think it would be well at this point
for the purposes of the record to incorporate excerpts from our
executive session?
Mr. Carr. I think that would be a good point. The reporter
will make a part of the record excerpts of the original
conference of October 6, 1953.
[The excerpts referred to are as follows:] Excerpts from
Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Re Korean Atrocities, October 6,
1953, before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S.
Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican of Michigan, presiding.
Maj. Kelleher (Psychological Warfare). There is presently under
active consideration, sir, and on the verge of approval, a program
which will really include three different phases. First is the exposure
for the benefit not only of the American public, but the world in
general, as to the nature of these atrocities, and that really covers
two phases there--domestic and foreign, do the same thing on a global
basis. It has a third phase which I might say Ambassador Lodge at the
United Nations, which will include the charge of biological warfare.
This plan will probably be kicked off within the next day or so. In
fact, Ambassador Lodge is going to show some films, motion picture
sound interviews with the same Air Force flyers who were characterized
in the so-called germ warfare charges. . . . also involved is the so-
called International Scientific Commission, made up mostly of Europeans
and Asiatics. The British representative is a man named Needham. They
went to Korea under the auspices of the Communists and made a so-called
impartial investigation of germ warfare. . . .
If you will recall he (Ambassador Lodge) entered a resolution at
the United Nations last spring asking for an impartial investigation of
the PW thing, and he defied the Communists at the United Nations
stating that if you will bring the so-called confessors out of North
Korea and give them thirty days rest, without exception they will
recant on their confessions.
We also feel, if I may bring up this point, that your committee in
making these investigations can be of tremendous help in the global
program that we are trying to get under way to bring this whole mess to
the attention of the world. [P. 887]
Senator Potter. Mr. Adams, I don't know whether anyone here would
be in a position to say whether the proper defense places would loan us
personnel to work on this case----
Mr. Adams (Counsellor for the army). I am quite sure we can. I am
quite sure the department will lend the committee any assistance which
you require to make preparations for the hearings. I am sure the
secretary of the army would want to and I am sure the secretary of
defense would.
The Psychological Warfare Office under General Erskine, Office of
Secretary of Defense, would be available to assist you. I am sure that
both the judge advocate general, G-1 and G-2 of the army would give you
all the assistance possible. [P. 898]
Senator Potter. Major Kelleher, I wonder if you know whether the UN
has a committee or commission working on this problem too? [P. 899]
Maj. Kelleher. With regard, sir, to the exposure of the PW mess or
refuting charges, yes, sir, they do. It is, I might say, a pet project
of Ambassador Lodge's and a follow-through from his resolution of last
spring demanding an impartial investigation of this thing.
Senator Potter. Would it be your advice to contact Ambassador Lodge
so that our efforts are coordinated?
Maj. Kelleher. Yes, sir, I believe so. It could be done very
handily right here in Washington. In this particular case, he has a
back stopping group which works out of the former Psychological
Strategy Board, now the Operations Coordination Board of the National
Security Council. This is Mr. C.S. Jackson's group, sir.
Mr. Adams. I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you talk personally
to Ambassador Lodge about it. It might also be well to speak to General
Robert Cutler, administrative assistant to the president on this
psychological strategy matter. Both of them might be able to give you
assistance, help the committee.
Senator Potter. That is good advice. [P. 899]
Senator Potter. Mr. Adams, I am wondering if somebody could be
designated soon to work as liaison between the committee and the
Department of Defense on this matter.
Mr. Adams. Yes. Secretary Stevens asked me to work as liaison with
the committee on matters such as this; initially me. [P. 903]
Mr. Lyons. (Judge Advocate General's Office). . . In the early part
of September at the start of this so-called Department of Army
Psychological Warfare Plan, we communicated with the Korean
Communications Zone and asked them to forward us, on a loan basis, a
certain type of case. . . To date we have received roughly seventy-
eight of these case files. . . Now we personally would like to offer
for your consideration as a suggestion the idea that you might want to
use some of those better case files and we would offer to you the
officer whose interrogation it was in the field in 1950 and 1951, who
saw the victim, talked with survivors, interrogated eye witnesses, were
present when the pictures were taken, wrote up reports of cases which
he submitted to the War Crimes Division. [P. 906]
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, I think one of the main purposes of this
committee will be to get the greatest psychological value we can from
the hearings and it would seem to me from the questioning this morning
that it would be desirable to work with yourself (Mr. Lyons), the JAG
office, and also others, particularly the Psychological Warfare
Division, to get three or four names where we have eye witness accounts
where the soldiers are back here. Bring him in for the purpose of a
hearing. I think it would be much better to have a former GI himself
tell his eye witness story than it would be for an officer to relate
his story . . . [P. 906]
Mr. Adams. I think it would be well, Mr. Chairman, to explain how
the psychological warfare program was developed.
It generated in the army. It was first conceived by General
Ridgeway and proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The secretary of
defense agreed to their proposal and it was submitted to the National
Security Council, which is composed of the president, the vice
president, secretary of state, director of mutual security, secretary
of defense, and the director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. The
National Security Council made the decision so it was as close to
national policy as you can get if the decision is finally made to
publication. It was not something that was ill considered at the
Pentagon. It started as the public information program and has had
global ramifications. The truth, the pure facts are such potent anti-
communist propaganda that it has global ramifications rather than just
domestic. [P. 907]
Mr. Carr. (Executive director, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations) Major (Kelleher), it seems apparent that your
department, psychological warfare, you seem receptive to the
committee's going into this matter. You say it will work out very well
from your standpoint. Now, what kind of concrete suggestion do you have
as to our approach to this thing? [P. 913]
Maj. Kelleher. I think I can answer that fairly clearly. We would
like to help. There are many sides to it. This mind murder or complete
inversion of mentality, if we could do that, display the methods used
in all propaganda, the false conceptions, the distorted stories. . . .
The Acting Chairman. . . . I would appreciate it if somebody could
be designated as liaison with the committee. I think I had better take
care of that matter myself and call either the secretary of defense or
General Erskine so that we would have somebody working at full time and
not going off on cross purposes. [P. 916]
Mr. Adams. I am sure General Erskine for the psychological strategy
phase would designate Major Kelleher. As far as the atrocity matter is
concerned, I believe the secretary of defense would turn it over to the
army, Secretary Stevens, who in turn would give it to me, and I would
designate Mr. Haskins sitting next to me. I think that would probably
save you the call unless you want to talk with General Erskine. [P.
916]
Senator Potter. I am going to be away on other committee
assignments until the first part of December. That will allow time for
the staff to work liaison with Mr. Lyon's office and also the
Psychological Warfare Division and make other contacts that may be
necessary. [P. 916]
. . . Is that agreeable to you, gentlemen? Can you see any cross
purposes to that? In the meantime, I think the committee should go out
and contact Senator Lodge . . .
Maj. Kelleher. For your information, Ambassador has the PW item
coming up on his agenda today--any time after about the 21st of
October--I am thinking only in keeping the campaign alive. This might
just fit in.
[End of Excerpts]
Mr. Carr. It was pointed out at that time by Major Kelleher
that there was under consideration a program which would
include various phases. One phase was that Ambassador Lodge
might possibly kick off the program at the UN by showing of a
film and motion pictures of interviews of the American flyers
involved in the alleged germ warfare charges.
There was also, I believe, at that time a question as to
whether or not the Department of Defense could loan personnel
to the committee to work on this matter. Mr. Adams felt sure
that it could be worked out, and that proper liaison could be
established through Mr. Charles Haskins of his office.
Mr. Anderson. Do you recall the acting chairman pointed
out, and I might quote here, ``I would appreciate it if
somebody could be designated as liaison with the committee. I
think I had better take care of that matter myself and call
either the secretary of defense or General Erskine, so that we
would have somebody working at full time and not going off at
cross purposes.''
Mr. Adams followed and said, ``I am sure General Erskine
for the psychological strategy phase, would designate Major
Kelleher as far as the atrocity matter is concerned. I believe
the secretary of defense would turn it over to army Secretary
Stevens, who in turn would give it to me, and I would designate
Mr. Haskins, sitting next to me. I think that would probably
save you the call unless you want to talk to General Erskine.''
Mr. Carr. I think it should also be noted that I myself
stated that it was apparent that the psychological warfare was
receptive to the committee going into this matter, and asked
what kind of concrete suggestion could be offered so that we
could approach this thing in a proper manner. All of this is
being put in the record just to make it as clear as possible
that the position of everybody associated with the subcommittee
has been that we at least thought we were operating in full
cooperation with the Department of Defense on this matter. It
appears that somewhere along the line the business has become
pretty much snafued. We are in the position, as I understand
the picture, where we have a man who is over at the Department
of Defense trying to establish liaison in this matter, and yet
at the same time the information which he has been seeking is
made available to the press before it is known to him.
The point we are interested in getting straight here is
whether or not this was an oversight or some sort of design, or
what the purpose of this thing was, because it becomes apparent
that much of the information given to the press was the type of
information that we had been seeking.
It seems to me that our best position this morning should
be that we do everything we can to salvage something from the
situation. It also seems to me that a more proper way of
handling the situation would have at least been to notify
Senator Potter by at least forwarding this material to him at
the time the release was to be made.
I might say for Senator McCarthy that he feels that
something has been fouled up here, that he is anxious to get it
straightened out, and he is very anxious to see that Senator
Potter, as acting chairman, does have the full cooperation of
the Defense Department in this matter.
Mr. Anderson. May I interject something at this point? I
have discussed the situation with Ambassador Lodge of the UN,
and also Ambassador Wadsworth. It is quite clear that they
likewise were not notified of any release such as the
Department of Defense made available to the press on Wednesday.
Mr. Carr. Gentlemen, that seems to be the position we are
in. It is Senator McCarthy's intention, I know, because I have
been in contact with him, and I understand it is the intention
of Senator Potter's office, to continue to try to cooperate in
this matter to the point where we can conduct these projected
hearings as had been intended. The problem that presents itself
is what material do we use now. Most of it has been made
public. These are the points we would like to get under
discussion at this time.
Mr. Anderson. In the hearing of October 6, Mr. Lyons stated
as follows:
To date we have received roughly seventy-eight of these
case files. We personally would like to offer for your
consideration as a suggestion the idea that you might want to
use some of those better cases files, and we would offer to you
the officer whose interrogation it was in the field in 1950 and
1951, who saw the victims, talked to the survivors and
interrogated eye witnesses, and were present when the pictures
were taken and wrote up reports of cases which he submitted to
the War Crimes Commission.
It is my understanding that those cases were included in
the release given fully to the press.
Mr. Carr. On that matter, it is my understanding that Mr.
Lyons has fulfilled his statement made on October 6 in that he
has scanned the cases that were available and tried to be
helpful to the committee by, I would say, boiling it down to
several cases which he thought would be most helpful. He
notified you, Mr. O'Donnell, that the rest could be made
available.
Mr. O'Donnell. May I interject at this point, Mr. Lyons
made available at my first meeting with him at the Pentagon
approximately fifteen case files which probably were the best
case files in his unit from an evidentiary standpoint. There
were cases which probably would have been tried if the War
Tribunal Plan had gone into effect. At that time he also
informed me that we could have anything in his unit. So there
was complete cooperation with Mr. Lyons as far as I know.
Mr. Carr. However, as Ray points out, of the fifteen cases
all except one of those fifteen have been incorporated in this
report.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is correct.
Mr. Anderson. That is the point I wanted to establish.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. Now, of the original number of seventy-eight, or
seventy-four perhaps--
Mr. Lyons. Roughly around seventy.
Mr. Carr. It appears that all of these cases have been made
public at this time. What we have to come up with, I think, at
this time is some additional cases which have not been made
public which are, it seems to me, equally infamous. I think we
have to have some more positive assurance from the Defense
Department that the Defense Department is fully cooperating
with Senator Potter in this matter. We do not wish to appear
this morning to be in the role of complaining, other than the
fact that we cannot afford to let Senator Potter go into this
matter, and then have it exposed before he has had his full
chance to do it, especially when it seems to me that Senator
Potter was perhaps the most cooperative committee member that I
have ever seen on the Hill. His whole attitude was one of full
cooperation with the department in this matter. He made it
quite clear that he wanted his program to be coordinated into
the overall picture. He did not want to upset any applecarts
that were already under way. But by his coordination into the
general picture, I am sure he did not intend that he be
coordinated right out of the thing. It is like a fellow I knew
at law school who once said that the dean said he should do a
little relaxing, so he proceeded to relax himself right out of
law school.
That is the problem we are faced with this morning and we
want to come to some solution to this thing. We feel we must,
and we are definitely going to see that Senator Potter's
program in this matter is fully protected as well as it can be
at this stage. We would like to have any suggestions that you
might have on this matter.
Don, from your contact with Mr. Lyons and the others at the
Department of Defense, is there a possibility of there being
other cases?
Mr. Lyons. Could I interrupt before Mr. O'Donnell answers
that question?
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes.
Mr. Lyons. I will probably address my remarks more to Mr.
O'Donnell, because we sat down at that first conference. If you
will remember at that hearing when we spoke to the senator of
the officer who investigated, he said he would prefer to have
GI survivors as his witnesses. That, of course, immediately
lessened the available number of cases that we could give you,
because there were only a small percentage. I think as I said
that morning at the hearing, of the roughly seventy cases we
had then, only about forty involved Americans as the victims,
and of that forty, a smaller percentage were cases in which
there was an available U.S. survivor. So that in itself was the
reason why only roughly fifteen cases were offered to Mr.
O'Donnell at that time.
Mr. Carr. I might say, Mr. Lyons, we are satisfied with
that phase of the thing. The problem presented to us, now, of
course, is since those cases were so few in number, the
exposure of those cases, I might say personally, prematurely,
does place us in the position where the possibility of other
cases is very limited or almost the point of impossibility.
Mr. Lyons. I wonder if it can be said that making public
the information that has been made public in these cases has
destroyed the value for the committee. You have no eyewitness
testimony in these thumbnail sketches that have been given out.
Do you think that one of these good cases, the tunnel massacre,
has been spoiled because one paragraph has been given out? We
could bring in ten or fifteen or twenty witnesses who actually
saw the killing.
Mr. Jones. May I add this information which is a statement
made by the senator in the executive session. It reads:
Gentlemen, I think one of the main purposes of this
committee will be to get the greatest psychological value we
can from the hearings. It would seem to me from the questioning
here this morning that it would be more desirable to work with
yourself, Mr. Lyons, the JAG office and also others,
particularly the Psychological Warfare Division, to get the
names of eye witnesses where the soldiers are back here now.
Bring him in for the purpose of the hearing. I think it would
be much better to have a former GI himself tell his story than
it would be for an officer to relate the story.
That is the end of the quote.
Subsequent conversation with the senator on this particular
point cleared it up to this extent, that the senator would
prefer that a GI--and when he is thinking of a GI, he is
thinking of a non-commissioned officer and soldier, rather than
have the officer in the Pentagon relate the story.
Mr. O'Donnell. I think that was clearly understood. May I
interject at this point that according to the information I
received at the Pentagon the other day, and this is from Major
Robert Cook in the Office of Public Information, photostatic
copies of complete raw files on forty-two cases which came out
of your office with certain phases deleted, such as names of
survivors and the face, etc. blacked out, were made available
in toto to the press. He further informed me that he had
photostatic copies of two hundred of your thumbnail summaries
which would be presumably the better cases of your sixteen
hundred, and if any member of the press desired the raw file
case based on that summary, it would also be made available to
him. He further advised that this particular release, and the
availability of the files, was to be a continuing one, so that
any member of the press could come in at a later date and
review a file, which leaves us in the apparent position of only
having the possibility of live survivors to testify. But all
the other information is readily available to the press,
according to that office.
Maj. Kelleher. May I make a suggestion, sir? First I would
like to say that with regard to our original meeting with
Senator Potter, please believe me there was no intention of bad
faith or anything in the way of the manner in which the thing
developed. Senator Potter did make one statement at the October
6 meeting that sticks in my mind which may have been overlooked
where he said he was specifically interested in about 950
people whom we knew or had felt were still in the hands of the
Communists and still alive. That particular aspect of this has
not been gone into at all. It might be a very relevant point
and could be gone into. It seems to me that there should be
among the returned GI's in the United States now plenty of
people who were those individuals who gave us information when
repatriated as to the existence and the fact these individuals
were alive and know they had not been repatriated. That was one
point I thought Senator Potter was specifically interested in.
I think it was pretty early in the meeting that he brought up
this point.
Mr. Jones. I recall. I think it was 944 missing.
Mr. Carr. That is right.
Maj. Kelleher. When these people came through the
repatriation center, one of the first questions they were asked
was to name specifically anybody they knew of who was up there.
Then by a matter of comparison and elimination we came up with
a list of about 944 of the people we felt that the Commies
still held, and were alive, and we made a formal demand on the
Commies at Panmunjom to produce the people. They came back with
a list that said forty-eight people were repatriated, and the
others never existed. We still think they do and have evidence
to that effect. That thing stands right at about that point
now.
Mr. Carr. However, I think it was quite clear that Senator
Potter wanted roughly atrocity cases.
As I said before, we do not want to sound as though we are
sitting back here crying that we have been injured in the
thing. We want to salvage what we can from what we consider was
a mistake or perhaps a misunderstanding on somebody's part--
definitely a mistake--and it seems to me a definite slighting
of the senator's interest in this thing. The way the senator
wanted to cooperate, we feel that if they were going to make a
release, the very least they could have done was to have sent
the release out in the form of a notice to the senator that
this thing was being done. We do not want to continually harp
on that. We feel that the damage has been done.
I agree with Mr. Lyons that there is probably something we
can salvage from the thing, and that is what we have to do now.
I have to rely on Bob and Ray on this part, but I think the
senator was primarily interested in atrocity cases.
Mr. Anderson. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. It is true he did show some interest in these 944
cases. He also expressed a passing interest in the twenty-two,
but he indicated that he was not going into it. That is my
understanding. His prime interest was in the atrocities. Can we
work out some arrangement whereby he can still go into this
atrocity picture? What is the possibility on that, Don?
Mr. O'Donnell. The possibilities on that, as I see it,
depend on the number of cases that are released to the press
over and above those that are included in the report. Of
course, they do not have the individual survivors. Also, I
understand there may be some difficulty in using some of these
individual survivors in open hearings. So our field is
definitely limited.
Maj. Kelleher. I don't understand.
Mr. O'Donnell. There is a possibility that some of these
survivors gave the statement to the army on a confidential
basis, and did not want their names divulged at any time.
Maj. Kelleher. I am not aware of that.
Mr. O'Donnell. I picked up that information at the
Pentagon.
Maj. Kelleher. I see how it could be possible, but I knew
of no specific case.
Mr. O'Donnell. That was told to me by Major Cook.
Mr. Lyons. That may well be on cases involving
collaboration, but I find it difficult to understand that a
statement that would back up one of our atrocity cases, for
example, supposing we got hold of somebody who survived the
march, I don't think his statement would be confidential.
Mr. O'Donnell. If that is the picture, we could use the
individual.
Mr. Lyons. You remember what I said that morning, that when
we had determined the cases you wanted, then we were going to
go after the Big Switch returnees to see if it was possible to
turn it in later.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right.
Mr. Lyons. We did submit eighty-three or eighty-four names.
Mr. O'Donnell. Eighty-three.
Mr. Lyons. Yes, from that batch of cases as a possible
start. I don't know to what extent you feel we can still use
those names in the original cases. I honestly believe we can.
Mr. O'Donnell. We can, but we are faced with this factor.
We don't know to what use the press will make these individual
cases available to the public between now and the time of the
contemplated hearings, which was indicated by Senator Potter as
December 10 of this year. So we are faced with an unknown
quantity as to what we are going to combat. We could
conceivably work up possible cases within the week before the
scheduled hearings, and have all of our material available to
the public by individuals of the press who have access to these
cases.
Maj. Kelleher. If they are not already out, certainly we
can reserve ten cases, or something like that, can we not?
Mr. Lyons. Mr. O'Donnell is correct when he says that
everything we have received from the field has been made
available to that channel. Either the photostats have been
delivered, or the cases have been examined, and they know that
the cases are in our possession and are available for their
use. That is why I brought up here roughly fifteen or twenty
cases that are not in that summary. They are cases where
Americans were the victims and there are American survivors.
Some of them I think are very good cases. I say to you either
the photostat of that case is in the Office of the Chief of
Information, or he knows that the case is in our office.
Maj. Kelleher. Mr. Lyons, I am not quite clear, but even if
the cases are in the Office of the Chief of Information, have
they also been made available to the press at this point?
Mr. Lyons. Not all of them.
Maj. Kelleher. I don't see why we could not get a stop on
some selected cases, and hold it up.
Col. Fleischer. Mr. Carr, the reason I have not been
getting into this, I have been getting filled in on it like you
have, on behalf of Secretary Seaton. Listening to this
conversation about these files, I will certainly go back and
talk it over with Mr. Seaton, as Mr. Kelleher has suggested to
see if cases in which you people have an interest can not be--I
hesitate to use the word ``withheld''--but shall we say just
withdrawn or not made available. I must confess my surprise at
the moment to the fact that these things were made available on
such a grand scale. I don't know the reasoning behind that.
That is something I am not familiar with, nor is Mr. Seaton. I
will be glad to go back and talk it over with him, and see what
we can do in that respect. I fully understand your position.
Mr. Carr. Our position, I think, is plain. I want to
emphasize at the risk of repeating myself, it might be perhaps
a little different from many investigations conducted by
committees on the Hill, this one Senator Potter was confident
was being conducted with full cooperation with the department,
and he was trying to coordinate his efforts into that of the
overall program. He did not express any desire, and did not
have any desire, to upset anything in the overall picture. He
realized it was a big picture. He realized, as Major Kelleher
said in the record the last time, Ambassador Lodge might kick
the thing off with some of these pictures at the UN. He
realized somewhere in the statement that somebody said it was
possible the president might even kick the thing off. The thing
was a program. He expected to be coordinated into the program
voluntarily. He was giving up a sort of prerogative of his as a
senator to go in there and demand things. He wanted to be part
of the program. He wanted to be helpful to the program. It was
his understanding that he was being helpful to the program by
holding some open hearings on the thing. We just get down to
this position that somewhere along the line, the thing has
gotten snafued and what appears to have been his contribution
to the program, exposing publicly some of these worst
atrocities, seems to have been usurped and already exposed.
Now we want to salvage what we can from that situation by
complete cooperation. If we can work out, Bob and Ray, some
arrangement whereby the Department of Defense would--I don't
like to say withhold, because it puts you in the position of
withholding information--would not make available to the
general public certain cases that we could possibly use from
the remainder, we might salvage something from that. I think
the department has, whether intentionally or unintentionally--
we do not want to get into that phase of it--has very
definitely slighted the Senator, which in my opinion is a very
unfortunate thing to happen. I think we should have some sort
of a statement from the department recognizing the fact that
Senator Potter has been in this thing, and is in this thing.
Bob, can you elaborate on that a little?
Mr. Jones. I have one question. May I inquire as to who is
the official liaison between this committee and the Pentagon
here this morning?
Mr. Carr. Col. Fleischer is the liaison with the Department
of Defense.
Col. Fleischer. I will say now it has gotten up on the
defense level. In other words, when Mr. Anderson talked to
Secretary Seaton, and Mr. Seaton asked me to discuss the
background and look into what had gone on before, and meet with
you people, I would say the assistant secretary of defense for
legislative and public affairs is now the liaison in this case.
Mr. Jones. Does that mean that from here on in you will be
the active liaison between the committee and the Pentagon in
the conduct of these investigations?
Col. Fleischer. It will probably boil down to being Col.
Britton in my office.
Mr. Jones. Does that action supersede Mr. Adams and Mr.
Haskins?
Col. Fleischer. I would not say it is a question of
superseding the Department of Army, because they have the
action responsibility, the files, the personnel, the know-how
and so forth. But when you get into a position as we are in
now, where a committee of Congress feels that a defense-wide
operation--I say that because it was not only the Department of
Army as such, but also General Erskine's office, Office of
Public Information and the Office of Secretary of Defense--we
now get into a position, as I see it, whereby this thing has
actually gotten up on the secretary of defense level.
Mr. Jones. In other words, in the future if Mr. O'Donnell,
or the subcommittee staff, or Senator Potter's office, wishes
at any time to gain access to any Department of the Pentagon,
it would go through your office as liaison to this committee?
Col. Fleischer. That is right.
Mr. Anderson. May I also make this attempt to clear this
up, Colonel? Secretary Seaton has control of the release of all
information from all branches of the service with respect to
the release to the press.
Col. Fleischer. I am sorry to say that I am a little hazy
on that problem, because up to the time that Mr. Seaton came
into the office, I was only concerned with legislative liaison.
I would be glad to go back and check that for you. I am not
quite clear in my own mind. As you probably know, the three
departments have their public information services, as well as
the Secretary of Defense. However, the release on this came out
of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Mr. Seaton's public
information division as distinguished from legislative liaison.
Mr. Jones. Yet that went out over the signature of the
secretary of the army.
Col. Fleischer. That is right.
Mr. Carr. That seemed to be one of the problems in this
general snafu. Without getting into why, how or where, perhaps
the liaison was not fully known. I don't see why it should not
have been, but perhaps it was not fully known. Perhaps
something could have been fouled up along the line that
obviously was not made known to the liaison that was dealing
with the situation. So we won't run into the trouble again, if
it is now on the defense level, the possibility of such a
release should, it seems to me, be taken into consideration by
your office with some sort of arrangements with the other
agencies.
Col. Fleischer. I might go a little bit further. In reading
over this transcript yesterday and talking once or twice with
Mr. Anderson and also the people in the Department of the Army
and also with Secretary Seaton, I came up, I guess, you might
say, unilaterally with the same suggestion that we discussed
here this morning, that we attempt to salvage as much as we can
for your committee.
I think, too, that some of these cases ought to be
developed as rapidly as possible so that you can get the
maximum benefit from them. I do not think in the month's time
you have left you have too long for both the army and our
people to help you develop these things, because you do have a
problem with the survivors and locating them.
Mr. O'Donnell. The actual number of cases that were made
available to the press as of Wednesday, the 28th, when I was
over there, there were thirty-four files that were available to
them as of that day. That is the photostats of the complete raw
files. Eight more were in the process. That made a total of
forty-two, which were as of that day available. Of course, some
of those forty-two involve atrocities not from the American POW
soldier standpoint, but from a civilian standpoint, cases in
which we would not be primarily interested. So there are cases
over and above that number, as Mr. Lyons pointed out, and some
of them are here. But whether or not it can be worked out so
that a stop can be put on those cases being released to the
press, I don't know.
Col. Fleischer. I don't know either, offhand. I just made a
note when you first mentioned that problem here, and I will
talk to Mr. Seaton as soon as I go back about the problem with
a view to him talking to the people in public information of
the army and also the other departments. I can see your point.
Certainly if you get ready, say, the day before your hearing,
and two or three of the magazines and the other press media
pick up either accidentally or on purpose the exact cases you
are about to have a hearing on the next day, that is going to
be a very difficult situation for everybody concerned.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right. There is another thing here,
if I may, that is supplemental, but it is something we have
been completely lacking in from the knowledge standpoint of the
subcommittee staff. What is the specific program of the
department, particularly the Psychological Warfare Unit,
specifically in the future. We didn't know, for example, as of
Wednesday, and this is not in the nature of criticism, but lack
of information on our part, that General Dean was going to
appear on the TV show. We contemplated the possibility of using
Dean ourselves. We did not know that a movie was in the
preparation of release. We did not know, of course, that this
interim report was being published. We did not know to the
extent of it being made available to the press. This is only
part of it.
We didn't know that U.S. Steel was going to put on the TV
hour show.
Maj. Kelleher. We didn't either.
Mr. O'Donnell. You didn't? Well, that was on the other
night. We had no breakdown as to the positive program that was
under way by the army.
Col. Fleischer. If we learn in advance that certain of
these people are going to appear on a program, would you like
to know that?
Mr. Carr. Yes, if Don could keep a real cooperative liaison
with you, as I said before, this is the sort of thing in which
we are trying to work together with you, and if Don could be in
the position of knowing that, it would be helpful. I think also
if he is in the position of giving you any information he has,
it should be fully worked out. We don't want the situation to
arise again whereby we are caught off base. It seems to me also
that the UN was caught off base.
Mr. Anderson. It is my understanding that the UN was
completely caught off base, Colonel.
Mr. Jones. Who authorized it to happen so fast?
Col. Fleischer. I have not been able to determine that as
of yesterday.
Mr. Jones. How many cases have not been made public, Mr.
Lyons?
Mr. Lyons. I can't give you that answer. As far as being
made public, as far as I am concerned, concerning that,
everything that has come in has been made available to the
chief of information. At least they have knowledge of it. I
can't tell you.
Mr. Jones. In your original testimony here, you had
mentioned that sixteen hundred cases in the War Crimes
Commission in Korea were continually and daily being
supplemented, is that correct?
Mr. Lyons. That is right.
Mr. Jones. Have any of those cases been completed to your
knowledge since you were here last?
Mr. Lyons. An additional thirty or thirty-five. I think the
round figure now is around 110, of which possibly between sixty
and seventy involve GIs. Of that group, those in which there
are survivors that would be made available to the committee are
here, the ones Mr. O'Donnell saw, and one here that the file
was not available to me last night.
Mr. Jones. Will it be possible to have any of those files
in Korea brought over here?
Mr. Lyons. We have everything here from Korea that is of
any value at the moment.
Mr. Anderson. In other words, the cases are as complete as
you expect them to be developed at this moment, Mr. Lyons?
Mr. Lyons. At the moment. When they get this information
back on Big Switch, and when they can correlate it to what they
have over there, there will be a large number of cases,
particularly cases of mistreatment in the POW camps. But those
cases are months and months away. This report does not touch
that material at all, because it is not available. It is coming
in from the field very slowly.
Mr. Jones. That is the point I was trying to establish. I
think that might be a source of new material that this
committee could use, but you say that would be months and
months.
Mr. Lyons. For the Big Switch, yes, months and months. For
the committee I used seventeen hundred open files, and a batch
of closed files that were in the process of being re-examined.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Lyons, what exactly are these ten or twelve
files you have here?
Mr. Lyons. These are cases of GI victims, GI survivors whom
we think can be made available as witnesses, and the cases are
not referred to in this report.
Mr. O'Donnell. For example, these would be some of the
cases that we would like to have stopped that are available to
the Office of Public Information and through them to the press.
Mr. Jones. These have been made available to the Office of
Public Information?
Mr. Lyons. Some of them have. The chief of information
knows that everyone is in the office. Some of them he has
photostated copies. That does not mean that they have been
released.
Mr. Jones. But they would be released if the press
requested that information.
Mr. Lyons. Yes. I couldn't say to you that somebody is not
over there this morning right now.
Mr. Anderson. Mr. Lyons, in your opinion are these
outstanding cases?
Mr. Lyons. I think some of them are very good cases. Some
of them are not. I have gone over them very, very roughly. Some
of them are good cases.
Mr. Anderson. Comparable with the others that have been
pointed out to Mr. O'Donnell and made available?
Mr. Lyons. I think they are comparable to three or four of
those good cases that Mr. O'Donnell saw. The big march case and
the tunnel case, they are not comparable to those two big
cases.
Mr. O'Donnell. There is a possibility that we could still
use those seventy-five or seventy-six cases.
Mr. Lyons. I still think you can use seventy-five or
seventy-six. There are some good cases here.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Lyons, how long have you had these files
here in your possession?
Mr. Lyons. Early in October they started coming in. Wait a
minute. I have to go back on that. They started coming in the
latter part of September.
Mr. Jones. You will recall the day following our executive
hearing on the 6th of October I called you on the phone and
asked you for eight or ten of the more outstanding cases, as
Mr. Anderson just asked. You gave me those cases or a synopsis
of those cases over the telephone.
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Mr. Jones. Included in those cases were the tunnel
massacre, the death march, and a few of the others, which you
considered to be the more outstanding cases.
Mr. Lyons. That is right.
Mr. Jones. Those were the cases that were in turn released
to the press. These were in your possession at the time.
Mr. Lyons. That is right.
Mr. Jones. You said the more outstanding ones were the ones
you gave me which were in turn released to the press which
would more or less reduce these to a secondary level in
importance.
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. Mr. Lyons did not release it to the press.
Mr. Jones. No, he did not release it.
Mr. Lyons. You wanted to make a quick speech for the
senator that day, and I had a report on the desk and gave it to
you.
Mr. Jones. I was simply trying to establish the importance
of these documents as compared to the others.
Mr. O'Donnell. If I may, I would still like to go back to
the complete program in the Pentagon as affecting the war
atrocities because I think it is most important that we be
aware of that program from a knowledge standpoint, and be
alerted as soon as any aspect of the program comes to light,
whether it emanates from the Pentagon or outside source. I
think that is one of the difficulties in this unfortunate
situation. If we had known that this report was in preparation
for at least a month, and apparently it was, it would have
given us a different aspect. I would not have been over on any
of these fifteen cases that Mr. Lyons made available.
Mr. Jones. That is water under the bridge. Our job here is
to salvage something.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right, but if we know the complete
program, it will help us immeasurably, because we don't know
what will develop to offset contemplated plans we might have on
a salvage basis.
Maj. Kelleher. The foreign exploitation will be a
continuing thing which falls outside of the domestic public
information situation. That will be right down the line on this
material that has been released. In other words, the material
that is over in the chief of information's office that is
available to the American press is by the same right available
to the U.S. Information Agency, which carries out the overseas
exploitation. So as far as the basic material is concerned, it
is exactly the same thing. This is one of those cases, call it
propaganda of truth, if you want to, but the story that is told
the American people is just as powerful a story to tell on the
local basis.
Mr. Jones. Did Dr. Charles Mayo work with you?
Maj. Kelleher. No. He gets his Washington support from a
division of state, which is just called backstopping. They
backstop the U.S. delegation from the Department of State here.
Mr. Anderson. That is C. D. Jackson's organization?
Maj. Kelleher. No, sir. C. D. Jackson is the president's
assistant on psychological warfare matters, but his activities
are with the Operations Coordinating Board of the NSC. Then the
OCB in turn assists the deputy secretary of state, deputy
secretary of defense, the director of foreign operations, Mr.
Stassen, and Mr. C. D. Jackson sits there as the White House
representative.
Mr. Jones. What then is General Cutler's position?
Maj. Kelleher. He is the president's assistant for the
National Security Council and the OCB in turn is an arm of that
organization.
Mr. Carr. To sum up a little bit here, I think by working
through Colonel Fleischer's office we can avoid this sort of
snafuing of the information by one agency without the other one
knowing it. I think we can avoid that by working through
Colonel Fleischer's office.
Mr. Anderson. Is that your opinion, Colonel?
Col. Fleischer. Yes. I might say that in saying what I did
a few minutes ago, where I am actually bringing in a new aspect
to our office, on our level with our contact with public
information of the Department of Defense, with General
Erskine's office, with the army and air force and navy, if the
occasion arises, I think we have a better hold on the big
picture than any one of the individual departments. This thing
is a good example of when we get into a program of this scope,
you almost have to have somebody topside who has quick access
to all these different arms that are working on one of these
programs, and also be able to pick up a piece here and there
and fit it all together. Oftentimes in this instance the case
was to do it in a big hurry. When it is operating for one
department, the army was the action agency on this and will
continue to be. As I said before, they have all the files and
most of the personnel and so forth. It is a little difficult
for them sometimes to know about something that is going on on
the defense level or General Erskine's office or the State
Department. In the secretary of defense level we have more
ready access to that sort of information.
Mr. Jones. Colonel, do you know who gave authority to Life
magazine to go in there a week ago?
Col. Fleischer. No, I do not. On that I only heard about it
yesterday afternoon. I heard that they were going to have
access to some of the pictures which come out in their issue
this week.
Mr. Jones. Who would ordinarily give authority to a
publication to come in and see files of this nature?
Col. Fleischer. Normally the chief of public information
who has the material in his possession. On the other hand, you
sometimes have a department, for example, ordnance, that has
material on a new weapon or something like that, and they might
in turn alert the press to what they have and make it available
to them through the chief of public information. So you can't
say on every occasion it would be the chief of public
information who would make something like that available.
Normally he would make it available.
Mr. Jones. Did not the authority who gave that
authorization realize that these were the very files that were
going to be used by the Senate committee in pursuance of this
investigation?
Col. Fleischer. That is a point. That is the reason I
brought up about the secretary of defense level getting into
the liaison in this, because it is quite conceivable that the
people who released that information were completely unaware of
the committee's interest in the same information, if you see
what I mean. It would be like saying that somebody gave
something to the Senate Armed Services Committee on a subject
that you were working on up here.
Mr. Carr. By handling it on a liaison basis through your
office, Colonel, we can check this sort of thing.
Col. Fleischer. I hope we can.
Mr. Carr. I know you can't guarantee that it won't happen
because things do happen.
Col. Fleischer. That is right.
Mr. Carr. That is our best available way of handling the
situation.
Col. Fleischer. I think so, Mr. Carr. In trying to salvage
this thing for you people, we have quite a job to do. The thing
that I am primarily interested in is seeing that nothing else
happens to this thing. While I am taking on the responsibility
in this area, I would rather do that than have this thing jump
the track again.
Mr. Carr. Now, as to what can be salvaged from this thing--
--
Col. Fleischer. Could I interrupt you a moment to explain
one thing?
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Col. Fleischer. In working through my office and Col.
Britton, your gentlemen of the staff here, I want you to
understand that you can still through Col. Britton and his
assistants deal completely with the army. As you are quite
aware, they have all this information.
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Col. Fleischer. Working through us and now that we are in
the public information business, too, if we have an inkling of
some other aspect of this thing that is coming up, since we are
constantly attuned to your problem here, we can stop the thing.
I have done it before. In the last four years I have been in
this business we have had many occasions where I have made it a
particular point to see that a committee or in a couple of
instances every member of Congress was informed of something
well in advance of its happening in the Defense Department.
That is a part of congressional relations.
Mr. Carr. Now, as to what can be salvaged from this thing,
how are we going to work that out?
Col. Fleischer. The only suggestion I have to make on the
thing is that we try to pick out some of these cases that you
people can develop. When I go back I will talk to Mr. Seaton. I
know he in turn will talk to the secretary of the army and the
information people about withdrawing from circulation those
cases which you people feel you have an interest in.
Mr. Carr. What possibility is there of doing something with
the cases, particularly the seventy-five or seventy-six?
Mr. O'Donnell. I think there is a strong possibility
depending on what publicity is given to those cases between the
time of now and when we have our hearings. If the two major
cases, seventy-five and seventy-six, are thoroughly related,
their value will be lessened considerably, but there is a
strong possibility of using those two cases, and probably three
or four in addition to the others that have been available.
Mr. Carr. Is all the information released?
Mr. O'Donnell. All the summary concerning those cases has
been made available to the press by having photostats of the
raw files, with certain phases, such as names of survivors,
deleted.
Col. Fleischer. If I may interrupt, again, I can picture,
however, that as a result of the interest focused on this
particular document, probably now following up the exploitation
of these cases, because I am pretty sure they are not going to
let these lie around. So you do have the risk of those being
exploited faster than you could ever keep up with them.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right.
Col. Fleischer. Don't you agree, Mr. Lyons?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, I do.
Col. Fleischer. Once you give the press something to start
working on, that is what happens. We get several of the out of
town papers in the office, and I think it was yesterday's New
York Journal American which carried a feature article by one of
the CIC officers, a detective of the New York police force, and
they immediately grabbed him and ran a feature story on some of
the cases which he had investigated.
Mr. Lyons. That is something you can't control, the
investigators back in civilian life.
Col. Fleischer. But they probably got the lead from that
report.
Mr. O'Donnell. Or anybody who wanted to could go to the
press, and for a couple of hundred dollars give them the story.
Mr. Anderson. Colonel, do you have any knowledge that
further releases are contemplated on this same problem?
Col. Fleischer. I have no personal knowledge of it.
Maj. Kelleher. I think in that respect it is pretty safe
that the secretary of the army's release on that subject will
be the only one that is an official Department of Defense
release. The exploitation follows, of course. If they follow
past practices, there is one release on it which is in the form
of an announcement.
Col. Fleischer. I will make a note of that.
Mr. Lyons. I would like to offer for your consideration,
Mr. O'Donnell, that we gave some consideration to cases not
where there was a survivor, but where there was a witness. Take
this particular case [indicating].
Mr. O'Donnell. I see no objection to that as long as U.S.
soldiers are the victims.
Mr. Lyons. We had ruled those out because it was a witness
and not a survivor.
Mr. O'Donnell. We want primarily American troops to
testify.
Mr. Lyons. There are a couple of others of the same nature.
We have another case I think we could use where a medic found
the bodies. He was not a witness at all, but his testimony
would be worthwhile.
Mr. O'Donnell. I think we definitely should consider those
cases in the light of what has happened.
Mr. Carr. Bob or Ray, to make the best of this situation I
think we should consider the possibility of a release by the
Department of Defense of some sort of a story or some sort of
information to the effect that Senator Potter's probe into this
matter is still going on, that Senator Potter is being
furnished with information which has not been made available,
and that his probe will disclose additional information. What
thoughts do you have along that line?
Mr. Anderson. I think that is important. You will recall at
the executive session on the 6th, the senator said, ``I think
one of the main purposes of this committee will be to get the
greatest psychological value we can from the hearings.''
It is my opinion on behalf of the senator that if the
Department of Defense, in a news release, points up what you
have suggested here, it will fit into the program fully here to
emphasize the hearings that will take place early in December.
Col. Fleischer. We better have a little discussion on
Monday with you people to see what approach we are going to
use. The reason I say that is because I think that is an
excellent suggestion, but I think we have to make sure it is
carefully worded for this reason. We do not want to start
pressing about trying to beat you to the punch on some of these
cases.
Mr. Anderson. It was not my feeling that a release to that
effect ought to be made immediately.
Col. Fleischer. No.
Mr. Carr. No, that is right. From reading many of the news
stories on this thing, there is a definite impression left with
me that Senator Potter is entirely left out of the picture.
Mr. Anderson. That is right.
Mr. Carr. I think that should be corrected.
Mr. Jones. I think it ought to be clearly established,
Colonel, in this release that all future pronouncements on this
subject will be made by the senator and the Senate committee.
Mr. Carr. I would say the senator.
Mr. O'Donnell. Isn't it true it has reached a stage where
press inquiries are being received?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, they are constantly coming in.
Col. Fleischer. Did you see the last paragraph of the Star
story? I just happened to notice it this morning. I wonder if
that was supposition on the part of the press.
Mr. Jones. That was yesterday's Star?
Col. Fleischer. Yes. That provides a little lead to develop
whatever time you consider appropriate.
Mr. Jones. That was the only paper in which it was carried.
Col. Fleischer. Yes, I noticed that.
Mr. Carr. Just repeating myself again, but it gets right
back to the point that Senator Potter is not trying to grab the
thing. He wants to be a part of the thing and coordinate with
the department. I might say on behalf of Senator Potter--I
don't know whether he would say it himself--we don't intend to
see him coordinated right out of the picture.
Mr. Anderson. The senator made very clear at the close of
the hearing on October 6 that he was working very closely with
the Department of Defense.
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Col. Fleischer. I noticed that in the transcript.
Mr. Anderson. That does not appear to be evident.
Mr. Carr. I think in connection with this proposed release
some time in the immediate future, not today or tomorrow, the
release should be worked out primarily, Ray, through you or
with you, so that the senator can be closely advised as to what
is in this thing.
Mr. Anderson. That is right.
Mr. Carr. I think the terms of the thing can be worked out.
There won't be any real problem on that. That I think will
salvage some of the problem here.
The other points, as to the actual cases and what we can
salvage from the already released cases, Don will work out with
your office, Colonel, and with Mr. Lyons.
Mr. Anderson. I think that would have to be done quickly.
Mr. Carr. That is right. I think you should take under
advisement this problem of further release of additional cases,
and consider the advisability of whether or not the extent of
the release should be cut off at any certain point, realizing,
of course, that you can't withdraw ones you have released, but
consideration should be given to that. Unless you have any
further points on this thing, Ray, to bring up----
Mr. Anderson. It is my understanding that Don will
immediately get together with Mr. Lyons to segregate these
cases that can be used. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Col. Fleischer. I think that would be the first step to
really get your hand on what you want to start working with;
the rest can be dovetailed into just exactly what you want.
Mr. Lyons. You will be changing the department flow. We are
under instructions to do all of our coordinating through Mr.
Haskins.
Col. Fleischer. When you get to the department, I will have
to work that one out.
Mr. O'Donnell. I would say probably the first step would be
to find out exactly how many files have actually been made
available, and whether or not those that have not been made
available can be withheld. Then let Mr. Lyons and I take it
from there as to what cases are available and which are the
more immediate of those cases.
Maj. Kelleher. When you get that set of files selected for
this committee determined, I would like to have that, Mr.
Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. When do you think, Colonel, that we could get
together on this release? In other words, I assume you are
returning to talk to Secretary Seaton about this whole problem.
Col. Fleischer. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. What is your suggestion with respect to
issuing the release and working that out between us?
Col. Fleischer. We can do that some time the early part of
next week. Whatever time you think is best. We could start in
on it, and have it all ready for release at any appropriate
time, but I would suggest we get together with you in the early
part of next week.
Mr. Anderson. You are likewise going to take steps, as I
understand it, Colonel, to avoid any further releases from the
various departments.
Col. Fleischer. I have that double checked and marked all
over it on this paper.
Mr. Jones. I assume your contacts in that direction will
involve finding out who the authority was who released this?
Col. Fleischer. I would prefer not to go that far.
Mr. Jones. At least that person should be informed by
memorandum, or something.
Col. Fleischer. I think so.
Mr. Carr. Do you have anything further, Bob?
Mr. Jones. No.
Mr. Carr. Concerning this release, I am particularly
anxious that it be handled through you, Ray, because I want the
senator to be fully posted on it.
Mr. Anderson. That is right.
Mr. Carr. Concerning the cases, Don, you will immediately
be in contact with Mr. Lyons on this problem.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right.
Mr. Carr. I think we can salvage something from this thing.
I think we can come up with something that will be very good. I
think the whole situation, as it has developed, has been
unfortunate. I know Senator McCarthy feels that it is
unfortunate. I think that Senator Potter feels it is
unfortunate. As I said before, we do not want to be in the
position of complaining, yet on the other hand we want to be
sure that you understand our position on the matter. We do feel
that something has been really snafued on this coordination of
his activities with the program. We now have that behind us,
and we are now trying to reestablish the cooperation that we
wanted to establish in the first place.
Mr. Jones. Just one other thing, Colonel. I wonder if we
may have from the secretary a letter to the senator designating
yourself as liaison to this committee. I ask this in view of
the fact that a liaison was named at the last meeting of this
group, and you yourself said you were named today. For the
record, and for the senator's information, if we may have a
letter from the secretary, it would help establish
responsibility and authority.
Col. Fleischer. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. Is it your opinion, Mr. Lyons, that
worthwhile cases can be developed for the hearings?
Mr. Lyons. I am of the opinion that we can develop
worthwhile information for the committee for this public
hearing on the 10th of December? I am going a little bit
further. I honestly believe when we finish by working with Mr.
O'Donnell, you can say that no harm has been done. I think we
can put that over.
Mr. Anderson. Is it also my understanding, Colonel, that
such cases will not be made available to the press prior to the
hearing?
Col. Fleischer. When I go back, Mr. Anderson, I will tell
Secretary Seaton the results of this meeting, and my belief
that we should withdraw from circulation those cases in which
you are interested and prevent new cases from being made
available until we have had a chance to discuss it with you
people. I hesitate to go so far as to say that these will not
be released, because I am a little bit apprehensive that the
press may have gotten hold of a couple of these already through
circumstances which we just discussed. I will assure you of
doing everything I can with Secretary Seaton and the people
over there to see that your interests are protected.
Mr. Anderson. I think that is all.
Mr. Carr. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
[Thereupon at 11:30 a.m., the executive session was
concluded.]
KOREAN WAR ATROCITIES
[Editor's note.--1st Lt. Henry J. McNichols, Jr.; Pfc John
E. Martin; and Sgt. Carey Weinel testified in public on
December 2; Sgt. Barry F. Rhoden on December 3; Capt. Linton J.
Buttrey, on December 3 and 4; and Col. James M. Hanley and
Capt. Alexander G. Makarounis on December 4, 1953.]
----------
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in
room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Charles E.
Potter, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan.
Present also: Robert Jones, research assistant to Senator
Potter; Francis P. Carr, staff director; Donald F. O'Donnell,
assistant counsel; Robert J. McElroy, investigator; Ruth Young
Watt, chief clerk.
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, before we proceed I would like
to say again I am most appreciative of the cooperation of the
army and those of you who are now civilians and working with us
on this investigation.
You are not being investigated. I want to make that clear.
We are calling upon you to aid us in an investigation of the
enemy which we have been fighting. You can feel free to make as
complete a statement as you care to. This is a closed hearing.
Nothing you say here this morning will be known to the press.
We plan on holding two days of executive session. This is
not for publication as yet but we are planning to hold open
hearings beginning Wednesday morning. The open hearings will be
much similar to the hearings we plan on starting today.
I am sure you have been advised by the military personnel
here that you can speak freely. I think the only requirement
that they have made is that you not mention a person's name who
has suffered atrocities. You can tell about the incident and
you can tell his rank or whatever that may be. But don't
mention his name. The same thing is true with any aid you might
have received from Asiatics; don't disclose their name. But
outside of that, that is the only security restriction that you
have.
If, during the course of the testimony, something of a
security nature should come up, we can easily take care of it
here in executive session without your violating any security
code.
We will call Lieutenant McNichols.
STATEMENT OF 1ST LT. HENRY J. McNICHOLS, JR.
Senator Potter. Lieutenant, we do not want to put a man in
the military under oath, so we don't have to worry about that.
Your word is sufficient.
First, if you would identify yourself for the record,
Lieutenant, and give your full name and your present
assignment?
Lt. McNichols. Henry J. McNichols, Jr., First Lieutenant,
0-228401, Infantry School Attachment, Fort Benning, Georgia.
Senator Potter. Where is your home, Lieutenant?
Lt. McNichols. As a professional soldier, actually I was
born in St. Louis.
Senator Potter. You are regular army?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Lieutenant, what unit were you assigned to
in Korea?
Lt. McNichols. Company E, 5th Cavalry Regiment, sir.
Senator Potter. When did your unit first go?
Lt. McNichols. My unit arrived in Korea, Pohangdun, 19 July
1950, and I went in first as a weapons platoon leader of Easy
Company E and became the company executive officer, and I was
captured--do you want me to go through this?--I was captured on
the 10th of September 1950 in the vicinity of actually a little
north of Hill 203 in the vicinity of Taeju.
Senator Potter. Can you point out the approximate vicinity
on the map right behind you?
Lt. McNichols. Yes. It was approximately here, near Taeju.
Senator Potter. That was during the major flurries of the
North Koreans, wasn't it?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, the UN defenses there.
Senator Potter. Right up to the Pusan perimeter area?
Lt. McNichols. My unit was in the town of Waxwon and along
the Naktong River we pulled back from there about the 5th of
September, succeeding pulling back about a mile the first time,
the second time possibly a mile or two miles; but actually
about three miles south of the town of Wagwon, it is.
Senator Potter. At that time you were commanding Easy
Company?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, I was executive officer.
Senator Potter. Company E executive officer?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
The night of 10 September I was separated from my unit, and
we pulled off a hill and I went back up on the hill to try to
get a wounded man off; I think I walked into an ambush. They
had a habit there, if you ever did have occasion where there
was a wounded man behind, they would jab him with a bayonet to
make him scream and before we got him off, I walked into an
ambush.
I was separated from my unit, and the Americans had pulled
on back then I was in between, and in fact actually the way I
came off this hill I ended up to the rear of their lines. The
next morning I became a member of the North Korean Army then,
and they had me from the 11th actually, caught me the morning
of the 11th and they had me until the night of the 20th.
Senator Potter. Were you captured by military personnel or
by civilians?
Lt. McNichols. By military personnel, North Koreans. I
don't know what units or anything that I was mixed up with.
They kept me ten days.
Senator Potter. Did they keep you in that vicinity?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, approximately about a five-mile square
area there.
Senator Potter. Were there other PW's with you?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, I never ran into another PW.
However, they did show me a lot of AGO cards and not dogtags or
anything, but AGO cards and class A passes and what have you
that did belong to other soldiers.
Whether they got them off bodies or not, I don't know. They
did have these psychological warfare sheets and they used to
have a picture of the officer, usually up in one corner there
saying ``stay out of the capitalistic war,'' and then signed by
the man, and his name and rank and unit down there. They showed
me quite a few of those, also.
Senator Potter. You say they had a picture of an officer,
an American officer?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, Lieutenant Granberry, who never
showed up on the list.
Senator Potter. And that was one of those confessions?
Lt. McNichols. So-called, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. That it was an imperialistic war and that
was the nature of it?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, and stay away from MacArthur, the
warmonger. They did make me broadcast one day, and they gave me
one of those, and we wrote it to place my name and I was
supposed to read my name where the other man was and they had a
loud speaker set up. Actually it was in a South Korean sector
where it was, a little to the right of where the First Cavalry
Division was when I was there. And I read this thing.
Senator Potter. Was that in the same area?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, it was all back in the same area.
Senator Potter. What pressure did they use on you to get
you to broadcast?
Lt. McNichols. Well, first of all I had them believing I
couldn't read, and then they found out--I guess they figured
all officers were supposed to read or something--and finally
the colonel came up and said you will broadcast. We fooled
around and when they finally did take me, they had me with one
unit and they handed me over to this propaganda outfit, and we
went up into a farmhouse, actually a regular North Korean hut,
or South Korean in that case, and they had a generator and a
regular sound system and they gave me the thing and told me to
read the thing.
Persuasion, they stuck a pistol at my head; but that first
five days I got a lot of that.
Senator Potter. They put a pistol to your head which
implied if you did not do it, you were not long for this world,
is that true?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether that type of broadcast,
was that heard by Allied troops?
Lt. McNichols. To the best of my knowledge; no, sir. I have
talked to a lot of officers that have come back from there, and
no one heard it, and well, I sound like Seoul City Sue, if you
ever heard one of her broadcasts; a dead, low monotone, and I
did the same thing. In fact, he was afraid I was talking too
fast and by the time I got finished my own brother wouldn't
know who was broadcasting. At the beginning I was supposed to
say ``I am Lieutenant McNichols.'' I said ``I am a lieutenant''
and I went on from there. So I didn't identify myself over it.
Senator Potter. How long a document was it?
Lt. McNichols. Sir, it wasn't but a piece of 8\1/2\ by 11,
regular typewriting paper, Korean type, that is what it was. I
wouldn't say it was over 250 words.
Senator Potter. Did that ask for other soldiers to
surrender?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, to stop the capitalistic Wall
Street fight and that kind of stuff.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether that was recorded or
not?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, it couldn't have been. The
loudspeaker set-up they had, we use them at the Infantry School
and I am sure you have seen one. It is a generator system and
then the sound box, actually it was stamped USIS, and they must
have got it around Seoul. They had two loudspeakers and that
was back here by the farmhouse and I couldn't even hear the
thing going on. I could hear it away out in the distance.
They had a couple of girls there in this propaganda outfit
and they used to sing songs and then the various propaganda
about coming over and join our side and I didn't understand
Korean, but I imagine that is what they were putting up there.
Senator Potter. How long were you in this area?
Lt. McNichols. Well, actually, sir, they only had me ten
days altogether, and in that ten days I stayed right around in
this more or less immediate area. Actually there was an enemy
regimental or division CP, and I was questioned by four or five
people there and then turned over to this propaganda outfit and
when I was turned over to the propaganda outfit we actually
bore southeast.
Actually we were going to the right of Wagwon, and we got
that one broadcast in and they wanted to do it again, but the
Americans were pushing them too hard and they never got a
chance to set it up again.
Senator Potter. What else happened to you during that
period?
Lt. McNichols. Well, as far as the treatment went, there
was never--they scared me quite a few times there with the
various cases of the pistol flashing and so on, but I ate the
same thing that the Koreans got around there and we had a
bucket of rice.
About that time the rains had started and their underwater
bridge across the Naktong River then was about out of business
and they weren't getting any supplies either, and they were
hurt just about as bad as I was.
To the last night I actually had good treatment.
Senator Potter. Did they beat you at all?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir. The first day they had me they
walked me into the rear, that night, and put a load of rice on
my back the next morning and I walked that up to the front line
troops, which I think is a violation of the rules of warfare.
Senator Potter. They used you as a supply carrier for their
troops?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What happened in the last day?
Lt. McNichols. Well, the last day the Americans had started
to break out from Pusan and the rest of them had come in at
Inchon, and we had been in actually a ravine right outside of
this Korean area there and we stayed there until approximately
5:30 or six o'clock when it got dark, at which time they wanted
to cook and started a fire.
Usually when I left I had about seven or eight prisoner
chasers on me, and one at either side and one at the foot and
one outside the door, and my case of trying to get away, it was
a little too late then. I was pretty well covered.
Senator Potter. Were you confined then in a house of some
kind?
Lt. McNichols. Actually put in a house, sir, and put in
there usually at dark, and brought out again in the morning
when we would go and hide some place from the air force and the
artillery spotter planes.
At any rate he woke me up, and I went to sleep, and he woke
me up about eight o'clock at night and I heard, or later found
out it was a jeep that hit a land mine and I heard a lot of
Americans yelling. But I didn't have any idea what it was, and
this lieutenant came and got me and the rest of the unit
there--there were about nineteen in all--and took us up to the
top of the hill and he told me to sit down and be quiet, at
which time he tied my hands behind my back and further tied my
hands then to a tree, and then went up actually to the lip of
this hill. There were actually two hills, and the shorter and
then the main peak of this hill; I was in a gully right in
between. The First Cavalry stopped at the first peak. They
started up with a good yell, and there wasn't much artillery
fire, and all of the Koreans ran out with the exception of this
lieutenant. He came over and shot me then.
Senator Potter. While you were tied?
Lt. McNichols. I was tied to the tree, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. In other words, your hands were tied behind
your back, and then that was that you were also tied to a tree?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were you alone at that time?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, I was the only prisoner that they
had, the only American prisoner that I saw in the whole time
that they had me.
Senator Potter. It was a North Korean officer?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, a first lieutenant.
Senator Potter. Was he right up beside you when he shot
you?
Lt. McNichols. About four feet from me, I guess.
Senator Potter. Did he pull out his pistol?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How many shots did he fire?
Lt. McNichols. Well, I only remember one. However, I ended
up with four bullet holes; four in and four out. I imagine the
first one, I got shot through the mouth and I remember my mouth
and my nose running, and I imagine the first one I got through
the mouth.
Senator Potter. Did he assume that you were dead?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, I think I did a pretty good job of
playing dead then, and all I remember was seeing the sparks,
and my mouth and my nose running. That was all I remember until
I woke up about, I guess I came to about, four o'clock in the
morning and I started yelling then. The soldier didn't come out
and get me because of the same fact of this using of wounded
for ambush purposes, but at daybreak they did come out and get
me.
Senator Potter. When did the shooting take place; what time
of the day?
Lt. McNichols. Approximately ten o'clock at night, sir, and
it would have been the 20th of July, 1950.
Senator Potter. And you were recovered by our troops then
on the following morning?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, about 7:15, 21 July.
Senator Potter. Where else were you hit besides in the
mouth?
Lt. McNichols. Two of them went in the neck, and one in the
shoulder, and I was shot through the leg the day they captured
me. I didn't get my medical treatment from them because I don't
think they had any. However, they all looked at it, and they
got some water out of a stream there and rinsed it off for me.
But no other form of medical aid.
Senator Potter. What type of pistol do the Communists
carry?
Lt. McNichols. It is not tovarisch, it is the only piece of
equipment that they had that didn't have a hammer and sickle on
it, that I saw, even enemy equipment.
Senator Potter. Most of their military equipment?
Lt. McNichols. Everything I ran into with the one exception
which was an officer's pistol, and I did run into one guy with
a Mauser, and he put that at my head and he said he liked my
shoes and I was without shoes for the rest of the time.
Senator Potter. When you were captured, they took your
shoes?
Lt. McNichols. After a day, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did they take any other articles of
clothing?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir. When they frisked me they got
everything out of my pockets, and I got shot through the
pocket, and I had a Rosary and my wallet; I had an AGO card,
and identification card and a scapula medal and that is all.
They took all of that, and just peeled it right out.
Right after that some guy grabbed me and took my dog tags
off, and one time there I got into a Korean house and I found a
pencil and a piece of paper. I started to write my name and
address and stuff it in my pocket and they caught me at that
and took it off my pockets.
Senator Potter. Did you have any jewelry on you; a ring or
anything?
Lt McNichols. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Or watch?
Lt. McNichols. No, they were disappointed about that. I had
a busted fountain pen and they were put out that I didn't have
a wristwatch or a cigarette lighter.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did they take your clothing away?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, they didn't. In my case, they got
my shoes and they gave me first some of these, they looked like
Keds, and I guess they were about four sizes too small, and
then I ended up, I went to a good house in one, or Korean
house, and I found they look like rubbers and they hook about
here and back here, and they are very hard to walk in and very
hard to keep on. But I did use those the rest of the time.
I had the army wool cushion socks which came in very good
and for a time I walked in my stocking feet.
Senator Potter. What time of the year?
Lt. McNichols. It was September of 1950, and it was just
before the cold weather.
Mr. O'Donnell. It was prior to the cold weather?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Could you describe exactly in detail,
Lieutenant, the manner in which you were tied to the tree?
Lt. McNichols. Well, they got me out of the house and we
went up to the top of this hill and they told me to come with
them. So we got up there and this Korean first lieutenant
couldn't speak any English, nor could I speak any Korean.
However, with the colloquial Japanese between the two of us he
informed me to stay where I was and keep quiet.
However, he had rice linen, that white clothing which a lot
of them and quite a few of the soldiers they use it actually to
keep themselves warm and they could always throw it off and
look like a civilian. He took strips of that, then, and made it
into one long strip, and then tied my hands behind me and made
me sit down, and then tied me to the tree and told me to stay
there and he would be right back, and to be quiet while he was
gone.
He went then actually up on this lip of the hill, and when
the Americans started up the hill, all of the soldiers ran out
and took off north, and none of them came anywhere near me.
However, this guy did go by.
Mr. O'Donnell. You are speaking of the North Koreans?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Actually you were tied; your hands were tied
behind your back and then you were later tied to the tree?
Lt. McNichols. Actually, it happened all at once, and first
he tied my hands behind me and made me sit down and then
whether he put the bindings to my hands to tree or not, I don't
know.
Mr. O'Donnell. What would be the reason as far as you know,
or do you know, the reason for the shooting?
Lt. McNichols. The only thing I can think of is just the
Oriental point of view. We shoot them and he doesn't come back
and fight us again. And in my case there I would have
undoubtedly fallen into American hands at that time. This is
hearsay evidence, but we had a company in my battalion who at
one time I had been a platoon leader over there, but not at the
time, that they shot the whole company of them, twenty-eight or
twenty-nine. They captured them, and when we organized a
counter-attack, immediately when we started into the thing,
they lined them up in a ditch and shot them. The only thing we
can figure is that they will kill us so we cannot come back and
fight.
Mr. O'Donnell. How long did it take you to recover from
your wounds?
Lt. McNichols. Six months, sir. I went back to duty the 9th
of March 1951.
Mr. O'Donnell. How long were you actually hospitalized?
Lt. McNichols. Actually, sir, I was in the hospital until 9
March 1951, until I was released from Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
Mr. O'Donnell. What condition are you in today, Lieutenant?
Do you have any reaction from those wounds?
Senator Potter. First, have you gone before the board as
yet?
Lt. McNichols. I am trying to make the regular army, but I
was disqualified because of wounds, but I do have a profile
change, and I am getting hard of hearing in this ear, rather,
and I have got what is known as a horno? I don't sweat on this
side of my head and I do sweat on this side of my body, and
this lid doesn't go all of the way up and this pupil is
smaller. Actually I went from astigmatism to farsightedness.
Senator Potter. Where did the bullet enter your head?
Lt. McNichols. One of them came in here, in this dimple and
came out over here, and two of them went in right here, and one
came out down here and one back here; and the other one was
through the shoulder there.
Senator Potter. What is your regular army profile now?
Lt. McNichols. I have got two two's, one on my shoulder and
two on my hearing.
Senator Potter. All of the rest are one's?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. For the benefit of the civilian, what is a
two and what is a one?
Lt. McNichols. A one is a warm body ready for duty; and a
one is actually, according to the army standard now, and the
army standard would actually vary depending upon whether it is
an all-out situation or a peacetime again, such as we have now.
Two is in the case of my right shoulder, a weakness in it,
and not a full ability to pull a full weight with it. When you
get up to three's and four's, then it is these guys who are
crippled, and in fact I had a friend who has a wooden leg and
they gave him a four on his leg.
Mr. O'Donnell. Actually you are useful to the army--your
usefulness hasn't been impaired apart from your physical
suffering?
Lt. McNichols. No, I don't think so. I can still carry a
rifle and squeeze the trigger.
Senator Potter. Lieutenant, you have seen the enemy at
first hand and you witnessed their attempts of indoctrination.
I can ask you the question for your opinion, and you do not
have to answer it unless you want to: Do you think that the
Communists in the United States are different than the
Communists that you were fighting in Korea?
Lt. McNichols. Do I have an opinion, Colonel? Actually, we
don't have any opinions. Let me make a statement. We have a
board of officers and we ask not to write these things. When I
came back to the States in 1950 I was one of the first returned
prisoners and we had an occasion in St. Louis, there of two or
three women put an ad in the paper to get our sons home from
Korea, and what have you.
I got very browned off and wrote to the paper and told them
to cancel my subscriptions. However, I found out later that
that was going on all over the states and they are organized.
Senator Potter. I had some visit my office.
Lt. McNichols. They probably know a lot more about you than
your wife does.
Senator Potter. I am afraid they do.
I think in order that the record may be complete, what
happened after you were tied to the tree. You say that you were
rescued in the next morning and just how did that happen? Can
you go into more detail how that came about?
Lt. McNichols. Well, the soldier who came out and cut me
off got killed about three or four days up the road,
unfortunately. However, I have run into quite a few who heard
me out there yelling all night. As soon as I came to, I could
hear some sound out there and of course I didn't know who it
was and the only Korean word I knew was ``Oiy'' which means
either, hey you, or something like that. So I yelled ``oiy''
and ``help'' the rest of the time and I was having quite a time
as far as my mouth was concerned. I got about six teeth that
were running loose in my face and I was spitting those out and
so on, but I sat there and yelled.
Senator Potter. You were still tied to the tree?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, and they heard me. However, they
waited until about daybreak when they came out and got me and
they brought a litter and actually the man with the Carbine
bayonet which is a pretty sharp piece of merchandise, usually
you will find them a lot sharper than the M-1 bayonet, he spent
almost three or four minutes cutting all of that stuff off to
get me off the tree. He did quite a tying job on me.
Senator Potter. Were you rescued by your own unit?
Lt. McNichols. No, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry.
Senator Potter. Then you were evacuated immediately to
Pusan?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, I went to the regular evacuation
channels, and they ran me down to the bottom of the hill and
back again.
Senator Potter. And you arrived back in the States when?
Lt. McNichols. I got back in the States the 18th of October
1950. I stayed in the Tokyo Army Hospital for twenty-three days
and whether the fact I had head wounds and they wanted to let
them dry out before they shipped me or not, I don't know, sir.
Senator Potter. Are you now on active duty?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. The question I asked you about whether you
felt your opinion of American Communists--I am sure that the
military has no objection to you expressing an opinion on that
if you care to do so. I will tell you frankly the reason I am
asking this question. You will find many people today in our
own country who have an idea that the Communist party of the
United States is a political party, and that is something
entirely different from communism elsewhere. One of the
purposes of the hearing is to let the people know the type of
enemy that we are fighting.
While it is true that the killing has stopped in Korea, the
war hasn't stopped as you well know, and the war is still in a
cold stage at the present time, but the war between communism
and free people is still in effect.
I think no greater service can be rendered than by people
like yourself, Lieutenant, and others, who have seen the enemy
firsthand. This is not newspaper accounts or some fuzzy-
thinking professor, but you have seen the Communists firsthand,
and if you have strong convictions towards it I am sure
military personnel would have no objections to you expressing
it.
Lt. McNichols. I have never had any dealings, that is
trouble, and you don't know whether you would have dealings
with a Communist, and you don't know whether your best friend
is one. I am a Catholic, also, and in my case where I went to
school communism was recognized way back in 1937, probably long
before that, and so we were always instructed in that affair.
Actually in our case, in the case of a Catholic, his religion
in itself, has been fighting communism as long as it has been
going on over there.
Senator Potter. That is true.
Lt. McNichols. However, if we get an opinion, if they can
run them out of business we have got a tendency to be too soft.
Senator Potter. Is it your opinion that the Communists of
the United States receive their orders from the same source as
the Communists of Korea or China or wherever it may be?
Lt. McNichols. I don't think that there is any doubt of it.
Senator Potter. Colonel, do you have any questions that you
would like to ask?
Col. Hanley. Due to the short time that you were held by
the enemy, I don't presume they tried to put out any propaganda
efforts?
Lt. McNichols. I did get a quizzing by a political officer,
some rather fantastic questions at times. They wanted to know
if my father was a worker or capitalist, and they were
particularly interested in the amount of time I had in the
service. And they called Harry Truman a rascal and MacArthur a
war monger, and they had a set up.
The thing they tried to get out of me was my home address.
I told them my mother and father were dead and I had no family,
and let it go at that and they never pressed it, the fact that
they didn't get my home address out of me in that respect. But
they were decidedly looking for the home address, there was no
doubt of that. Seoul City Sue did declare me dead on her
program, but the only thing, when I got promoted to 1st
lieutenant and I left the orders in the CP and they might have
found that order and some of my mail that was up there in a
bag.
Senator Potter. Did Seoul City Sue--is that the Korean
equivalent of Tokyo Rose?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. In the broadcast when she said you were
dead, did she know you were alive?
Lt. McNichols. Actually, it happened about, they picked a
broadcast up in Japan, some of the people over there, some of
the wives heard it; I didn't hear it and I think it happened
during the time I was a prisoner and she called me Nichols
instead of McNichols, but she had the right serial number and
the Second Battalion and she had quite a bit of information.
Therefore I think the way she got it, she must have found some
mail or they found this promotion order. That is the only thing
I can figure.
Senator Potter. Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'Donnell. Lieutenant, after you were shot and regained
consciousness, and started to yell, it was quite some time and
it was nearly daylight until you were actually rescued by our
forces, and now the reason for them not coming to rescue you
sooner, I think you mentioned, was because they were afraid of
an ambush?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was it a common practice to use a captured
PW as bait to get our boys to come into an ambush?
Lt. McNichols. I don't know whether in the other outfits, I
can only speak for my own experience, we did have occasions
where they worked over the wounded. In the cases we did come
over a hill and a man was wounded when we came down the side of
a hill and they would get him or any of these stragglers, and
in one case of pushing him with a bayonet and making this guy
scream. Now, the one I went up after, I talked to some other, a
sergeant in my company, and they went up the next morning to
try to find me and they did find a boy's body and he had been
both stabbed and shot.
Mr. O'Donnell. You would have to assume that they forced
him to yell?
Lt. McNichols. He was yelling, there was no doubt of that.
Senator Potter. And then they killed him?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, they probably did.
Senator Potter. He was found dead?
Lt. McNichols. It was very dark, and there was a moonless
night, and I don't imagine I was more than five yards from him
when I did walk into this ambush, and actually there were just
four of us coming together in the dark; three North Koreans and
myself, and that was it.
Senator Potter. I would like to also go back to questioning
by the political interrogator when he asked you if your father
was a working man or a capitalist.
Did they ask you whether you owned an automobile?
Lt. McNichols. They wanted to know who owned the jeep in
the company, and the argument was that a company commander had
to buy his own jeeps in there and they were curious about that.
One other thing might be for your interest: While I was a
prisoner, I had occasion to meet one who wanted to come over to
Westinghouse and study how to be a sound engineer.
Senator Potter. One of the North Koreans?
Lt. McNichols. He was from Seoul some place or other, and
my number one prison chaser has been a bartender in an
officers' club in Seoul, and a houseboy for a lieutenant
colonel up there. The first time that I was quizzed by this
colonel, this guy was interpreter, and I got talking to him in
strictly the Brooklyn colloquialisms and I said ``you have been
a bartender in some officers' club,'' and a couple of days
later he admitted he had been.
Quite a few of the North Korean soldiers still had drivers'
licenses from the 219 Battalion in Seoul.
Senator Potter. Do you have any notion as to whether they
were Communists by indoctrination or whether they had been
forced to fight with the North Koreans?
Lt. McNichols. I had quite a few that used to come up, and
say ``Capitalistic Dog'' and so on, and one kid--he was
strictly a kid, I think he was about seventeen years old--
wanted to come over to Westinghouse, and I think he was going
where the rice was at the time. What his bargain was and so on,
they used him for an interpreter and I remember we got a big
harangue from some colonel and he sounded about as bored as I
was when he interpreted the thing about the warmongers and what
have you.
But the great majority of them there were decidedly
Communistic, and there was no doubt of that, and decidedly
indoctrinated.
I ran into another one who got thrown out of Seoul in 1946
and was going to the University of Seoul, and he got thrown out
of school and I think out of South Korea for his Communistic
leanings. They used him for an interpreter when I was in this
regimental or division CP.
Senator Potter. Was he an officer?
Lt. McNichols. Sir, I don't know, he never wore a shoulder
board and I imagine he was, though.
Mr. O'Donnell. The only suggestion I have, when we go into
public hearings, it is for the benefit of civilians and will
you spell out the terms?
Mr. Carr. Lieutenant, this lieutenant that actually fired
the shots that hit you when you were tied to the tree, was that
as far as you could determine, an individual action? Everybody
else, you say, was getting out of there.
Lt. McNichols. It looked decidedly like an individual
action because this colonel that was with this propaganda
group, I hadn't seen him for better than two days and this
lieutenant was in charge of the bunch, and it seemed to be an
individual action that he did himself.
Senator Potter. Was this lieutenant in charge of this
group?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. So that actually he was the commander of
the group that did it?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. It wasn't just an individual soldier?
Lt. McNichols. It was the commander, himself.
Senator Potter. Do you know his name?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, he didn't speak any English, and I
spoke very little Japanese, and about the only way we could do
it was through Japanese and he didn't have much to do with me,
and I could sit there and look him right in the eye and he
would turn away. The one I was telling you about, the sound
engineer, he and I got to be great buddies, and he actually
helped me out. I don't know where he used to do it, I was the
only one who was smoking cigarettes and he would go out there
and get them for me. The lieutenant was very uncommunicative
and decidedly a Prussian type of officer and strictly divorced
from the men.
Senator Potter. You mean to tell me in the Communist army
they had a caste system there?
Lt. McNichols You bet you they do.
Senator Potter. I have no further questions.
Lieutenant, the tentative plan will be for us to hold
public hearings beginning Wednesday morning, and if you could
be available--I do not know the schedule yet as to whether you
will go on Wednesday or Thursday or Friday--but we will
certainly appreciate it if you could stay around. You have a
story that should get out.
Lt. McNichols. Thank you very much.
Senator Potter. We will call Corporal Wilton.
STATEMENT OF SGT. BARRY F. RHODEN
Senator Potter. Will you have a chair, Corporal. Will you
identify yourself for the record, Corporal, and give your full
name and your present unit.
Sgt. Rhoden. You are mistaken, Senator. My rank is
sergeant, and my name is Barry F. Rhoden; Sergeant Barry F.
Rhoden, RA 1432093. I am assigned to the 35th, in Jacksonville,
Florida.
Senator Potter. What is your home address?
Sgt. Rhoden. McClenny, Florida.
Senator Potter. You are not kicking about your assignment?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, would you tell the committee what
unit you were assigned to when you first went to Korea?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was in training with the Second Infantry
Division in Fort Lewis, Washington, when the Korean War
started. We were alerted for Korea, and on the 22nd of July we
left the States for Korea. We landed on about the 1st of August
in 1950. About the 30th of August of 1950 we were up on the
line, the Neptung River; and the exact position I do not know,
sir.
Senator Potter. Can you identify the approximate location
on the map behind you?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes. Right around here near Taeju
[indicating]. It was to the left of Taeju.
Senator Potter. That was also on the Pusan perimeter area?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. That was the western boundary of the Pusan
area?
Sgt. Rhoden. The whole time I was there I did not know
north, south, or what; but it was in the area near Taeju. The
exact dates, sir, I am not sure. In the affidavit I said on the
31st of August, sir, but I remember now when we were joking
with each other about payday. That was the next company day. So
it was on the 30th of August, sir, when the North Koreans hit
us there and my unit was surrounded.
On the morning of the 31st of August we were taken
prisoner. We had no ammunition. I, along with sixty other
fellows, was trying to move back to our lines. We were opened
fire on by some of the North Koreans.
Senator Potter. What was your duty with the company?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was the assistant squad leader, sir, in the
57 Millimeter Recoilless Rifle Squad. We were trying to get
back to our lines, sir, and we were kind of off to the side of
our company--on an outpost. When they overran the main
positions we were firing and they missed us. We were throwing
grenades in to a bunch of them, and they did not even notice
us. I do not know what was wrong, whether they were doped or
what.
After we were out of ammunition, we were trying to get back
to our lines. We were moving along the edge of the lake or a
little trail and we could hear the firing. We knew our lines
were there some place, and we were trying to get to them.
About a platoon of them opened fire on us from up on the
mountain. We began to run. We had no ammunition. We knew it was
the North Koreans and that they were after us. There was a bend
in the trail--it went around the edge of the mountain--and out
across the rice paddy I could see a bunch of fellows moving.
They looked to me like GI's. I looked through binoculars and I
could see they had on their GI uniform, the fatigue, the GI
boots, and the steel helmets. We actually thought they were
GI's, sir. We had been chased a while and we were going to let
them chase us right on into a trap, and it worked the other
way. When they opened fire on us, the North Koreans opened fire
on us. They came off the hill on us. The lake was at our back,
sir, and we were helpless there.
Senator Potter. How many of you were there in the group?
Sgt. Rhoden. There were seven to start with, sir, and three
of the fellows were killed while we were being taken prisoners.
We had just a few rounds each, sir, and our bayonets. We did
the best we could, sir, but three of them were killed. The
other four of us they put to carrying ammunition for them
during the day. The lieutenant mentioned taking the dog tags.
They took our dog tags. The officer who was in charge of the
group that we were with, he had a nice roll of chains and he
was making a collection of them.
Senator Potter. That was the Korean officer, the North
Korean officer?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. Thereafter we were taken prisoner
and there was this one officer--they wanted to shoot us several
times and he would stop it. I take it he was the political
officer. He had a little briefcase with a lot of papers, of
propaganda, and pictures and so forth, and he would let us read
those.
Senator Potter. Were those the individual North Korean
soldiers?
Sgt. Rhoden. The North Korean GI's He would let them beat
us but he would not let them shoot us. As long as you would
look him right in the eye, it was all right; but if you turned
your back, he would hit you. They hit us with their rifle
butts. Maybe they would kick us or spit on us or beat us with a
stick or something.
They took all of the stuff we had on us--our billfolds, our
watches, and our papers--and it was like a kid at a Christmas
tree. He enjoyed getting all of it. We were put to carrying
ammunition for them.
Senator Potter. That was the same day?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. They had loaded us down with the
ammunition, sir, and some of us were loaded pretty heavy. When
we would fall we got a flogging, sir. They had taken our boots
and our jackets. The North Koreans, none of them could speak
English, sir, and I could not speak their lingo. So the
questioning they did was by drawings on paper and signs. They
would draw a picture of a plane and they wanted to know how
many planes we had. So we put down ten planes--you had to put
something. I did not know, sir, and I tried to let them know I
did not know; and I would get a beating. So I got so I would
mark and he would draw a plane. He would want me to mark how
many and I would fill the page up. If I put maybe ten or twelve
down, I got a beating. So I filled the page up and just kept
going until he stopped me, and then he was satisfied. The same
way with the tanks and the artillery.
Senator Potter. This was all done by drawings?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, and by signs. He would draw his rank and
I would draw my two stripes down.
Senator Potter. Do you know what rank he had?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, I do not. It was all confusing to me.
Senator Potter. But he was an officer?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. He had the runners coming to him,
and when he gave an order the fellows jumped around. One time
when he was questioning me, sir, he got a little rough with me,
and this other fellow----
Senator Potter. What do you mean, he got rough?
Sgt. Rhoden. He put the pistol to my head, right up here
[indicating], and motioned I had better come across or else.
This other fellow came up and run him away and then he sat down
there with me, the old buddy-buddy. He pointed to me and then
to himself, and he would go like that [indicating] and I would
play dumb. He would go through the motion again, and again I
would play dumb. So the next time he went through the motion,
he took my hand and shook hands with me. I motioned I knew what
he meant.
The other fellow said, ``He is trying to get friendly. Ask
him for something to eat.'' We were all very hungry; our
rations were running low before we were taken prisoner. So we
asked him for something to eat. He went into a rage. He beat us
around a little.
Then the fellows told me, ``Ask him for some water.'' So I
asked him for water and they did give us a little water. But
all of the questioning was by drawings, sir, and signs.
After the questioning there, sir, where he tried to get
buddy-buddy with me----
Senator Potter. Was this the first day?
Sgt. Rhoden. This was all in the first day that I was taken
prisoner, sir. From there we went on. They had a unit
surrounded and they set up a road block. There was one vehicle,
an army truck, trying to get in to the outfit and they knocked
the truck out, killing the driver. Then there was one trying to
get out from the unit that was trapped and they knocked the
vehicle out. There were two GI's there and one of them got
away; he was wounded but he made it back down.
We could see the unit out in the valley. An American
infantry company started up to see if they could knock out the
road block. They left a few there to try and hold them back
while the main body of the ambush pulled back. They had us with
them and it was getting along late in the afternoon. Just about
dark, about two or three miles from where they had the unit
surrounded, they stopped us. A new officer had taken over, the
one that had been questioning us, and he had stayed behind I
guess. I did not see him anymore.
This new officer went through questioning me again by
drawings and signs. The rest of them were sitting up on the
hill. We were on the little trail right by a rice paddy. They
asked the other fellows questions. I was the squad leader at
the time, and the fellows would look at me before they would
try to give any answer. So they were really questioning me.
They thought I knew all the answers.
After questioning me he gave me a little piece of paper
about so long and so wide which was mimeographed. It had Korean
writing on it and also English. The statement was, ``You are
about to die the most horrible kind of death.''
Senator Potter. That was the statement that was given to
you?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. He gave me the statement and told me
to read it to the fellows.
Senator Potter. What did it say, again?
Sgt. Rhoden. ``You are about to die the most horrible kind
of death.'' That was all there was to it, sir. I guess they
wanted to maybe make us run, sir, or something, and have a
sport with it. When I read this statement, the other fellows--
we had been expecting it. We had read of what had happened to
some of the prisoners.
After I read the statement I crumpled it up in my hand. I
wanted it there when they found us. They took the statement
away from me; they would not let me keep it. I do remember some
of the fellows saying, ``Well, they are finally going to shoot
us,'' or something like that, sir.
So he motioned me to go where the other fellows were
standing. They were just about the length away from us as we
are here, sir, and as I turned around to go--I did almost an
about face. He had the burp gun over his shoulder--they carried
it with a strap--and as I turned around, sir, I was shot in the
back with the burp gun. The bullet knocked me down, sir. As the
lieutenant said, I did a good job of playing dead, sir. It did
not knock me out. I lay there. The way I fell, I could see the
fellows out in front of me being shot.
Senator Potter. He shot you in the back and then he shot
the others?
Sgt. Rhoden. They shot me in the back, sir, and I laid
there praying and pretending I was dead, sir. They shot the
other fellows and then stopped over me and bayoneted the other
fellows a time or two. Then they left. After a while they left.
After they had gone, sir, I began to move around when I thought
it was safe. I was paralyzed from my waist down. I pulled
myself around, and I noticed the other fellows were still
alive, too. They were moving around. I went over and made them
as comfortable as I could.
There was a little embankment there and I pulled them down
over it. A couple of them helped them get down. I stayed there,
sir. I do not remember just exactly--I know there were four of
us when we were shot. There is one fellow that I am in doubt as
to just what happened there. I understood later that he made it
back to the States.
I do remember two fellows there. I bandaged them up the
best I could. I blacked out, sir. When I came back to what I
was doing, I was still there and it was dark. I felt the two
fellows and they were stiff. I do not know how long I had been
out there. The other fellows were definitely dead. I do not
remember the third one. I am kind of foggy. I do not know if I
could find them, and I do not think that I could find the other
fellow.
Senator Potter. You remember that two of them were dead?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes. I know I found two. The third one I am in
doubt, sir. I do understand this other fellow made it back. I
do not know if he is still in the army or out, sir. I crawled
off to a little stream and drank some water. When I drank the
water, sir, I blacked out. I do not remember anything else
until----
Senator Potter. This was at night?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. They captured us in the morning and
they shot us that night. I guess it was the same night, sir.
When I drank the water I blacked out and I do not remember
anything else until I was wandering around calling one of the
fellows that had been shot with me. And then a patrol of North
Koreans--I saw them just about the same time they saw me--took
a shot at me, sir. The bullet missed me. It was at awful close
range, though.
They came up where I was at and made me get up and walk up
the side of the hill. They had me standing there and they were
kind of a half circle around me. One put his rifle up and made
like he was going to shoot me. Then they would all laugh and he
would take his rifle down and the next one would go through the
same motion.
At the time, sir, I was in such pain that I began to want
to get it over with. I felt I would be better off. I sat down,
and it made them mad, sir. I was actually trying to provoke
them into getting me out of my misery, sir. They were in a
stew. Then I saw this little plane circling around. I do not
know if he knew what was going on, but our planes started
strafing them.
When the planes started strafing them, one of the North
Koreans--the one in charge; I guess he was an officer, sir--was
hit. I picked up the little pot he had, the one he mixed his
rice in, and started off down the hill. At the bottom of the
hill there were two of them who came from behind a rock with
burp guns on them. They wanted to know in sign language where I
was going. I motioned to the ones on the hill and motioned they
were sending me to the stream to get water to take up to them.
I got that story like I did the pot.
When I got to the stream, it had pretty steep banks. I hid
in a small pea patch. I pulled the vines over me. I had my
little pot full of water. They came looking for me but they did
not find me. The rest of the time, sir, I would hide out during
the day and move at night. Sometimes I do not know what I did.
Sometimes I would be running around in the day time. Then I
would hide out.
Later I found out it was the 7th of September. I was just
fixing to hide out for the day. I was almost ready to give up
when I heard the vehicles, the motors, and I looked. I could
see the big white star. I knew it was our boys, sir, but they
got by before I could get there at the time. I would raise up
and just stumble until I would fall. I would give myself a pep
talk and I would go again. I knew I was so near our lines.
I made it out to the road. There was a jeep coming and a
tank, and then a truck loaded with GI's. I guess they were
replacements, sir. I guess as the lieutenant said, sir, with
the wounded they usually had an ambush waiting. So they were
kind of leary there. I began to think they were going to shoot
me. But they got down and the sergeant got out of the jeep. I
was doubled up and I did not have any shoes or any shirt, The
sergeant asked me, ``What is the matter? Do you have a cramp?''
I told him, ``Yes, I have got a cramp.'' I asked him if he
would take me to the aid station.
I do not know what unit it was, sir. I was so glad to get
back.
Senator Potter. How long were you behind the enemy lines?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was taken prisoner and shot on the 31st of
August of 1950. Later I found out it was the 7th of September
when I made it back to our lines.
The affidavit I have there, sir, I believe it says I was
captured and shot on the 1st of September. On my medical record
they say I made it back to my lines, or I was wounded, on the
7th of September. That is the date I made it back to our lines.
Senator Potter. Whereabouts were you shot in the back?
Sgt. Rhoden. The bullet went in just below my belt in the
back and fractured my spine and nicked my spine. The reason I
was paralyzed, the bullet went through my bladder and out
through the front, sir.
Senator Potter. That is certainly quite a story. What time
did you get back to the States?
Sgt. Rhoden. I believe, sir, it was the 27th day of
September of 1950. I was awfully glad to get back, though.
Senator Potter. I can well imagine. Actually, you are the
only one of the seven who came back, outside of this one man
that you are not sure of?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was under the impression he was, sir. I saw
a picture in a magazine of my old top kick, the first sergeant,
sir, and I wrote him a letter. He was in a hospital, sir, and I
wrote him a letter. He wrote back and told me that this other
follow had made it. I began to check around, and I think that
he did make it, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. I think we can let the record show that
there was another survivor. The other survivor's story up to
the point of the shooting completely corroborates Sergeant
Rhoden's story.
Sgt. Rhoden. His name, sir, when I made my affidavit I saw
from the War Crimes Section a little statement there that he
had made it. His name was Updegraaf, George Updegraaf. He was
from Kansas City, I believe, or Oklahoma City.
Mr. O'Donnell. We should have that in the record, that it
is completely corroborated.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, did they try to indoctrinate you
at all?
Sgt. Rhoden. He gave us a lot of the literature to read.
They have a picture up in the corner of an officer, always an
officer. They have a long list of stuff there, about how nice
it was, to come on over. They wished we would come on over and
join with them; why fight the people? It was the same old Wall
Street story and the capitalists. There were remarks about our
president, sir, and it was all phony. You could see it was
phony, sir, every bit of it. You could see right through it.
Also, when we read the stuff we would laugh and joke about it.
None of them could speak English, so we did not have to worry
about what we said too much.
Senator Potter. They did not have an interpreter with their
group?
Sgt. Rhoden. There was no one. I heard one word I could
understand while I was a prisoner, sir. When our planes were
strafing them and the marine corps were there, he called it
whispering death. He said ``whispering death'' as plain as I
can say it, sir. They cut their engines in to throw the
rockets. They wanted to know about the planes, and they kept
questioning us about them. They did not like them too well.
As I said, we marked down ten planes and we got a beating.
If we filled up a couple of pages, then they were satisfied.
Senator Potter. I want to make sure that I have this
clearly in mind. As I understand, after you were captured the
second time by this group and our planes strafed the group,
their leader was killed?
Sgt. Rhoden. There were several of them killed, sir, out of
the bunch. I say ``several,'' sir, but there were three or
four. Actually I will tell you, sir, I saw this little plane up
there circling. I guess it was an artillery or an observation
plane. As I said, I was trying to provoke them into shooting
me. My tummy felt like I had hot lead in it, sir, and I
actually spit at them when they were trying to make me stand
up. Then all of a sudden the plane was there. When the plane
started strafing them--I do not know why I picked the pot up
off the officer's pack, but I grabbed the pot. I do not know,
sir. When I saw the plane strafing them I was ready to give up,
but when the plane hit and I saw I had a chance, it gave me the
pop to try it again.
Senator Potter. Then you ran down towards a creek and you
met two other North Koreans and they thought you were going
after water for them, is that right?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, I was stumbling down the hill and
the planes were still strafing up behind me on the hill where I
had just left. These two North Koreans came from behind the
rock and they wanted to know where I was going. They saw I was
wounded, and when they made me walk up the hill I started
bleeding an awful lot. My pants were all bloody and they wanted
to know ``bang-bang?'' I motioned ``bang-bang'' and they had to
look to see where I had been shot. It pleased them, sir.
Then they wanted to know where I was going and I motioned
that the ones on the hill were sending me to get the water. I
got the story like I did the pot. I had a good line, sir. The
planes strafing up there, they fell for the story. They stood
there and watched me. The stream was about one hundred yards
away and I kept looking back, and they were watching me. When I
got to the stream it had deep banks, but the water was only
about a foot deep. So I went up and hid in the pea patch.
When it got night, I started moving back to our lines.
As for the treatment we had, sir, this one officer would
let them beat us up but he would not let them shoot us. When we
asked for something to eat we got a beating. But he did send
off to get some water for us. He sent off the little pot for
the four of us, and when they brought it back there was about
an inch of water to the pot. I split the water with the other
fellows. He did not know what to think about that. The water
was for me and he did not care about the other fellows at the
time he was trying to get stuff out of me.
Senator Potter. During that seven-day period, you had no
food?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, I managed. The North Koreans had
been through the area, sir. Actually, the most of what they ate
was what they could get out of gardens. I found one little
cucumber about so big and I ate the cucumber, but it made me
sick and I wished I had not eaten it. I had one little
cucumber.
Senator Potter. When they would beat you, would they beat
you around the head or where?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, mostly, as I said, sir, if you could
look him in the eye--I do not know why it was--but you would
stare him down and he would not do it. Usually we were carrying
equipment or something, and if we fell then they beat us on the
backs with their rifle butts. Maybe he would come up behind you
or if you walked by him going along, as you passed he would
reach out and hit you with his rifle butt. They always hit us
from behind, usually up and down in the back. I got hit once
right behind my neck. That was about the only time I was hit
around the head. I did have the pistol--they keep punching you
with a pistol when they wanted information and they thought you
were not telling them. They keep poking you with a pistol. It
was a pretty gun and made on the order of our 45. It had the
big red star in the handle. There was a little hole in there.
There was a red star and USSR, sir.
Senator Potter. A Russian pistol?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. I saw the USSR.
Senator Potter. The leader was the one--he allowed the
beating but at that time he did not want any of the men to
shoot you. But was it the leader that shot you?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, let me straighten this out now. The
first one--which I take it was the political officer, as he had
the briefcase with the stuff--he is the one that would not let
them shoot us. But he was separated from us when this one
infantry company was coming in there, sir, and they moved up
and got in their skirmish line and started forward. There was
about a battalion of them that had us.
There were a few hundred of them. They left just enough to
hold the company off, and they began to actually run. We tried
to make a break there, sir, even while the planes were strafing
them we would try and we could even plan and, talking just like
I am, what we were going to do. When the planes started
strafing them, they would always circle us, and point their
guns at us, and when they started running I began to fall back
and tell the other fellows to fall back, and we were going to
jump them when we got back on the end. But they caught on to us
and wouldn't let us.
But the political officer, what I take is the political
officer, he stayed behind and we were separated from him while
we were running there, sir. Then when they stopped us there----
Senator Potter. When you were shot, was it the leader of
the group that did the shooting?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, he was the leader of the group. I
guess he was, the rank, sir, I don't know what it was. The
piece of paper I had crumpled up in my hand, his aide was there
to get it away from me. There were runners coming to him and
leaving him.
Senator Potter. You assume he was an officer?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, when he gave the orders, you could
see them jump around.
Senator Potter. It was an officer that shot you?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, he had the burp gun and shot me.
They got right up to my face to question me and they were
trying to get into my face, and I did an about-face and I was
shot by this same follow.
Senator Potter. How far were the other men away from you at
the time?
Sgt. Rhoden. Approximately as far from me to you, sir.
Senator Potter. About twenty-five or thirty feet or
something like that?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And he shot you and then he shot you first
and then he shot the others?
Sgt. Rhoden. He shot me, and the bullet knocked me down,
sir, and of course there was no pain at the time and when I
fell I was kind of like this and I could see the way the
fellows were, and I see them as they were being shot.
Senator Potter. And they were shot and then some were
bayoneted, is that true?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And afterwards you helped take care of a
couple of them so that you know that some of them were bayonet
wounds?
Sgt. Rhoden. I talked to them for a while, sir. They lived
for quite a while and I don't know just how long. They were
talking, though, trying to pep each other up.
Senator Potter. But they died that night?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, they did.
Mr. O'Donnell. I would like to go back to when you were
seven and the seven were overrun for lack of ammunition and you
held out as long as you could, and three of you were killed.
How were the circumstances of those three deaths?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, they were closing in on us, and as
I said they were coming up behind us, and from out in the rice
paddy and the lake behind us, and they were just about fifty
feet up there, just swarming off like ants. This one fellow,
the squad leader, a bullet creased him along the side of his
head and he fell and before he fell, sir, he said ``I am hit,''
and he was right by me. I know he was playing dead because he
stayed there for just a few minutes and a few seconds, and
fired his rifle the last couple of times there, and he fell,
sir, and I saw him look a couple of times. I was looking around
to see how many of us there were. Then the squad leader fell
and he was playing dead, sir, and the other two fellows, I
don't know how badly they were hit.
After they got us there, sir, they went over and they
bayoneted the fellows, and the other two fellows and shot them
in the head and I don't know if the other two were playing dead
or not. But I do know----
Senator Potter. Whether they were dead or not, they shot
them?
Sgt. Rhoden. They were the three of them were down, sir, on
the ground and they went up to these two and shot them and
bayoneted them several times, sir, and the squad leader, here
he was my very good friend and I know he was playing dead and I
was pulling for him, and maybe he could make it, sir, but they
walked up to him and this officer, he was the one that was in
command of the troops, sir.
Senator Potter. He wasn't the political officer?
Sgt. Rhoden. Not the political officer and he stuck a rifle
right down to his head and shot him. I know he was playing dead
because after he shot him, you could see him moving, you know,
and you could tell he was dying. I know he was playing dead,
sir, when he was shot and the rifle was put right to his temple
and he was shot.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were any of the four who were captured,
wounded?
Sgt. Rhoden. Maybe one or two creased, sir, and one nicked
me across my stomach, and he was fixing to bayonet me and I had
one round left and I had a pistol, a 45 automatic and one round
left, and I was saving it for myself, sir. I was going to shoot
myself before I would be taken prisoner, and I just didn't have
what it takes to pull the trigger and the excuse I made to
myself was as long as I have got a breath I have got a chance.
I looked and he was coming down, and we were right by a
little embankment and he was fixing to bayonet me and the
bayonet got me along the side here and I shot him, sir, with
the last round.
I was wounded just a little place along my ribs where the
bayonet hit me and the other fellows had been creased with a
bullet, the best I can remember, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. The prime reason they didn't kill the four
who were not seriously wounded was because they needed them to
pack ammunition and water, and so forth?
Sgt. Rhoden. I take it, sir, they did load us down, and
they gave us a tremendous load to carry. And it was an awful
load and they kept prodding us, too. It was heavy, actually it
was pretty rough going. It was just about all that you could
prod along with and it was enough that you would fall with it.
None of us were seriously wounded, no, sir. When we fell we
would get flogged.
Senator Potter. What type of ammunition were you carrying?
Sgt. Rhoden. Ammunition for about a 50-calibre that they
had, and I had a bag of ammunition for that, a big sackful, and
some of the follows, one of them had a big mortar plate for
their big mortar, and some ammunition for the mortar and a lot
of the personal gear of the fellows, and they would throw their
personal gear on it, and we were all loaded on ammunition with
the exception of the one who had the base plate for the mortar.
Mr. O'Donnell. How far would you estimate you actually
carried the ammunition?
Sgt. Rhoden. I would say approximately, sir, about eight or
ten miles, and all day we were going around this.
Mr. O'Donnell. During this period of time were you given
any food at all?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, I asked for food once, and that is
when I got the beating.
Senator Potter. Do you have any questions?
Did the North Korean soldiers eat any food while you were
carrying this?
Sgt. Rhoden. Oh, yes, they had the rice there, and they had
a powder looking stuff that they eat, and it was like a meal
and they would mix it with water and eat it, and also they
would tell us we could eat and maybe we would find a potato
patch and they would tell us we can chop-chop, you know, and
motioned to help ourselves. Then we would dig the potatoes and
they would take them away from us and so we quit digging. As
long as we would dig the potatoes, they would take them away
from us.
I saw one eat a part of a pumpkin and they had to eat, and
they carried it in a nasty bag, this powder-like stuff, a meal,
and they would mix it with water and eat it just like that.
They didn't cook it, sir, a cold meal.
Senator Potter. But they had food?
Sgt. Rhoden. Definitely.
Senator Potter. But they did not give any food to you?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Or to the other men?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, and I didn't see any get any food.
Senator Potter. How long were you hospitalized, Sergeant?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was released from the hospital--I made the
trip back to the hospital, sir, to our aid station, on the 7th
of September, and I was released from the hospital in January
of 1951.
Senator Potter. Are you on active duty now?
Sgt. Rhoden. I am, sir.
Senator Potter. Do you have any permanent injury as a
result?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, sometimes yes, I have a little
trouble. It is with my legs, sir, I do.
Senator Potter. You are not on limited duty, you are on
active duty?
Sgt. Rhoden. I am on active duty, sir, but I have the
profile, a three on my profile which is a 3-D, and it limits me
to my assignments as to the places I can be assigned to.
Senator Potter. You are limited to service in the army, but
on active duty?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, do you mind if I ask you the same
questions I asked the lieutenant? You have an experience first-
hand, and do you have any comments that you would like to make
concerning the Communist movement here in our country?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, I was fighting in Korea, sir, and I
hated them, and after I arrived back here, of course, we didn't
hear too much about communism.
Actually, sir, I didn't actually know what it was until the
Korean War started and I began to see what I could find out
about it. I finally made Korea and I hated them and after I
went into the hospital I was on a public appearance tour, and I
received some letters from them, around, and it is all the way
I take it, sir, for the same purpose. They are trying to
overthrow our government, and it is all for the same purpose.
If I hate them in Korea I see no reason why I shouldn't hate
them here. You asked me my personal opinion, sir, and that is
the way I feel about it.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, did the political officer, you
mentioned he asked you about the number of planes and the
number of tanks and so forth, did he ask you any political
questions about your home life or anything of that kind?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, he wanted to know where I was from, and
the way he would draw a map of Korea and he put Japan and the
States, and then he wanted to know where I was from, where I
come from, from the States to Korea or from Japan to Korea, or
what.
I was confused by doing this. I didn't know, and then he
would get rough and so I motioned the States and he wanted to
know maybe in the States and he wanted to know what point.
As for my address, sir, I had a lot of stuff in my wallet
and I didn't have time to get rid of anything, and they had all
of the stuff I had, as to the information as to the addresses
and so forth. They wanted to know where in the States I was
from and so forth.
Now, I got some pretty nasty letters, from the time I was
on the tour, sir, a couple that made some pretty----
Senator Potter. Do you have those letters with you?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, I don't have them with me, and I
turned them over to our intelligence officer, sir, at district
headquarters.
Senator Potter. Could you give us the essence of what they
said in the letter?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, it was along the same line we had
over there, maybe it was put together a little better. Actually
I didn't read it too thoroughly, or try to memorize any of it.
You could tell from where it was from, one point in the state
and one from another, and none of them were signed. They called
President Truman at the time, sir, a puke from Missouri, and
about MacArthur, remarks along the same line. I turned the
letter over to----
Senator Potter. The letters were postmarked from the United
States?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, the one calling Truman a puke from
Missouri was from Daytona Beach, I believe. I turned the letter
over.
Senator Potter. Do you know where the other one was
postmarked from?
Sgt. Rhoden. From St. Petersburg, Florida, and maybe one
was Coral Gables.
Senator Potter. Colonel Whitehorn, do you suppose we could
get those letters from G-2?
Col. Whitehorn. I wouldn't know. I can check on that.
Senator Potter. Were you intimidated in any other way after
you got back from the Communists?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, just the letters. I was encouraged in
the letters to write my congressman, and so forth, and try to
get the useless killing stopped in Korea and if you have got
the letter you will get an idea, all of them are along the same
line.
Actually, sir, at the time when I got the first letters, I
didn't turn them in, and I might still have some of them. What
I did get, if I have them I don't know, sir, but I have to
check through that, but this one or two that I turned in, sir,
they are all along the same lines, sir, and I turned in two
that I know of.
Mr. Jones. Let me get this information for the record.
The basis of your conversation with the political officer
in Korea was reestablished again in the form of a letter to you
mailed in the United States, is that correct?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, the letters were on the same line
as the pamphlets he gave us, yes, sir. It was on the same line.
Senator Potter. Capitalistic war and so on?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, the same stuff and you read one
letter and the next one in the same way, and they don't vary
such.
Senator Potter. But the correspondence corresponds with the
type of indoctrination they tried to give you in Korea?
Sgt. Rhoden. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. Jones. And we would assume that your name was sent
through the regular Communist channels to the Communist party
in this country?
Sgt. Rhoden. I wouldn't know that, sir.
Mr. Jones. That would very likely be the way they would
act.
Senator Potter. You had made some talks?
Sgt. Rhoden. They had me on this public appearance tour, as
soon as I could get around, and going before the various clubs,
and the Lions Club and the American Legion and so forth, and
giving those talks about my experience, sir, and how our
equipment compared to theirs, and so forth.
Senator Potter. Colonel Wolfe, do you have anything that
you want to add?
Thank you kindly, Sergeant.
I would like to call Captain Buttrey.
Captain, will you take a chair? You hadn't arrived when we
first opened our hearings, but I want to take this opportunity
to thank you ahead of time for being with us.
The purpose of this hearing, of course, is to aid us in the
investigations and to let the American people better know the
type of enemy that we have been fighting. We have nothing, and
we are not investigating anybody here, we are just trying as a
matter of securing information, to buttress our efforts in the
United Nations, and to secure public information.
Would you identify yourself for the record, Captain?
STATEMENT OF CAPT. LINTON J. BUTTREY
Capt. Buttrey. My name is Linton J. Buttrey, sir, 0407113,
and I am stationed at Replacement Training Center, Camp
Pickett.
Senator Potter. I have had some memories of Camp Pickett,
and I do not know that they are the most pleasant, but I was
stationed there at one time. I thought Camp Pickett was closed.
Capt. Buttrey. No, sir, it was very active Friday when I
left, sir. I think most of the people there are hopeful that it
will be closed.
Senator Potter. I was there in 1942, in Advance Training
Area before I went overseas.
What is your home address, Captain?
Capt. Buttrey. Nashville, Tennessee, sir.
Senator Potter. When did you first go to Korea, and what
unit were you with?
Capt. Buttrey. I was with the 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry
Division.
Senator Potter. What was your assignment?
Capt. Buttrey. I was assistant battalion surgeon, with the
first battalion. I am a medical service officer.
Senator Potter. Now, would you give us your account of how
you were captured, and what took place?
Capt. Buttrey. Well, sir, it was on a Sunday, 16th of July,
Sunday morning, and I use the vernacular, the old army talk,
when all hell broke loose in those rice paddies over there.
Senator Potter. This is 1950?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, that was the 16th of July, 1950.
We were told to evacuate, and it was probably about 6:30 or
seven o'clock in the morning. We didn't evacuate right then. We
fought in and out of this little valley there on the Koon River
but in the afternoon we had to organize and protect the unit
itself, and all of our equipment.
But that night we had to abandon and leave it and move out.
I suppose we got out over the hill, the ridge, about midnight,
I am not sure, and no one paid too much attention to time under
those circumstances; but it must have been around midnight.
Senator Potter. And were you overrun?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, we were. Of course, my job was as
a doctor there and we had two doctors in there. I don't
remember, but we had many patients and we were getting them out
all along the afternoon if we could run a roadblock--they had
set up a roadblock.
At night they would infiltrate and surround us, and as you
know the American forces were not large in numbers then, and so
they infiltrated and surrounded us and set up a roadblock the
night before, and they attacked in the morning, which occurred
about 6:30 or seven o'clock.
Senator Potter. Would they fire on an ambulance?
Capt. Buttrey. Well, yes, sir, they would fire on any
vehicle at that time. What actually happened, where the
ambulances were concerned, and I didn't witness this but the
ambulances were shot up, any of them that would come out and go
back, in case they didn't try to get back in, they were shot
up.
Senator Potter. Of course, our ambulances are very vividly
marked with the Red Cross.
Capt. Buttrey. They make good targets, and it was a
beautiful day.
Senator Potter. Captain, would you tell in your own words
after you left it, I assume it was your battalion aid station
about midnight?
Capt. Buttrey. Well, sir, we moved the battalion aid
station back to the regimental aid station, and that was prior
to our being completely blocked, but I suppose the regimental
commander and his officers expected to get out, which we
didn't. He was wounded there, too, the regimental commander
was.
But in the afternoon, probably three or four o'clock, when
we set up our convoy hoping to run this roadblock and put the
troops out on either side of the flanks to defend us after we
got out, their forces were stronger so I was told, and what
would have been our rear and we couldn't make it and so we had
to abandon the convoy and in doing that we had many patients. I
don't know just how many patients, sir, we did have. We had
some trucks loaded with them, and the signal told me there was
no doctor there then and he was attending other patients. But
in my immediate area we didn't have enough transportation to
get them out.
I couldn't think of leaving them, so the signal told me I
could unload their trucks, and they had two, I believe, in
there. Once we started to do that, but then that wasn't
feasible, all of the men weren't mobilized yet. So I asked for
enough people to help us take the patients over the hill and
they did. They let me have them and, of course, they had their
arms and it was dark by this time, you know, so they helped
carry the patients by litter over the hill.
In getting over there, there was no vegetation in South
Korea, that is trees, and there was a small cemetery there, and
they are just mounds--I believe they tell us they bury their
dead sitting upright, but anyway they are huge mounds. The only
vegetation there at all of any site, that is trees, there are
probably half a dozen of greens and they were tall and not much
foliage on them. But my idea there was we had this great number
of patients and we would have to move them and the sun would be
hot the next day.
So I asked them to put them down there, and then another
thing I requested of the troops themselves. They were still
fighting out there, and the officers who were present agreed
that every time we could that four men would take one patient,
and I don't know how many patients got out that night. But many
of them did and many of them died on their litters and we could
find them later, or they were found, so we were told later.
That was on the night, Sunday night of the 16th of July,
1950. All night long the chaplain, he had remained with me,
too, and about daybreak----
Senator Potter. In other words, you and the chaplain stayed
with the wounded?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir. There will be a little humor in
this. You know how we Americans are. It is bad enough, but I
like to think of the humorous side of it, too. I mentioned in
my report a corporal that got out and he did get out and I made
the remark that many of these people, patients now, dragged
themselves out. Well, he exemplified what I mean. He was from
Texas, and if there are any Texans in here you should be proud
of this. But the humorous article, I had asked each patient
during the night when they were calling for me and I would
adjust their bandages, and so forth, and give them any
medication, I would ask them--I didn't think we would get out--
and I would ask them: Do you think you can walk? And I intended
to get everyone out I could.
And Taylor, his name is, I would like to know where he is;
he is out somewhere. He was a skinny youngster and about
eighteen or nineteen years old, and when I got to the litter I
asked him, I said: ``Corporal, can you walk?'' And I had known
him in Japan and I had been on a trip with the navy and taken
thirty troops on a tour with them early in the spring. So he
said: ``Yes, sir, I think I can.''
I looked and he only had one boot and so in the old army
way I said, ``Where in the hell is your other boot?'' And he
said, ``I don't know, sir, I don't need it.''
I said ``We are ten or twelve miles away from any
medication, and you need it,'' and I said ``I will get one off
another patient.'' He said ``No, sir, I can go back for it''
and I said ``Oh, you damn Texans, I don't care how you get out
if it is on your head. If you can walk, get going,'' and so he
did. He was willing to just get out any way and so he did. I
will advance this a little bit, and so I find myself in Japan
and they were very nice to me in the hospital and bring me the
roster every day of those who had been admitted. So one day I
looked about a week or two days later, and here was Corporal
Taylor, and I didn't think he would get out, but by virtue of
his not accepting the boot, sir, I am pretty sure that that is
the only thing that made him get out. He was too weak
otherwise, and he couldn't have carried that extra boot.
But the pity of it now is this: I went to the ward and they
wheeled me to the ward to see him and he was in very bad shape
and he had been shot in one leg and he was almost paralyzed in
that, however he did get back. The one that was paralyzed, and
had no feeling, not necessarily paralyzed, but had no feeling
in it, he had dragged that leg until there was no skin on it to
speak of, from the knee to the end of his toes.
That is the circumstances under which he evacuated himself,
and he didn't have the feeling to know that he was doing that
apparently to himself.
Senator Potter. It was about a twelve-mile trip?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, ten or twelve miles; yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Then did the North Koreans overrun your
position?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir. It was on Monday morning and I
don't know but it was seven or eight o'clock and the chaplain,
he saw them coming first, and I was administering to the
patients, and he just signaled to us that he saw them coming. I
don't know how many there were, but there were enough. And when
you get over there you have a lot of hills and you can see them
coming across these little ridges in great numbers. But
naturally they didn't get into us, all of them, at least I
don't think they did. But we were overrun and they were quite
gleeful and excited about it.
A thing that drew their attention quite a bit was our GI
ration cans, or C ration cans, the few we had had been thrown
out, and they picked them up and talked about them. I don't
speak Korean and they weren't speaking English, but they were
very happy about it and they were shooting some of them, and
they shot the rest of them.
Senator Potter. You mean they would shoot the patients?
Capt. Buttrey. The patients on the litters, and some of
them tried to flee, and those who, I expect they, like anything
else, they mustered a lot of courage, and some of them tried to
run and tried to got away, and they were shot in the back or
just shot.
Senator Potter. Did they shoot any right on the litters?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, right on the litters.
Senator Potter. Did they shoot you, Captain?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, I was wounded there, too, and they
shot me.
Senator Potter. Were you wearing an arm band?
Capt. Buttrey. On the arm, yes, sir, a medical brassard.
Senator Potter. And I assume the chaplain was similarly
identified?
Capt. Buttrey. He had on his, yes, sir, the chaplain's
brassard.
Senator Potter. Was he shot, too?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, he was killed.
Senator Potter. About how many wounded were there at this
point, at that time?
Capt. Buttrey. About how many were there?
Senator Potter. Yes, sir, how many Americans.
Capt. Buttrey. Shot on the litters? It is only a guess,
sir, but I don't know, fifteen or twenty, and I don't know. You
see we had probably sixty or seventy to begin with, but many of
them, you see, were taken out, and many of them were able to
walk out. They weren't all originally on litters and we didn't
have that many litters, and so many of them had gotten out.
Senator Potter. Out of that group that were shot on their
litters, or at this collecting point, how many are alive today?
Capt. Buttrey. I don't know, sir.
Senator Potter. Where were you shot, Captain?
Capt. Buttrey. In the left thigh.
I suppose the one who shot me couldn't have been over five
or six feet away.
Senator Potter. So there was no doubt that they knew that
you were a doctor?
Capt. Buttrey. Oh, no, sir, I am not sure about that. There
were no matured individuals with them, all of them impressed me
as being just youngsters in teenage, and some of them may have
been twenty-one years old, and I doubt that.
Senator Potter. Was there a leader in the group?
Capt. Buttrey. You couldn't discern that, and you could not
identify any leader as such. It was sort of like a riot, you
know, just a bunch of youngsters.
Senator Potter. Were any of them bayoneted?
Capt. Buttrey. No, sir.
Senator Potter. They were all shot?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. When were you recovered, Captain?
Capt. Buttrey. I got out the next day, I think it was.
Senator Potter. How did you get out?
Capt. Buttrey. I had to walk out, sir. It was a miracle,
almost, sir. Lucky my leg wasn't broken, and the artery wasn't
cut and the muscle wasn't torn. I bled very little and, of
course, I became infected and I was in the hospital several
weeks.
Senator Potter. Did they assume you were dead?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, I hope that is what they did,
because I had to feign death there, and they shot at us after
they got away. They would shoot back in the area and they would
shoot from the hills and in fact all day long they would just
shoot over into the area from both sides.
If they had had mature leadership, sir, I don't believe
that they would have done that. I think they would have
probably killed us all, but I think they would have just done
it differently.
Senator Potter. It was more like a riot of hysterical kids?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes. Back somewhere, I am pretty sure they
had a mature leader, but just where, I don't know.
Senator Potter. Did any of the group speak English?
Capt. Buttrey. No, sir.
Senator Potter. So there was no interrogation of any kind?
Capt. Buttrey. Oh, no, sir, their only motive there was
just to intend to kill everybody.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was there any resistance offered by you, the
chaplain, or any of the seriously wounded litter patients?
Capt. Buttrey. No, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Could those youngsters, those North Korean
troops, could they other but help to see that they were going
in to helpless men?
Capt. Buttrey. Surely they understood that; I am convinced
they understood that, that they were helpless. You see, they
laughed all of the time and it was a joke to them.
Senator Potter. Were you armed at the time?
Capt. Buttrey. I had had a 45, and I don't remember. I
think I had disposed of it already, and I never had used it.
And in fact I never had even thought about it, sir, and we were
too busy. The day before you see, there had been hand-to-hand
combat as we all know that were there, and you know that since.
But up to the river side, my executive officer was killed and
nearly all of the officers were killed and right on down the
line. I don't know but one or two who got out.
Senator Potter. Did I understand you to say you are in the
medical service corps?
Capt. Buttrey. Medical service corps. I am not a doctor.
Senator Potter. At that time had they started arming any of
the medics?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. As a result of the early atrocities, we had
to arm them over there to protect them?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Are there any questions?
Mr. Carr. Well, Captain, as I understand it, then, it was
your group from maybe fifteen to twenty-five men wounded by the
time they actually came down on you, and you were there alone,
and there were no combat troops with you when they swept down
on you and shot your men without any resistance from you or the
wounded, and then went back up into the hills or back across.
Capt. Buttrey. They just passed on, yes, sir; just passed
on.
Mr. Carr. Thinking that they had killed everybody?
Capt. Buttrey. I hope that is what they thought, yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. I think the record should show that all of
the litter patients were actually killed, and that Captain
Buttrey's story has been completely corroborated by other eye
witnesses who were not litter patients, but who saw it; one a
master sergeant who viewed the entire atrocity through field
glasses.
Senator Potter. If there are no other questions, thank you
very much, Captain, and you weren't here when we were
discussing this before.
We will probably begin our public hearings Wednesday
morning and this is an executive session now so that we know
just where we are going and what we are doing, and see whether
there is any testimony that should be made public.
As we get closer to Wednesday morning, you will be notified
about what time you will appear.
Capt. Buttrey. Very well, sir.
Senator Potter. It is 12:30 now, and I agreed to have lunch
recess at 12:00. If we can recess now, will an hour and a half
be sufficient time? We will stand in recess until two o'clock
and we will continue with the other two men we didn't have this
morning.
afternoon session, 2:30 p.m.
Senator Potter. The hearing will come to order.
Sergeant Weinel? Do you want to take a seat and identify
yourself for the record, please? Give your full name and your
unit.
TESTIMONY OF SGT. CAREY H. WEINEL, 504th MILITARY POLICE
COMPANY, FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA
Sgt. Weinel. Master Sergeant Carey H. Weinel, RA 37009511,
presently on duty with 504th Military Police Company, Fort
Eustis, Virginia.
Senator Potter. Where is your home, Sergeant?
Sgt. Weinel. Kansas City, Missouri.
Senator Potter. And when did you go to Korea, and what unit
were you with?
Sgt. Weinel. I went to Korea in August 1950, joined the
Second Division, 23rd Infantry Regiment.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, what was your duty?
Sgt. Weinel. I was a squad leader, sir.
Senator Potter. A squad leader.
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. I wonder if you could tell the committee
the circumstances under which you became captured.
Sgt. Weinel. We was holding a perimeter of Pusan there, and
it was right on the Naktong River there, near a village, think
Chinju, what they called the village. It is right along the
Naktong River.
Senator Potter. Can you point that out on the map?
Sgt. Weinel. Right in this vicinity here [indicating]. We
had just moved into that position and activity was light when
we first moved in there but we heard of an attack coming, while
we didn't know when it was going to come, and we were alerted
for it.
Senator Potter. Were you in a holding position at the time,
a defensive position?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir. And due to the lack of personnel,
our replacements were awful thin. They were spread out quite a
ways. When they made the push on us, that was on the 30th of
August, that is when they made the push against us----
Senator Potter. Was that a night attack?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir. We got the attack about two o'clock
in the morning, the final attack did come at about two o'clock
in the morning, and they more or less just run over all of our
positions, all positions overrun, and I stayed in my position
until I knew they was all around me, and the only thing I could
think of was getting back to our company CP, our command post,
and seeing if we could reorganize what men we had left, to see
if we could reorganize and start to hit them again.
Our orders was to hold at all costs, and that is what we
was doing, we was holding at all costs. That was our final hold
there, at the command post. After we formed----
Senator Potter. Then did the North Koreans overrun your
lines?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; they overrun our lines completely.
Then they finally had us surrounded there, in the CP, and the
only thing for us to do was to try to make a break to our own
lines. They know where we was at and tried to throw mortars
into our position there. We organized what men we did have and
tried to fight our way back to our lines but we didn't last too
long. When it finally wound up there was something like
fifteen, I think, fifteen of us.
Senator Potter. Captured?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir. Myself, I got hit in the foot and
one in the hip. When I got hit in the hip it knocked me plumb
out. When I come to one was standing over we with a burp gun,
motioning for me to get up. I could move all right. It didn't
break no bones, it was just a flesh wound. I got up and the
first thing he did was take my shoes off and the next thing
they did was grab my dog-tags and throw them away.
Senator Potter. They took off your shoes first?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. That seemed to be a common practice.
Sgt. Weinel. They was hurting for shoes. It started to get
cold and all they had was tennis shoes.
Senator Potter. What time of year was this?
Sgt. Weinel. This was the last of August. And so after they
collected us all up and hid us in a ravine there, they brought
in about three more prisoners, and then this here officer
started interrogating us. He couldn't talk no English at all
and he had an interpreter with us, and the interpreter wasn't
too good. But he give us the idea if we would tell him the
truth and don't lie to him, that we would go to Seoul to a big
prison camp. He mentioned many, many Americans there.
And that we would have medical care and so forth and so on.
They took our names, all of our names and serial numbers and so
forth and so on, and he asked us as a group about our own
forces and tanks and so forth and so on, how many tanks we had
and so forth and so on. There was a few of them that did give
that information. But there was others of us that didn't.
Senator Potter. Did he ask you any other questions
concerning any personal questions about your families?
Sgt. Weinel. No, he didn't there. He was so interested in
the UN he wanted to know if any UN troops had entered into the
fight yet. That is what they was interested in more than
anything else. It seemed they were trying to find out whether
the UN troops was into the fight yet or if they wasn't in yet.
Senator Potter. Did this interrogation take place the same
day that you were captured?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; the next day.
Senator Potter. How many were captured in this one group?
Sgt. Weinel. There was fifteen of us.
Senator Potter. Fifteen?
Sgt. Weinel. Approximately fifteen of us. Then they took us
to our own command post, and let us eat our rations, our own
rations, and they treated us pretty good while we was there.
But up until that time they didn't take any prisoners at all.
So we got the idea through this interpreter that they had been
promised that if they take prisoners they would get two
thousand dollars in American money for every American prisoner
they took.
Senator Potter. You felt that that was true as a result of
the conversations that took place with the interpreter?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. He give us the idea that they
would get two thousand dollars American money out of each one
of us, is the word I got from him.
Senator Potter. And he also told you that prior to this
time they had not been taking prisoners?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right.
Senator Potter. They were killing them as they captured
them?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, that is right. Then, of course they went
ahead and had all of our watches and everything like that taken
away from us, all of our personal articles, and was starting
into going down through the dead bodies and get the articles
off them. They kept us there in that one, in our own command
post there for three days.
Senator Potter. But you had rations, your own rations to
eat?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, plenty to eat there. Then on about the
third day--I mean, they didn't pay too much attention to our
planes. They was running around there all the time, and never
paying any attention to us. The third day, however, the planes
come in there and they strafed us, and there was three of our
boys killed outright and there was two injured pretty seriously
by our own planes.
Senator Potter. In other words, the strafing killed three
of the prisoners?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right.
Senator Potter. Three out of the fifteen?
Sgt. Weinel. And the rest of us we got out of the building
and they collected us up and got us in a ravine there and hid
us there until night, and when night come they started us back.
They had a hospital, they had set up a hospital right next to
this town there, and we left what men was really wounded bad,
that couldn't hardly even walk, they left them there at this
hospital and that left us about ten men or less than ten men to
make the forced march.
Senator Potter. And where did you march to?
Sgt. Weinel. They took us to Taejon.
Senator Potter. How far was that?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, we rode the train the last twenty miles
to Taejon, that was all. The rest of the time we walked. It is
about, I guess, seventy or eighty some miles.
Senator Potter. You pointed out in the map your position
when you were captured, the lower part of the Pusan perimeter.
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; right in here, sir [indicating].
They moved us into Taeju and then on to Taejon.
Senator Potter. And you marched that whole distance with
the exception of the last twenty miles?
Sgt. Weinel. We rode the train from this twenty miles here
into Taejon. That is where we rode the train in.
Senator Potter. How long did you take to make that
distance?
Sgt. Weinel. I don't have any idea, sir. I lost track of
all time. They was just giving us what we could barely get by
with to eat.
Senator Potter. Did they feed you once a day or twice a
day?
Sgt. Weinel. Once a day, just about. And that was very
skimpy.
Senator Potter. What would you have?
Sgt. Weinel. Most of the time it was rice, either a rice
ball or rice soup. There wouldn't be too much of it, either.
Senator Potter. Did you got any medical treatment at all?
Sgt. Weinel. No, sir, no medical treatment at all.
Senator Potter. What were the conditions of the march?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, we lost two men on the march.
Senator Potter. There were ten of you that started off, you
say?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; and lost two on the march.
Senator Potter. They died en route?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. We picked up some other
prisoners at one of the towns later on, we picked up some more
prisoners there. Of course out of that bunch we lost heavier
since we picked them up than we did any other time. At one of
the towns on the way we picked up, I would say about twenty of
them, twenty other prisoners.
Senator Potter. That was on the way on the march?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes. At Chinchon there, they put us in cells
there, in a jail there, they put us in these cells and our
planes come and strafed the jail we was in. As luck would have
it only one man was hurt, he got a board splinter from one of
the boards that hit him in the back but it didn't injure him.
But they was doing a good job of tearing the jail up, though.
Senator Potter. Did they destroy the jail?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; they done a good job on it. I think
that was the only building that was left. There had been a big
prison there, I think, at one time, and that was the only
building that was left, you know, in the ring of this concrete
wall around it, about the only building left standing.
Senator Potter. What was the cause of the death of the two
original ten?
Sgt. Weinel. What was that, sir?
Senator Potter. What caused the death of the two that died
en route?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, one was dysentery, and the other was--he
got stomach cramps. I don't know. He got stomach cramps and he
never could straighten up. He just doubled over and we couldn't
get him straightened up at all.
Senator Potter. Were they given any medical attention?
Sgt. Weinel. No, sir; they wasn't. However, all of us had
stomach cramps at one time or another, for lack of food and
what food they did give us just seemed to cause stomach cramps.
Senator Potter. What was the treatment of the ones who had
physical disabilities or had dysentery or stomach cramps?
Sgt. Weinel. Didn't have any, sir, no medical care at all.
Senator Potter. Did they try to have them keep up with the
march?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir. They marched us awful fast, I mean
they was moving us awful fast, and after we got back to
Chinchu, they turned us over to, I think they called them
civilian police. It seemed like to me from what I gathered they
had been trained at Poyang, to take over these villages and
towns as they took them over, and establish law and order. As
they take us from one town to another, when they change their
guards, and have new guards all the time, they was constantly
trying to move us faster than we could move. I mean, they was
all the time rushing us.
Senator Potter. Did they beat you?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; they did. If you didn't keep up or
for any reason you lagged back, they would take a rifle butt
and hit you with the rifle butt, or some of them would even
kick you. That is, to have you keep up with the rest of them.
We had some men that--especially, you know, they give you a
little break and start you out again. That was always the
hardest, starting out after a break, if they give us a break.
Of course none of us had any shoes, and walking on that
ground all of our feet was--well, there was scars on top of
scars, you might say, and blisters on top of blisters. They
finally got us up there and got us on the train and then they
took us on into Taejon and put us in prison there.
Senator Potter. You stated that enroute you were
transferred from the North Korean military guard to some type
of civilian guard?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Was the treatment of the guards any
different?
Sgt. Weinel. I think that the civilian guards, I think
their treatment was rougher than the military guards.
Senator Potter. Rougher than the military guards?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did they parade you through any of the
towns enroute?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; they did. They paraded us pretty
near all the towns that we come through. They would parade us
through mostly in the day time. They would always try to move
us out in the daytime, and then by the time we get out of town,
you know, it would be dark. By the time we got out of town it
would be dark, and we would march all night in the dark. That
is after the planes got so heavy that we could not march on the
roads in the daytime. Our planes, any time we was on the road,
would get them, so they started marching us at night. But up
until that time if the planes left them alone, they just
marched on the road in broad daylight and after the planes got
pretty thick, every time they would hear one, they would go for
cover too like the rest of us would.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, did they endeavor to humiliate
you as you went through the towns? Did they try to incite the
civilian population?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, we would have them strike at us with
their fists as we would go through, as we marched through. Some
civilians would strike at us while we was in line. They would
strike at us or try and kick us, one or the two. But we didn't
have too much of it, but we had it happen, in certain
instances.
Senator Potter. Did the guards try to keep order, try to
keep the civilians away from you?
Sgt. Weinel. No, sir; they didn't. They didn't try to keep
them away at all. After we got to Taejon to the prison there,
it was just more or less--I don't know. They had kind of an
open house to all the army personnel. All army personnel and
high officials, they could come in and molest us all they
wanted to. I mean, the guards didn't pay no more attention to
them as though they wasn't even there.
Senator Potter. They would come in and beat you?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. Specially for clothing. They
would come in, like some of us still had socks, and if they saw
a pair of socks that didn't have no holes in them they would
take them. Or trousers the same way, or jackets. We finally
learned that is what they were doing, so we started tearing
holes in the fatigues so they wouldn't take them, tearing the
pockets off.
Senator Potter. From the time that you were captured until
the end of this march, were you interrogated?
Sgt. Weinel. We were interrogated several times, yes.
Senator Potter. Several times?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Senator Potter. And what course did the interrogation take?
Was the interrogation entirely on military intelligence, or
what?
Sgt. Weinel. No, they tried to question us about our
families, about our families and----
Senator Potter. What type of questions would they ask you?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, they would ask us where our home was
first, and ask us where our home was, and after the home they
would ask us if we was married, if we had children, also if we
had cars, and if our families had cars, and such things as
that.
Senator Potter. Did they try to indoctrinate you in any
way?
Sgt. Weinel. They did while we was at the prison, yes. They
give us these books, they had books, about that thick
[indicating], and they would give us them, and they told us we
were going to have to sit up an hour every day reading, have
one of our own men read the book to us, and explain it to us.
But somehow or other they never did follow through with that.
Senator Potter. How long were you at this prison?
Sgt. Weinel. We was there about I would say around eighteen
days, or something like that.
Senator Potter. About eighteen days.
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And what was the general treatment in the
prison?
Sgt. Weinel. The general treatment in the prison was pretty
bad. I mean, they wanted us to know that they was the boss and
they didn't want no foolishness out of you, out of none of us,
and they would take a delight, it would seem like, and just
antagonize you, just to get you mad, you know, just enough to
keep you mad, and keep you upset. They liked to do that. It
seemed like little things that could upset you, they would just
keep it up, just keep a steady role of it at all times.
Senator Potter. Were you placed in a cell in the prison?
Sgt. Weinel. We were placed in one room all together.
Senator Potter. How many in the room?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, at the prison there, when we got to the
prison there was approximately sixty Americans and the rest
were South Koreans. They had us divided off, had all the
Koreans, South Koreans together, and they had most Americans
all together. They had some of them in the room with the South
Koreans but not too many of them.
Senator Potter. In the room you were in, how many were in
the room?
Sgt. Weinel. In the room I was in, I would say there was
about forty.
Senator Potter. It was a very small room?
Sgt. Weinel. I would say about the space of this right
across here [indicating].
Senator Potter. Not much more than ten by ten.
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. That is about what it would
amount to.
Senator Potter. Could you lie down to sleep?
Sgt. Weinel. You could lay down to sleep, yes. It was a
concrete floor. It had been one of the modern buildings there
that had been concrete, and it was a concrete building. It did
have concrete floors, and you slept on the concrete floor, and
a few of us had mats, they brought in some mats, but not enough
to go around. And some of them had to sleep right on the
concrete floor.
Senator Potter. What was your food ration?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, we got--you could either have a rice
ball or the rice soup, whichever one you wanted. They would
give you merely a small bowl. What it was was just the starch
off the rice, the skim off the top of the rice, and if you
happened to get a few grains of rice in it that was fine, but
most of the time they made sure you didn't got too much rice in
there.
Senator Potter. How many times a day were you fed?
Sgt. Weinel. We was fed twice a day. But, as I say, it was
one small rice ball.
Senator Potter. What were the sanitary facilities?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, they had a latrine downstairs.
Downstairs they had a headquarters set up downstairs and the
guard says whenever you wanted to go, one of the guards would
go down with you.
Senator Potter. They would take you?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, and bring us back up.
Senator Potter. You stated you were there about eighteen
days?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What type of interrogation did you receive
there?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, we had one of the boys that could speak
Russian who was with us, in the prison camp.
Senator Potter. One of the boys, is that one of the
prisoners?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes. He could speak Russian, some Russian, and
he was the first one they took out, when they found out he
could speak Russian they took him right up to some of the high
officers, and later on they would come down and take us, or
themselves, in the prison, and would ask us everything about
our own equipment, you know, and they had captured a few of our
new bazookas, and they was wanting there some of our boys to go
and show them how to fire it, the new one. They was wanting the
boys to show them how to fire it. But as far as I know, there
wasn't any of them that showed them how to fire it. Also they
was trying to get ones that knew something about mechanics to
work on their jeeps, what they say would miss, you know, put-
put, in other words missing on them. It was missing on them,
that is what they were trying to tell you, and they wanted to
get the missing out of them, on the jeep. And then--I don't
know exactly the date, around the 28th of September around the
26th of September, rather, we could hear, you know, from the
concrete, sleeping on that concrete floor, you could hear a
dull thud in the far off distance, and we thought the Americans
was moving up. We didn't know for sure but we had an idea that
is what it was. Very next day one of our boys died in the
prison there, he had dysentery, and we had a burial detail out
to bury him and one of our planes come over and dropped
leaflets. They had the scissors cutting across Korea, by Inchon
up there, and so we knew then that they had made a landing up
above us. Then along towards that evening, some of their troops
was going south, coming from the north, and they was really
beat, so we know darn well that the Americans had landed and
was pushing, was on the push. So as soon as them leaflets come,
as they dropped them leaflets, they doubled our guards on us,
doubled our guards right then. We started getting mortar fire,
I mean artillery in the town, and that is when they started
moving. They started moving out then.
That night, a lot of rumpus was there, you could tell they
was moving furniture and everything. About four o'clock in the
morning they come up and woke everybody up and told us we were
going to Seoul, that they was taking us to Seoul, that we would
have blankets and everything in Seoul, that they was going to
take us all to Seoul. So we could see through the window, and
they had a partition in the building on the side where the
South Koreans were and we could see them, they was tying them
all up, tying all their hands together. After they got all
their hands together they took them outside and it was shortly
after that we heard rifle fire. It wasn't too long until here
they was coming back up for us. So we figured then what was
coming off, I mean what they was up to.
Senator Potter. Before you go into that part of it, you
stated that at the prison they gave you certain books to read,
is that true?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Senator Potter. What were the books?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, it was more or less the Communist aims
and their plans. It was more or less their plans of their
government and so forth and so on, like that.
Senator Potter. Did they ever question you, or try to
propagandize you into accepting communism, and that the
Americans were the aggressors?
Sgt. Weinel. They started. They kept questioning us about
why we was fighting, why we would fight and everything like
that. They wanted to know the reason why we fight them, that
they wasn't wanting to fight us but they had to have their
freedom. Of course they was the North Koreans, of course. And
that that is the only way that they could see they could have
freedom, was by fighting the South Koreans, and that we had no
business in it, that we was more or less intruders into the
fight.
They tried to a certain extent, but not too much.
Senator Potter. Can you recall the exact titles of the
books or documents you might have read?
Sgt. Weinel. No, sir; I can't.
Senator potter. That is, at the prison camp.
Sgt. Weinel. I do know, though, that the book had been in
Russian and somebody had interpreted it into English. But a man
would pretty near have to know something about Russian before
he got too much out of it. You would go on and pretty soon you
would find a Russian word that you wouldn't know anything
about.
Senator Potter. You stated in the beginning that they told
you that you were to study an hour a day.
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Senator Potter. Did they ever enforce that?
Sgt. Weinel. No, sir; they never did enforce it.
Senator Potter. Did you have any so-called classes while
you were in the camp?
Sgt. Weinel. No, sir. They were supposed to have them but
for some reason or other they never did start them.
Senator Potter. Were you ever called before any of the
officers there for interrogation?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir. They interrogated all of us there.
Senator Potter. How did they handle you when they
interrogated you? Did they beat you at that time?
Sgt. Weinel. No, they would threaten you. They would
threaten if you don't tell the truth that they would shoot you.
They put that very plainly. They was all the time pointing a
gun at you for some reason or other, if for nothing else for
the fun of it. They try to threaten you with the weapons, yes,
but I don't think many were frightened too much on it because
by that time they were getting pretty well used to having to
look down a rifle barrel. But other than that, they didn't beat
us to that extent, but they did while we was in the prison,
they did, they was constantly beating and hitting somebody.
Senator Potter. You say they allowed a lot of other people
to come in and have sort of a field day?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir. It was more or less like a three-
ring circus, what it was. Of course, I was a little older man
than the rest of the boys and they couldn't get over how long I
had been in the army and not being more than a sergeant. They
said in their army you would be at least a major, if you had
been in the army as long as I had. That is the way they were
working it. I didn't try to explain it to them, sir.
Senator Potter. And when these unauthorized persons or
apparently they were authorized but they were not part of the
prison force, when they would come in, I understand that they
would not only steal your clothes, but they would also beat you
up?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. You see, they hated, for some
reason or other--if you couldn't talk their language, they
would get awful mad at you, and when they got mad they would
start swinging. It is one of those things. One incident in
particular, he is a little joker anyway, he would come in there
and we come to find out he was a captain, equal to one of our
captains, and he was in the tank outfit. He come over to me and
he motioned me to stand up. I stood up and he started jabbering
to me in Korean, and I told him no understand, no savvy, and it
made him mad. He just doubled up his fist and hit me in the
stomach as hard as he could hit me. Naturally, I didn't have
anything on my stomach and I just keeled over. That is one
incident that happened, but it was nothing, because that
happened every day.
Senator Potter. All right, then. You stated that they
started to move out about in the middle of the night?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes. They doubled our guards on us and they
tied us and tied the Americans, tied the Americans six and
seven men to a group. They just had a piece of communication
wire and they would just tie seven men together. Then they
would take them out. Shortly after they left the building, we
would hear another firing. The bunch that was tying us up was
all the time tying. Myself, I kept moving towards the rear.
Every time they would tie some up or anything like that, I
would move back, and I figured if they made a slip I was going
to make a break for it, figuring that it was pretty well to die
making a break for it as to let them take me out and shoot me.
But they didn't make no slips.
Senator Potter. How did they tie you together?
Sgt. Weinel. They tied us together with wire. There is the
scar on my wrist there from the wire they had around me. They
would tie your hands to the wire. They had a string of wire and
they would make a loop in it and stick your wrist in it, and
tighten the wire. They would go to the next man and do the same
thing, whatever it happened to be, the right or left wrist,
whatever they could got a hold of to turn him around. That is
the one they tied into the wire. Towards the last they got
hurrying pretty much, and the group before me, they got us in
both groups downstairs, and I got to watch them shoot the group
just before me. I mean the group that they took out.
Senator Potter. You watched them shoot that other group?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir. The first thing I knew when I
stepped out there was they had M-1 rifles, and armor piercing
ammunition they had captured from the 24th Division when they
was in there before, in Taejon.
Senator Potter. How many men did they have doing the
shooting?
Sgt. Weinel. They had six or seven of them doing the
shooting.
Senator Potter. All with rifles?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; all with rifles. And they had a
ditch dug around the court, the wall inside the prison yard.
They had a ditch dug around this here wall that come up this
way and then up to an ``L'' here.
Senator Potter. An ``L'' shape?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes. And when I stepped out there they had
shot all the South Koreans up in the upper part here, and they
then started on the Americans, finished out up here, and
finished down this way.
Senator Potter. When they were taking them off to this
trench, what would they have them do, just stand there?
Sgt. Weinel. Sit down in the bottom of the trench.
Senator Potter. Sit down in the ditch?
Sgt. Weinel. And the minute they sat down, they would open
up on them. The group I was in, we was sitting, they were
making us sit down, and we just sit down and they opened up on
us. I was sitting down, you know, sitting down in the ditch
with my neck up this way, with my hands on my leg like this,
and like that, and they couldn't have been any more than two
yards away from us, shooting down on top of us. He got me in
the hand, hit my hand. So all of a sudden the firing stopped
and I was still alive. I didn't know just what I should do or
shouldn't do. So I figured well, I better start doing something
or something is going to happen for sure. So I just jumped over
against one of the other men and just laid there. The next
thing I knew I heard shovels, they started burying us then.
They started at the other end of the line and just come on up
and throwed enough dirt on us to cover us up. When that dirt
was coming up towards my head, I come darn near getting
panicky, but I made myself sit there and hope and pray that
they didn't put enough on me to smother me.
Senator Potter. You laid there and they covered you over
with dirt?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; they covered me over with dirt, too.
It was just loose dirt, with enough to cover my head up. I laid
there and after they got through I could breathe through that
loose dirt, enough to get enough air to hold me for a while,
and then after they got us all covered up they come back over
again and took care of any of them that moved, any personnel
that moved. They would finish them off then, give them a
finishing shot. They was ready to take off. They left us to the
last thing to take care of. They was all ready to go, they had
everything ready to go to move out of town and left us for the
last thing to take care of, They was burning the records there.
That is the only light they had, when they was burning the
records there.
Senator Potter. We have some photographs here, Sergeant.
They were taken apparently from that same camp. Can you
identify the photograph [presented to witness]?
Do those look like the trenches you were put in?
Sgt. Weinel. No, sir; this isn't it, sir.
Senator Potter. That is not it?
Sgt. Weinel. I don't believe so, wait a minute, let me make
sure. This looks like it here.
Mr. O'Donnell. Check the number on the back of it, will
you?
Sgt. Weinel. It is in the same order as this, yes, just a
deep ditch. I believe the ditch I was in was a little deeper
than that, at least a little deeper than that.
Senator Potter. It was a deeper ditch than this?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Senator Potter. This could possibly be the ditch where the
Koreans were in?
Sgt. Weinel. It could be, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. All this while you were still bound
together by this wire?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And after they buried you over and then
they went back, if there was any movement they shot again.
Apparently you were pretty quiet and that one shot was all----
Sgt. Weinel. I decided not to move at all.
Senator Potter. And you showed good judgment.
Sgt. Weinel. I guess it was for about a half hour, I didn't
move at all and finally I had to get more air and so I moved my
head until I got a hole down to my nose. It looked like a
pencil nose, what it looked like, from where I was at it looked
like a pencil hole, you know. Where somebody stuck a pencil
through the dirt. I stayed that way, I guess for about two
hours, until I made sure that they were gone. When I didn't
hear too much movement or anything, I got my head out, stuck my
head out, and I stayed that way until night. After dark I tried
to dig my way out but I couldn't dig my way out at all. I had
too much dirt that I couldn't throw away. This hand here was
tied with these other follows and I couldn't get it loose, and
on this one the flesh was just hanging from the back of it,
where they busted it all up.
Senator Potter. Did you say your back was broken?
Sgt. Weinel. The back of my hand, you can see it there.
Senator Potter. How did that happen, Sergeant?
Sgt. Weinel. That happened there, with the shot.
Senator Potter. That was when you were shot.
Sgt. Weinel. It struck my neck with one, in my collar bone,
but the only real damage was to my hand. I mean it just barely
broke the skin on my collar bone and neck. But when it hit my
hand it shattered all the bone on this side of my hand. Of
course it busted out the whole back of my hand and that was the
only hand I had free that I could dig with. I dug out as much
as I could, but I couldn't dig out enough dirt to keep from
sliding back in on me, or throw it far enough away from me.
So I stayed in that position all that day, and all that
night, and the next day I got hurting pretty bad, I had managed
to get on my knees but I couldn't get my weight off my legs.
All of my weight was resting right on the back of my toes. I
managed to get up enough to where I could get sitting up but I
couldn't get out, because one of these bodies was pinned across
my legs. I couldn't move him to get the rest of the weight up.
If I could have moved him I could have gotten up and got
out myself. But I got to hurting so bad, so I started hollering
for help. One of the boys said to holler [?]. That is the only
thing I know in Korean. I started hollering it and as luck
would have it some South Koreans found me. They was pretty slow
about getting me out, of course. Bodies was all around me and I
was down in all them bodies, and it took them quite a while to
get me out of there, Besides that, our planes was working over
Taejon pretty good about that time, too. Their women folks had
those white aprons and they was flagging to our planes.
Senator Potter. Because the enemy had left at that time?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, they had left by that time. But they had
been running patrols back into the town. The enemy had been
running patrols back into the town. But most of the main forces
had taken off from the town, yes. They had taken off from the
town. They took and hid me out for, I guess it was a day or two
days, I don't remember which one it was, the South Koreans hid
me for two days in one of the houses, until the Americans came
in. Major Jones from the 24th Division was the first man to me,
when I was liberated. Then I went through the normal procedure
of coming back to the hospitals, and I spent about eight weeks
in Japan, recuperating there before they sent me on.
I want to Camp Atterbury Hospital, at Camp Atterbury, and
stayed there until I was released, which was in January 1952.
Senator Potter. What is your medical rating now, Sergeant?
Sgt. Weinel. I have a U-3 profile, sir. That is upper
injuries and the hand. Other than that, I am in pretty good
shape, except for my legs. My legs--I can't stand too much
walking any more. I don't know whether it was caused by the
pressure on my legs or what it is, but I can't do the walking I
used to do. But other than that, my physical condition is in
good shape.
Senator Potter. You are not a good man for a twenty-mile
hike?
Sgt. Weinel. I think I would have to pass that up.
Mr. O'Donnell. How long would you figure you were actually
buried alive?
Sgt. Weinel. I would say just for about two hours, sir. It
would be longer than that, it was two hours that I stayed
without moving at all, about an hour before I moved any at all,
and then I got the pencil hole. I would say it was about six
hours.
Mr. O'Donnell. Six hours all told?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, because it was early in the morning and I
waited until that evening before I come out. It would be six or
eight hours at least.
Mr. O'Donnell. Sergeant, how many American prisoners were
taken out in groups of seven that were tied and shot that day?
Sgt. Weinel. I don't have any idea, sir. There was sixty
Americans, and forty South Koreans in the prison where I was
at. And to my knowledge, as I heard later on from different
sources, another bunch, a group about two miles from there,
there was three hundred of them in there and not a man came out
alive, out of three hundred.
Senator Potter. Not a man came out alive?
Sgt. Weinel. Not a man.
Senator Potter. And as far as you know, you are the only
man from there?
Sgt. Weinel. I came out and a little Pfc came out with me.
He was from New York. But he died two hours after we was back
in American hands.
Senator Potter. Did you know him when you were trying to
get out?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, he was way up at the other end, sir. But
we did holler back and forth to one another, when we dared to,
just enough to find out who he was and he found out who I was.
But other than that, when I started yelling for help, he was
starting to holler, too.
Senator Potter. You say he died soon after that?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; he died two hours after he was in
American hands.
Mr. O'Donnell. That number, sixty Americans PW's, is that a
pretty firm number in your mind?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir. You see, they had a chart on the
inside of the prison with all of our names on it, and would
count how many of them. It would run around sixty.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know anything about any other than
South Koreans and American PW's that were killed?
Sgt. Weinel. That is the only one I saw. Like I say, about
two miles from there there was some. I heard it was a church, I
heard it was a church and I heard the other three hundred were
massacred there, mixed Americans and South Koreans, both.
Senator Potter. Any others?
Sgt. Weinel. I don't know for sure. That is just hearsay.
Mr. Carr. Sergeant, when you finally did get up with the
help of the South Koreans, was it at night at that time?
Sgt. Weinel. No, it was daytime.
Mr. Carr. Did you at that time get a chance to look around
and see the extent of the ditches in the area, how big this
``L'' ditch was?
Sgt. Weinel. No, I didn't. They made a stretcher and got me
out of there as soon as possible because they were afraid the
enemy would come back into the village.
Mr. Carr. One other thing, Sergeant: You were wounded
before you were captured.
Sgt. Weinel. That is right.
Mr. Carr. So that at the time you were captured you already
had a wound in your leg and hip, I think?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right.
Mr. Carr. And then you sustained these additional wounds in
your hand and shoulder or collarbone?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Mr. Carr. All the time during this march you had no
treatment? Until you were taken back to the Americans, you had
had no treatment for any of these wounds?
Sgt. Weinel. No, I didn't have any treatment for any of the
wounds, only what I could find, you know. I found clean clothes
in some of these houses we would stay in, and I used that to
bandage my own wounds but other than that there was no medical
care at all.
Mr. Carr. At the time you were noticing through this
opening that the South Koreans were being tied together and
taken out and subsequently you would hear shots, it was very
obvious to you that the evacuation of that particular area was
taking place?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right.
Mr. Carr. And along with this?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. They had their packs already
packed, the rice bags hanging to their packs and so forth and
so on.
Mr. Carr. So what would appear to be their last official
act in evacuating the town was to massacre the remaining
prisoners?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. We had a few wounded men that
couldn't even walk and after they took all of us out that could
walk, they went back up and carried them down and throwed them
in the ditch, just bodily threw them down there in the ditch
and shot them.
Senator Potter. And they then shot them?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Senator Potter. Did you witness any of them being hit in
the head with any objects to kill them that way, or to finish
them off?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, I imagine shovels, they used the shovels
to a certain extent, yes.
Senator Potter. When they would shove them in, they would
hit them?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes. Because out of the whole bunch that was
shot there, I never heard one man ask for mercy, none of them
did. In fact, there was one of the boys that wasn't hit good
and he even asked them to give him another. Out of that many
men, no man cracked, I thought that was quite unusual.
Senator Potter. It certainly is.
There is a photograph here that was in the War Crime
Commission report. I am wondering if you might identify that
trench.
Sgt. Weinel. This is it right here. I will never forget
that as long as I live.
Mr. O'Donnell. We have a positive identification on this.
Sgt. Weinel. And I come out about right down in here, I
think, my location [indicating].
Mr. Carr. Sergeant, there is no question, then, in your
mind, that this was an official act?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. It come from a higher up some
place. The only man mostly that we got to see was one fellow
they called Sarge. I don't know him. He was a regular Korean
soldier. The guards was all civilians, civilian guards. But
every once in a while this here fellow they called the sergeant
would come in and check us over and ask us a few questions and
so forth and so on, like that. I think he was the man that was
in charge of us.
Mr. Carr. If this was an official act of international
communism, I don't suppose, then, you have any great admiration
for American communism?
Sgt. Weinel. Not a bit, sir. No use whatsoever.
Senator Potter. Have you ever been contacted since you have
been home by Communists?
Sgt. Weinel. No, sir; I haven't, sir. My wife has been
scared of the thing ever since I come home. She thought maybe
they might try and got a hold of me there, but they never did.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, after all you have gone through,
I do not think you have anything to worry about.
Sgt. Weinel. I am not scared of them, anyway.
Senator Potter. You mentioned that one of the GI's spoke
Russian and they used him or took him out for an interview
first.
Sgt. Weinel. That is right.
Senator Potter. Do you recall, was he returned to the unit?
Sgt. Weinel. He was returned to the prison, yes.
Senator Potter. Was he shot with the rest of them?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, he was shot with the rest of them. We had
a few of them collaborate with them, a few of the prisoners,
and they still shot them, too, right along with the rest of us.
Senator Potter. You had some that tried to play ball with
them?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Senator Potter. As I understand, the prison was in charge
of civilians.
Sgt. Weinel. That is right.
Senator Potter. But you had some military people as well?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, the headquarters they had downstairs was
all military.
Senator Potter. All military?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Senator Potter. Who was in charge?
Sgt. Weinel. That is what I say. I think this sergeant, he
was a fellow they called the sergeant. He seemed to be one that
was in charge of the prisoners, and also of the guards that
guarded the prisoners. But when they doubled the guards, they
put army guards on us then, army guards with the civilians.
Senator Potter. Who did the shooting? Was it army personnel
or civilian personnel?
Sgt. Weinel. Both, sir.
Senator Potter. Both?
Sgt. Weinel. Both, yes, sir. One thing I might say, too, on
that, in the prison there they had what you call these
meetings, they had these big high official meetings, and they
would have a speaker come and speak to them. Boy, he would give
them--he had a line of propaganda. We couldn't understand
anything he said, but according to the men's actions when they
left that meeting, it was pretty inspiring to them, you know.
It was very inspiring to them.
Senator Potter. Now, those were meetings of the civilian
personnel at the prison?
Sgt. Weinel. To the military. No, their own military.
Senator Potter. Their own military.
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; their own military personnel.
Senator Potter. And after these meetings they would be
pretty well charged?
Sgt. Weinel. They would come out of there like nobody's
business.
Senator Potter. And as a result of those meetings and what
actually happened, there can be no doubt in your mind, then,
that this was a planned command action?
Sgt. Weinel. That is right.
Senator Potter. It wasn't just a result of some local
commander?
Sgt. Weinel. No. Because as I say, they had everything
ready to go, everything was ready to go and they left us to the
last thing to take care of. They even had soldiers waiting
around there to move out, with their full gear on. They just
left us to the last detail to take care of.
Mr. Carr. Do you recall whether or not there was one of
these haranguing meetings to their military personnel shortly
before this action?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, there had been.
Mr. Carr. Is your memory fresh enough on that after this
experience to recall whether or not it was just shortly before,
any idea about how long before?
Sgt. Weinel. Well, about every three days they had a
meeting, sir, about every three days.
Mr. Carr. Do you recall whether or not they had this type
of meeting on the day it happened?
Sgt. Weinel. Not on the day it happened, no.
Mr. Carr. Not on the day it happened?
Sgt. Weinel. No.
Mr. Carr. Do you remember whether it was the day before?
Sgt. Weinel. The day before. I think they had one the day
before.
Mr. O'Donnell. That becomes very important, Sergeant. Can
you be sure that it was the day before that they had a meeting
of this nature?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes, sir; I am almost positive it was the day
before, I know it wasn't the day, the night--like today and the
night, it wasn't like that. It was the day before that.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was the highest ranking officer that
you saw while you were in the prison?
Sgt. Weinel. I don't know too much about their rank, sir,
but there was four of these stars across here. I don't know
what their rank is.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, the reason that this is important
is the fact that evidence has been secured, starting the 26th
or 27th, that practically all over South Korea at that time the
North Koreans were killing their PW's. So it had to be a
command order rather than just a prison order.
Sgt. Weinel. That is right. Because up until that time they
wouldn't let any of them shoot us, but they could beat us all
they wanted to. They didn't care about beating us at all. Of
course, the guards they threatened to shoot you a few times
every once in a while, but that was just a more or less
everyday occurrence.
Mr. Carr. But you did find out, after you were rescued--
that may not be the word, but after you were taken from the
ditch by the South Koreans, you did find out that there had
been a similar incident about two miles away?
Sgt. Weinel. Yes.
Mr. Carr. And in which you had heard, at least, there were
three hundred persons?
Sgt. Weinel. Three hundred South Koreans and Americans
both.
Senator Potter. Well, thank you kindly, Sergeant. We will
probably have your public testimony some time Wednesday.
Colonel Hanley? Colonel, we would be interested in getting
your observations. You heard some of the experiences that the
men have testified to this morning and this afternoon. I know
that you were in on this war crimes atrocities from the very
beginning. I would appreciate your giving your observations as
you see fit to present them. I would like, first, to have you
comment on the Taejon massacre that was just mentioned.
TESTIMONY OF COL. JAMES M. HANLEY, U.S. ARMY, CAMP ATTENBURY,
INDIANA
Col. Hanley. I haven't had an opportunity to----
Senator Potter. Colonel, first would you identify yourself
for the record?
Col. Hanley. James M. Hanley, Colonel, United States Army,
stationed at Camp Attenbury.
Senator Potter. Where is your home?
Col. Hanley. Mandan, North Dakota.
The Taejon massacre is, as you were told and are well
acquainted with, is well documented. It was one of the larger
cases and one of the very early ones that we ran into and was
worked on over a period of many, many months, in securing
affidavits and photographic evidence that you have, the details
of which I have not yet had a chance to refresh myself on at
this time.
There were those killed in the prison as has been
mentioned, and also a warehouse, I am quite certain it was,
where some three hundred or something in that neighborhood,
were also killed. As far as I can recall, I do not think there
were any survivors out of that second three hundred group.
Senator Potter. You think they were all killed?
Col. Hanley. I think they were all killed. And as you know,
there were one or two survivors out of the jail. Whether or not
these things were done under orders of Korean higher
headquarters of the North Korean army, I don't know. There is
nothing in the record, at least there wasn't by the time I left
the war crimes section, to indicate that any orders to that
effect had been issued.
But as Mr. O'Donnell has stated, the fact that these things
took place around the same time, on the 27th of September, when
the North Koreans were retreating, would give some credence to
the thought that there must have been some plan, something that
came down, from higher headquarters as to the disposition made
of the prisoners. I know that at Mokdow, which is over on the
southwest coast, way down in the corner of Korea, that there
was large massacres of civilians, and there is quite a detailed
story in the files as to a meeting held by the jailers and
North Korean army personnel, the civilian personnel, who were
at the jail and in Mokdow at that time. It is a very
interesting story, if you can get a hold of it, to read. There
this meeting was set up for the purpose of discussing what to
do with the prisoners. The matter of taking them with them was
quickly disposed of as being impractical. They realized they
couldn't do that. The other alternative of disposing of them in
some manner was the only other thing discussed. It is rather
surprising to read that document, that story, and realize that
no one suggested the possibility of just leaving them or
abandoning them or turning them loose. That was not even
mentioned.
Senator Potter. That was not an alternative?
Col. Hanley. That was not an alternative that was discussed
or suggested.
Senator Potter. And those were civilians?
Col. Hanley. Those were South Korean civilians. They
disposed over those civilians over a period of about three
days, taking them in large groups out to a coal mine up in the
mountains and shooting them and taking some to an airfield and
shooting them there.
Senator Potter. Did this include women as well as men?
Col. Hanley. Yes, sir; it included women as well as men,
too.
Senator Potter. When did that take place?
Col. Hanley. When?
Senator Potter. Yes.
Col. Hanley. About this same general time. A great number
of those war crimes took place in the withdrawal of the North
Korean forces into North Korea. So far as we know, that is. Of
course, there are many others that took place while they were
in South Korea, and afterwards. But in many cases it wouldn't
be discovered. I think one reason that we know about so many in
that period is that we discovered them immediately.
Senator Potter. You came right through, yes.
Col. Hanley. We came through and discovered them. Mokdow is
also one of the cases in which we had very extensive
investigation. I had investigators over there at Mokdow for
many weeks, going into that particular case.
Senator Potter. Can you give us the information you secured
concerning the so-called death march from----
Mr. O'Donnell. That was the Seoul death march, that was the
principal one, and the secondary would be the Sunchon massacre,
and the other would be about thirty miles north of the Sunchon
Tunnel, a general picture, if you will.
Col. Hanley. From the case files, that whole story is a
little confused because a lot of that comes from North Korean
prisoners whom we had captured, who participated or knew about
it, who had been in on the marches, a lot came from survivors.
The average survivor would know just a little bit. Sometimes
the story is a little confusing, sometimes dates are wrong, you
can't be too sure. So the story, unless it can be verified in
talking with people from little switch and and big switch,
unless that can be clarified, the story is confusing.
But the fact that there was such a death march, the fact
that they were forced on these marches at rapid speeds, under
severe guards who wouldn't put up with any lagging and so
forth, is well established.
How many died I don't think anyone will ever know. It is
impossible to get at the number. But the men did receive
severe, harsh treatment, and they certainly had a lot of
casualties. Some of them probably natural. With some of them
their physical condition wore out on them and they finally
died, others were killed, shot, some perhaps trying to escape,
but it was a very severe march.
Mr. O'Donnell. Colonel, taking the Seoul march, from whence
did the American PW's originate that participated in that
march, from one point or several points?
Col. Hanley. There in a big prison in Seoul, where they had
assembled a large number of American prisoners. They marched
them north to Pyongyang. They collected them, of course, from
the Pusan area up until the time of the breakdown.
Mr. O'Donnell. According to the army records, based on the
affidavits, there were 396 American PW's who started out on the
march. I believe that is the accurate figure. And they ended up
at Pyongyang with 316. So they lost eighty men enroute. Do you
have any comments on those figures, and the causes of death
developed by investigation by members of your staff?
Col. Hanley. Well, I wouldn't at this point, without going
back and checking those files, want to go into the details of
that. I know my memory is that in some cases they were killed,
shot. In other cases they probably died from exposure and
wounds and so forth.
Mr. O'Donnell. Briefly, our problem is this: As I mentioned
before, Colonel, and we took you by surprise, I know, on the
Taejon massacre, the request I would like to make is that you
do do a little research, if you can, tomorrow, on case twenty-
eight, which is the massacre case, to give us a general picture
based on the investigative file in the possession of the army.
I know it is hearsay, but is information that has been----
Col. Hanley. Well, it is information I was responsible for
gathering, initial records.
Mr. O'Donnell. You were in charge at that time. I would
like to touch briefly on the approximate number, and I know it
cannot be put down to a definite figure, the number of
civilians killed. There is an indication it was one to five
thousand South Koreans killed at the same time. We would also
like to request that you go into cases seventy-five, seventy-
six and sixty-three, and as to figures on causes of death and
so forth. Because although we have some survivors, we can not
bring in the complete picture as I indicated to you this
morning and have it correlated in essay form. If you can
portray those pictures for us, we would very much appreciate
it, because it would be the background and it would alert the
American public as to what was coming, and then these other
fellows that went through these atrocities can actually get up
and tell their stories from a life standpoint. Can you do that
for us?
Col. Hanley. Yes, sir; very good.
Mr. O'Donnell. The other point would be, and it is a most
important one, if you could have--I am sure you can get a lift
on it--brought in, and it is going a little outside of our
actual survivor testimony, the other areas in which these
atrocities were occurring, around September 25, 26, 27 and 28,
which would indicate a definite overall plan. As you said,
there was no alternative of leaving them. It is in point with
what we are doing, although we will have no life survivors
because it involves South Korean civilians. But we would like
to develop from the dates in those cases to indicate fairly
conclusively that there was a definite pattern established by
the Chinese and North Korean command, probably North Korean, to
liquidate rather than to evacuate or leave. Could you go into
that for us?
Col. Hanley. I certainly will. I kept, when I was chief of
the War Crimes Section of the Eighth Army, a monthly--well, I
had these figures compiled by months. There was a big peak in
September. Now, whether that information is assembled over here
and whether the War Crimes Section at the Pentagon has that, I
don't know. But I certainly will attempt to find out and if it
hasn't, to try to reassemble some of that information.
It is very obvious that the big peak in numbers of victims
was in September of 1950.
Mr. O'Donnell. Of course we are primarily concerned with a
pattern. As I indicated this morning, we intend to use
Lieutenant Colonel Todd to give the overall picture from the
organization, plus statistical data to the present day. We
would be interested in statistics, but not in each and every
case. We are interested in the pattern as a planned operation
at that time.
Senator Potter. When you were with the War Crimes
Commission, did you make reports to General MacArthur? He was
commanding general at that time?
Col. Hanley. Yes, sir. He was Far East commander.
Senator Potter. Did you make your reports to General
MacArthur?
Col. Hanley. We did a report to the Far East command which
went to the judge advocate's office of the Far East command,
which in turn was utilized by General MacArthur's staff, to
send the same figures that went into the United Nations report.
It was a monthly report made by General MacArthur to the United
Nations. Those figures contain all the statistics on the number
of victims as of that time.
Senator Potter. What we thought we would do, Colonel, would
be to have you give that picture and then to have, as Mr.
O'Donnell said, some of the men who experienced certain
atrocities, or with eye witness accounts of such atrocities,
either on the march or at those places, amplify from the
specific atrocities that were committed. I think your
background coming first and then with their experiences, would
give a better picture for somebody who is not familiar with the
program.
So I hope we can plan on that. Our public hearings will
begin Wednesday morning. I don't know just when we will have
you, but I assume you will probably on Wednesday.
Thank you very much, Colonel.
Private Martin?
TESTIMONY OF PFC JOHN E. MARTIN, 359 ENGINEER AVIATION SUPPLY
POINT COMPANY, BORDEAUX, FRANCE
Senator Potter. Will you help yourself to a chair.
Will you identify yourself for the record, giving your full
name and your present unit?
Pfc Martin. Pfc John E. Martin, 359 Engineer Aviation
Supply Point Company.
Senator Potter. Where is that located?
Pfc Martin. Bordeaux, France.
Senator Potter. You are back in France?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. You do not feel too unkindly toward us for
bringing you away from France?
Pfc Martin. No, it didn't hurt.
Senator Potter. What is your home address?
Pfc Martin. 590 East Lewiston, Ferndale, Michigan.
Senator Potter. I want to compliment you on coming from my
state.
Would you tell the committee when you went to Korea and
with what unit?
Pfc Martin. I landed at Pusan the 20th of July with the
29th Regimental Combat Team.
Senator Potter. And when were you captured? Will you tell
the committee some of the particulars on how you were captured?
Pfc Martin. I was captured the 31st of July at Chinju.
Senator Potter. Can you point that out on the map?
Pfc Martin. I don't know whether I can or not.
Senator Potter. Is that near the perimeter?
Pfc Martin. I walked all over this place but I never looked
at a map of it. Here it is, right here [indicating].
Senator Potter. What were the circumstances of your
capture?
Pfc Martin. Well, we were retreating pretty rapidly, losing
a lot of ground for ten days that I was there, and we had a
battle, on the 27th at Haedong, and ever since then the outfit
had been more or less split up. We weren't operating too
closely under battalion headquarters. We were, but we were
spread over such a thin line of communications----
Senator Potter. You were pretty much on your own?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir; just about.
Senator Potter. What was your duty with the company?
Pfc Martin. A rifleman, sir.
Senator Potter. Were you operating pretty much as a company
unit or platoon unit?
Pfc Martin. We were actually down to squad level. Our
platoon had four hills to hold in an engagement. The order came
down to retreat but there didn't seem to be any well led plan
for the retreat and during it our squad was separated from the
rest of the platoon. So we reported to battalion headquarters.
We got in there about six o'clock in the evening. That was in
Chinju. They were evacuating all the wounded, burning the
records, getting ready to move out. They told us to go upstairs
and sleep with the I&R platoon in their billet and if they came
up and called these people not to bother falling out because
they would be going on patrol, but when they came to get us, we
had to be ready to move. They came up about two o'clock in the
morning and told us to get ready, and we got on a truck. I
thought we were going south but we didn't. They put us on a
hill and told us not to fire at any troops on the roads because
it was our battalion retreating. We sat there all night long
and the sun came out in the morning and the gooks were walking
down the road. Somebody forgot to put a checkpoint there.
Senator Potter. Your unit had gone by?
Pfc Martin. The battalion had gone by and the North Korean
army had been going by all night long. And they didn't know we
were up there and we didn't know they were there. We clobbered
them for a little while. But my squad was the only regular
infantry there.
The rest of them were truck drivers they just grabbed
because they needed them in a hurry and people like that. We
didn't have any machine guns or bazookas or anything. We had a
fire fight until about 12:30 that afternoon, and this one
sergeant called attention to the fact that there was help
coming, there were some tanks coming from Chinju. But they were
North Korean tanks. They kind of leveled the hill out. So about
four o'clock that afternoon there wasn't very many of us left,
and they kept yelling up for surrender, surrender.
This one little guy in a raincoat, a lieutenant, he would
stick his head out and yell ``Hey, GI,'' and a couple of
strange words, I don't know whether you want them, ``come down
and surrender,'' and then stick his head back in.
Senator Potter. That was a North Korean?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. Nobody else was firing, and I was
beginning to get a little worried. He yelled at me a couple of
times, and shot around my hole a little too close. So I yelled
at the guy to throw me a grenade, a buddy of mine.
This hill was a Korean graveyard and they had little mounds
all over. He was on the other side of this mound. He was going
to throw me one. The grenade landed on the side of my hole, and
I picked it up and looked at it. It didn't have a pin or a
handle on it. I threw it away but the concussion got me a
minute. The next thing I knew a guy was standing there and this
lieutenant was yelling surrender. So I didn't have a chance.
Senator Potter. How many were captured at that time?
Pfc Martin. Three of us. There were more men on the hill,
and when they got the three of us at the bottom they said to
tell the others to come out. We said there wasn't any others,
and he said, ``Yes, there is plenty up there.'' We said there
wasn't any. He yelled up there again, and said, ``Look, these
guys are here, and we are not shooting them. Come on out.''
A couple of wounded guys came out and they shot them.
Senator Potter. Shot them as they were trying to give
themselves up?
Pfc Martin. As they were trying to give themselves up.
Senator Potter. Then what happened?
Pfc Martin. They took us into this aid station of theirs
and there was two more Americans in there. We stayed in there
for about an hour and they threatened us and waved guns at us
and all of that stuff and finally told us to come outside, and
they made us line up. So we lined up and I guess everybody
thought they were going to do it right then but they didn't.
They marched us into Chinju.
Senator Potter. How far were you from Chinju?
Pfc Martin. Three miles, sir. We met seven more Americans
there.
Senator Potter. During this time did they beat you at all?
Pfc Martin. Just slapped us around a little bit, sir. They
were pretty teed off at us at the time. They just took us into
Chinju and a man met us and said he was from the International
Red Cross. He was a Korean, he had a little red arm band on,
and he told us we would be given all the consideration under
the Geneva Conference and all of this stuff, and let us make a
litter for one man that was pretty badly shot up. In fact, two
of the guards even helped us carry the litter for a couple of
blocks there.
They took us in front of this big house in Chinju, and he
told us that we would be given food and billets there. We ended
up where we slept out in the yard in front of this place. We
had about four little rice crackers apiece for our food. We
never did see him again. I don't know what happened to him.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether he was a representative
of the Red Cross?
Pfc Martin. He didn't show any identification. I don't
believe he was, personally. I didn't have any way of knowing.
Senator Potter. He just wore a little red cross arm band?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. I think he was just for propaganda
purposes. We left the next morning for the march to Taejon.
Senator Potter. How many of you were in that group all
together?
Pfc Martin. At that time there were twelve of us, sir. I
don't know exactly how long it took us to get to Taejon, to
tell you the truth.
Senator Potter. It is quite a way, isn't it?
Pfc Martin. It is a pretty good way, sir.
Senator Potter. About how far would you say it would be in
miles?
Pfc Martin. As the crow flies it may not be very far, but
it is a pretty good distance walking up and down hills and
around curves and so on, and we went cross country a good part
of the way anyway.
Senator Potter. You do not recall how long it took you?
Pfc Martin. No, sir, I believe it took us about five days.
Senator Potter. About five days?
Pfc Martin. We didn't travel too fast the first five days.
Senator Potter. Did you travel day and night?
Pfc Martin. Just at night, sir.
Senator Potter. Then what would they do with you during the
day? Put you in houses or what?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir, in a house. And once they hid us in a
big drainage ditch.
Senator Potter. A drainage ditch?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. During that march how many guards did you
have for the twelve of you?
Pfc Martin. I think we had about eight, sir.
Senator Potter. About eight guards for twelve men?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were any of you wounded?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. There were, I believe, seven out of
twelve wounded.
Senator Potter. Did they receive any medical attention?
Pfc Martin. No. They let us clean them up as best we could,
and a couple of us had our first aid packs left, and they let
us put those on the men. But actually as far as any drug or any
real medical treatment there wasn't any at all.
Senator Potter. What happened during the march? Did the
guards beat you at all?
Pfc Martin. The guards, sir, the first ones we had until we
got to Taejon, didn't treat us too badly.
Senator Potter. Were these military guards or civilian
guards?
Pfc Martin. They were soldiers. They were part of the
organization, the regiment, that we had been fighting, and I
imagine they were quite happy to get away from the fighting.
They were living off the fat of the land and any time they
wanted something off South Korea, they took it. If they wanted
something, we would stop at a house and they would have the
people kill a pig or something like that and didn't treat us
too badly.
Senator Potter. Did you share in their loot?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And then after you got to Taejon what
happened?
Pfc Martin. We stayed there--when we first got there, there
was quite a large group of prisoners there. Major McDaniel was
there, and I believe, I am not sure, but I believe there were
about sixty men there.
Mr. O'Donnell. I don't believe the major is living any
more. We will have to eliminate that name in public.
Senator Potter. This was a regular prison or prison camp?
Pfc Martin. I believe it was the upstairs of the old police
station. I may be wrong, but I think it was the same building
that the sergeant stayed in.
Senator Potter. How long were you there?
Pfc Martin. We were there about five days, sir. While I was
there that is the first time I ever really ran into the type of
brutality or anything. On the way up there to Taejon, the
reason it taken us so long was we had to travel across country
to get away from their troops coming down at night, because
they would just make a punch bag out of you all the way up the
roads as you passed.
Senator Potter. So they took you across country?
Pfc Martin. To keep us away from that. But when we got to
Taejon is when they first claimed they were going to give
medical aid, they took one man over and cut his leg off. I
wasn't there when the actual operation took place, but the
medico was there that is alive today, and he said they did not
give the man any anesthetic at all. And people were beginning
to die then of dysentery. Those people had been there three
weeks or so before we got there.
Senator Potter. When you arrived, they had some PW's that
had been there for three or four weeks?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. You stated that there was a good deal of
brutality at this prison. What form did that take?
Pfc Martin. Well, usually, sir, it was stealing. I had a
pair of pretty good boots. When I got to Taejon they told me I
better cut them up or do something, because if I didn't the
Koreans would take them. They had already taken my cigarettes,
watch and everything when they got me. I didn't have a chance
to cut them up. I went downstairs to the latrine and there was
a little guard down there and he saw my boots and started
sticking at me with a bayonet and told me he wanted the boots
or told the interpreter and the interpreter told me. I didn't
want to give him the boots and he jabbered some more and hit me
on the leg with the rifle.
The interpreter said I better give them to him. Finally he
told the interpreter if I didn't give him the boots, he would
stick me with the bayonet. I asked the interpreter if he really
would do it, and he said personally he thought he would. So I
gave him the boots. I wear a size ten boot, and that man wore a
size five, probably, in ours. He gave me his for mine.
Senator Potter. Did you get them on at all?
Pfc Martin. I had to cut the toes out of them. I still have
the scars on my feet today where my feet stuck out about that
far from the end of the boot. But I had no choice. I had to
wear something for my feet. Walking on those rocks would tear
your foot to pieces.
Senator Potter. While you were there, were you
interrogated?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What questions did they ask you?
Pfc Martin. At that time they weren't really interested in
military information. At least they didn't bother me too much.
Maybe it was because I was only a private. They wanted my name,
rank, serial number and organization, and I told them I was
with the 999 Smoke Company, or something, I don't know what it
was. It was some outfit that wasn't even there. We had already
been told when we got into Taejon that they know every outfit
in Korea, and just to give them some phony name, something that
couldn't help them. But at the same time if you didn't give
them something, they would beat you until they got some answer.
Senator Potter. Did they ask you about your home life, what
your father did?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir; they wanted to know whether my father
was a worker or capitalist. I told him he was an electrician
and that seemed to make them happy. I don't know, they said
they were looking for reactionaries. They wanted us to be
Communists and sing all these Communist songs. But one thing,
they couldn't make us do that because they were all in Korean
and we couldn't speak it.
Senator Potter. You couldn't do it anyway?
Pfc Martin. No, sir; not if we wanted to.
Senator Potter. Did they have any publications, magazines
or books that they required you to read?
Pfc Martin. They forced some pamphlets on us, but that is
all. We didn't get any books at all there. We did get a
lecture. This guy came around. I believe the people that were
there before had said he had been there before, and in fact he
told us he would be around again this week. He came up there
and yelled and ranted and raved for about an hour, how we were
all Wall Street imperialists, and slaves of the capitalists,
and finally this lieutenant stood up and asked him if we were
slaves how come we had cars and refrigerators and they were
still running around with lice in their hair.
Senator Potter. What did he say?
Pfc Martin. The guard slapped the lieutenant down pretty
hard.
Senator Potter. Was this lecturer a Korean?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did he speak good English?
Pfc Martin. Very good, sir. He was in civilian clothes but
he acted like he was a military man. I don't know, just the
appearance, you know, of a professional soldier more than
anything else.
Senator Potter. I assume this prison was under the
jurisdiction of civilians, is that true?
Pfc Martin. No, sir; this wasn't.
Senator Potter. This was under military control?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir; under military jurisdiction.
Senator Potter. And you were there approximately five days?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What transpired? How did you happen to
move? How did that happen?
Pfc Martin. Well, they always talked----
Senator Potter. Before we go into that, while you were in
prison were any of our men killed?
Pfc Martin. While I was there?
Senator Potter. Yes.
Pfc Martin. No. We had some died.
Senator Potter. But none were shot?
Pfc Martin. None were shot, no, sir.
Senator Potter. And they died of dysentery?
Pfc Martin. Dysentery, and when I got back, I found out a
good deal died from hepatitis, yellow jaundice. We all had it
pretty bad when we got back.
Senator Potter. Was medical treatment available? You
mentioned this amputation.
Pfc Martin. Well, a doctor came in, at least he came in and
claimed he was a doctor, and went around and asked people what
was wrong with them. You could tell him what was wrong and he
would just nod his head. He spoke fairly good English, but he
never did anything, he never gave out any medicine, never gave
anybody any advice or anything, but would just turn around and
leave. He came back a few days later. The Koreans seemed to
delight in telling us that they were sticking to the Geneva
Conferences, that doctors were coming around. We asked them
about food and they said they only have to feed us twice a day
under the Geneva Convention because we were not working. They
were feeding us twice a day, a rice ball.
Senator Potter. How big is a rice ball?
Pfc Martin. About as big as your fist.
Senator Potter. What is it, just a ball of rice?
Pfc Martin. It is a ball of rice steamed and then just
packed together. It is rice and millet, usually. I don't know,
I think they use some barley in them.
Senator Potter. Are you fond of rice today?
Pfc Martin. No, sir. I don't like it.
Senator Potter. What happened then? Go on into how you
happened to leave the prison.
Pfc Martin. I don't know. I imagine the eventual plan, from
what they told us, was to move us to Seoul which was supposed
to be a large temporary camp, and from Seoul north to Pyongyang
and a few camps up there. They kept telling us that there had
been large groups of Americans ahead of us, that had already
gone up there. And they kept talking--is it all right to
mention life survivors?
Senator Potter. Yes.
Pfc Martin. They kept talking that General Dean had been at
Seoul, and General Dean was with this large group.
Senator Potter. They told you that General Dean had been
through there?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. When did you leave the prison, in the
daytime or at night?
Pfc Martin. I don't even remember now, sir.
Senator Potter. Was it a large group?
Pfc Martin. About eighty of us.
Senator Potter. And was this a march?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir; definitely.
Senator Potter. Under military auspices or civilian?
Pfc Martin. Military, sir. We were given instructions
before the march, and told that we would march under regular
North Korean conditions, regular marching conditions. Most of
us thought it would be our own, a certain cadence, say 120 or
130, whatever it is, and maybe a break and then start out
again. It didn't work out that way at all.
Senator Potter. How did it work out?
Pfc Martin. We just started walking and finally when just
about everybody was falling down, we quit.
Senator Potter. You would quit then for a break?
Pfc Martin. No, sir; there wasn't any breaks.
Senator Potter. You wouldn't quit then for a break?
Pfc Martin. No, sir; there wasn't any breaks.
Senator Potter. No breaks. Did they march you at a fast
rate of speed?
Pfc Martin. Well, we wore out two sets of guards before we
got to Seoul.
Senator Potter. They changed guards on you?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What happened to the ones that couldn't
keep up?
Pfc Martin. They were shot.
Senator Potter. They were shot?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did you witness any of them being shot?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Who was in charge or command of the guards
there, do you know?
Pfc Martin. I wouldn't know his name, sir.
Senator Potter. Was it an officer?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir; a captain, I believe.
Senator Potter. Were you given food twice a day on the
march?
Pfc Martin. No, sir; once a day.
Senator Potter. And what did that consist of?
Pfc Martin. The same thing, rice. We would stop in a
village at night to eat, and go around and rummage up some
rice, and eat that and start out the next morning.
Senator Potter. Was it a march all the way up to Seoul?
Pfc Martin. I couldn't tell you. I believe it was about ten
miles in trucks. But they didn't care to go any further in
trucks and we didn't either because it was in the daytime and
our air force naturally had no way of knowing whether we were
enemies or not, and they gave us a pretty bad time there for a
little while.
Senator Potter. Was your march along the road?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And it was mostly at night?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And they would put you up in houses during
the day or hide you?
Pfc Martin. We would hide in some of these houses
somewhere, but twenty or thirty in one little house and twenty
or thirty in another one.
Senator Potter. Did the guards beat you during the march?
Pfc Martin. If you could keep up, sir, they didn't bother
you too much, but the ones that began to straggle, and fall
out--they were all suffering pretty badly from dysentery at the
time. If a man had to fall out and wasn't quick enough catching
up, they would slap him around a little bit.
Senator Potter. Would they slap them with their fists or
rifle?
Pfc Martin. Depending on how angry they were, sir. Usually
they just took the rifle butt and kind of poked you around.
Senator Potter. How many started out on this march?
Pfc Martin. I believe about eighty, sir.
Senator Potter. And how many finished?
Pfc Martin. I think we lost twelve men.
Senator Potter. And were those twelve men shot or did some
of them die?
Pfc Martin. I think only one man died, sir.
Senator Potter. And the rest were shot because they were
stragglers?
Pfc Martin. As far as I know, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did they assign certain Americans as
leaders of the group at all?
Pfc Martin. No, not exactly. Naturally, the highest ranking
man there was more or less recognized as our leader. They
didn't break us up into groups exactly, but the highest ranking
officer would be at the head of the column and according to
them were supposed to set the pace, which they tried to do
quite a few times. They tried to slow down the pace and most of
them took a pretty bad beating over it.
Senator Potter. What was your highest ranking man in your
group?
Pfc Martin. A major.
Senator Potter. How long did it take you to get to Seoul?
Pfc Martin. The last couple of days, sir, are kind of hazy.
I don't even remember the night we pulled in there.
Senator Potter. After you got to Seoul, then what did they
do?
Pfc Martin. Well, there were already quite a few PW's
there. I don't have any idea as to the number, except that it
was over a hundred, easily. They put us in these two rooms,
about thirty or forty men to a room, and the next morning the
interpreter came through, this Mr. Kim, that is the only name I
ever knew him by, and told us what to expect.
Senator Potter. What did he tell you?
Pfc Martin. He was so full of hatred and so bitter he
actually couldn't get anything out except dogs and so on and so
forth, and they were going to straighten us up, and they hated
all America and so on. I don't know. He was just full of
baloney. Actually, I think he wanted to take us all out and
shoot us then.
Senator Potter. Was he an officer?
Pfc Martin. He was a South Korean.
Senator Potter. Was he in civilian clothes?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How long were you in prison school or
compound?
Pfc Martin. I would say a month, sir.
Senator Potter. A month?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And how was your treatment there?
Pfc Martin. Well, we weren't fed very well. We did not have
any work to do or any marches but they wanted to indoctrinate
us, was the whole thing, classes, books, even had a movie and a
big meeting in a gymnasium one time.
Senator Potter. And what took place there?
Pfc Martin. Well, they had a big thing they wanted all of
us to--I believe they wanted our cooperation, kind of a
propaganda deal. They were taking movies to show the North
Korean people. They took us outside and lined us up, there were
about three hundred of us then, and they wanted us to carry
those banners. I don't know what they said, they were in
Korean. They were going to march us down around this tour,
about a mile and a half away, and back again. We didn't have
much choice but to march. They marched us down there and
around, and the guys kept dropping the banners and stuff like
that, and it got them kind of mad. They brought us back and
took us into the gymnasium there. Some guy got up and made a
speech. To tell you the truth, I don't know much of what he
said. I didn't pay much attention to it.
Senator Potter. That was a North Korean officer or
civilian?
Pfc Martin. Officer, sir. He was on the theme that they
were right and we were wrong, and we were invaders, and they
were defending North Korea after South Korea tried to invade
it, and they were going to prove this to us, and they wanted us
to go along with them and denounce the United States, and they
wanted us to make records for this whole thing for this woman
propagandist that was on the radio, and then they asked us all
to write and give them an essay on why we should not be in
Korea, and why we were in the wrong, and why the peoples
republic was so right. They said that the best one, whoever
wrote the best one, got to get on the radio and give a
propaganda statement.
Senator Potter. Did everyone have to write one?
Pfc Martin. They asked us all to write them. We were all
supposed to. I don't know. Everybody would write a couple of
lines and throw the thing in. Nobody ever wrote much. In fact,
I think most of the old-timers just wrote ``Go to hell'' on
them. They had a movie there, though, that was in Russian,
sound and all, and the Russians, you know, before our--whatever
you call it, who it is produced by and so on and so forth, at
the beginning. All of that was in Russian writing. I can't
speak it or read it, but I know Russian when I see it, and it
was about the meeting at the Elbe River of the American and
Russian troops. They made us out as-well, we had ridiculous
uniforms, the overseas cap having a point about that long on it
[indicating], and the troops were in Class A in the fighting.
The Russians stood on the south shore, all big, brave, smiling
men, and a bunch of little fat guys jumped to the water and
swam across, That was supposed to be us. They shook hands with
the Russians.
Then as the picture went on, from what I could see, it
showed that the Russians were actually--well, we were finally
realizing that the Russians were up to no good at all. They
were trying to put that idea over to the people. It showed us
black marketing. It showed them beating up colored officers and
throwing them out of the Officers Club, and I think they
lynched one later on.
Then there was an American major and Russian colonel that
were fairly good friends. The American major seemed to disagree
with his superior and his superior, naturally, was a big, gross
man who was stealing everything, taking beautiful paintings off
the walls and sending them home, and all of this thing. So this
major was sent up, supposedly, done away with, and this Russian
colonel was very sad, and that was the end of the movie. It
smelled pretty bad.
Senator Potter. They did not compare with a Mickey Mouse?
Pfc Martin. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Did they have material that they required
you to read?
Pfc Martin. Yes.
Senator Potter. Do you recall any of the pamphlets or
articles that you were required to read?
Pfc Martin. The one, probably the most famous, is by Karl
Marx. I don't know the proper title. It is something about the
capitalist system. It is his idea of the economics.
Mr. O'Donnell. Das Kapital?
Pfc Martin. That is it.
Senator Potter. Did you see the Daily Worker over there?
Pfc Martin. Not to my knowledge, sir. There were a lot of
books that they passed around, and most were about Russian
heroes in the Second World War. Right in the front was the
acknowledgment of some Soviet printing company translated into
English. They were all about Russian heroes.
There was a few about this other--they kind of sent it
around, the same thing--when the Russian met the American, how
he was so sad to see what a heel he was, and everything. And
one about Christmas, when the Americans had more than the
Russian people. They admitted that. But the colored people had
to go into one room and were treated pretty shabbily, and there
was not any love there, and they all got drunk. So this Russian
went back to his little party, where everybody had a good time
and everybody was hunky-dory.
Senator Potter. In this prison camp with you, did we have
any colored American troops there?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did they make any effort to instill hatred
in the colored troops?
Pfc Martin. I think they made a large effort and it didn't
do them any good.
We had at the time three, I believe, and one had been there
for so long that he had just about homesteaded. He was one of
the first in there. But they didn't impress that man at all.
He was, I would say, in his early forties. He was mature.
They always made him in the front of everything. If they wanted
somebody to carry a banner or something, they always made that
poor man do it because they wanted the idea--they were always
trying to take pictures of these things and they wanted the
idea that the colored race was being suppressed and were
fighting back.
Senator Potter. Did they try to get confessions from you on
certain things?
Pfc Martin. No, sir. They had not started that germ warfare
business yet. They were still winning the war. They made us
listen to this woman's broadcast every night, though.
Mr. Jones. Was that Sioux City Sue?
Pfc Martin. We used to call her Rice Ball Maggie.
Senator Potter. How long were you in the camp?
Pfc Martin. Thirty days, sir, about.
Senator Potter. Then you were moved from there?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. We were moved from there the 20th of
September.
Senator Potter. And where did you go and how did you go?
Pfc Martin. Well, a day or so before that, the navy was
blowing Inchon apart, and the air force was kind of tearing up
Seoul. We figured that the invasion was starting, and then we
were quite sure of it.
The South Koreans, the prisoners in the compound next to
us, told us that our troops had landed and broken out of the
perimeter. We managed to hear a couple of these Tokyo radio
broadcasts. So we were expecting to be liberated.
They put more guards on us and decided to move us out the
night of September 20, about 10:30 or eleven o'clock at night.
We came down and the whole sky was lit up. They got us and
started to move us out. We went one way and turned around and
came back, and then we went another way. We were all thinking
about trying to break them because there were about 390, I
believe, of us then. But it seemed that we were surrounded.
Every time we would walk a few miles in one direction, we would
have to turn back and walk again.
Senator Potter. They were American troops?
Pfc Martin. We still don't know. I don't know whether that
was the case or not. I imagine it was. We finally went through
part of the town that was burning. They told us when we started
that we only had to walk one kilometer. They said for all too
sick or too badly wounded to fall out over in one spot, if they
couldn't walk. Some twenty or thirty fell out.
We started walking and crossed the North Korean Parallel in
one day. I think the city was Kaeson, or something like that.
We were there just a few hours, a very few hours, maybe twelve
hours, when these other men that were supposed to have been too
sick to walk one kilometer came in. They had forced them all
the way up there.
Senator Potter. I assume there was quite a hike in one day
for that distance, was it not?
Pfc Martin. It is a pretty big distance.
Senator Potter. Will you point it out on the map?
Pfc Martin. It is from Seoul to the parallel line. I don't
know exactly how far it is, but it is a pretty good distance.
We lost quite a few men on it.
Senator Potter. You lost quite a few men?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How did you lose the men? Did they fall
out?
Pfc Martin. A few, I believe, tried to escape. I don't know
how many made it, after we got going, and I think the majority
that fell out were shot.
Senator Potter. They were shot as they fell out?
Pfc Martin. Well, they didn't make much effort to get them
to come on once they did fall out. I don't know the exact
number. I was toward the head of the column and I was so
doggoned tired I wasn't paying much attention anyway. I was
just trying to keep moving.
Senator Potter. Who was in charge of that march?
Pfc Martin. He was, I believe, a captain, again, that had
been in charge all the time we had been at Seoul. I am not
positive. But he showed up later on when we hit this next town,
so it must have been him.
Senator Potter. When these men were shot, the ones that
could not keep up, were they shot by the guards or by the man
in charge, or both?
Pfc Martin. Well, sir, the only shooting I ever saw was
done by the guards, there.
Senator Potter. After you got to the 38th Parallel, and the
ones that were left behind because they were too weak to make
the march finally, what happened then?
Pfc Martin. Well, this part, I have lost three or four days
at a time in there. I know we moved from that city into another
one. It did not look like--well, it was supposed to have been
an old school building, but it was actually built like an old
factory.
We stayed there for three or four days, I guess. It was
such a good target for planes that the guards wouldn't even
live in there. They went out and dug holes around outside by
the road. We were bombed there once. They wouldn't let us out
of there, either. A B-29 came over and dropped seven bombs,
thinking, I suppose, that it was a factory, and they wouldn't
let us out of the place.
Senator Potter. They kept you in the building?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did they lose any men as a result of the
bombing?
Pfc Martin. No, sir, we were lucky. We found out where
their storehouse was for their food, the North Korean kitchen.
Some of the guys started going down there at night. They were
coming back with sweet potatoes and all kinds of stuff,
stealing it, and they found out about it and took them out and
beat them up pretty badly. But they wouldn't feed us, and we
had to do something.
Senator Potter. From the time you left Seoul, did you get
food every day or not?
Pfc Martin. The day after we left Seoul, if I remember
correctly, all we got was a bunch of crackers and some water. I
think we got some rice again the next stop, but I am not
positive.
Senator Potter. Just carry on. You say you miss a day or
so. Do not worry about that. After that point, where did you
go, and what happened?
Pfc Martin. From then on, sir, it was just a series of
march, march, march, all night, and fall into a town, and then
get up that night and march, march, march, again, just the same
thing over and over.
Senator Potter. Did the same thing continue with the men
who could not keep up? Were they shot?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. That is when we started to lose men a
lot. We went from a group of 396, and at the time we hit
Pyongyang, I don't think there was 280.
Senator Potter. Where is that on the map?
Pfc Martin. That is the North Korean capital, right on the
coast.
Senator Potter. You almost walked the whole length of
Korea, did you not?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. You do not have any idea how long it took
you?
Pfc Martin. About fifteen days, I would say.
Senator Potter. Did you still have the same commander in
charge of the march?
Pfc Martin. No, I believe that we changed officers about
halfway through that, sir.
Senator Potter. And the treatment was still the same?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir, it never changed. In fact, it got
worse.
Senator Potter. As you kept going north it got worse?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. We would begin to pass bunches of
bodies, three or four in a group. South Koreans had started
ahead of us, and we all thought at the time that that is
probably what it was, that they had shot their stragglers right
along.
Senator Potter. When they would shoot them, would they
shoot them on the road where they were walking?
Pfc Martin. Most of the time they would move them off a bit
and then shoot them.
Senator Potter. Did they make any effort to bury them?
Pfc Martin. No, sir, not then.
Senator Potter. They just left them there and kept walking?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. They had another little trick they
used to pull. You would come into a town and have quite a few
men that were very badly off, that wouldn't last much longer.
They would say they would leave them in the town where they
would be well taken care of. We no more than left there when
they did away with them.
Senator Potter. The people in the town would bury them?
Pfc Martin. Yes. We buried as many as we could, and the man
in charge had to always take the name, rank, and serial number
on a piece of paper and try to put it in a bottle or something,
and put it in the grave. But they wouldn't let us mark the
grave.
Senator Potter. They would not let you mark the grave?
Pfc Martin. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Then what happened after you got to
Pyongyang?
Pfc Martin. We got in there at night and they put us up in
a school building again. That is about the only building, I
guess, that could hold all of us. They didn't feed us rice
then. They brought in this bread, about six inches long, I
would say, and about two inches high and wide. We got one of
those a day. It was awful hard stuff. It was so hard you
couldn't eat it, actually.
Senator Potter. Was it dark bread?
Pfc Martin. No, it didn't seem to be. It was pretty light
in texture.
Senator Potter. But it was hard?
Pfc Martin. Hard as a rock. I don't know whether it was
baked that way or that stale, or what. You couldn't just bite
it. You had to break off a chunk and chew it.
Senator Potter. Were you given any medical attention there
at all?
Pfc Martin. Not too much, sir. We had people dying of
dysentery right and left, four and five a day then, easily.
They just told us to put them all in one corner of the room.
They made us move them all into one corner of the room, and
they were lying there with flies and everything.
Senator Potter. They left them right there in the room
after they died?
Pfc Martin. If somebody died, we had to wait for them to
get around to it before they would let us take them out and
bury them.
Senator Potter. How long were you there?
Pfc Martin. I don't know. I would say three days at the
most.
Senator Potter. And then where did you go?
Pfc Martin. Then is when we started to move out to
supposedly another camp up north. They told us all kinds of
stuff, that it was a great big camp where the PW's worked and
they had a big school there, and all, a bunch of stuff. They
took us down to this train and put us on a train at Pyongyang.
We stayed on the train for about ten days.
Senator Potter. On the train for about ten days?
Pfc Martin. Not right on it. They put us in coal gondolas,
those open things. We would ride a few miles and get off the
train and go out in to the field. We would sit out there maybe
all day long. Night would come, and they would put us back in
the gondolas and we would ride a few more miles. They never
seemed to make much headway at all. We finally pulled into the
tunnel.
Senator Potter. How did that happen?
Pfc Martin. We went into the tunnel there, and they were
afraid to move any further up because of the planes. The planes
were coming over awful low at the time. We found out later they
were looking for us. They found out we had been on the train.
They put us there one day and we didn't get hardly anything to
eat that day, even less than usual. We had three men die that
day, the first day in there. I think they took a burial detail
out and buried them. The next morning we still didn't get fed.
We found four more dead men, and they made us pile them up by
the side of the railroad tracks outside the tunnel.
Before the burial detail got ready to go out--that was
about four o'clock in the afternoon--there was three more and
we had to put them in there. Then that evening they say--well,
not evening but late that afternoon--that they are going to
feed us. That is when they took the men out in groups.
Senator Potter. Do not go into too much detail on that
phase of it.
But they told you they were going to take you out and give
you some chow, is that right?
Pfc Martin. They took the highest ranking man we had and
the man who had been acting more or less as our mess sergeant
whenever we had a chance to cook any of our food. They came
around and asked us for all the money we had, in case we had
any, and give it to this one man because the North Korean said
if we wanted anything, any vegetables, we had to buy them. They
said they were not in South Korea and could not pick whatever
they wanted but they had to buy it.
I don't know where the guys got the money, but some of them
had some, and they took all the money.
I believe there were two sergeants, one officer, and
another man who went out with the Koreans supposedly to get
food. They left at two o'clock in the afternoon, maybe, and we
never saw them again. But they came in there about 4:15 or 4:30
and said they were going to feed us, but it is a chesei house,
a small house, and they couldn't take us in and feed us all at
one time, that they had to take a few in at a time, a small
group.
We were hearing small arms fire before, not too heavy
bursts but scattered fire. All of us thought the UN troops were
getting pretty close. So they took the first group out and
actually, I think, everybody was more or less just about on
their last legs, in a daze, because when we did hear that fire
it didn't register. Personally, I never thought a thing about
it.
They came back fifteen or twenty minutes later and said it
is time for the next group to go.
We all grabbed up our little bowls and got ready to go out
there. We walked down the railroad tracks and they kept saying,
``Hurry, hurry, hurry.''
Senator Potter. How many were in the group?
Pfc Martin. In the group I was in, the second group, I
think there were about forty men. They let us down the railroad
tracks three or four hundred yards, and there was a paddy, as
this hill came down, and more or less leveled off, there was a
paddy, and an irrigation ditch, one at either side and then
with the bank. There was only three guards with us at the time.
As they went up on this bank, they started yelling ``Airplanes,
airplanes, get in ditch.'' And we all got into the ditch. We no
more than got in the ditch than they just seemed to come up
from the other side of the bank, and they went forward and just
started.
Senator Potter. Do you mean with burp guns?
Pfc Martin. Both, rifles and automatic weapons.
Senator Potter. Were you hit?
Pfc Martin. No, sir, I wasn't hit at all.
Senator Potter. But you pretended to be dead?
Pfc Martin. I was the last man to come around. I was having
trouble with my feet. I just got around into the ditch more or
less when the firing started and I fell up against the
embankment.
Senator Potter. Then I assume that they assumed that you
were dead?
Pfc Martin. They never actually checked me. They came down
the line and never got down as far as I was. They were in a
hurry. They wanted to get out of there. They wanted to get it
done and get out.
They were ready to roll, I guess, because just a half hour
after they finished all of that stuff, they were on the train
and the train had gone.
Senator Potter. Did they have other groups after you?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were they brought to the same place?
Pfc Martin. No, sir, they were not.
Senator Potter. They were taken to other places?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were there any other of your forty that
were still alive?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. There were quite a few left alive,
pretty badly shot at, but there were a few others that were not
hit at all, and a few with flesh wounds. There were quite a few
of the guys that died during that night that were left alive
after the thing was over.
They came down and checked but were in an awful hurry. They
would dump this guy and if he groaned they would shoot him and
then go after a few more.
Senator Potter. You say they left within a short time?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. I would say within a half hour.
Senator Potter. Within a half hour. They got back in the
train, did they, or was the train still in the tunnel?
Pfc Martin. I heard the train whistle and everything.
Naturally, I never actually saw the train leave but I assume
the train left.
Senator Potter. Then what happened?
Pfc Martin. Well, another guy and I decided we better get
out of there in case they did come back or in case there were
any more running around there. We called off and hid inside of
a bunch of sugar cane stocks, after the harvest, I guess where
they pile them up like a corn shock. We were in there for about
three or four hours, and it was dark, and we heard somebody
crashing around out there and thought it was a North Korean. We
looked out and just this little ways away there was this other
guy going around bashing open these things. He was a GI. He was
looking for another American. So we dragged him into ours and
stayed there until the next morning.
Senator Potter. Had he been one that had been on the train?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir. He had been in a different group than
we had been in. He had been shot in the leg. The next morning
we looked out and didn't see any soldiers but we saw a lot of
Koreans running around there, and we didn't think it was safe
to go out yet. We waited a little longer. I don't know actually
what time of the day it was. We heard people yelling, ``GI's,
come out. GI's, come out.'' But when we looked out there, they
were Koreans. They had on uniforms, but half of the Koreans
would wear fatigues when their uniforms were gone anyway. We
stayed a little longer, and finally decided we would take a
chance, and we went out and it was the Americans and the South
Koreans.
Senator Potter. So then you were back ready to go back?
Pfc Martin. Right.
Senator Potter. Ready to come back to the States?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. We have a photograph. I do not know whether
you can identify it, but it is a photograph taken of the
massacre, the tunnel massacre. [Handing document to witness.]
This is a photograph that the War Crimes Commission put out
in their report of the remains of one of the prisoners that
they found slain in that same incident. Here is a train. See if
that is the type of train that you were on. [Document handed to
witness.]
Pfc Martin. It looks a lot like it. This isn't a whole
train, is it?
Senator Potter. Apparently not.
Pfc Martin. There was some box cars on the train.
Senator Potter. Did they have troops in the box cars, too?
Pfc Martin. No, I don't think so. They had mostly supplies,
and I believe they had some of the things that you use to mint
money for the North Korean government on there. We started to
tear some boxes open once, looking for food, and they were
great big heavy plates in there.
Senator Potter. We thank you for giving us the benefit of
an experience which I know has not been pleasant and no doubt
you would just as soon forget it if you can. But I can well
appreciate with all the moving around they had you do how it
would be very easy to have days slip your mind.
I wish to thank you for a very complete story. We will hear
you either Wednesday or Thursday, probably, in a public
hearing.
Pfc Martin. Thank you.
Mr. O'Donnell. This may have been covered, but I do not
know for sure. How much weight did you lose?
Pfc Martin. I went from 165 to 118.
Senator Potter. 165 to 118?
Pfc Martin. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Thank you very much.
Capt. Makarounis?
Captain, I am sorry that you had to be here all day. I hope
it has not been too uncomfortable.
Capt. Makarounis. In fact, I would like to come tomorrow
and hear the other gentlemen, too.
Senator Potter. You may, if you care to.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. ALEXANDER G. MAKAROUNIS
Senator Potter. Captain, I wonder if you would identify
yourself for the record?
Capt. Makarounis. Alexander George Makarounis, captain,
infantry, United States Army.
Senator Potter. You are now convalescing at Walter Reed
Hospital; is that correct?
Capt. Makarounis. I am a patient at Walter Reed Hospital,
presently on sick leave, waiting for my next operation.
Senator Potter. Where is your home, Captain?
Capt. Makarounis. My home is 548 Fletcher Street, Lowell,
Massachusetts.
Senator Potter. Captain, would you tell the committee when
you first went to Korea, and with what outfit?
Capt. Makarounis. Yes, sir. In the middle part of July of
1950, I was a member of the 29th Infantry Regiment stationed on
Okinawa. We were alerted. The tentative plan was duty in Japan.
The plans changed a few days later, after the alert, and we
were told we were leaving directly for Korea.
The regiment could muster but two battalions, breaking up
one battalion. Even so, we were under strengthened. We gathered
the remainder of our strength from troops that had arrived on
Okinawa on the 21st of July.
Shortly after midnight of the 21st, which would make it the
22nd of July, two battalions of the 29th Regiment, sailed for
destination Korea. We first went on the outskirts of Japan
where we formed part of a convoy. On the 24th of July, we
entered Pusan, North Korea. We disembarked there, secured the
remaining equipment that we were lacking in our units, and
immediately proceeded to our destination of Maoson by rail.
From Maoson, we went by truck to Chinju, where we became
attached to the 19th Infantry Regiment. I might say the
remnants of the 19th Regiment.
Senator Potter. What was your duty? Were you a platoon
leader?
Capt. Makarounis. I was commander of I Company. That
evening we got our mission at Chinju. We were to move to the
vicinity of Hadong, South Korea, to engage about two hundred or
more guerrilla forces that were disturbing the citizenry and
recruiting for the North Korean Communist Army.
We moved out by truck and then by foot. Our first major
engagement--we ran into the elements of four North Korean
divisions that were making that sweep to form the Pusan
perimeter defense as we commonly know it.
Our battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 29th Infantry
Regiment, was practically wiped out. By that statement I mean
that we did not have sufficient troops to cope with the
situation. Rather than moving into the guerrilla activities, we
moved into the elements of the full North Korean divisions,
according to a New York Times report which is all I base it on
sir.
I might say all of this information I have in a scrapbook
at home, newspaper articles and information from other
personnel.
I Company was in reserve and soon the S-3 officer, now
Major Robert Flynn, committed my company, which was to support
L Company on the left flank of the defense line.
As my platoons got to the prescribed terrain, I was
beginning to make a reconnaissance of the situation when I
received an order from the first order of headquarters company
battalion. The order was to withdraw.
I complied with the order, ordering my platoons back. It
was at this point that we met men from the other companies who
were moving also back through the only route left, the route
that I Company had taken to get into position.
I was bringing up the rear of the withdrawal when we were
pinned down heavily with mortar fire and machine gun fire. It
was so much so that we could not move. There were approximately
fifty to seventy-five men left in the group, not many from my
company but from the other units. We were pinned down in the
rice paddies of the field. There was no further withdrawal for
the remainder of us, and that is where we were all shot in the
rice paddy fields when the Communist troops came down upon us
and we were taken prisoners.
Senator Potter. About how many of you, Captain? About
fifty?
Capt. Makarounis. About fifty to seventy-five, sir, that
were pinned down, but many came out of that alive. I would say
around the 50 percent mark. They shot and killed those troops
that were in the rice paddies. They came down and shot and
killed them with the submachine guns, the Russian type burp
guns, as I called them, having seen them before.
I might say we were pinned down and we were all shot. I was
shot through my back and as I lifted my head to cough, one of
the men behind me, a man from my home town, stated
``Lieutenant, they're taking prisoners.''
We looked up and they were signaling to those who could get
up to raise their hands, throw off their clothing, fatigue
jackets, take off their watches, pen and pencil sets, rings,
and throw them in the rice paddy fields. They then marched
those of us who could, and those who could help the wounded
prisoners, to a Korean trail, I might say, and there they let
some of our own men get first aid packs and dress our wounds.
That night was the only time that four North Korean
Communist medical men dressed the wounds, about thirty of us in
this one building. We were the seriously wounded personnel who
could not even move.
They came in, sprinkled a little sulphamilamide powder, and
put a thin gauze bandage on, and that was the one and only time
that we ever received medical treatment by the Communist army
troops.
I might say that the next few days had the town of Hadong
strafed and bombed by our air force, practically leveling the
town. It was a small Korean village or city, I might say.
During this strafing, the other prisoners who were in
walking condition were in a Christian church in the town of
Hadong. The building was hit accidentally and less than ten
soldiers died in this building. The rest were taken out. The
ones who were wounded built our number to about fifty in this
one building. The remainder were taken out and marched all the
way up to Seoul. These were all men from the 29th Infantry
Regiment, 3rd Battalion.
Daily for about the five days following my capture, the
town of Hadong was strafed continuously all during the day. At
these times, we moved up to the hill which was to the rear of
the building, a large concrete building that we were staying
in. We moved up in the trees, and in two or three caves, that
were in the area. About the fifth day following this, it was my
decision at that time that I would die there, so then I planned
to escape rather than die in the town of Hadong.
Along with two other soldiers from my company, we escaped
at night, crossed the river across a sand bar, and took off
across country.
About five days later, twenty miles as the crow flies, we
were recaptured in a small South Korean village as we were
attempting to dress our wounds by breaking into a supposedly
doctor's office in this village, who was not there.
We were turned over to the police authorities in the next
city by what I term quizzing personnel.
Then started a trek from this area down to the southernmost
large city that I believe is in South Korea called Kwangju. I
believe it is near the coast. It was at this point, while we
were getting down to this city, that we were always confined in
civilian type jails with civilian prisoners, South Korean
civilian prisoners. This, to me, seemed strange, since we had
on our army fatigue clothing and I remembered, by handling
prisoners of war in World War II, that none of this came under
the Geneva Convention rights. It was at Kwangju, I believe,
sir, that we met three Columban Father missionaries. They were
Roman Catholic missionaries in Korea, who were taken prisoner
in the town of Mokpo, and were transferred to the town of
Kwangju.
I would like to say I would like to leave this article
which is published by the Columban Fathers, and which will tell
the story there how we split at Taejon.
Senator Potter. That will be made a part of the record.
Capt. Makarounis. From Kwangju, we went all the way to
Taejon.
Senator Potter. By walking?
Capt. Makarounis. By truck and walking. Most of the way by
broken down trucks with about thirty-two prisoners, the three
Columban Father Missionaries, five, including myself, American
prisoners, and the South Korean prisoners.
Senator Potter. You were guarded by military personnel?
Capt. Makarounis. We were guarded by Communist soldiers,
yes, sir.
During this trip to Taejon, the hands of all five of us
were manacled together by hand irons. The hands of the
missionaries were tied together with rope.
Senator Potter. Are they like handcuffs, hand irons?
Capt. Makarounis. Handcuffs, right, sir. At Taejon we
stayed but a few hours together, the three missionaries and the
five soldiers, including myself, and there we were split.
We were taken to this large building in the city which at
one time, I believe, was the temporary headquarters of one of
the regiments defending Taejon, of the 24th Division, and
which, I believe, was a permanent police building. It had a
large courtyard.
As we entered there, they singled out the soldiers and had
us sit down, and had photographs taken, numerous ones, of us.
As we moved up to the second floor of this building, we met
approximately one hundred other American soldier prisoners.
This was the first large group of prisoners I had seen. This
was a couple of weeks after I had been captured.
I might say that back on the 27th of July1950, the day that
we were captured, there were between twelve and twenty-four men
who were wounded badly. An example is my company messenger, who
was shot in the neck, in the shoulder, and in the chest. These
seriously wounded men who could not even get up were taken to
the road junction where we were first assembled, about one
hundred yards from the place where we were cut down, and they
were left there. These soldiers I never saw again nor have I
heard of what happened to them. They are still carried, I
believe, as MIA. It is the common knowledge, among us, that
they were shot and killed immediately by the Communist
soldiers.
I might say that while at Kwangju, the Columban
Missionaries told us that we would go through the same
procedure they had gone through. They were taken out
continuously and interrogated at length by North Korean army
officers. I am not sure but to this day they stated that they
were given the statements to sign dealing with many subjects.
What was in the statement, I don't know, but it had to do with
the invasion, as they called it, of Korea by the United Nations
forces.
Senator Potter. In other words, they were confessions of
American guilt?
Capt. Makarounis. It was bordering on that line, yes, sir.
I might say that one of the missionaries, a Monsignor, was
an American. The other two were from Ireland.
The day that they took us out, they took us to a Christian
church. The church had many tables and chairs in there for
interrogation. They were using the church as an interrogating
point. They put me in a chair beside one desk, with a Korean
Communist captain. This captain was a young man, as much as you
can tell the age of a Korean. I would guess it would be in the
twenty-thirty bracket. He was quite angry because it took at
least one hour or so to find an interpreter. As it was, we just
sat there.
All through the questioning, the captain kept getting mad
every once in a while. He would say things against General
MacArthur and against President Truman, and that it was all
Wall Street's fault that there was this war.
He also wanted to know about my family, too. He kept saying
what did my father do, and I said he was retired but that he
had been a worker in the woolen mills in Lowell. This seemed to
please the captain when I gave him this reply. He also got
quite a charge out of the fact that my mother was Ukrainian and
was born over in Austria. When I told him after he asked me a
question about owning property, he grinned from ear to ear when
my answer was ``no.'' It seemed like if you were a man of
means, or had any information to give them that you were on
what they call the capitalistic side, they definitely were
opposed to you.
Senator Potter. They gave you a hard time if they thought
you had property. Ownership of any property, I assume, then
meant you were a capitalist.
Capt. Makarounis. Yes, sir. That definitely to them was
their thought.
I might say that during this interview, all three of us,
the two men who are not here today and myself, the
interrogators would take a revolver out, which seems to be a
fancy of theirs, to acquire revolvers, and American pistols,
and tell us that we would sign statements and confessions, and
point the revolvers to our head. The three Columban
Missionaries had explained that this would happen to us.
As soon as I got into the room with the other American
prisoners, they were divided into two rooms. Two master
sergeants explained to me to tear up and cut up my clothing and
shoes. If I did not, these would be taken away from me in that
the Korean Army soldiers were acquiring all soldiers' shoes and
clothing that was in good shape, that was not torn and ripped.
I immediately ripped my fatigue jacket and trousers and cut the
toes out of my shoes, and slit them. But they were useful, they
had soles on them.
In the room I was in, a big room, about forty by sixty, I
guess there were maybe sixty GI's. In the other one, just like
it next door, were thirty more Americans, plus a lot of South
Koreans. In my room were two young soldiers who had each had a
limb amputated by a Korean doctor. One had lost his arm almost
up to his shoulder, and the other had his foot removed above
the ankle. They were supposed to be recuperating in this room.
This is what they had been told. The condition of the room
could not be described, and the floor was covered with filth
where GI's had relieved themselves, since they would not let us
go out of the room only once in the morning and once in the
evening.
Senator Potter. What place are you talking about?
Capt. Makarounis. Taejon. This is the first group of
American soldiers I had met in captivity.
On the evening of the second day in Taejon, the guard said
for all that could walk at all to fall out in front of the
building. Then they marched up and down past us, counting how
many there were. There was ninety-one. One of them said in
broken English how many of us could walk twenty-two miles. He
said we were going on to Seoul and that after we had gone
twenty-two miles there would be a train and we would go on to
Seoul in that. Seoul was about fifty miles or so beyond. Eighty
of the men said, ``Okay, sure,'' they could make the twenty-two
miles. Eleven stayed behind and we never saw any of them again.
The trip was quite a march in itself. Of the eighty, I would
say that more than half had been wounded in one way or another.
A few of their wounds had healed by nature's own course.
We started off and that first night alone we must have
covered the twenty-two miles and perhaps more. In addition to
the GI's there were a lot of South Korean prisoners but how
many I don't know. All of us were in columns of four, and we
had to keep abreast all the time. Maybe once every two or three
hours they would give us a break, ten minutes, and if you
couldn't keep pace, you would get a rifle butt in your back.
I might say here, sir, that at all times while North Korean
army soldiers guarded us, they had bayonets. Their bayonets are
not like ours. They come to a sharp point and are oval in
shape. But to me this distinguished whether or not the person
guarding us was a Korean soldier or a civilian guard because
the guards never had bayonets on their antique, actually,
rifles. I never saw civilian guards with these rifles. The
majority of the time, after the first two weeks of capture,
they were all military guards.
As we got into the city of Seoul itself, it must have been
about eight in the morning. There was an air-raid going on,
with B-29's, fighters, and all. The fighters were strafing some
of the streets in the city. Fortunately, however, they either
didn't see us or did and recognized us as Americans. They did
not harm us.
The streets were crowded despite the raid, and there were
these kids with little baskets of cookies and breads, and we
yelled at them to throw some cookies, and some did.
Capt. Makarounis. Finally, after they marched us up one
street and down the other, sort of a Cook's Tour, I call it,
with all the people lining the streets and looking at us, we
got into a courtyard. There was a wall around it and inside the
wall there were these three buildings, all fairly large and
leaning out the windows were what seemed like hundreds of men.
They were Americans. They kept shouting at us and some I knew
by name. Some were from my company, from among those who stayed
behind at Hadong. You can imagine what our first question was.
Somebody shouted, ``How's the food situation,'' and they
told us soup twice a day and bread twice a day. It wasn't so
bad, they said. It was a chance to wash twice a day, too, and
plenty of water to drink, but no Red Cross and no chance to
write letters. That's the kind of information they shouted down
to us from the windows.
We probably would have learned much more except around now
I heard this voice say, ``Get the hell away from those windows,
you bastards, and stay away.'' This was my introduction to Mr.
Kim that the other prisoners have mentioned. That's all we knew
him by, Mr. Kim. He was a man whom all the soldiers hated most
of all.
At that time I was lying on the ground and all around me
were men who passed out, out of what you might call sheer
exhaustion. Mr. Kim herded us into the building.
Before he did this, though, he had us all put down our
name, rank, serial number and organizations.
As he herded us into the rooms I was put into what they
called at the time B group. He opened the door to this room. I
walked in. There were a lot of other men, including a few
officers. I was standing there inside the door when this light-
haired captain came up to me and smiled and said, ``I'm Captain
Locke.'' He introduced me to the other officers, a Lt.
Blaylock, who is now back in the States, and a Lt. James Smith.
Lt. Smith was a colored officer.
That makes five officers and there were probably forty-five
enlisted men in the room. Captain Locke also told me, or maybe
later, there was a major who was in charge, being the senior
officer. There were also three other lieutenants and a captain,
which makes a total, I believe, of ten officer captives.
This evening--and I have it labeled it as September 11--we
got a bowl of soup that had some kind of greens floating around
in it and a small loaf of bread with a hard crust.
On the bread that we got in the cities of Seoul and
Pyongyang, the bread was colored such as our wheat bread is
colored, but they never used salt in their bread. We had our
own medics, that is, enlisted corps men, first aid men, who
were prisoners also with us, just a mere handful.
Senator Potter. How long were you a prisoner in Seoul?
Capt. Makarounis. Sir, I have the date set at September 11.
That was my first evening. I have the date set as the evening
of the 20th that we left.
From about the 10th of September or so the air raids on
Seoul seemed to be intensified and there were lots of jets and
fighters around. Also from anywhere around the 18th until we
took off we heard artillery and some of the men said it was
from 16-inch guns on ships. It wasn't until later, of course,
that we realized we had been hearing the buildup for the
landing at Inchon. On the evening of the 20th just after dark
we were all set to go to bed when a guard came in and ordered
us to fall in outside the building. We lined up in this
courtyard where the North Korean troops used to have bayonet
practice every morning and then the guards had us all sit on
the ground.
There seemed to be a full moon and for some reason I
remember that. That was the start of the death march, so-called
Korean death march from Seoul to Pyongyang. I figure that the
number of prisoners in Seoul was about approximately four
hundred.
We did leave twelve or fifteen behind who just couldn't
even get up to move, sir, and they were supposedly left behind
in the sickroom along with one first aid man, a Private Eddie
Halcomb. This Mr. Kim stood in front of us and he asked one
question: ``How many men cannot walk one mile?'' Quite a few of
the men fell out. I would guess between twenty and thirty. Mr.
Kim walked up and down in front of them and he asked each of
them, ``What's wrong with you?'' When they began telling him he
would start cussing, and I would say he sent almost every one
of them back into line with the exception of maybe two or
three. The few that he sent up to the sickroom, I should say,
were carried up because they were men who couldn't even walk a
step.
The guards kept getting us to stand up and then ordering us
to sit down continuously over and over again. This was for the
purpose of a head count that they took many, many times in this
one courtyard. A corporal from my company who had made the
first escape with me passed out completely and some of the
other prisoners started to pick him up to carry him back to the
sickroom. Mr. Kim said, ``Bring that blank back.'' Those were
his exact words, and they did.
Then Kim gave us a little speech. He said that it would
become very dangerous there in the city of Seoul. He said the
front was getting very near. Mr. Kim made one final inspection
of the sickroom. He sent all of the men that he thought were
even halfway capable of walking out again. While he was gone
the other soldiers took this corporal from my company back into
the sickroom.
At about nine o'clock, somewhere about that time we started
out of the courtyard for our death march.
Senator Potter. Nine o'clock in the morning?
Capt. Makarounis. In the evening, sir.
First we went across the main part of the city of Seoul and
then on to the country. We must have walked a good five miles
straight north it seemed and the pace was fast. The Korean
pace, when they walk, sir, is much better than the 120 that we
use in the military. They are naturally very hardworking
people, the farmers in what they do, and carry heavy loads.
Senator Potter. Is it a shorter stride?
Capt. Makarounis. It is a short fast clip, yes. It is more
or less, I would judge it, a run for us. About an hour or so
after we headed out a North Korean army officer on horseback
rode up and started to shout something to the guards. There was
a lot of jabbering and grunting. Then they turned us around and
marched us right back into the city the way we came from. We
kept on marching and we went out another route out of Seoul.
I might say here that we did see those flares that were
sent up by our mortar fire on the outskirts of the city,
lighting up the city. We heard distant gun fire too from
artillery. A little while later as we were going on the
outskirts of the city we started through a sort of small
forest. Captain Locke came up to me and told me that two of the
lieutenants had escaped from the column. I have never seen
those two gentlemen to date, nor have heard that they have come
back.
We started out with the number of 376 prisoners. When the
two lieutenants escaped that brought us down to 374. I would
say we walked roughly twenty miles that night and toward
morning we crossed the 38th Parallel. It was just like any
other place except there was a marker on the road and it meant
something. Until then we had hoped we would be liberated, but
at the time we didn't know if American troops would ever cross
the 38th or not.
A little while after daylight a couple of planes came
over--Captain Locke said they were Marine Corsairs--and the men
started to scatter and so did the guards. Captain Locke shouted
to stay put and most of us did. We waved everything we had,
white rags, our jackets, and we shouted, although I don't
imagine they could hear us.
I don't think any of us even breathed for a minute while
there, while we waited. Then these two planes circled us again
and they came down low and dipped their wings. That was their
recognition continuously on our death march when we were
walking during the daylight. They started marching us off in
the evenings and they always had us in school buildings. Every
town we would come to they seemed to have school buildings and
they always kept putting us in these school buildings.
You asked one of the former witnesses about the size of the
rooms of the Korean buildings. I would say it would be
approximately one-half the size of this room here, or perhaps
even smaller. A majority of the time the floors were wood, but
in many cases they were concrete floors in the permanent type
buildings that had brick. They would crowd us in and at night
time falling down we couldn't stretch out flat on our back. We
would have to be on our right side or left side. This served a
dual purpose. It provided enough room for all of the prisoners
to enter the room and also by sleeping body to body it kept us
warm, which was necessary. There was no clothing issued. There
were no blankets. They had none themselves to issue. I don't
imagine. The only thing that we would do, as we marched some of
the men took these sort of, not bamboo, but these sacks that
they keep their rice in and they would keep us a little warm.
We would throw them over us. The nights were extremely cold as
we kept going north.
Senator Potter. Did you witness during this march when a
person couldn't keep up that he was shot?
Capt. Makarounis. I witnessed everything except the actual
shooting of the prisoners, sir. There were many, many--and by
many I mean between twenty-five and thirty-five--who perhaps
would come into that total that fell back, perhaps a little
lesser figure than that, and although I did not see a person
shot by this North Korean army Communist lieutenant--and I say
he was a lieutenant because of the epaulets they wear, bearing
one star with the Russian type insignia on the epaulet.
Senator Potter. Second lieutenant?
Capt. Makarounis. The lowest second lieutenant, yes. They
had three grades of lieutenants I believe and the captain I
know to be four stars on the epaulet.
Senator Potter. When I was a second lieutenant, they said
there was nothing lower. What was the total number on that
march that you gave?
Capt. Makarounis. The number that started out of Seoul,
South Korea was 376. The total number that wound up in
Pyongyang alive was 296. Those were from our own counts that we
used to take along with the army guards.
Senator Potter. Besides the men that you lost on the march
as a result of not being able to keep up and who were murdered
by the Communist guards, did others die of their wounds or
malnutrition?
Capt. Makarounis. Yes. In the so-called sickroom of Seoul
there was one who died of his wounds and malnutrition. He died
right in front of my eyes, because I was in the sickroom. There
was one lieutenant who passed away from pneumonia and
malnutrition on the death march.
Senator Potter. How long did that trip take altogether from
Seoul to Pyongyang?
Capt. Makarounis. I have the date set as September 20th
that we left Seoul, South Korea and arrived in Pyongyang, North
Korea on the 10th day of October 1950. I used that figure
pretty definitely because we were in Pyongyang, Korea, for four
days and nights and it was the evening of the 14th that they
took the prisoner group out, my prisoner group out, and put
them on trains, as I recall, from information given to me. That
was the evening I made my second escape.
Senator Potter. Did you escape from the prison in
Pyongyang?
Capt. Makarounis. In Pyongyang, Korea, the evening that
they took the prisoner group out, and this was on the 14th,
since I was hidden six days and nights in my second escape, and
the city fell on the 20th of October 1950, and I was liberated
on that day.
Senator Potter. How did you manage your escape?
Capt. Makarounis. One day--I believe it was the 13th of
October--Captain Locke and I were sitting out in this large
courtyard along with the other prisoners, killing all the lice
on our bodies. That is about the only way you could get rid of
them. He asked me what I would do if I had a chance to bug out,
as we called it, which meant escape. I explained to him I would
give my right arm right up to the shoulder to get in on
something concrete like that. He explained the situation to me,
stating that a Japanese-American soldier, a Sergeant Kumagai
had arranged to have three escapes effected by contacting three
Korean underground schoolmen who were in the building. The
reason that this was done by Sergeant Kumagai was he could
speak Japanese. Japanese was the only language allowed in Korea
from 1905 until 1945, I believe. They did not allow the
teaching of Korean in the schools.
The plan, as Captain Locke explained to me, was that the
senior officer, the major, himself and Sergeant Kumagai, would
be hidden out by these three Korean teachers who signified they
wanted the senior officer also. The major declined the
opportunity, being a West Point graduate, stating to Captain
Locke that he felt as the senior officer he felt that his
responsibility was with the men. I might say that the major was
very, very weak. He had pneumonia and he was, I would say, a
man that didn't have any food for three months, so what would
you call that body, a starved body, along with the sickness.
Senator Potter. Did the major return, do you know?
Capt. Makarounis. No. That is why I am not mentioning his
name. He did not return. He was the major who was taken out on
a pretense of feeding them along with my mess sergeant, who was
the mess sergeant of the prisoner group at the Sunchou tunnel
massacre. When the major declined the opportunity for some
reason or other they wanted two other officers with Sergeant
Kumagai, and Captain Locke told me I could make the escape with
him.
Senator Potter. How was that affected?
Capt. Makarounis. That was affected in the building that we
were quartered in. On the evening of the 14th, just about one-
half hour to forty-five minutes before they moved the prisoner
group out for boarding the trains to move out of the city of
Pyongyang, there were no guards in the corridor. Sergeant
Kumagai had already made the contact with the underground
school teachers and knew where to take Captain Locke and
myself. We slid down the rear stairway, down to one of the
numerous large rooms that were in the building empty, and went
to a corner of the room where there was a trapdoor about one
foot square. He moved the table and we entered this trapdoor.
We got into the what I call a cellar, but it is not, since it
is only about two to three feet high, and there we stayed for
six days and nights. The underground school teachers, one of
them anyway, daily would come and bring us water, and a couple
of times brought us rice and this poached corn, this roasted
corn, like the Koreans roast their corn.
Senator Potter. And you were there until you were liberated
by the American troops?
Capt. Makarounis. Yes. I believe the book, sir, will bring
out--I will look it over well and make a condensation of the
thing--the points that you mentioned.
Senator Potter. Yes. You do that. We do not know just what
day it will be, but we will notify you ahead of time as best we
can. Thank you kindly.
Capt. Makarounis. Thank you, sir.
Senator Potter. We will be in recess until tomorrow at ten
o'clock.
[Thereupon, the hearing recessed at 6:00 p.m. Monday,
November 30, 1953, to reconvene Tuesday, December 1, 1953, at
10:00 a.m.]
KOREAN WAR ATROCITIES
[Editor's Note.--Cpl. Lloyd Kreider and William L. Milano
testified in public session on December 2; Cpl. Willie L.
Daniels, Sgt. George J. Matta, and Sgt. Wendell Treffery, on
December 3; Lt. Col. John W. Gorn, Lt. Col. James T. Rogers,
Sgt. Orville R. Mullins and Sgt. John L. Watters, Jr. on
December 4, 1953. Sgt. Robert L. Sharps and Donald R. Brown did
not testify publicly.]
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to notice, in
room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Charles E.
Potter, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan.
Present also: Robert Jones, research assistant to Senator
Potter; Francis P. Carr, staff director; Donald F. O'Donnell,
assistant counsel; Robert J. McElroy, investigator; Ruth Young
Watt, chief clerk.
Senator Potter. We will proceed.
For the benefit of you and others who were not here
yesterday, Colonel Gorn, this is an executive session, and the
purpose of our hearings is to develop the facts and to let the
American people and other free people know the type of enemy
that you men have been fighting.
While I am sure we are all thankful and appreciate the fact
that the war in Korea, or the fighting and killing in Korea,
has ceased, our battle against communism hasn't ceased. The
beast-like atrocities that have been related here which you men
are most familiar with is a pattern of the character of the
enemy. The more people that know the character of the enemy,
the better off we are going to be.
Now, Mr. Gorn, will you proceed?
We plan on holding public hearings beginning tomorrow
morning at 10:30. We have a full schedule today, and we are
going to have to rush along as fast as we can; and then we will
prepare to go to open hearings tomorrow.
Now, Colonel, will you identify yourself for the record,
giving your name and your unit?
STATEMENT OF LT. COL. JOHN W. GORN, OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY; FORMERLY EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE WAR
CRIMES SECTION, EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY IN
KOREA, AND CHIEF OF THE INVESTIGATING
BRANCH OF THE WAR CRIMES SECTION
Col. Gorn. Mr. Chairman, I am Lieutenant Colonel John T.
Gorn, presently in the Office of the Chief of Legislative
Liaison, Department of the Army, but formerly from December
1950 to July 1951 I was executive officer of the War Crimes
Section of the Eighth United States Army in Korea, and chief of
the investigating branch of that section.
I might say in regard to my discussion of the particular
case assigned this morning that I am not an eyewitness to the
case, but I am acquainted with the facts through my official
capacity as chief of the Investigating Section of the War
Crimes Commission.
Senator Potter. As I understand, in the War Crimes
Commission they had an investigating staff and an interrogating
staff, is that true?
Col. Gorn. That is right.
Senator Potter. As a result of the interrogations, certain
statements were made, and it was your job as head of the
investigating staff to investigate and determine the validity
of the statements?
Col. Gorn. That is right. We correlated not only the
information that we got from our interrogation, but also
information we got from field reports, and correlated them into
particular war crime cases. This particular case is War Crime
No. 164, or as it is commonly called, the Bamboo Spear Case,
and it occurred in the vicinity of Mooju, which is to the
southeast of Taejon. It is on 13 December 1950.
The committee no doubt will recall, though, at that time
the actual combat area in Korea was considerably to the north,
the Chinese Communists having just launched their first
counterattack north of Pyongyang.
Now, despite the fact that the combat area had moved to the
north at that time, from the time of the initial breakout from
the Pusan perimeter, in September of 1950 until this time, and
even throughout 1951, the area over here south and southeast of
Pusan, a very mountainous area, was infested with guerilla
activity coming from Communists and remnants of the North
Korean Peoples Army.
So much then for the background, as far as the tactical
situation of this case is concerned.
On 12 December a convoy of twelve vehicles manned by
personnel of the Eighth Fighter Bomber Wing of the Fifth United
States Air Force, left an airfield up in Seoul headed for Pusan
down in the southern part of Korea. The convoy reached Taejon
on the evening of the 12th and left three vehicles there for
maintenance, and then proceeded on. This was in the middle of
the night, close to midnight.
Shortly after going beyond Taejon, the column apparently
made a wrong turn and got off the main supply route. Five of
the vehicles continued on, and the sixth vehicle stalled, and
those were all heavy vehicles, most of them with trailers, and
the sixth vehicle in the column stalled so that the column
behind it was held up, but five of the vehicles continued on
down the wrong road. Although they knew they were on the wrong
road, they could not turn around because the road was so
narrow, characteristic of most Korean roads.
Finally they reached a spot in the road where there was a
filled-in bomb crater, and they halted down around the vicinity
of Meouju because they were not sure the filled-in crater would
support the heavy vans they had in the convoy. They waited
there until daylight, and then at daylight one of the vehicles
with two of the men decided that they would back-track up the
road to contact the rest of the convoy.
Meantime the other four vehicles and eight men were to
continue on the road they were on slowly and let the rest of
the convoy catch up with them.
These two men and their vehicle rejoined the balance of the
convoy at about nine o'clock, and the evidence is obscure
there, but at any rate the balance of the convoy continued on
to Taeju; instead of going on the wrong road, they turned
around and hit the road. Upon arriving at Taeju they waited a
considerable length of time, and the other four vehicles did
not show. So they proceeded to Pusan, and an investigation was
started to see whether or not they could locate the four
vehicles, and this was started by the Somber Wing.
Senator Potter. This is air force personnel?
Col. Gorn. Yes, sir; air force personnel.
On the 17th of December, two members of the 565th Grave
Registration Company in Taejon were in the vicinity of Meouju,
and they had heard that the four missing vehicles in question
had been ambushed south of Meouju at about 900 hours on the
13th of December.
They got the support of about thirty soldiers from a
Republic of Korea battalion stationed there and there they
found three bodies. They were scattered among the vehicles. The
vehicles were partially burned out and had been abandoned. The
bodies, some of the bodies were burned.
Senator Potter. Some of the bodies were burned, as if
burned in the vehicle?
Col. Gorn. From the report we have, apparently they were
either killed in the fight, shot in the fight, or burned in the
vehicle. In sweeping through the area down to the scene of the
ambush, the Republic of Korea troops took four prisoners, none
of whom were in the so-called guerrilla band that had ambushed
the convoy. However, one of the prisoners stated that he had
heard from other sources that the guerrillas had taken five
other Americans from the group and taken them to their party
headquarters at Maesonri.
He also stated that these men had been stripped entirely of
their clothing. The clothing, of course, was taken by the
guerrillas themselves.
On the 27th of December, information was received at Taejon
that the Republic of Korean troops operating in the vicinity
there had found five more American bodies South of Meouju,
between Chochonri and Maesonri. Unfortunately, I cannot find
those locations on the map there. These bodies were recovered
by the Grave Registration Company.
When the Republic of Korea troops found them, the men were
entirely naked and their hands were tied behind their backs.
Upon further examination, all of the bodies showed multiple
puncture wounds throughout, mainly on the chest and arms, but
also in the face and the neck and the upper abdomen; and the
number of puncture wounds on the bodies varied from three to as
many as fifteen to twenty.
It was the opinion of one of the doctors who examined the
bodies that the wounds were probably caused by some sharp
instrument, and that they had undoubtedly resulted in prompt
death because there were no signs showing later infection or
healing. These five bodies as well as the previous three that
had been found were identified as being the missing members of
the lost convoy. It accounted for all eight of the members of
the convoy.
Senator Potter. Were they buried or just lying on the
ground?
Col. Gorn. My information on that is obscure, Senator. As I
recall the grave registration account, I cannot recall whether
they had to dig up the bodies or not.
Some period later, at least it was after I left the War
Crimes Section, certain natives of the village were
interviewed, and they stated that the vehicles had been
attacked by remnants of the North Korean Peoples Army operating
in the area as guerrillas. There was evidence that this attack
was carried out by a so-called Anson group and the prisoners
were taken to the headquarters of this group after the ambush.
One of the guerrillas later was taken prisoner by the
United Nations forces and interrogated by members of the War
Crimes Section, during which time he admitted shooting three of
the Americans two hours after the ambush on orders from a
Lieutenant Lihanson, and that he thereafter, also on orders of
this officer, stuck the bodies with bamboo spears. He stated
that the other prisoners had been killed by another guerrilla
about a day or so later.
We were never able to locate the reported other guerrilla,
and Lihanson was killed almost at about the same time we
received a report on the case. Apparently the strength of the
force was about eighty that attacked the convoy.
Senator Potter. You do have an account that at least this
one soldier was killed at the direction of the officer in
charge?
Col. Gorn. Three of them were.
Senator Potter. Three soldiers?
Col. Gorn. Three of them were killed at the direction of
the officer in charge.
Senator Potter. It would be a natural assumption that the
others were killed under the same directions?
Col. Gorn. That is right.
Senator Potter. Now, Colonel, you have used the term
``Grave Registration.'' I know what grave registration is, but
it would be well for our public hearing to just briefly state
what you mean by ``Grave Registration.''
Col. Gorn. Grave registration unit, of course, has the
unhappy task of recovering the bodies mainly of our dead; and
consequently, whenever casualty reports are received,
particularly areas that are off the beaten path of normal
collection, the grave registration unit is assigned the duty of
locating any bodies and identifying them for the purposes of
future casualty reports.
Now, as far as the operations in Korea were concerned, of
course, the so-called Indian country which existed so much
beyond the Pusan perimeter made it necessary to have grave
registration teams operating continually in that area, because
very often bodies were located some months after combat had
passed through them.
Senator Potter. Was it their job to try to locate the
bodies and to identify them?
Col. Gorn. Yes, and then take them to the central
collecting or temporary burial spot.
Senator Potter. Now, I think, Colonel, that is what we
wanted you to present; and we have some pictures. Did you see
the bodies?
Col. Gorn. No, I did not.
Senator Potter. It was your teams that got the reports?
Col. Gorn. That is right.
Senator Potter. We have a Colonel Rogers with the Medical
Division, I believe. Colonel Rogers, will you come forward?
STATEMENT OF LT. COL. JAMES T. ROGERS
Senator Potter. Will you identify yourself for the record?
Col. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, I am Lieutenant Colonel James T.
Rogers, presently with the Medical Section, Headquarters,
Fourth Army. At the time that these atrocities were committed,
I was with the Medical Section. It was the ``I'' Corps in
Korea.
Senator Potter. What is your home address?
Col. Rogers. My home address in 16 Calhoun Avenue,
Greenwood, South Carolina.
I viewed these atrocities of five soldiers at the National
Cemetery in Taejon, Korea. These five soldiers, in my opinion,
were subject to multiple wounds of the face and chest and
abdomen as a result of some sharp instrument which caused their
death. I am of the opinion that this sharp instrument was
heated.
Senator Potter. It was heated?
Col. Rogers. I felt like it was red hot, and these bodies
were probed and stuck, and you could see where the tissue
receded and where it was all pitted. I am also of the opinion
that as a result of these multiple perforating wounds, these
individuals died from internal hemorrhage.
Senator Potter. We have here a couple of photographs that
are purported to be of the five men that you mentioned, and I
will give them to you to see if you can identify those
photographs as being photographs of the men that you examined.
Mr. O'Donnell. Those are from the official army files in
the case.
Col. Rogers. These are the men.
Senator Potter. Colonel, is it your belief that they were
punctured by bayonets or by bamboo poles or by both?
Col. Rogers. I felt like in review here of the statement
and the certificate that I submitted, I remembered that one of
them apparently was bayoneted up under the chin. One of them
seemed to have a gunshot wound in the head. The others had all
of those multiple perforations that appeared to be with
something that was red hot and we just made an assumption that
those were the result of maybe the heating of an iron rod or
the heating of some bamboo sticks.
Senator Potter. The multiple wounds that you examined, they
alone would have caused the death of these men?
Col. Rogers. Yes, with the multiple wounds and then the
fact that they stuck them apparently, we thought maybe they
must have tortured them to begin with and then they stuck them
into their abdomen and chest which resulted in hemorrhage.
Senator Potter. Thank you kindly, Colonel.
Col. Rogers. One question that you asked or something about
them being buried. These fellows gave no indication of having
been buried when I saw them; they were stark naked and lying
out there and there wasn't any dirt or anything else in ears or
anything like that that would indicate that they had ever been
interred.
Senator Potter. It would be your assumption that they were
just left there on the ground where they were killed?
Col. Rogers. That is right.
Senator Potter. I do not know just when you will be
scheduled to appear, Doctor, except probably Thursday. So,
thank you for coming down and you are through for today. If you
want to stay, you are perfectly free to do so; however, if you
care to leave, why you can, and we will notify you. I would
appreciate it if everyone would be here later.
Will Corporal Kreider come forward please?
STATEMENT OF CPL. LLOYD KREIDER
Senator Potter. Corporal Kreider, will you state your name
and your unit for the record?
Cpl. Kreider. Corporal Lloyd D. Kreider, RA 13266788, 307
Medical Bureau, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Senator Potter. What is your home address?
Cpl. Kreider. Westwood, Pennsylvania.
Senator Potter. Can you tell me when you went to Korea and
what unit you were attached to at the time?
Cpl. Kreider. At the beginning of hostilities in Korea I
was a member of the 34th Medical Company, 34th Infantry
Regiment, 24th Division, and I was with the first outfit that
landed in Korea.
Senator Potter. Can you briefly give us a little
description of how you were captured?
Cpl. Kreider. It was on about August 4; 34th Regiment was
overrun that night, and I was an aid man, and I was taking care
of some wounded and trying to get a man back to the rear, and
it seemed that they annihilated the 34th Regiment at that time.
I could not find the rear. So I carried this wounded patient on
my back for awhile and then he died, and I left him lying in
the weeds.
Then I hid out that night and all of that following day,
figuring that the Americans would come back and maybe I would
be liberated. So then the following day, the following night, I
tried to make it back through the dark, and I could not find my
sense of direction so well, and I stumbled along all night
long.
Early next morning, it was getting daybreak, and I saw a
communication wire and I figured it was an American army
communication wire, and I followed the communication wire, and
it went between two ridges. I followed that wire for about five
miles, and I saw on a hill it looked like American soldiers,
and I went up towards them, and I was certain it was American
soldiers; and I yelled, ``Wait on me,'' and I was hysterical,
and I did not eat for quite a while, and I was glad to get
back. And it was a bunch of North Koreans came walking out and
started shooting at me, and so I yelled to them in Japanese--
and I can speak fluent Japanese--not to shoot me.
At that time it seemed like the sergeant or whoever was in
charge of this group of North Koreans held back their fire. And
a few minutes later they started shooting again, and I acted
like I was hit and I rolled down over the hill, and I went in
the opposite direction.
Then I walked all of that day and towards evening and I
heard some more Koreans patrolling yelling at me. I didn't want
to turn around and I kept going, and they started shooting, and
I was so fatigued and tired, and one piece of shell bit me
along the eye, and I passed out, because I fell.
When I came to, there was this North Korean, North Koreans
standing there in front of me. They asked me for my rifle, and
I told them I was a medic and I did not have a rifle. I asked
them in Japanese if I could have a drink, and they let me drink
some water.
So they told me they would take me to a school to learn
communism. So I stayed in their line about one week, the front
line, and then they took me down to Naktong River.
Senator Potter. What did you do while you were in their
lines? Did they put you to work?
Cpl. Kreider. At that time they did; during the day I was
carrying water for them out of the stream; and a lot of
American aircraft were in the area, and they were afraid to go
out of the holes, and I would go out and get water for them.
And during the night they had a guard watching me. That lasted
for about one week and then they took me across the Naktong
River, and there were about fifteen other prisoners there, and
they kept us there one day, and most of the men were wounded,
pretty badly.
So they kept us there; and they moved us out, and we all
had to walk. And one boy was shot right below the heart, and he
had a hard time walking, and I remember the guards used to kick
him and we would pick him up. They would tell us to leave him
behind, but we tried to take him along with us, because we knew
they would shoot him. Later that day, finally, they made us
leave him behind, and we do not know what happened to him until
later.
Senator Potter. You never saw him again?
Cpl. Kreider. No, sir. Then I was taken a few miles back to
the rear and stayed there another day, and then we kept on that
way, each day we kept moving back in the direction of Seoul and
Taejon. The further back we went, the more American prisoners
they would have, until we had quite a few, and I do not recall
how many there were. I would say approximately fifty on that
march.
Senator Potter. After you were captured, did they take away
any of your clothes?
Cpl. Kreider. The first thing they did was take all of my
clothes except my pants, and they took my shoes and everything
I had, and they gave me only one boot. It was tight and I could
not put it on, just one big Russian boot it was; and so they
didn't give me anything since then the whole time I was
prisoner, to wear.
It was better out of clothes because they had so many lice,
you could take them off by the handfuls on their body, and they
had no medications, and they got in your clothes and it
bothered you more with clothes. When the winter came, and it
was colder, a lot of the men died from malnutrition and from
exposure.
Senator Potter. During the march back to Seoul, did you
witness any men being killed by the guards?
Cpl. Kreider. Yes, sir; the men got weaker and weaker as
each day went by; and the Korean guards, we know they were
shooting them, but we were not sure at first. The North Korean
guards told us not to take them with us because one rotten
apple would spoil the whole bunch, and if one man is carried by
two healthy men, we will get weak and we would also die.
Finally, they would not let us carry them any longer. They took
them into villages, and we heard them shooting, but I did not
witness any killing at that time until we got close to Seoul,
and then we were getting so weak and they wanted to move us
fast. Then I saw them shoot one man on the road march; there
was only one man I saw get shot.
Senator Potter. Can you tell us what happened with the man
who got shot?
Cpl. Kreider. What happened, a few of them were shot, and
he came back to the column, and we were marching north, and
they took some of the men who were so weak and they had their
legs swelled up from beriberi or lack of food, and they went
out of their mind, and they did not want to walk, and they
would fall, and it is better to be dead, and we tried to drag
them with us.
The guards would tell us to move on, and they would take
them back, and we heard them shooting; and I saw one guy make
it back to the column, and he was shot in the leg, and he died
the following day. And that is how I know that they were
shooting the prisoners at the time.
I didn't witness any more killing except from men who would
die from malnutrition and on the wayside, and many men would
die from malnutrition.
Senator Potter. Can you estimate how many men died or were
killed on that march up to Seoul?
Cpl. Kreider. Sir, I think it was about one-third of the
men, approximately one-third of the men. Along the wayside they
were taken out, ten or five at a time, and we accumulated
different men at different points.
Senator Potter. Most of the march was made at night?
Cpl. Kreider. All made at night, until we got to Seoul, and
we walked all night long and part of the morning, and then when
the sun would come out they would hide us in a field or put us
in some school building or a church.
Senator Potter. Did they feed you on that march?
Cpl. Kreider. If they had any food, and sometimes we walked
all night long and the men were so hungry and weak they could
hardly stand up, and we would fall, and actually we were all
casualties and we were picking each other up, and we got to a
town and they would say there is no food, and we would go one
more kilometer, and one kilometer is not quite a mile; but they
would make it about twenty-five miles for one kilometer; and we
would go to another village. Some days we got a rice bowl, and
some days we got nothing. That is what the men were dying from.
Senator Potter. Did they march you through the town for
public display?
Cpl. Kreider. It was the main thing; they stayed in towns
and a lot of civilians would come around, and I remember one
said ``American spy,'' and he spit on my face. They used to
make a public display out of us because we were so weak and
undernourished, and they were telling the people that that is
the way we were in the United States, and we didn't have food,
and they used it for propaganda.
Senator Potter. Were you beaten on the march?
Cpl. Kreider. On the march to Seoul I was just pushed and
kicked around, and everybody was treated cruelly, but actually
I was not inflicted with any wounds, but many other men were
inflicted with wounds.
Senator Potter. After you reached Seoul, how long were you
there?
Cpl. Kreider. I went to that girls' school in Seoul, and I
was there approximately three weeks, and in that school they
tried to teach propaganda. They had an officer come around and
read us lectures on Russia, and we had a lot of books made from
the Moscow Language Institute, and I noticed that on the cover.
Senator Potter. They were made where?
Cpl. Kreider. Moscow Language Institute. They used to teach
communism as the New Russia, and we would argue with them and
tell them how poor it was, and they said it was New Russia.
Senator Potter. Did they endeavor to try to make you sign
statements?
Cpl. Kreider. They wanted us to write out, and they gave us
speeches, and they wanted us to write an essay, and I never
signed a statement that I recall, but they made us sign our
name on a blank piece of paper, and there were about seven of
us, and I don't know if they wrote something to that blank
piece of paper or not, but I never made any broadcast. They
made some of the men make broadcasts on the radio.
Senator Potter. Did they ask you about home life, about
your parents, what your father did?
Cpl. Kreider. They wanted to know, that was one of the
first things they wanted to know, if my father was a
capitalist, and I said he was a carpenter. And he said he liked
carpenters and farmers, and so everybody turned out to be
farmers after a certain length of time.
Senator Potter. You were treated better then?
Cpl. Kreider. They wanted to impress everybody. In a movie,
they showed us one movie of Washington, where they had a fat
man sitting up drinking wine and all people raggedly walking
around, and it was a lot of propaganda, and someone who lived
in America would know it was all foolish propaganda; but they
tried to impress upon us that the American people were living
in undernourished state.
Senator Potter. In what form did these interrogations take
place? Were you called into a room?
Cpl. Kreider. We had three rooms, and they kept some of the
officers in Seoul in one room for awhile by themselves, but
most of them were usually under confinement because, I guess
they did not want them to be with the enlisted men.
In this one room they made us read, I believe, about four
hours a day, books, and they had one man stand up and read to
the rest of the men, and then sometimes the North Korean high-
ranking officer would come in and give lectures, and he had an
interpreter, and they showed us a movie, and also he said in
the lecture how the South Koreans invaded North Korea. And
first he said they sent a peace delegation and they never
returned, and that is when they were mad, and then they still
didn't fight and the South Koreans asked them for a peace and
they attacked back.
Senator Potter. They were trying to tell you that it was an
act of aggression by South Korea rather than by North Korea?
Cpl. Kreider. We knew it was foolish propaganda, but they
tried to make us believe that.
Senator Potter. When you were being interrogated, did they
beat you at all or pull out their pistol?
Cpl. Kreider. Many times they did that; they threatened to
shoot us, and they asked me how many planes I had, in Japanese;
and they used to interrogate me a lot because I could speak
Japanese, and I would always say approximately five or ten, and
they would get mad until they got fed up with it, and I figured
they would shoot us. I said everybody had their own airplane.
Then they said, ``Where is your airplane?'' And I said that I
wrecked it, and they never asked me after that. I believe they
believed it, and they believe fantastic stories sometimes.
Senator Potter. How many times were you interrogated at
Seoul?
Cpl. Kreider. Mostly I was interrogated on front line, at
school it was mostly all propaganda and they were trying to
teach us communism and talking about the evils of capitalism,
so-called, and they were trying to impress how good they lived,
and I could see they didn't live good, and that is what they
were mostly trying to impress on us.
Senator Potter. Did they ever ask questions or try to
propagandize you against the American army and against American
officers?
Cpl. Kreider. No, sir, I don't recall them ever talking
against that. They were just talking about why were we in the
army and they thought we made good money, and they figured we
were in the army because it was the only way we could make a
living.
Senator Potter. Did they ask you whether your parents had
an automobile?
Cpl. Kreider. Yes, sir; that is one of the things, if I had
an automobile, and I said that I did, and they thought I was a
capitalist. It was before I got to Seoul, and this North Korean
officer wanted to shoot me, and I got in friendly with this one
North Korean who seemed to be an American sympathizer, and he
used to tell me what was going on and he told me they wanted to
shoot me and said since I was an interpreter they saved my
life. I think he was telling the truth.
Senator Potter. Did you know a Mr. Kim, was a Mr. Kim
there?
Cpl. Kreider. Yes, sir. I cannot say what he is, but he was
about as low down as they come, I think. He was supposed to be
a newspaper reporter in Seoul, and he said he was a Communist,
and he was taken over when the North Koreans took over that
camp, but he called us low-down names and names that could not
even be mentioned and he used to kick us around.
They had a radio in our room, and we were supposed to
listen every evening to Seoul City Sue; and one evening we
turned on to Tokyo, and they must have had it wired, and they
knew we had it on, and he came in and kicked everybody around
and they took it down to the mess hall, and every evening they
made us all go down to listen to that broadcast from Seoul City
Sue.
Senator Potter. Was he in charge of the propaganda?
Cpl. Kreider. I don't know if he was in charge. I was not
sure about that, but he was probably the best speaking English,
and that is why they used him here, but I don't think he was
actually in charge. I noticed they had a Russian civilian came
around three or four times to that building.
Senator Potter. A Russian civilian did?
Cpl. Kreider. And they took pictures of us, two men
together, and the North Korean officer and the civilian, and
twice he came to the building, and we were sitting down and
they told us to stand at attention, and this Russian civilian
and a North Korean officer just looked over the building and
asked if we liked the food. We didn't have any food that day,
but we had to say we liked it. We said it was okay, and that is
all we said to them, because it would not be any use to say
anything else.
Senator Potter. The movie that they showed you, was that
Russian made?
Cpl. Kreider. They were Russian speaking, because the
speaking was in Russia and the characters were Korean
characters, and so I believe it was for propaganda for Korean
soldiers, and they had the Korean PW's to see the movie also.
We had movies in Japan that were the same way, and they had
English speaking and they had them in Japanese, and so I figure
they were Russian movies for propaganda in Korea.
Senator Potter. Have you ever been contacted by the
Communists since you have been home?
Cpl. Kreider. By whom?
Senator Potter. Have you ever received any letters?
Cpl. Kreider. No, sir, I never have, and I don't expect to
either.
Senator Potter. What happened after you left Seoul?
Cpl. Kreider. Well, that is when it really got bad, and
they really got cruel with us. When the Inchon landing came on,
we had a South Korean that was driving a truck in that school
that had a lot of North Koreans, and this South Korean was
driving a truck and he brought in supplies, and he told us that
the Americans were a small way from here and he saw the flares
coming, and we knew that there was going to be a landing, and
they were coming up from the south.
They moved us out one morning early in the morning, and it
was dark and they moved us out and said we had to move out, and
we would go one kilometer, and that is when they took us up to
Pyonyang.
Senator Potter. This was on a foot march again?
Cpl. Kreider. All of the men were so weak they could not
even sit up, and they just laid down like a corpse, and they
could not even sit up, and some of them as soon as they got to
the area died, right away some of them died. I believe they
left some of them in the building, and I don't know whether
they were ever repatriated or not or were shot.
Senator Potter. There was a considerable amount of cruelty
exhibited on this last march?
Cpl. Kreider. On the way to Pyongyang there were many
people falling out from the march, because they had no food and
very seldom got anything to eat; and each day it got worse and
worse, and the men were going down, and each day the number
increased that would fall out; and we never knew what happened
to the people who fell out, because we figured they would be
shot.
The guards would let them come back and would catch up with
the group. We heard them shooting, but I wasn't an eyewitness
at that time, but when we got to Sunchon.
Senator Potter. Who was in charge of this march? Did they
have Korean officers?
Cpl. Kreider. I understand there was a lieutenant, and I
don't know the insignia too well, but there was a young
officer, and he was a clean-faced officer, no marks I could
recall, and he was small featured, and he did not weigh much
more than one hundred pounds, and I really don't know who it
was.
Senator Potter. Did he order----
Cpl. Kreider. I saw he was the one who shot one of the men,
also.
Senator Potter. He shot one of the men?
Cpl. Kreider. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. So from what you witnessed on the march, it
was evident that it was a command decision, and it was not just
some guard, but it came as orders from the officer?
Cpl. Kreider. It was from the officers.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether this was the same march
that Corporal Martin was on?
Cpl. Kreider. From Seoul, yes, sir; it was the same march.
Senator Potter. All right. Then what happened?
Cpl. Kreider. We kept going until we had approximately 370
men when we left Seoul, and they marched us on the way to
Pyongyang, and I am not sure how many died on the way, but I
know a lot of them died from malnutrition, and we got to
Pyongyang, and they kept us there a week or a week and a half
in another building, and we saw the flares coming over there;
and they moved us out again and the same way as before, and the
men were weak, and they would not give them any food or would
not let them go to the latrine, and it was in horrible
conditions, and a lot of men could not stand up and could not
even close their hands.
Senator Potter. It was in this confinement at Pyongyang?
Cpl. Kreider. Yes.
Senator Potter. How long were you there, about a week?
Cpl. Kreider. Approximately a week.
Senator Potter. And you could not leave the room to go to
the latrine?
Cpl. Kreider. A lot of the men were so weak they could not
even stand up, and they would black out and they were just
living corpses, but a few of us, we had to talk to the guard,
and they would not let us go, and the guard wouldn't let us go
to the latrine; once in a while they would let one or two of us
go, but most of us never had a chance.
Senator Potter. Were conditions much the same there as when
you were confined in Seoul?
Cpl. Kreider. I believe they were worse, sir. Every time it
seemed that they would retreat, when the North Koreans were
retreating, they would always get rough with us, but as soon as
they thought they were winning, they would be nicer to us
because they figured maybe they could teach us communism.
But I always was under the impression if it got so bad that
they were going to lose the war, I knew they were going to kill
us sooner or later.
Senator Potter. Did they try to give you any Communist
propaganda while you were there?
Cpl. Kreider. No, sir, I don't believe they had time; all
they did there was just let us lie around. I went out with a
detail to the graveyard and they had a few men die every night,
and we used to carry them out there, and they would take me
along as interpreter, and we would bury a few men every day,
and I found leaflets dropped from the air, one of them had a
picture of General MacArthur and Mr. Truman on it.
Senator Potter. These were Communist leaflets?
Cpl. Kreider. No, sir; they were dropped from the air, from
our forces, and they were calling for Kimysong, calling on him
to surrender, and that was one of the leaflets; and we knew
then that the country was being taken over by the United
Nations.
Senator Potter. They moved you out of there?
Cpl. Kreider. Yes, right before our forces; and the same
condition was there at Seoul, a lot of men could not even stand
up, and they would hit them over the head with the rifle butts
and kill them right there on the floor. Some died outside the
building after we carried them out.
Senator Potter. In other words, the men that could not get
up to go to the march were beaten to death with rifle butts?
Cpl. Kreider. Yes, sir, and we could not carry them all; we
had so many we could not carry them, but each one of us was
helping to carry someone. We were all weak and we could not do
much about it. They took us on a train at Pyongyang and took us
right outside of the city a few miles, and I don't know exactly
how long later, a few days later, right close to a week, they
took us out into a field and he was supposed to be a South
Korean guard, or he said he was, but be told me that they were
going to shoot us.
I didn't know if he was telling me that to scare me or
really believed it, but he took us out on a field and American
planes came out and then they took us back to the train, and
the American air force knew where we were, and they were scared
to do anything because they would follow us, and they knew we
were on the train. And other times they would move us out at
night. I was wondering why they moved us out at daytime and the
air force knew we were in there.
That same day they took us to Sunchon, above the city,
right to a tunnel, and they put the train cars in the tunnel;
and some of us were in a coal car. They left us in that tunnel
until it got evening.
Senator Potter. Were you in a coal car or boxcar?
Cpl. Kreider. Sir, I was in a coal car before we got to
Sunchon, and I believe they disconnected some of the cars there
for some reason and put another train on. I believe they just
took boxcars then to the tunnel, and I think that that is what
I was in at the tunnel; it was in a boxcar. They took us out
there, and that day or that evening and they said they were
going to give us chow. They wanted about forty at a time to go
to eat. That very morning they took all of the officers out
from the group and they said they were going to take them to
Manchuria; I don't know what they did, but they told me that.
That evening they took us out, by groups of forty, and I
was in the second group, and they took us along an embankment,
and they told us to sit down; and I figured what was going on.
Everybody was too weak to run or too weak to even walk hardly,
and they just set there and they opened up fire, six guards;
and one boy fell on top of me, and he had his arm up over my
face, and I guess they figured I was dead. That is why they let
me go.
Senator Potter. Were you hit?
Cpl. Kreider. Not seriously, just grazed on the knee at the
time. So then there was one more man that survived, Master
Sergeant McFadden, and he was pretty weak, and I think he was
out, and I helped carry him back, and we went back to, part
way, to Sunchon, and it was too cold to walk. So we laid in a
corn shock, and the next morning the North Korean civilian gave
us food and he took us back to Sunchon where we met up with
South Korean forces; and from there we were taken back to Japan
and the States.
Senator Potter. Corporal, I assume because of your
knowledge of the Japanese language that you were able to
receive much more information then the average man who had no
knowledge of the language, and you certainly saw the Communists
operate at first hand. Do you have any expressions that you
would like to make on your own as to that?
Cpl. Kreider. I noticed one thing especially in North
Korea. I spoke with many, many civilians at the graveyard and
especially crowded around when we were burying the dead, and we
would read the Bible, and the North Korean guards didn't like
it. This old woman she went okay and folded her hands like she
was praying, and the guards jabbed her with a bayonet.
Senator Potter. The guards jabbed this lady?
Cpl. Kreider. And I noticed North Koreans were very
sympathetic to us, the civilian population, and they would
sneak apples to us, and I was standing there and one boy
touched me, a little boy, and he gave me some North Korean
money and gave me an apple. And on the way back to the camp
after burying the dead, I asked if I could buy some apples, and
he said, ``Where did you get the money?'' And I said that I
found it, and that is where I got a little food in there at
Pyongyang that way, through the help of the civilian
population.
I noticed that the people who had been living under
communism, I believe, hated it more because they know what it
is, and I noticed the North Korean civilians hated it much more
than the South Korean civilians did.
Senator Potter. It is a form of government you hate to see
come here, isn't that true?
Cpl. Kreider. I think that I would sooner be dead than
living, under communism, myself.
Senator Potter. Thank you, Corporal.
We will let you know when you are to appear.
Senator Potter. I would like to call Sergeant Sharps.
TESTIMONY OF SGT. ROBERT L. SHARPS
Senator Potter. Sergeant, would you state for the record
your name and your present outfit?
Sgt. Sharps. Sergeant First Class Robert L. Sharps, 14 AAA
Battalion, Fort Monmouth, Virginia.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, what is your home address?
Sgt. Sharps. High Point, North Carolina.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, you have heard some of this
testimony. Were you here yesterday?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And you heard Corporal Martin's statement
and you have heard Corporal Kreider's statement this morning.
If my information is correct, you were on the same march, is
that correct?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And were you in the tunnel massacre?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. I am wondering if you have anything to add
to the story of the march. Was your march much the same and did
you have the march up to Seoul first?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir, my march up to Seoul, none of these
fellows were with me, I was on a different march.
Senator Potter. Did the same conditions prevail?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes sir.
Senator Potter. Did you witness, or were any of the men who
couldn't keep up, were they shot by the Communists?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir, they were.
Senator Potter. Did you witness any of them being shot?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Would you mind telling us some of the
experiences or what you witnessed?
Sgt. Sharps. I was a medical aid man in Korea.
Senator Potter. First you might tell us the unit you went
over to Korea with and when you went to Korea.
Sgt. Sharps. I went on July 4, 1950 with the 19th Infantry
Regiment. I was assigned to George Company of the 19th Regiment
as medical aid man.
Senator Potter. Will you tell us how you happened to be
captured?
Sgt. Sharps. We were cut off after the Communists crossed
the Kum River and my company was cut off, and due to misguiding
or misleading information, my platoon was left behind and we
stayed behind for an extra day.
When we came to realize it, we were far behind the enemy
lines, and we walked into a trap and the enemy fired and there
were forty-three men in this platoon, and at this particular
time they killed all but four of us.
Senator Potter. In that first fighting?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir, and when it came dark they came down
and searched the bodies, and bayoneted quite a few people that
weren't dead. I was one of the lucky ones that didn't get hit.
I know that they had bayoneted them because I was a medical aid
man and after the Communists left I went to them and helped
them as much as I could.
Senator Potter. The ones that were wounded, they went and
bayoneted them and killed them?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir. The four of us went to hills and
tried to find our way back at nights, but after four days
without anything to eat I went to get some food and I was the
only one who wasn't wounded, and when I was down to get food
the Communists caught me. They ran at me and forced me to
surrender, and they started asking me right away political
questions.
Senator Potter. Right away?
Sgt. Sharps. They asked me what I thought about General
MacArthur, and what I thought about the president and so forth
and so on.
I had to play ball with them. I did because they would have
killed me. They took me to Taejon then and put me in prison,
and there were some thirty to forty other guys there when I
arrived.
They had no medical aid at all. I tore the clothes up, my
clothing, and theirs, and patched them up the best I could, but
they had no medical aid from the Koreans whatsoever.
Senator Potter. When you were captured, did they take your
shoes away from you?
Sgt. Sharps. They did.
Senator Potter. And other personal effects?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir, and they told us that from Taejon
they were going to take us to Seoul and we would be put aboard
planes and flown back to the States. That is what they told us
to get us to march. The men that could walk were started on the
march north and we went to Seoul.
All the way up to Seoul people that couldn't make it were
shot. Mine differs from most of these people because they
didn't try to hide it; they didn't try to hide the shooting of
people.
Senator Potter. Did they have Korean officers in charge of
the march?
Sgt. Sharps. There was one Korean officer and he was in
charge and the rest of the people were guerrillas or police.
Senator Potter. Did the Korean officer do any of the
shooting?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. So that it was part of their command policy
then to just shoot the ones that couldn't keep up with the
march?
Sgt. Sharps. In my opinion that is what they did.
When we were staying in buildings, it seemed that we were
put in the buildings that were the most conspicuous ones they
could find, and we were put in a lone building some place and
our planes would strafe daily. They would kill quite a few of
the prisoners because there was no way that they knew we were
in those buildings.
Senator Potter. There was no markings at all?
Sgt. Sharps. No.
Senator Potter. No markings that there were prisoners in
there?
Sgt. Sharps. No, sir, our rations up until we arrived at
Seoul were about one rice bowl a day if we were hungry. The
only time we could eat was when we went through towns.
Senator Potter. Did they do the same with you? Did they
march up through towns for public display?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir, they did. They had no restriction on
who could talk to us, and who could harass us and who could
beat us and there was no restriction. Civilians, the kids, and
soldiers, and anybody.
Senator Potter. They would come up and beat you?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir, that is what they did.
Senator Potter. Then when you arrived at Seoul, were you
confined in the same building that Cpl. Kreider was confined
in?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir, and in those buildings it was a
school for girls and it was laid off like one of our schools.
They had different sections and they split the prisoners up in
there, and we had mandatory classes and Communist literature
that we were required to read. And they had movies, and in the
movie that fellow mentioned yesterday, something he left out
about the movie, there was some American officer in the movie.
I don't know who was playing the part, but they always made him
out as a drunk and he was always drunk and he never was sober.
Senator Potter. In other words, the man who was playing the
part of the American officer was always the drunkard?
Sgt. Sharps. He was always intoxicated.
Senator Potter. Did they interrogate you while you were
there?
Sgt. Sharps. They asked me what my family were, and I told
them that they were workers and they didn't like white collar
people, or people that had important jobs. Most of the fellows
told them they were either farmers or machinists or something
like that.
Senator Potter. If they told them that, they didn't treat
you badly?
Sgt. Sharps. That is right. They told us the history of the
second war, that when Japan surrendered we failed to go into
South Korea, and the Japanese had torn the country to pieces.
And when we wouldn't go in and stop them, the Russians moved
right away and stopped the Japanese from tearing the homeland
up and the Americans didn't care. They didn't care why or
anything about the Korean people. One of the officers who is
still alive now would argue with them on points like that.
Senator Potter. How would they react when he would argue
with them?
Sgt. Sharps. They didn't like it at all, and they didn't
bother him physically.
Senator Potter. Was this Mr. Kim there when you were there?
Sgt. Sharps. I don't know exactly what his job was, but he
could speak perfect English and he knew all of the slang, too.
He knew all of the American slang and he could understand
anything you talked about. I don't know exactly whether he was
in charge or not. I don't think he was, and I just think that
he was an interpreter. We had Russian people come there, too.
Senator Potter. You had Russians, civilians, going into the
camp?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What would they do?
Sgt. Sharps. They were always accompanied by the North
Korean high officers, and they didn't have anything to say much
at all, except we had to stand at attention.
Senator Potter. Did the North Korean officers give them a
great deal of respect when they came in?
Sgt. Sharps. They did.
Senator Potter. We can assume that they were influenced by
these Russians and the people coming in to look the camp over?
Sgt. Sharps. That is right, sir. I remember one time when
they had come and they took us all and gave us haircuts and
tried to get us to looking as best they could when they came.
Senator Potter. So that you are of the opinion, as a result
of that and other things that they had a great deal of
influence on the operations of the camp and they wanted to
impress their superiors?
Sgt. Sharps. That is right.
Senator Potter. Do you have anything else you would like to
add that hasn't been covered by the prison conditions at Seoul?
Sgt. Sharps. Not at Seoul, no, sir.
Senator Potter. Then you were on the march after the
landing, they took you out of Seoul?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were you on the same march as Corporal
Kreider?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Do you care to add anything to what he
stated about the march?
Sgt. Sharps. Only that there was food on the march; there
was food available. Pumpkins and apples on the roads at the
side of the roads and it would have been no trouble for them to
let us have them, but they wouldn't let us do it.
Senator Potter. They would not let you have them?
Sgt. Sharps. No, sir, some of the fellows who were hungry,
and the worse ones, would run out into the fields and they
would shoot them. The only time we could get water was when we
would stop and some of the fellows were drinking out of mud
holes. That is the way we got water. We carried water, but they
would not let us have any.
Senator Power. Then you arrived at Pyongyang?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes.
Senator Potter. Were you confined in the same place as
Corporal Kreider?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And do you have anything you would like to
add to that?
Sgt. Sharps. I know they had a sick room, a special sick
room, and they didn't set the room up; we did. We kept the
people that couldn't move in this one particular room, and in
this room when they told us we were going to move again, and we
were going to the Manchurian border, the people in this room
could not move and they were weak and the guards came in and
they killed almost all of them with their rifle butts. They
refused to let us carry them because they were in a hurry.
Senator Potter. They would hit them in the head with a
rifle butt?
Sgt. Sharps. They would hit them in the head, or any part
that they could just hit. They hit them all over.
I know of one case of a man in charge who begged them not
to kill the people and they did anyway.
Senator Potter. Were you there at the time?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Then they moved you out of there when the
Allied march got closer?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What happened? Were you placed aboard a
train?
Sgt. Sharps. They placed us aboard a train.
Senator Potter. And were you in the tunnel massacre?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Will you relate your own experience there?
Sgt. Sharps. In a process of about five days, I don't know
exactly how many days, but we left Pyongyang and we arrived at
this Sunchon. The train was put inside of a tunnel to keep our
planes from tearing it up. They told us that they were going to
feed us, and they were going to take us out in groups of
thirties or forties, take us to individual Korean homes and
feed us.
We went outside and they took my particular group into a
little ditch outside there and all of the fellows sat down and
they had bowls with them and they thought they were going to
eat. I heard a rifle bolt slide forward and I looked around and
I jumped up and I was the first one to jump. They shot us and
when they shot me, it spun me around and the people started to
falling on top of me and I would say for twenty minutes they
fired. When they had finished firing they came around with
their rifle butts and checking the people to see if they were
dead.
Senator Potter. If they thought they weren't dead, they
bayoneted them?
Sgt. Sharps. Three of my ribs were broken.
Senator Potter. With a rifle butt?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes.
Senator Potter. Where were you hit?
Sgt. Sharps. In the arms and legs.
Senator Potter. They had assumed that you were dead?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Or they would have finished you off?
Sgt. Sharps. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What happened after that? How did you get
away?
Sgt. Sharps. After they left; after they had done.
Senator Potter. Apparently they left pretty quickly after
they did the killing.
Sgt. Sharps. They did. It is my opinion they took a train
and went further north; I don't know. But I crawled away and
there were seven in the group of the thirty or forty that they
didn't kill outright. I understand some of them died later but
they didn't kill them outright. There were two of us that could
move and we crawled away and we waited until the American
forces came in and I weighed 165 pounds upon capture and I
think that I weighed less than one hundred when they found me.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, I want to say to you and to all
of the others who have testified so far, that you certainly
experienced treatment that is beyond the realm of civilized
thinking.
If you have anything, as a result of your experience, that
you would like to comment on concerning the Communist
doctrines, please do so. Do you think the Communists in the
United States are much different than the Communists elsewhere?
Sgt. Sharps. They tried to teach us communism, and even the
people that were masters at teaching it, they couldn't put it
across. I don't think that there was any reason, any reason at
all, why anybody should be a Communist.
I have my own opinion of them and it is not very good. I
think anybody that is a Communist in a great country like we
have is worse than what I had to fight.
Senator Potter. Thank you.
We will call Mr. Milano.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. MILANO
Senator Potter. Will you identify yourself for the record?
Mr. Milano. William L. Milano, 7056 Regal, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.
Senator Potter. When did you go to Korea?
Mr. Milano. July 10th, with the 27th Infantry, 25th
Division.
Senator Potter. What were the circumstances under which you
were captured?
Mr. Milano. Well, on November 6th we got orders to go out
on a patrol, I would say fifty miles southwest of Kaeson, and
we were supposed to get in contact with them and find out their
strength.
We left in the morning about six o'clock on November 6th,
two platoons. About eleven o'clock we met these two South
Korean policemen which they told us up to two days ago there
was enemy around here. We dismounted our jeeps and the drivers
followed behind us and we went on patrol; we walked.
Senator Potter. What type of platoon were you with, a rifle
platoon?
Mr. Milano. Reconnaissance platoon, and we have one platoon
from K Company and they were supporting us.
Senator Potter. What was your duty and rank?
Mr. Milano. A scout and driver.
Senator Potter. All right, go ahead.
Mr. Milano. We dismounted and there was a bridge where you
could see they must have put a grenade to it and blow half of
it away, and so we had to go under the gully and so we did, and
we walked for about, I would say, half a mile, and the jeeps
followed us--the whole convoy was about a mile--and we were
separated and as we walked along on the left we saw three
civilians with their hands tied behind their back. You could
tell they were just shot because you could see it was fresh
blood, maybe a couple of hours before that.
Senator Potter. It was three South Korean civilians?
Mr. Milano. Yes. So we went up, I would say a good mile,
and still nothing. So our platoon leader told us to jump in the
jeeps and it was like the first squad. There was a hill here
and a hill there and we had to go around a bend. The mortars
was about a mile in back of us and we were all spread out and
so we jumped in the jeep.
Senator Potter. It was Communist mortars?
Mr. Milano. It was ours, it was in case we got into
trouble. So we got in the jeep and we turned the bend and then
they hit us, and they were right on top of us.
Back at the platoon of mortars, they could hit first, and
they sucked us in a mile, and this major said there were about
two thousand of them. This was during the push.
So we dismounted from the jeeps and we hit for the ditch. I
would say they had us pinned down there for about three hours
and you could hear them talking and they just had us cut right
in with that machine gunfire.
About two o'clock they throw a Banzai attack, four or five
hundred of them and they overrun us. They took thirteen
prisoners and the ones who were wounded were left there and
couldn't walk.
They marched us around a bend and as soon as we got around
the bend they had some officers there and they told us to
strip, so we did. They took our shoes and everything except our
pair of fatigues. They got about four guards with burp guns and
they told us--nobody could speak English then--to march and so
we did. I figured we marched for a good hour and we marched
about ten miles.
On the left there was a house and they took us in there and
they had their medics there and we had some wounded and they
put clean bandages on our wounded and they gave us a pair of
North Korean shoes and North Korean jacket, and they gave us
apples and they gave us cigarettes.
So I figured we stayed there for about half an hour. Then
the guards, they could only motion because they couldn't speak
English, and they motioned this way. It was like a dried-up
gully there was a village and they took us down there. They
lined us up outside and seven or eight officers came out.
Senator Potter. That was in the little village?
Mr. Milano. Yes, sir, and seven or eight officers came out
and still the interpreter didn't come yet and so they took us
inside a big hut, and they had guards all around us. So after a
while a civilian came in and we had two officers with us at the
time. The civilian told the officers that he was a North Korean
officer and he would like to ask me a few questions.
Senator Potter. He could speak English?
Mr. Milano. Yes, good, too. All during the interrogation,
he would say to the officer, ``Are you hungry'' and he must
have said it seven times, and like he would skip around and he
would say you shut up. Like he asked me ``how old'' was I, and
I told him nineteen years old and he asked another guy what
grade of school he was in. And one officer he would ask were
any Chinese Communists in Korea yet?
Senator Potter. One of those captured was an officer?
Mr. Milano. He said he was. He asked another officer who
was the greater man, Stalin or Truman.
Senator Potter. I am trying to figure out this civilian who
was acting as interpreter. Was he asking these questions of the
prisoners, of you and other prisoners?
Mr. Milano. Yes, and he was asking the officers.
Senator Potter. Did you have officers?
Mr. Milano. A platoon leader and an artillery officer. He
was asking us such questions as where was your regiment, and
how many tanks and how many men. They didn't tell them anything
and that was going on for about an hour and a half, and I
figure about seven times he said ``Are you hungry?'' The
officer said ``yes'' and he said ``We have nothing but rice''
and the officer said that would be all right and so he said ``I
will bring you back in the morning, and we will question you
again.''
Before he took us out, this other officer that didn't speak
English, he looked like he was in charge, and he told everybody
to empty their pockets out which we did. We had our dog-tags
still on and we took them off and laid them down. As we walked
out of the hut, two guards walked with you and I was the last
one out and I only had one guard and he walked out with me and
so the North Korean interpreter said he would bring you back in
the morning and question you again. He said he was going to
take us to chow.
As we were walking along, he gave an order or something and
so they started marching us and we went around the bend and
there was a hill, and the North Koreans were standing there.
About thirty of them. Most of them with burp guns and rifles.
Senator Power. Were they North Korean military soldiers?
Mr. Milano. Yes, from the North Korean green uniforms on
and all.
However, the other officer must have given a command in
Korean, for what he said I don't know, but, say I am facing
this way, I heard a bolt go back and I went like this, and he
fired and caught me in the right hand and threw me, and as it
did I figured the blood hit me in the face, and he took another
shot and he hit me underneath the leg and just took a piece of
skin away and it was getting near night, like twilight, and you
couldn't see too good. The third shot he took and hit me right
behind the foot and I just felt the dirt and all.
Still, after the shooting was over, the officer must have
said something and they started laughing. The guard I had come
over and kicked me once, but never checked me, and he took the
shoes I had on, the rubber shoes and he took them off. So they
just laughed and they started walking away. So after they
turned the bend I got up and I went and checked all the rest of
the twelve guys and they were all dead and I thought it was
best to get out of there. So I went over a hillside, 150 yards,
and down on the main road, and the North Koreans, I was
seventy-five yards up on an angle and the North Koreans were
walking there and I figured I had better hide for a while and I
started losing a lot of blood and I was getting weak and I
couldn't move.
Before that, though, they must have gone back and shot them
again to make sure they were all dead right after I got away
because I heard shooting right in back of the hill again.
Senator Potter. Right where you had been shot the first
place?
Mr. Milano. I found myself, it was on a little hill about
seventy-five yards, cornstalks and I got in the middle of them
because I figured they couldn't see me and I got there. I woke
up three days later; two civilians were waking me up and I
looked up because all during these three days I was delirious
and I was dreaming I had a cold glass of beer, and I looked up
and you know I didn't know for sure and I didn't know how to
speak Korean.
I said in Japanese, I asked them for some water and a
cigarette and something to eat, and then I went back to sleep.
I don't know how long after it was that they came and woke me
up and they had shoes for me and bandages and water, and they
had rice and some corn silk to smoke.
They were trying to tell me--I didn't know it at first--
that the Americans were out in the main road, my own regiment
was pushing there. They had come about fifty miles and I just
wanted to get away from there. I couldn't walk because both of
my feet froze, and my hand froze.
Senator Potter. What time of the year was this?
Mr. Milano. It was November 6th.
Senator Potter. It was cold?
Mr. Milano. Yes, it wasn't snowing yet. So I said, the guy
must have been about fifty years old and I don't know if you
have ever seen them, the way they carry their wood, and they
picked me up there and just put me on his back and carried me
to the main road. There was an American platoon setting up a
roadblock and they called a jeep and took me right to the
medics.
Senator Potter. How far did this Korean have to carry you?
Mr. Milano. I figure it was a good four miles.
Senator Potter. You were the only one that survived?
Mr. Milano. There was another kid, I heard, that they took
out and he wasn't there when the interrogation was going on,
and he was taken prisoner with me. They called him to drive one
of our captured jeeps and when I heard from a buddy of mine, he
said that they told him they would give him one hundred yards
start, and he outrun them and Australians picked him up fifteen
days later.
Senator Potter. They were using him just for sport?
Mr. Milano. Yes, but he outrun them.
Senator Potter. Thank you kindly for coming down here, and
giving us this story.
Do you have anything you would like to add of your own
volition? You have seen the type of enemy first-hand.
There is no doubt in your mind that an officer gave the
order?
Mr. Milano. Yes. And I think the interpreter mostly there,
the way he smiled, he knew they were going to take us out there
as soon as we left the building. It wasn't four minutes later
when they opened up.
Senator Potter. So you think----
Mr. Milano. They must have known I had escaped because when
I was in the building they counted thirteen, and this major, I
met him in San Antonio, Texas, and he was in charge of the 1st
or 2nd Battalion and he said he took a company of men on patrol
and he didn't know if the enemy was on patrol, and they found
the bodies all buried, all unrecognizable. It said they buried
them about three feet.
Mr. O'Donnell. I think we can let the record show that the
War Crimes Division did actually find twelve dead American PW's
at the particular scene of this atrocity.
Senator Potter. Thank you.
We will recess now until 1:30.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m. a recess was taken until 1:30
p.m. the same day.]
afternoon session
[2:15 p.m.]
Senator Potter. The hearing is reconvened.
I would like to call Sergeant Treffery.
TESTIMONY OF SGT. WENDELL TREFFERY
Senator Potter. Sergeant Treffery, will you identify
yourself for the record and give your name and the unit that
you are attached to now?
Sgt. Treffery. My name is Sergeant Wendell Treffery, RA
115660, presently at Army Hospital, Walton, Massachusetts.
Senator Potter. What is your home address?
Sgt. Treffery. Todd-Hollow Road, Terryville, Connecticut.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, could you tell the committee when
you went to Korea, and what unit you were assigned to?
Sgt. Treffery. October 1949 I volunteered for Far East
command and the last part of November I started for Japan and
landed in Japan Christmas Eve. I left San Francisco in
December.
I was immediately sent to northern Japan, to Mikado,
northern Japan. There I was a ski instructor for the first two
months, first part of '50.
Senator Potter. You were a skiing instructor?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, and from the last of February of 1950
to May '50 I was in pharmacist school down in southern Japan.
I went back to northern Japan when the war broke out. That
is where I was.
Senator Potter. When did you go into Korea?
Sgt. Treffery. I landed with the Seventh Division, at
Inchon.
Senator Potter. What were the circumstances under which you
were captured and what was your duty at the time?
Sgt. Treffery. I was medical aid man attached to Major
Company, 31st Regiment, Seventh Division.
Senator Potter. How were you captured, Sergeant?
Sgt. Treffery. Sir, on November 29, at six o'clock in the
morning, the 1st Battalion of 31st Regiment was attached to the
1st Marine Division and we had driven up from Hamhung to 1st
Marine Division CP, which was almost to the Chosen Reservoir.
We were attached to them and kind of formed a company,
battalion, to head for the reservoir to help the men out who
were stuck up there, surrounded by the Chinese.
Senator Potter. This is what time of the year?
Sgt. Treffery. November 29, sir, six o'clock in the
morning. We pushed up on attack on the morning of the 29th, 1st
Battalion, 31st Regiment when we went up through the valleys
and the 1st Marines took the hills. We got up about four miles
and the Marines came down out of the hills and we loaded on the
trucks and headed for the Chosen Reservoir.
We got along about two miles, just getting dark, and a
machine gun opened up on us from the right and one of the
aircraft dropped a napalm on it and destroyed that. We
continued about a mile and everything opened on us from both
sides, front, and both sides.
We disembarked and took cover and started to fight. That
fight lasted all night long, up until six o'clock in the
morning. During the night our airplanes overhead dropped flares
trying to spot us and trying to give us a helping hand, but
they couldn't find us.
In our convoy several trucks had caught fire and lit our
area up and we were sitting ducks for the Chinese. Six o'clock
in the morning came and it is about 120 of us walking, most of
us wounded, and there is about 350 to start with.
A marine major had answered a call of the Chinese
interpreter from the army, and he hollered down for us to
surrender. And because we had no chance, we were very out-
numbered and the marine major talked it over with the other
officers, of what was left, and decided it would be best if
they gave us a good deal to surrender to them because we had no
chance.
So the Chinese agreed with the marine major to turn all of
the wounded back which we had quite a few of, to our lines if
we would surrender to them. The major thought it was a good
deal and so he surrendered us.
The Chinese moved in and before they moved in everybody had
a chance to destroy their weapons and everything like that,
valuable to them. The Chinese got us into two files to march us
up to two cabins on the mountain. There we stayed until
December 1. It was about seven o'clock in the morning, and we
couldn't build any fires because the Chinese figured we would
get spotted.
About six o'clock on the first of December 1950, they
started us back the same way we came up, and past the convoy
that had been ambushed the night before that, and to take us on
the way to march us north. They backtracked us by a convoy and
our wounded we had left there a couple of days before were
frozen. It had snowed and this snow had covered the bodies.
Senator Potter. They hadn't evacuated the wounded?
Sgt. Treffery. No, sir.
Senator Potter. After they said they would?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. You were captured by the Chinese?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. When you were captured, did they leave you
your clothing?
Sgt. Treffery. No, sir, they stripped us of our outer
clothing, heavy clothing, and we had most of us to wear
fatigues, and it was twenty-five to thirty below zero; it was
pretty cold. We came down out of the cabins, by the convoy and
as we went by, I found two rubber boots on the road, both for
the left foot and I picked them up and put them on.
Senator Potter. You didn't have shoes at the time?
Sgt. Treffery. No, sir, not at the time.
Senator Potter. They had taken your shoes?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, all of our heavy clothing, except
fatigues. We marched the first night, we bunked down in some
hay on some snow and we kept warm by huddling together. Then
the next day they marched us mostly by night and it is only
about fifty miles from where we were captured to the Yalu River
and we marched eighteen days.
The second night they put us in some cow stalls, pig pens,
about six or seven inches between the logs. They put us in
there to sleep and that night I froze my feet and the third
morning they let us out immediately to start marching again. So
we marched and I kept on marching until about the 17th day, and
all during that march, all of the skin came off and nothing but
bones left on my feet.
But one time my mother told me, keep your chin up and
things will get better, and so I never could see dying over
there.
So I always kept going and I had to keep going, and put my
mind to get going, and we got to Kanggye.
Senator Potter. How far is that from the Yalu River?
Sgt. Treffery. The town is closer than sixty miles; it is
pretty close to the Yalu River.
Senator Potter. The Seventh Division was the farthest
advanced of any division up there?
Sgt. Treffery. We got to the Yalu at one time. We got to
Kanggye and during the march the men who were wounded, I had a
medical aid kit but all of the bandages I had used except for
three boxes of morphine and a lot of the wounded men, you
couldn't administer morphine on account of head wounds and
stomach wounds or any wound like that, you couldn't give them
morphine. Morphine makes you weak and you might kill them.
I had three boxes of morphine left over and I had them
under my belt. The Chinese never confiscated those because they
never found them. On the march I used it on these guys who were
wounded pretty bad in the legs and arms and the hip. So I used
up all of my morphine on those wounded guys, but they never
made the march. They were left behind and the men who were too
weak to go, they just dropped out and you didn't dare look
behind because you were afraid to get a bayonet in the back,
and you would hear a shot about two minutes after they dropped
out, but you didn't look behind to see what happened.
After arriving at Kanggye, very few of us were left, about
a third of them didn't make it. After arriving in Kanggye, they
were dying off one after the other, and the food was getting
very small, a bowl of maize. And you gentlemen are probably
familiar with maize, or sorghum you call it in the Middle West.
You grow it for cattle and pigs and they feed us a little bowl
of that in the morning and a little bowl at night.
Senator Potter. Was it hot?
Sgt. Treffery. Sometimes hot, sir, and sometimes we would
got these sorghum balls of frozen ice. Above all we tried to
get some water and we had to march, and you get awful thirsty
and they wouldn't give you any water.
So we were walking down the road and there was a little
water running down off the mountain frozen in the middle of the
road, and I kind of kicked my heel into it and got a mouthful
before they grabbed me. That kept up and we arrived in Kanggye
and it wasn't too many of us left and after we once got there
they were still dying off from malnutrition and some men had
pneumonia. They kept us there until the first of January 1951.
Senator Potter. How many started this march?
Sgt. Treffery. One hundred twenty.
Senator Potter. How many finished it?
Sgt. Treffery. I would say about eighty. They kept us there
until the first part of January 1951, and the Chinese came
around one night, twelve o'clock, and said all sick and wounded
were going to move to the hospital. We knew better than that.
We figured they had one under the ground. There was some train
tunnel. Everybody had to go and there was no other choice, and
everybody crawled out to those ox sleds and they hauled us all
night long and arrived in a little valley, just south of
Kanggye, I would say about five miles south of Kanggye.
They kept us there until April 25, and during that time we
were there, it was about eighty of us went there and after
arriving in Kanggye there were other PW's there besides us and
eighty of us went to this so-called hospital, and while we were
there there was about fifty of us come out; about thirty died
there.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, would you hold up a minute?
Sgt. Treffery. All right.
[A short recess was taken.]
Senator Potter. I am sorry, Sergeant. Can we proceed?
Sgt. Treffery. They took all of the sick and wounded to
this valley and they kept us there until April 25, and during
the time we were there, the first three days we were there they
gave us medical attention, once every day, for the first three
days, and they gave us half decent chow.
Senator Potter. Were you billeted in buildings?
Sgt. Treffery. We were four in a building, a mud hut. I was
in charge of the other three, like a squad leader. So they said
``you must take care of these other three'' and I couldn't even
take care of myself. So I said, ``Okay.''
One of them had frozen feet like myself, and the other two
there was nothing wrong with the other two. But by April, all
of the other three had died off, one by one. For the first
three days I was unconscious, and I was talking out of my head
and talking crazy like. Every man died that I have seen before
they die they start talking crazy, and when I came to, what
made me come to I don't know, when I did come to the guys told
me that I was accusing them of stealing my cigarettes and my
food and I didn't have any to steal. So I said don't pay any
attention to me, I didn't know what I was talking about.
One died off and we didn't know what was wrong with him,
and he was eating this little bowl of chowder, and as each meal
would come along he would eat less and less, and I said you had
better eat. It isn't fit for the pigs, but you must eat it. And
he said ``I can't do it,'' and one night he didn't eat hardly
anything and he said ``I can't eat it.'' I said ``Did you say
your prayers?'' And he said ``yes,'' and he went to sleep and
when we woke up in the morning he was dead.
The next one he had frozen feet, a marine. I kept telling
him to take care of your feet, and I had a comforter and we had
one apiece, and I had a pair of fatigues which I ripped up and
made bandages. Twice a day I could take a comforter to take
care of my own feet and absorb the puss and blood coming out of
my foot and use those fatigues I ripped up for bandages. Twice
a day I would take the dirty cotton and throw it away and put
on some new cotton and by spring I didn't have any cotton left
in my blanket.
So he said ``No,'' his blanket at the bottom was getting
soggy, and I said you had better take care of your feet. That
poison is going to backtrack up in your system and kill you,
and he said ``I can't take care of my feet,'' and I couldn't
figure it out. So he died.
There was one other man left and he got malnutrition and he
got beriberi and all kinds of diseases and about a week before
they moved us, he died too and left me there all by myself.
So I asked this Korean woman, how about some water to
drink, and I could speak a little, a few words and she told me
to go out there to the spring water running out of the rice
paddies, and the rice paddies, they use human manure in the
rice paddies. I said ``if I drink that it will surely kill
me.''
So as soon as spring came, I went out in the fields and dug
up some dandelions and different kinds of greens and took them
and got a steel pot and some chips out of the door guard, and I
boiled those greens down and I ate the greens and drank the
juice. I did that about a week and it really helped me out.
April 25 came around. Chinese came up with ox carts and I
am getting a little ahead of myself here.
On January 15 this Korean woman came around and was
supposed to be a nurse and she was about eighteen years old and
she had a bag here and she had a big pair of shears and she had
some newspapers stuffed in that little bag, and she asked me
what was wrong with me. So I stuck my feet out from under the
blanket and it was nothing but bones, and she told me to lay
down on my back. So I did what she told me and so another guy
came with her to assist her and sat on my chest and she started
clipping off my toes with this big pair of shears, it looked
like hedge shears.
Senator Potter. Clipped off your toes with those shears?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes. She left two big toes on my feet, and I
think I was making quite a bit of noise, after she did that.
Senator Potter. There was no anesthetic?
Sgt. Treffery. No, and she took some dirty newspaper and
she did that and it was bleeding, and put it over the nub, thin
dirty newspaper, and tied it with a piece of string and I
looked at her and I cursed her in English up and down and she
didn't understand me; a good thing.
After she left I tore that off and I took cotton out of my
blanket. After she left, they never did come back. The two guys
with me they died off and on April 25 the Chinese came and
picked us up, and then I weighed seventy pounds. I found out
after I got back, this camp here, camp number one, they brought
us up there, on April 28 we arrived there. They took us up in a
truck, it took us three days to get there.
After I arrived there, I saw a lot of my buddies, and I
thought they had just died off and I never thought they existed
anymore. It was like a reunion to see them again.
We got there and they put about fifteen of us in a room,
about fifteen by fifteen, or fifteen or twenty of us in a room,
and we were so snug together we didn't hardly breathe, and all
of that winter I had been under the blanket for quite a few
months and my legs up under me so far. By the time spring came,
the muscles of my legs had drawn up and I couldn't straighten
out my legs.
Senator Potter. What was the name of the camp where they
cut off your toes?
Sgt. Treffery. This didn't have a name, it was just a
little valley about five miles south of Kanggye.
Senator Potter. Were there many other prisoners?
Sgt. Treffery. Ninety of us sick and wounded. It was about
thirty of them died and there were about fifty left.
Senator Potter. Did you give the place any name? Was it
known?
Sgt. Treffery. We called it ``Massacre Valley,'' but the
PW's came back, they had another valley they named that name,
so you might get the two mixed up.
After arriving in Camp 1, April 28, 1951, a lot of my
friends were there, and the Chinese said they were going to
give us sick call. It was to dress our wounds. I still had two
big toes on, nothing but bones. Then they waited about eight to
ten days before they gave us sick call. They kept with excuses
and didn't have the stuff to do it or something was wrong.
That second night after I was there they fed us dough
balls. They were little balls of dough, strictly dough, and
made out of rice flour. Some of the guys there ate thirty or
forty of those; four of them died. Some went down to the creek
behind camp and ate a lot of cold water and just swelled up;
three or four or five of them died.
After that they started feeding us cracked corn, and just a
little bit of rice, you could hardly notice it. From that corn
a lot of guys got dysentery, and your insides would be so
scratched up and bleeding, and infected, and myself, I got this
dysentery.
So many of the guys, I would say at least ten or fifteen a
day just laying around the ground, too weak to get up, and I
was too weak to help them and you couldn't help anybody. They
were so weak, a couple of days after they would be dead. About
eight hundred died there in about four months time. One guy
helped carry a fellow up on the hill and the next day he would
go out.
Senator Potter. What do you mean by carrying them on the
top?
Sgt. Treffery. They planted them all on the top of a big
hill, and they would bury them in a three-foot grave, and the
first rain storm would wash all of the dirt off and it would
leave the body open to the air. Then the dogs would take over,
and you see a lot of dogs up around there.
About the last of May I got dysentery pretty bad and I
couldn't sleep in a house. Everybody had dysentery. I was
sleeping in mud huts and they couldn't get out quick enough and
the place would be an awful mess. So I decided one thing, I
would go out in the air raid shelter and sleep, and my first
sergeant and I slept out there. He and I were pretty sick and
we had dysentery, and we slept out in the air raid shelter. It
was a big hole and we would get out of bed at least, and then
in the morning clean it up, and that is the best you could do.
So we slept out there until about the last of June. He was
taken to the hospital and they threatened to take me to the
hospital on account of my feet, those two big toe bones
sticking out. So they took me up to the hospital after my first
sergeant went up there on sick call. So I went up there about a
week after he went up there and after I got there I made up my
mind to see him and see how he was making out. So I got up
there and it looks like a Japanese castle on the side of the
mountain; alongside the castle they had stalls which looked
like race horse stalls, and there were about like a small box.
There were two men in there, my first sergeant and another
guy and they were both naked, and the last of June and July is
pretty hot weather and the big green flies flying around there,
and if you didn't have enough strength to brush them off, they
would plant eggs and maggots would start. And my first sergeant
and this other guy was lying naked on the floor and I opened
the door and saw them both lying there and I said ``What is the
matter?'' I said ``put something over you, those blow flies are
giving you the works,'' and he couldn't even talk to me he was
too weak, both lying there.
While I was there I saw the maggots working on them,
rectum, and the eyes and ears, and the maggots would start to
come out of the eyes. I said, ``My God, something has got to be
done,'' and I went to the Chinese doctor, and I said ``Can't
you do something?'' And he would say ``later date, later date,
later.''
I said ``They won't be here later,'' and you couldn't talk
sense to them.
Eventually I heard that both of them died, and along with
many, many more up to about 90 percent or 95 percent of the men
up there died. Very few of them came out of the hospital, and
so they threatened to take me up there. This Chinese doctor
came in and he said you go hospital, and I said ``for what?''
He said ``your feet'' and he leaves the room for about five
minutes, just long enough for me to break them off. And around
the base of the bones it was decaying, around the base of the
big toe bone; and all of our hair was along down to our
shoulders, and the fingernails were long and dirty. So I took a
long finger nail and punched it around the bone and I broke it
off at the base.
Senator Potter. You broke off your own big toe?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, and I broke them off. As I gave them a
big push to break off, they would break off and go across the
floor. The Chinese doctor came in and he said ``you go to
hospital'' and I said ``nothing doing, my feet were okay,'' and
he said ``let me look.'' And he took a look and I had the bones
broke off, and he said ``okay'' and so he went outside the door
and never bothered me. I figured if I went to the hospital I
would never get out of it.
In July, after July 15, the peace talks started up in
Panmunjom and things started to improve after the peace talks.
The Chinese figured so many men had died, they couldn't afford
to let any more die because they would have nothing to turn
back, and so they started feeding us a little better, and they
started giving us pork once a week. You got a piece of pork
about the size of a quarter, and you were lucky. The first
piece of pork I wouldn't swallow it; I chewed on it.
Things started to improve quite a bit after that.
In July, about the 28th, around the 20th, around the last
part of July, all of the sergeants a way up in the northern
camp, Chingson, they kept us all there until August of 1952,
and we were all at Camp 4. It isn't marked on the map.
Up until that time things started improving quite a bit and
not too many men were dying like before. We had sick call quite
regularly. In August of 1953 all of the sergeants were moved to
Camp Fuller. I went along with the sergeants because I had made
a promotion in October, the first part of November of 1950, and
so my first sergeant notified me and I went along with the
sergeants.
We went to Camp Fuller in August of 1952. When we got there
the Chinese wouldn't mark the camp. We asked them why and they
said UN didn't recognize it. I said ``What did you move us here
for, you are endangering our lives.'' So they said they could
bring us down there for more education, we weren't educated
enough, and they were moving us to a new university.
Senator Potter. Had you, prior to this time at the other
camp, been getting indoctrinations?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, all of the time, sir.
On May Day, 1952, we almost had a revolution there among
the POW's, quite a revolution almost. They were supposed to put
a play for us down on the square, and after they had made these
Communist lectures to us, and in going down to the square they
were going to make us carry the red flag for them. So, after
everybody filled out to go down to the square, about two miles
away, down the highway, they brought this red flag out to the
men in front of the column, and so when everybody saw that red
flag everybody scattered and then they called the regimental
commander up and they were going to have quite a stink raised
about it.
So the regimental commander said you men, students, fall
out, you won't have to carry the red flag. So we fell out, and
we marched almost to the square, and out comes the red flag
again and we couldn't turn back. We were outside the compound.
They gave it to one guy from Mulberry, Kansas and he took it
over and stands it against a telephone pole.
The Communists said you must carry this and he said ``I
ain't going to carry that'' and so they didn't force anything
on us at that time and they started marching us to the square.
Just when we got to the square we started singing God Bless
America and they didn't like that and we marched in the square
singing and the Chinese said ``shut up, shut up'' and nobody
shut up; everybody would keep singing.
So we were going to have a little play. The GI's were
putting on a little play just before the lectures and so this
one British guy got up in front of us on this stage and he
started telling us a little joke about the three soldiers going
on to the Golden Gate and St. Peter was going to let them in
and one GI went there and he said St. Peter said ``Who are
you'' and the GI said I am from the United States and St. Peter
said ``All right.''
And the Englishman came up and he said ``Where are you
from?'' St. Peter said ``Where are you from?'' and he said I am
from England, and St. Peter said ``Enter.''
And finally a representative from the Chinese Communist
forces came up and St. Peter said ``Where are you from?'' And
he said ``I am from China''' and he said, ``Go back, go back,
we can't cook Kemchun rice here for one.''
They didn't like that, and they threw him off the stage and
told him they were going to put him in jail.
So they went on with the lectures and everybody was really
riled. They said bring so and so back and they said do you want
to hear the rest of the play? And we said no, we want to go
back, and they started in, and they were pulling their hair
out.
So everybody started to get kind of hot under the collar
and some guards jumped out with some burp guns and they started
to open up on us and everybody figured we'd better stop, they
had the gun then. We all figured we had better go back and so
we went back and two days later the Chinese regimental
commander saw the mistake he made and so he came up and tried
to apologize to us, and nobody would listen to him.
And he told us about the facts; they always mixed up the
facts.
This one day, after our bomber had bombed us because our
camp wasn't marked, and it was October 13, our ``Bed-check
Charley'' was quite familiar with us and he raided us one night
and he bombed us because he didn't know. The Chinese cook was
cooking in the Chinese kitchen for the Chinese troops, and a
light came out and he swoops down and drops a few eggs on the
kitchen, and drops some on us, too.
The Chinese didn't like that, so about a week later, two
weeks later, the Chinese bring some dynamite around and planted
them in these bomb craters. They dug the hole a little deeper
and planted some dynamite in the holes. So they exploded the
dynamite and while they are doing that, they are taking
pictures.
Up until then they were always saying we make the facts,
and we don't lie, and we tell you the truth and this certain
day they really showed their true colors. Everybody was razzing
them and it was getting under their skin.
Senator Potter. What they were doing, they were taking
dynamite and putting it in some of these craters and exploding
them and taking pictures of it for propaganda purposes?
Sgt. Treffery. ``Why is American imperialists bombing their
own troops,'' that is what they said, because the Chinese
didn't even tell the Americans where we were so that in the
propaganda they had to put the dynamite in and blow the bomb
craters out.
After that we always razzed them, you make the facts, we
saw the facts. They would turn around because they knew we were
getting under their skin. We stayed there until August of 1952
and they moved us to Camp 4.
Why they moved us there we had a pretty good idea because
there was a camp of privates right next to us, and Communists
liked to pick on the privates and they could use their
education. They moved us out because we were telling the
privates to lay off.
They moved us to Camp 4 and while we were there they really
threw the work at us, very little sleep and very little chow.
That lasted about a mouth or two.
Senator Potter. What type of work did they have you do?
Sgt. Treffery. Wood details, I was in a crippled squad, and
some guys were wounded and couldn't do any work, and they put
us in that crippled squad. The other fellows had to build walls
six feet high to keep the cold out, and it wasn't even
sensible.
They fed us turnips, cabbage, and that stuff would be
burned up. They kept us there until about Christmas of 1952.
Then they gave us a pair of American-made socks which I found
out later the Red Cross had sent in to us.
Senator Potter. Did conditions get better?
Sgt. Treffery. As time went on they started improving a
great deal.
Senator Potter. Now I would like to ask you a little more
about the type of propaganda that they used. Did they give you
literature and require you to read certain literature?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, sir, they gave us so-called New York
Daily Worker, and San Francisco Daily Worker.
Senator Potter. You got the Daily Worker?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, and we got them about every two months.
And it would take letters four months to come through.
Senator Potter. Did you notice at any of the camps, did any
civilians go into the camp to give lectures?
Sgt. Treffery. No, we saw Russians on many occasions, and I
saw two Russian pilots after they were shot down, and I saw
Russian ack-ack man go through our compound in the daytime.
Senator Potter. What were they doing there?
Sgt. Treffery. Well, the ack-ack guns, and truckloads of
Russians manning the ack-ack, and we would holler Russian at
them and they would look around or wave a hand and there wasn't
anything oriental to them, sir.
Senator Potter. What type of questions would they ask? Did
they interrogate you?
Sgt. Treffery. They interrogated me once, and I told them I
was a medic and I knew nothing that they would want to know
about pills or bed pans or anything like that, and they didn't
bother me.
Senator Potter. Did they ask you any questions about your
home life?
Sgt. Treffery. Oh, yes, we had to write an autobiography,
everybody had to write one, or go to the turnip hole, and that
is like a jail; very cold.
I wrote an autobiography and they wanted to know if I
volunteered for Korea, and I told them yes, and they wanted to
know why and I said I like wars. They said you are a warmonger.
Then they furnished us with one handful of tobacco every
seven days, and no paper. When we had to write this biography
they furnished us with two paper sheets and we said we needed
more than that, because we would tear it up and use it for
cigarette paper. By the time they gave us six or seven sheets
we would write one, and they would say what happened to the
other paper, and we would say it was just a sample, just
scratch paper.
Senator Potter. You used the other paper for cigarette
paper?
Sgt. Treffery. That is right.
Mr. O'Donnell. While you were at Massacre Valley, Sergeant,
what did they give you to eat?
Sgt. Treffery. Very small bowl of maize, once in the
morning and once in the evening.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did they ever give you any dog food?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, I had dog one time.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was Massacre Valley? Was that a
collecting point for wounded prisoners, primarily?
Sgt. Treffery. No, we were the only ones that were there.
It wasn't isolated cases, as I figure it.
Mr. O'Donnell. Over and above the fact that your feet were
frozen, at the time you were captured, were you wounded?
Sgt. Treffery. I had a shrapnel wound in my chest.
Mr. O'Donnell. While you were at Camp 1, PW Camp 1, you say
about eight hundred prisoners of our boys died there?
Sgt. Treffery. In about four-months time, yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. If they had received, I know that you are
not a doctor, but if they had received proper food and medical
attention, would they have died?
Sgt. Treffery. I would say about 99 percent of them would
be alive.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know anything about the prison
confinement at PW Camp 1 and 4? If someone made a minor
infraction or major infraction of the rules, what would happen
to them?
Sgt. Treffery. They would be put in jail and once or twice
a day they would be stood on one foot and slapped down by
Koreans called in off the street.
Mr. O'Donnell. Can you describe the jail facilities? What
did it appear like?
Sgt. Treffery. I was never in jail, sir, but I had some
buddies who were in jail.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was it like?
Sgt. Treffery. They said in the daytime they would make
them sit with their feet under them and their hands like this
at attention all day, and you would be allowed to go on the
latrine once a day early in the morning, and once or twice a
day they would be stood on one foot and they would call
civilians in off the street and they would be slapped.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know whether any of the boys were
operated on for an experimental purpose?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, I know quite a few instances.
We call it monkey gland, and they cut you here, just right
under your arm, a little slit, and they put some kind of a
gland in there, and I forget what kind of gland. I think it is
a gland out of a pig or chicken liver, and they put it in there
and the Chinese say that would give you better appetite and you
couldn't eat in the first place and I don't know why a better
appetite. It would make you more spry, and give you more pep,
and make you stronger, and they should take some of that
chicken liver.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know what the real purpose was of
these operations?
Sgt. Treffery. Strictly experimenting, that is all I could
figure.
Senator Potter. Was there any bad effect in any of the men?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, I saw a lot of them festering up, and I
know one guy one night took his shirt off and opened up his
arm, it busted open, and it ran down his side and festered.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you observe or do you know of any of our
wounded that were not killed and not buried, but were otherwise
disposed of?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, I got this one pretty first-hand, sir.
About this one GI on the march and he stopped along the road to
go to the latrine, and as he stopped there is a big cliff and
as he was going to the latrine the Chinese guard came and gave
him a kick and he went over the cliff. That is pretty well
true.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know if they ever did it to a group?
Such as ten or thirteen or fourteen men?
Sgt. Treffery. At a time, no.
Senator Potter. I don't care for any names, but while you
were at Camp 1 did they use any American PW's to try to
indoctrinate the rest of the men?
Sgt. Treffery. Oh, yes, sir. What they classify as squad
leaders and platoon sergeants and they would get them to help
them teach us songs and stuff like that.
Senator Potter. They did that under duress, by force, or
what?
Sgt. Treffery. I wouldn't say force, no.
Senator Potter. You would say it was done under force or
not?
Sgt. Treffery. No, I wouldn't say.
Senator Potter. That there were a few?
Sgt. Treffery. They were told to do it and they did it.
Senator Potter. We have heard a lot in the newspapers about
the so-called few progressives.
Sgt. Treffery. Those are ``boyces''; we had a triple A
organization to our camp.
Senator Potter. What is that?
Sgt. Treffery. Triple A organization, and those boys took
care of those progressives.
Senator Potter. How many American troops did we have in
Camp 1?
Sgt. Treffery. At that time in thirty-one it was all mixed
up, and we had 1st Company and 2nd Company and 3rd Company; and
2nd Company included the British, French, Turks, and along with
3rd Company. It was all mixed up.
Senator Potter. Could you estimate the amount of Americans,
would you say it was eleven hundred or one thousand?
Sgt. Treffery. I would say close to that, yes, sir, pretty
close.
Senator Potter. What would be the percentage of number of
so-called progressives?
Sgt. Treffery. I would say one out of a hundred; very small
minority.
Mr. O'Donnell. You mentioned one instance, namely after our
planes were bombing the camp because it was unidentified, that
the Chinese would use this dynamite and build it up as a prop
for propaganda purposes. Do you know of any other instances
where they would take one or more of our PW's and use them for
propaganda purposes? I am thinking in terms of taking them out
and giving them good food and taking photographs of them
eating.
Sgt. Treffery. One certain platoon in 7 Company, right next
to our company, they were called the movie stars.
Senator Potter. They were the ones used for propaganda
purposes?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, and the Chinese made a movie something
like the Steel Helmet, and I saw it posted it on our theaters,
this Korean wearing a steel helmet, and these guys went along
with them and made this movie.
Senator Potter. Have you ever seen this magazine, United
Nations PW's in Korea?
Sgt. Treffery. No, sir, I never have.
Mr. O'Donnell. Let me tell you what this is. This is a
publication which was not put out by the United States, I
assure you, but published by the Chinese Peoples Committee for
World Peace, and it purports to show the excellent treatment
that our PW's received when they were over there. Would you
just take a glance at it?
Sgt. Treffery. Sure.
Senator Potter. How would it be if we let you look this
over for half an hour and we will have someone else come on,
and after that you can come back?
Before you do go I have a couple of more questions I would
like to ask.
In this prison Camp Number 1, did you see any evidence of
the Chinese having any Communist facilities, or having any
medical facilities available, and did they have any medics?
Sgt. Treffery. After the peace talks started up on July 10,
they opened a so-called dispensary, and they had a hospital,
but the hospital I wouldn't put my bugs in. In the dispensary,
you go down there.
Senator Potter. Is it hospital 1 where you were talking
about your sergeant?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. In other words, it wasn't a medical
facility?
Sgt. Treffery. No, I wouldn't classify it as one. In this
dispensary, it was nothing except for a little tape, and a few
bandages, and a very small amount of medicine. If you got
dysentery they gave you two small chocolate pills and if that
didn't do it, it was too bad.
I took some of this sorghum crust and ate it and I figured
salt will heal an external wound pretty quick and why wouldn't
it heal an internal wound? I stole some of them and sucked them
3 or 4 times a day and within a week's time my dysentery was
gone. I don't know whether it was due to the salt or not, but
it was gone.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, did you ever have any
International Red Cross representatives?
Sgt. Treffery. No. They didn't allow Red Cross. They said
they were spies for Americans. They wouldn't allow them in.
Senator Potter. Would you care to answer what is your
physical condition today, Sergeant?
Sgt. Treffery. My physical condition, sir, is pretty good.
My mental condition is excellent.
Senator Potter. You can tell that. You have now the both
feet amputated?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, sir. My left foot is still open, still
getting medical attention on that one.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, you have seen communism first
hand, you spent a great deal of time----
Sgt. Treffery. I studied that every day I was over there.
Senator Potter. Would you have any comments that you would
like to make at this time?
Sgt. Treffery. Yes, sir; I have, I have quite a bit I would
like to say. Every day I was over there I took notice how the
people lived and how they operated. Believe me, it is rotten to
the core. It is no good. The Korean forefathers built the
towns, the streets, and the Chinese came in and they can't go
down the street, the Koreans can't, they have to go around the
mountain. When they leave the town, they have to have certain
passes to know where they are going. They grow a crop in the
springtime and harvest it in the fall and so much of that has
to go to the commissar, whatever it is, we called it City Hall.
Every day they would go into City Hall, take the bags of rice
and so on, and I have a pretty good Korean friend who told me
all of this, and he said they have to go in there and get
permission to sell that, what they are going to sell it for,
how much they are going to get, and what they are going to do
with the money.
If it is of benefit to the government, go ahead and sell
it, and take the money, as long as you benefit the government.
But if that was in the United States, if it is my car, it would
be yours, too. Everything is like that. Strictly it is out, no
good. Myself, what I think of the Communists in the United
States, I wish I had them under my thumb right here. If they
don't like our way of life, send them to hell over to Korea,
and let them eat rice for the next twenty years. Then it they
like rice that good, let them stay over there, otherwise let
them live the way we are living and like it.
It is a lot better than communism. It is a lot better.
Senator Potter. I want to thank you, Sergeant, for telling
us this experience. I know it has been probably an experience
you would like to forget. But there are too many people in our
own country that have forgotten it or also never knew it.
Sgt. Treffery. That is right.
Senator Potter. I think it is well for them to know.
Sgt. Treffery. I would say the biggest majority of the
people don't realize what communism is. But once you get a
taste of it, they will wake up to it.
Senator Potter. You fellows will perform a great service by
letting them know how you care about communism. If you would
like to go through that magazine and afterwards we can discuss
and see if you recognize any of that.
Sgt. Treffery. All right, sir.
Senator Potter. George Matta.
STATEMENT OF SGT. 1ST CLASS GEORGE J. MATTA
Senator Potter. Sergeant, will you identify yourself for
the record, give your name and your unit at the present time.
Sgt. Matta. Master Sergeant George J. Matta, 1202 ASU,
Boston Army Base, Boston, Massachusetts.
Senator Potter. What is your home address?
Sgt. Matta. 15 Grover Avenue, Brockton, Massachusetts.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, would you tell the committee when
you went to Korea and with what unit?
Sgt. Matta. I went to Korea on August 17, 1950, with the
Second Infantry Division, 38th Infantry, D Company. I went over
as a supply sergeant.
Senator Potter. And would you tell the committee the
circumstances under which you were captured?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And your duties at the time.
Sgt. Matta. It was around February 11 that our company or
battalion got surrounded by the Chinese South of Wonju.
Senator Potter. Do you have any idea where that is,
Sergeant? Well, that is all right. Go ahead.
Sgt. Matta. We were up in the front and when we got
surrounded we abandoned most of our vehicles so we could make
it out, we destroyed them, and we were making the march out. We
made it out the night of February 11, about two o'clock when we
actually got surrounded, and then we were fighting our way out.
We fought about three miles out this pass. Then we assembled in
this group, in this valley. We were getting shelled pretty
heavily there so we decided to make it out the best we could. I
went on a three quarter ton truck, one of our machine gun
platoon trucks, and we were doing pretty good--we got out, I
think it was about five hundred yards before we hit this bridge
and they hit our three quarter ton. We jumped off to the side
of the road and as we were firing across the road at the
Chinese on the opposite hill we didn't see the others, about
twenty Chinese, coming to our right. There was only four of us
at the time. So they came and we finally realized that they
were Chinese and they had us surrounded. We had to put our
weapons down. We knew we couldn't fight it then. But at that
time, if I thought I was going to go through what I did, I
would have fought it out then instead of going through what I
did. So they took us from there and brought us across the road
up on this hill, and then they started bringing in more
prisoners. There was about thirty of us at the time. They had
us segregated on this hill there. We stayed there all that day.
Then the next morning they brought us down the road and took us
about two miles into some valley on to another hill. They kept
us there three days on this hill. We didn't have no food or no
water in them three days.
Senator Potter. Was there a hut or something you were in?
Sgt. Matta. No, sir; just out on the open hill.
Senator Potter. What time of the year was this, Sergeant?
Sgt. Matta. February 12.
Senator Potter. It was pretty cold then?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did they take any of your clothing away at
that time?
Sgt. Matta. Not at that time. They searched us and took
most of our valuables and things but at that time our planes
were giving them such trouble. I don't think they was worrying
about taking our clothes. Then from there we marched one day
through those hills and we stopped in this village.
They put us in these buildings, about fifty men in two
buildings about ten by ten, rooms ten by ten. We had quite a
few wounded men with us that we had been carrying along. After
we laid the wounded men down, we was lucky if we could even
stand. They wouldn't let us go outside because they were scared
of our planes. Then we would march at night. I got captured
February 12 and we marched from about February 12--we was out
about eight days, I think, on the march, and me and three other
fellows and this South Korean decided we was going to escape.
So when we was marching out of this village and going along the
bank, we jumped over and laid in the bushes there. We pulled
our pants down as though we were going to defecate and we
stayed there until the whole column passed us. When we thought
it was safe we got up and started going out to the part where
the road was, so we could go toward our lines instead of
theirs.
On the way we run into a couple of Chinese and this North
Korean. This South Korean with us spoke to them in Japanese,
and in turn they thought he was bringing us to catch up with
the other prisoners and they let us go. As we got on the road
we went the opposite direction. We had about a five-mile pass
to make through. We had to make it on the road because it was a
steep valley and we didn't dare to get down there. So we
decided we would go on the road. We was walking up the road and
there were Chinese mule carts and trucks going by the same road
we was walking on. We would be smoking cigarettes and every
once in a while this Korean kid would speak to us in Japanese.
We was doing good. We was about fifty yards out of the pass
when we got stopped by these two North Koreans. This Korean kid
didn't have no papers or nothing to show them, so they brought
us into this house and searched us and the Korean kid got
talking with them. He was posing as an American Japanese. So he
got talking with the guards and they told him that they had an
alert out for two other American soldiers that escaped and got
caught and then overpowered the guard and took a burp gun and
pistol away and they escaped again.
Then they tied our hands behind us and marched us into this
little town about ten miles away and put us in a cement
dungeon. All there was was a cement block building about eight
feet, eight square feet, and about five feet high. It was all
cement and it had one steel door. They put us in there.
Senator Potter. No light?
Sgt. Matta. No light or nothing. There was a little square
hole on the steel door about four inches in diameter. They put
us in there and we couldn't go out. We did all we could to get
air. We had to defecate and urinate in there. They wouldn't let
us go out. We stayed in there three days. And in that three
days we had what they call a bean ball. It is nothing but
soybeans, half cooked, mixed with sorghum. They gave us one
each about the size of a baseball. About that time we were so
hungry it actually tasted good. So from there they tied us up
again. They had this wire around our hands.
Senator Potter. Your hand was still tied while you were in
there?
Sgt. Matta. No, sir, they released us there. When we got
out again they tied our hands behind us and then had a lead
rope to the other one. At that time they caught the two men
that escaped, that took the burp gun and pistol and put them in
with us. Then they took the six of us and tied our hands up. I
was in about the middle. One was pretty weak, he couldn't walk
too much in front of me, and he would fall, and as he would
fall the wires would cut into our hands. We must have marched
like that for about two days. We got to this place they called
the hospital. All it was was just about three or four buildings
and they had our men, they had about a hundred men there
altogether, and what it was was actually a place for the men to
lay and die, because they wouldn't give them no medicine and
the only food we had was like some kind of wheat. We would get
that once a day in the morning. It was very watery and wasn't
filling.
Senator Potter. You were given no medical attention?
Sgt. Matta. No, sir.
Senator Potter. That was supposed to be the hospital?
Sgt. Matta. That was supposed to have been the hospital.
While I was there I still had a little strength, and the ones
of us that did we took our underwear and made bandages for the
wounded men. The maggots were starting to get into their wounds
and everything and we cleaned them up the best we could. Then
about three days after that they got fifty of us that was able
to walk and they told us they were taking us to the rear where
it would be safer. So we left there around March 20, I think it
was, and we started to march back.
We were marching back towards Pyongyang. On the march each
day we would have to stay in these buildings. They would put us
in one room, about the thirty of us in one room. We couldn't go
outside. If you started to go outside, most of them had
dysentery and if they started to go outside the guards would
stick their bayonets at them. We had to do the best we could.
The men that had dysentery we would put in one corner and
let them go in one corner of the room.
Senator Potter. Were these Chinese or Koreans?
Sgt. Matta. Chinese. Then we marched. It was about the
third day march out and we stopped at this village. For some
reason we got hold of a big building. They kept us in there, a
school house. We had plenty of room but it was so cold we
huddled up together anyway. It was the only way to keep warm.
Then we were marching out and we crossed this river and were
going up a path. They sent the last four of us on the line back
to get some chow, they said. We went back and it was hard to
make them understand. We would tell them chop chop, and that
they had sent us back. As we were coming back, they kept two
there and me and this other kid started back for the line to
catch up with the rest of the men.
Senator Potter. Did you get the chow you went after?
Sgt. Matta. No, sir. We started to catch up with the men
and we heard three shots. We stopped because we thought they
were firing at us. Then we didn't see nobody around and we
started up the path again. As we was going up we could see
these three Chinese dragging something into the bushes there.
We didn't think nothing of it then but as we got up there, and
the guards didn't notice us and started walking, as we got up
there we looked into the bushes and we was going back and all I
could see was the heads and blood was coming out of their
heads.
Senator Potter. They were Americans?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, sir. So we kept on going and we caught up
with the column. There was this instructor they called Wong. He
asked us where we was and we told him we went back to get the
food and they didn't have no food. And he said did you see two
men back there. I said no, what two men. He said the two men
back there, and I said no. I said there were two men getting
food. And I said did somebody escape? And he said no, that is
all right, get up to the column.
When we got up to the column we asked the men what happened
and they said there were these two men that couldn't make it,
couldn't walk anymore, and they said they were going to put
them in the house back there until they got better. That is the
way of putting them in the house, to shoot them. It happened
many times, for men to fall back and stay behind. We tried to
carry them, as weak as we were, we would try to carry them but
we would be lagging behind and they would tell us that they
were going to leave them behind in a house. But as you would go
on a thousand yards you would always hear shots. So we just
about pictured what happened.
We was on the way to what is known as the bean camp, or the
mining camp. It has two names, the bean camp or the mining
camp.
Senator Potter. Where is that located? Do you know?
Sgt. Matta. South of Pyongyang, just before you got to
Pyongyang. I would say about twenty miles.
We left with fifty men and when we got to the bean camp we
had thirty-five men. Fifteen died on the way. We tried to
remember most of the names but what we did is we would write
their names on a paper or whatever we had. We got to the bean
camp, around April 17, and when I was there I ran into a lot of
my men from my company and they were pretty well down. What it
was, I think, was old Japanese barracks they had before, with
little rooms about six by six, and they would have about ten or
fifteen men in them, and they were pretty sick. When we got
there, they were dying, I would say, from an average of four to
five a day. They would carry them up the hill and we would take
them up there one day, and they would have little holes, I
don't think over two feet deep, and we would ask them for tools
to dig the holes deeper and they wouldn't do it. All we did was
put the bodies there and I think the Koreans must have buried
them because we would come the next time and the rain would
have washed the dirt away and there would be nothing there but
bones. We went back and we got on to them about it, about the
people digging up the graves and taking the clothes. They tried
to tell us it was the dogs that did it, that did the digging.
They must have had pretty smart dogs that could dig the graves
and take the clothes off the men.
So actually that is when I got my first taste of
brainwashing. At that time we didn't call it anything.
Senator Potter. That was at this bean camp?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, sir. The only thing we would call it then
to us was a bunch of bullshit. So they would tell us. This one
instructor was up there and he was telling us how the Chinese
and North Koreans are pushing Americans back, they were in
Taeju and they were going to push them off Korea. This one F1
didn't care what they told them. He told them the only way you
are going to get to Taeju is the way we got here, as prisoners.
He didn't like that pretty well, and they didn't give him chow
that night. But between us we seen that he had his chow.
What little there was, that is. At that time that is why
they called it a bean camp. All we got was a bean ball about
the size of a baseball, these soybeans, half cooked, and this
sorghum.
I would say due to that 90 percent of our men died due to
lack of food and proper medicine.
Senator Potter. How long were you at this camp?
Sgt. Matta. About seven days. We got there and we were
there for about seven days.
Senator Potter. Did they interrogate you there, or question
you?
Sgt. Matta. No, there they just give us them lectures and
took our names. Then they moved us from there, about 760 of us
altogether when we started. There was two groups. One left
today and the other group left the day after. I left there
April 24 with the first group, and we marched from April 24
until May 17, altogether. As we were marching, one or two men
would die each day and men who couldn't march any more would
fall along the side and we just had a picture to ourselves what
happened to them.
Then I think it was about three days out they put us in
these trains, boxcars is what it was, and they put about two
hundred men in one boxcar. We couldn't sit down, we had to
stand up, and we drove on them trains for about two days. We
got, I think, to Sinandu. We got out of Sinandu and we started
marching again. We was on a march every day except one day that
it rained and we stayed in this place.
On May 17 we was going up this steep hill and I made one
big hill with no trouble and then the second one I was going up
and I rested half way up and this Chinese guard came up and hit
me across my forehead before I even knew what happened. He
didn't knock me out but he just about did. He stunned me.
Senator Potter. Did he hit you with his fist?
Sgt. Matta. No, the butt of his rifle. I was disgusted and
ready and I said to hell with it, finish and kill me. My
buddies grabbed me by the arm and they got me to the top of the
hill. And then I went down, we went downhill, and I gradually
got my strength back a little bit and then we hit what is known
as Camp 1.
Senator Potter. You said there were seven hundred and some?
Sgt. Matta. Seven hundred and sixty.
Senator Potter. And how many reached Camp 1?
Sgt. Matta. Roughly I would say about fifty died on the
march. But from May 17 I would say--well, I better go on and it
will pick it up.
We reached Camp May 17. It was a little village. It is
known as Camp 1 now. They put about twelve of us to a room. The
rooms didn't have doors on them and half of the walls were
caved in. When we reached there we were so tired we just
dropped down and laid down. We didn't know, but we figured it
was just another stop on the death march, as we called it. But
one or two days passed and three days come, so we finally
realized we were going to stay there.
We started on ourselves and it was the first time I had
taken my clothes off since the time I used my underwear to help
the wounded. I took my clothes off. At that time when I got
captured I weighted 207 pounds, and I was pretty well built,
fat. When I took my clothes off all the hair was off my body
and I could practically see my ribs. I think I went from 207
down to 150 pounds in the space of that time. So I was pretty
weak, mostly from the blow on the head I got from the guard.
We had so damn many lice on us that we started a lice
killing campaign. The best way we could kill them was squash
then with our fingernails. By the time you got finished and got
half of them off, all of your fingernails were red. So it was
kind of hard.
Actually it is bad to say, but most of the men were too
damn weak and didn't have the strength. They wouldn't bother to
clean the lice off of them so we made them sleep outside. Where
we were there was this river. As cold as it was we went down
there and tried to wash half way decent. We never had a piece
of soap. We washed the best we could. We never shaved in that
time, about four months we didn't shave.
Senator Potter. You would have quite a beard, too?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, sir. It was almost down here to my chest.
We gradually got together and the ones that could get around
and could do things gradually fixed up the houses and cleaned
them up a little and washed what little clothes we had.
In all, that time, from May 17 to about August, I would say
the middle of August, it started out like in May, we were
burying from an average of six to seven men a day and at times
it went as high as 12 men. Before we had a chance to give them
a decent burial they were up the hill and they dug the holes
sometimes, but when we dug the holes we dug them as deep as we
could but they would always get on to us. I would say out of
the 760, one day we just sat down trying to figure how many of
us were left. I don't think there was a hundred men left out of
that 760 that left the bean camp.
It is something that is hard to make people believe, but it
is actually true. Actually, myself, I wouldn't believe it if I
didn't see it myself. Few people realize what has happened.
Senator Potter. While you were there did they try to
indoctrinate you, to get you into communism? Did they give you
a lot of Communist propaganda?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, sir. Well, they didn't bother us about the
first two weeks and then they had what they called classes.
They would pick so many men out of the squad and they went up
to the school house. That is when they started their communism.
Then it started to pick up and they brought us out to the
square. They would have this Chinese, that was supposed to have
been a regimental commander. He would get up and speak for an
hour in Chinese, and the interpreter would interpret him and
tell us what he said, and it was always the same old bologna
about our warmongers and how we were duped in going over there,
and things like that. Then I started getting very sick. I would
have these spells and blood would come out of my nose and I
would have terrific pain. They brought me up to the hospital.
You couldn't actually call it a hospital. It had two buildings.
One was like Treffery said, like a Japanese temple and the
other was these four rooms which we nicknamed the dungeon. When
I got up there I had dysentery and trouble with my head. The
only reason I didn't get in the dungeon is I was lucky enough
where I could get up and go to the toilet by myself. But any
man who couldn't get up and go around, they would put him in
the dungeon, where there was four rooms, they would put him in
there and wait for him to die.
They wouldn't bring them their food, they wouldn't bring no
medicine and we would go over to see what we could do for them
and they would run us away. That is why we nicknamed it a
dungeon, because they put them in there to die.
Senator Potter. They put them in there to die?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did you get medical treatment while you
were there?
Sgt. Matta. The only thing I got was charcoal. If I had a
terrific headache I got charcoal. It was the only medicine they
had at that time was charcoal. If you had dysentery you got
charcoal, or if you had a headache you got charcoal. This
doctor Wong, which we called the water doctor, would tell you
to drink plenty of hot water. He wouldn't let us go there and I
blame him for the deaths of all those men, because with just a
little proper medicine and proper food them men would be alive
today.
Senator Potter. They would be alive today?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Sergeant, I would like to get into this with
you for a moment, the filling out of various forms or peace
petitions and being placed in jail for refusing to so do.
Could you go into that for us, please?
Sgt. Matta. Well, what it was like this Treffery says, is
they would get us out there and read off the petition, I think
it was to go to the United Nations, a protest that we were
supposed to sign. They got us all out there and we fell out on
the road, and he explained it to us. He passed out paper and
nobody would take the paper and nobody would do anything. He
got kind of peeved. He said maybe you misunderstood me.
Everybody that wants to write go to this side of the road and
the ones that don't want to write go over here. So everybody
got up and went on the other side of the road and they just
about threatened us that if we didn't write them they were
going to cut our food down and everything. We didn't write at
that time. And there were many instances when they would call
us up by ourselves. They called me up one day, the one we
called Glasses.
Senator Potter. Was he a military man or a civilian?
Sgt. Matta. A Chinese military. He called me up to his room
and they usually start out and ask you how you feel and this
and that, and hand you a cigarette or a piece of candy, and
then you started with it. He wanted me to write my congressman
about the atrocities that our side was doing, and about the
holding up of the peace talks. So I told him no, I couldn't do
that. He said why. I said the people voted him in and the
people don't tell him what to do because they voted him in. I
said I can't tell him what to do. He said well you have to
write it. I said no, I ain't going to write it. So he got on to
me and I wouldn't write it.
Then he told me about mail. He said are you getting mail
from home? At that time I got one letter from my wife. He said
you don't want to go home, do you? I said what do you mean? He
said you are our prisoner, you are supposed to do what we tell
you to do. So I said, you took me prisoner, but I don't do what
you tell me. All I am supposed to do is give you my name, rank
and serial number. He got kind of mad and he let me go back. It
was that way.
It happened to quite a few. They would call them up and try
to get them to write to their congressmen or the United
Nations.
Senator Potter. Did they ever punish any of them for not
signing the petition or not doing what they wanted them to do?
Sgt. Matta. Well, the only way that they punished us was as
a whole. Like this time on that May first deal, when we
wouldn't march with the flag, this Company 7 right next to us
was getting this beef, a can of beef. They were getting one can
for two men and in turn our side was getting one can for six
men. In other words, you would just about get a taste.
Senator Potter. Was this Company 7 a more cooperative
company as far as that is concerned?
Sgt. Matta. No, I would say it was a company that were
mostly captured in the later part. Actually the Chinese were
babying them, I guess, to try to get them to go along.
Senator Potter. Keeping them fat for show purposes?
Sgt. Matta. That is right. There were a few, I would not
say there weren't any, but a few in there that didn't go along
with them. The majority didn't. But they brought them up in
October 1952, and they put them beside us. So we went to them
and told them that they could keep the beef if they was that
short of it. When we told them that 7 Company was getting two
cans per man they wanted to know how we found out, and we would
tell them the same old thing that a little birdie told us. They
kept us segregated from 7 Company. They kept us pretty well
segregated from there. At one time you do get a pass and go
over there, they would let you go over there for about ten
minutes and they would have a Chinese interpreter go with you.
In other words, you couldn't say what you wanted to say
when you went over there. I would like to add on to that what
you asked Treffery. Like on the movies, I used to get over to 7
Company to get around because I could sneak over there better.
What it was is they took these men out of 7 Company, they
dressed them in fatigues, our fatigues, and steel helmets and
everything, and gave them M-1 rifles. I think they took them
about ten miles out of camp, by this river, and they went up
there and the first day most of the guys didn't know what was
going on. They took them up there and got them up there and
they had them posing with the M-1's, and a bunch of Chinese
coming. They were making a movie is what it was. So the second
day, the men got wise when they found out what was going on and
a half of them wouldn't go out to make the movie. They
threatened them. The ones that went out, they got seven or
eight loaves of bread about the size of one of our buns, and
the men that didn't go out, they were given one bun and they
were cut way down on their chow. That was the deal on that.
They went out and made this movie. I mean, the Chinese
Communist propaganda movie showing our men being overpowered by
the Chinese.
And another thing on that movie that they made after the
bombing, what they did, I don't think that Treffery got down in
that end of town, but if you went down there was a building
that was bombed before, I think, before we even got there. They
molded it with straw and they had these two Negro boys--I don't
know their names, I forgot them--they had them all painted with
iodine and they set the building on fire and they had the
Chinese carrying them out on their backs.
In other words, the Chinese soldiers were carrying them out
on their backs and the movies were there taking pictures.
Senator Potter. Where was that?
Sgt. Matta. Right in our camp. They set fire to the straw.
They would actually make it look as though it was the real
thing. And another thing, like on their propaganda.
I was up at the hospital at the time. At that time this was
in May 1952, when the peace talks were going pretty good, they
had us up there and they had beds, they made platforms is all
it was, to get us up off the floor, and we were there and it
struck us funny when they came in and gave us two new decks of
cards and told us to play cards. We sat down and started to
play bridge, and some Korean girls starting coming around and
placing big numbers on the walls, and policing the place up,
and they brought us a white table cloth on the table. We were
sitting there playing bridge and wondering what was happening,
whether the Red Cross was coming or what. They were fixing the
place up and we figured somebody was coming up there.
We were sitting down playing bridge there, and I noticed
this cameraman coming in the door. Then it dawned on me what
was happening. So I got up and this kid that was playing with
me both got up, and went outside. Then they came in and these
two other Chinese, the first time we had ever seen the nurses
coming in with white uniforms, and arm bands, Red Cross arm
bands, and a hat with a little red cross and it was the first
time as prisoners we had ever seen them dressed like that.
Then they sat down, those two Chinese boys sat down, with a
big white uniform and a big red band on their sleeves, and they
were holding the cards and the cameraman taking the picture.
The other two GI's, I don't know whether they were dumbfounded
or what, but they stood there and let them take the picture.
In the meantime they got the nurse picking up one boy that
was sick, showing her feeding him. They took all pictures like
that. They had white sheets hanging up on the wall so it would
look all white. Then the doctor came out and tried to get me to
take a picture, guess because I had started to get a little
more weight back and looked like one of the healthiest ones
there. I wouldn't go in. I told them no. I said if they did
that every day and treated us like that every day, I would
gladly, I would be one of the first to have my picture taken.
But I said that is just propaganda, and what is going to happen
when the cameraman goes. I said it would be the same old thing,
and I didn't want my picture taken.
The next day they discharged me from the hospital.
Senator Potter. This was a hospital scene, the picture they
took?
Sgt. Matta. That is right. They had everything, nurses all
dressed up in white uniforms.
Senator Potter. But prior to that time or after it took
place, those conditions did not exist?
Sgt. Matta. No. In fact, we just got tobacco the day
before, and they come in with a big tray of tobacco and a tray
of apples, nice apples. So they took pictures showing the trays
of apples and tobacco and when a cameraman left, the apples and
the tobacco went back, the boys didn't see any of it.
Senator Potter. They took them away?
Sgt. Matta. They took them away. They just had them for the
pictures.
Senator Potter. Do you have anything else, Sergeant, that
you would care to add?
Sgt. Matta. Well, a little on this experiment on that
chicken liver. This has been the talk of what the Chinese were
supposed to have told the men in camp, that that was a Russian
experiment, that it was the first time they used it, that it
was a Russian experiment. That got around camp pretty much.
Senator Potter. As a Russian experiment?
Sgt. Matta. Yes, a Russian doctor's experiment. And they
were using it.
Senator Potter. And it was supposed to make them feel
better and have more strength?
Sgt. Matta. That is right. At that time, if you didn't take
them--I wasn't in the hospital at the time, but if the men
didn't take it, they wouldn't give them no treatment or
anything. So a lot of them just took it more or less thinking
that they would get better treatment or that it would help
them.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, you have had an experience which
you and the other men that have testified here have seen
communism work at first hand. Do you have anything you would
like to say along that line?
Sgt. Matta. Yes. I am glad you asked me that, because I
have come home and I made quite a lot of speeches, and many
people don't actually realize what communism is, and how
communism lives. Like you say, I have seen communism, I have
seen how they live under communism, how the kids in the street
don't have shoes or clothes, how they don't eat but about one
meal a day, and how they are being treated and how communism
lives.
To me communism is like a cancer; in fact, worse. That is
why myself I want to see communism wiped out as badly as we
want to see cancer cured.
Senator Potter. What do you think of Americans in the
United States who advocate the overthrow of our government to
establish a Communist society here?
Sgt. Matta. Well, if I had the power, my only way of
answering that is I would take them, and let them go to a
Communist country, let them live under communism, not this
built up communism that they have toward peace and people's
China, but let them live under real communism and see what
communism is. And then if they like communism, okay, let them
stay there. But me, on communism I would rather die than see
communism in the states, because I can never forget my buddies
on the hills. I have lost many good buddies there, and the
worst part about it is that they died and they didn't have to.
That was part of communism.
Senator Potter. Human life is pretty cheap to them is it
not?
Sgt. Matta. Yes. They could have saved them boys with just
a little proper medicine and food. It wasn't that they didn't
have it. The peace talks have proved that. Before the peace
talks we were getting nothing but cracked corn, soybeans, and
no meat, and our living conditions were bad. And then July 8
come around, the first word that we got was that the peace
talks were started. It was a funny coincidence but about three
or four days after that in comes the pigs, we had pork and
flour come in and we had steamed bread, and that from then on
the men actually stopped dying, they didn't stop right off, but
gradually what was left of us were getting better just from
getting a little good food. Why I say it is good food is
because it was better than we were getting. They stopped giving
us this sorghum and started giving us rice. Then they used to
tell us about the peace talks, about our side stalling the
peace talks. Once in a while you would hear a few guys saying
gee, I wish they would hurry up and get the peace talks over
with. I used to tell them it don't bother me, if they said two
years, five years or ten years, it is them peace talks that is
keeping us alive today, and we haven't any bitches about the
peace talks, no matter how long they take.
On our lectures, that is the main thing they would harp on,
how our side was stalling the peace talks. We knew that was a
bunch of baloney, and knew it was the peace talks that saved
us.
We had all the confidence in our side and knew that we
would eventually get what we fought for.
Another thing to add is that many people have asked me why
did we fight over there, what did we gain. The only answer I
got, like when they would say about all those boys dying and
being wounded over there. We actually won a victory, because we
went over there to do what we did. We went over there to stop
the spread of communism. We didn't stop it fully, because the
only way to stop communism is you have to wipe it out
completely. That is my way of saying that we won something, and
the boys did not die for nothing.
Senator Potter. We went there to stop a Communist
aggression, and we did.
Sgt. Matta. That is right.
Senator Potter. I think our American troops fought under
the most difficult conditions that any American soldiers have
been called upon to fight under. I think the stories that you
fellows have told here and the history of the Korean War will
go down in the annals of American history as the greatest
heroism and courage on the part of our men. I am mighty proud
to be an American. Thank you, Sergeant.
Corporal Daniels?
STATEMENT OF CPL. WILLIE L. DANIELS
Senator Potter. Corporal, will you give your name for the
record and your present unit?
Cpl. Daniels. Corporal Willie L. Daniels, RA 38136347, 6006
ASU Station Complement, Fort Lewis, Washington.
Senator Potter. Corporal, would you give us your home
address?
Cpl. Daniels. 623-58th Street, Oakland, California.
Senator Potter. Would you tell the committee when you went
to Korea and with what unit you were assigned at the time?
Cpl. Daniels. I landed in Korea August 16, 1950. I was
assigned to the battery of the 508 Field Artillery Battalion,
Second Division.
Senator Potter. You were with an artillery battalion?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Corporal, would you tell us the
circumstances under which you were captured?
Cpl. Daniels. Well, I was captured February 12, 1951. On
the 11th we got attacked about twelve o'clock at night. We
fought, tried to fight, but we couldn't do much good. We got
CSMO and we tried to pull out. Most of the fire power was
coming from our left front and left flank, and most of the men
had these tractors, you know, and most of the men, you know,
were on the side of the tractor, trying to shield themselves
from the firepower.
But during that time one of the men pushed me, and at the
same time another one of my men got shot and he caught on to me
and pulled me down. So that separated me from the unit at the
time. So I jumped and got in a ditch. I got there by myself for
about fifteen minutes and then I looked up and saw some men,
some men of my outfit, running across the field, and I cut over
to them. We fought all night, fought our way to several others,
until about nine o'clock the next morning. We was going forward
and taking a hill, or one side of a hill, it was, and by the
time we got up to the top, the Chinese on the other side had us
surrounded. At the same time the Chinese from the rear just had
us cornered off there.
Senator Potter. How many in your group were captured?
Cpl. Daniels. I think it must have been about forty of us.
Senator Potter. After you were captured, what happened?
Cpl. Daniels. Well, they took us in small groups.
Senator Potter. Where were you captured?
Cpl. Daniels. About twenty miles north of Wonju.
Senator Potter. Of Wonju?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir. They put us in groups and took us
on the side of the hills, under some trees.
Senator Potter. Did they take your clothes away from you at
that time?
Cpl. Daniels. No, sir; not at that time, no.
Senator Potter. Did they take your valuables? Did you have
a watch on or anything?
Cpl. Daniels. No, sir. A deck of cards was the only thing I
had with me. But I was feeling bad at the time. They took us to
a hill and left us all day in the cold and snow. At night about
dusk they marched us back about three miles in the woods. Some
of our artillery was over there, and they let us stay there
until about twelve o'clock. Our artillery was firing in, so
they moved us back a little more. We stayed there until early
morning and then they moved us back about two miles and put us
in a building on top of a hill. It was about five hundred
yards, I would say, where our position was the day before.
At the same time our air forces were coming in and
destroying our equipment and all the time they was coming over
and coming pretty close to us. Of course, they was out in the
hills, and in holes and stuff like that, and we were out there
on top of the hill in a little shack.
Senator Potter. You had no cover, but they had holes?
Cpl. Daniels. That is right. Every time a plane would come
over, one of the men would shoot at it with a rifle, I guess to
show them that they were there.
Senator Potter. Then they would come back on and go over
it?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes. None of the men got wounded there or
nothing, but later on that evening they started to march us
back towards the bean camp, although it took us quite a while
to get to the bean camp, I imagine about forty or fifty miles.
Senator Potter. How long did it take you, would you say, to
get back?
Cpl. Daniels. From that day about the 14th of February,
until about the 9th, I believe, of April.
Senator Potter. There were still about forty of you?
Cpl. Daniels. Well, some more joined.
Senator Potter. Some more joined during the march?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir. Also some South Koreans, they
joined.
Senator Potter. During that march back, did any of your men
die or were they killed?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir. A few died at that time. Some were
wounded and didn't get no medical attention, and some had
pneumonia. They died. They didn't get no medical attention
either. A few before we reached bean camp died. But after we
reached bean camp, seven men died from pneumonia, beriberi,
frozen feet and dysentery.
Senator Potter. How long were you at bean camp?
Cpl. Daniels. Until the 24th of April.
Senator Potter. That would be about how long?
Cpl. Daniels. About two weeks.
Senator Potter. About two weeks?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Was your experience at the bean camp much
the same as Sgt. Trefferey's?
Cpl. Daniels. My experience at the bean camp? They had us
all in rooms there and wouldn't allow us to go outdoors. We
didn't have no heat. The only heat we had was what we tore off
the house. We tore it off and put it in a bucket, a hot pot is
what it is called, and we would make a fire right there.
During the time the sun would come out, we would go out and
sun a little bit. They wouldn't allow us to stay out very much
because the air force would come over.
Senator Potter. Did they try to indoctrinate you at the
bean camp at all?
Cpl. Daniels. No, sir, not at bean camp.
Senator Potter. Did they take your clothing away from you
there?
Cpl. Daniels. They took my shoes.
Senator Potter. They took your shoes?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir. But they gave us some low quarter
tennis shoes about two sizes too small. I couldn't wear them.
Senator Potter. Shoes to the Communists must be quite a
luxury.
Cpl. Daniels. I imagine it was, sir. They had tennis shoes.
I guess they were used to it.
Senator Potter. When you left bean camp, how did you go?
Cpl. Daniels. Walked. We started walking with twenty men in
a squad.
Senator Potter. Twenty men in the squad?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir. On the way to Camp 1 there was
about three of us left about half way, I guess, by the time we
got the train. There were three of us left out of twenty men.
And then when we got to Camp 1 there was three of us left.
Senator Potter. How many got in?
Cpl. Daniels. Three.
Senator Potter. And there were just three that were left?
Cpl. Daniels. Three out of twenty, they put us in a ten-man
squad, and three of us left out of a ten-man squad. That made
about twenty-seven men died.
Senator Potter. About twenty-seven men died?
Cpl. Daniels. Out of thirty, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How long a trip was that?
Cpl. Daniels. From the 24th of April to the 17th of May.
Senator Potter. To the 17th of May?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. You were put in, I understand, boxcars.
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And what did these men die of?
Cpl. Daniels. Dysentery and lack of food, malnutrition.
Senator Potter. Did any of them die of carbon gas?
Cpl. Daniels. I think there was two men died while we was
in a tunnel.
Senator Potter. They would put you in a tunnel to keep them
away from air raids?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir. And they died.
Senator Potter. And two men died because of carbon
monoxide?
Cpl. Daniels. I don't know what they died from, but they
died.
Senator Potter. They suffocated?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Then you went to Camp 1?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What took place there? You have heard the
statements of Sergeant Treffery and Sgt. Matta. Do you have
anything to add to it?
Cpl. Daniels. Well, when we got to Camp 1 our food wasn't
so very good, in fact it wasn't good at all. It was cracked
corn, millet, and some sorghum. Most of the men could not eat
the food the way it was cooked. In fact, I couldn't hardly eat
either, so I decided I would fry some of it, and see how it
would taste. I didn't have no wood, but I found a piece of
plank out there and taken it and burned it up and got a piece
of tin and fried me some. One of the Chinese guards caught me
at it and they put me in jail for three days. In fact, I was
supposed to stay three days, but I stayed fourteen days.
Senator Potter. You stayed fourteen days?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And the reason they put you in was because
you were trying to fry some of the rice or millet?
Cpl. Daniels. The reason they put me in was for burning
this plank, destroying Korean property, is what they said.
Senator Potter. What were the conditions in the jail or the
cell that you were in?
Cpl. Daniels. Well, the conditions, it was a little room
eight by eight, and my duties then was that I was on detail, as
soon as I came off one detail I would go on to another. I was
on the wood detail, ration details, brush details, broom
details, barrel details, all day long, back and forth all day
long like that.
At the time I got to Camp 1, I weighed about eighty pounds
from 135, my original weight. I was weak, just like all the
rest of the men was weak.
Senator Potter. In this jail was there plenty of room to
stand up? You weren't confined to any kneeling position or
anything of that kind?
Cpl. Daniels. No, sir. At night we would go to bed about
the same as the others, but during the day we just worked all
day long.
Senator Potter. They worked you all day?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And you were supposed to be in confinement
there in your cell for three days and they kept you how long?
Cpl. Daniels. Fourteen days.
Senator Potter. While you were in Camp 1 did they then try
to have any indoctrination courses?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir. In fact, the whole company had
indoctrination. We had what they called a school, had classes,
had lectures and stuff like that, lectures and classes.
Senator Potter. Corporal, did they try to work with you to
propagandize you on racial problems?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Was this at Camp 1?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. I don't mean to be embarrassing at all, but
if you don't mind I would be interested in hearing what the
type of indoctrination was that they gave you along that line.
Cpl. Daniels. Well, they would tell the Negro men that
there was no use being depressed all your life, and ``We also
have been depressed. We want to help you out,'' and a whole lot
of stuff, a whole lot of junk. I consider it a whole lot of
junk. Some of them they would give them cigarettes sometimes.
Some of them they would treat pretty nice and some others they
don't. It just depends on how the others talk to them, I
imagine, whether they treat them all right or not.
Senator Potter. I would like to say this, that from all the
information that I have had, I am mighty proud, I will say it
again, of all the American troops, and certainly mighty proud
of all of them and that includes the Negro troops that were
fighting in Korea. I do know that that was part of the program
to put special emphasis on our Negro troops.
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. We can proudly say that they handled
themselves in an excellent manner. I think it is remarkable the
very few that their propaganda had any effect on. The Negroes
are certainly a credit to the army, a credit as Americans.
Cpl. Daniels. Well, at Camp 1 we moved out of Camp 1 August
15, 1952, to Camp 5. At Camp 5 we had a big dinner waiting on
us, and they segregated us there and put all the Negroes in the
same company together with no Filipinos or British. When we got
there I think we had eleven donuts, a big pot of beans, pork
and lamb all mixed together, and they had some greens, some
kind of greens, kenschu, some kind of picked greens, in fact
they fix them up some kind of way and bury them for I don't
know how long. They smell bad and taste about as bad as they
smell. After what we had had, it was a good dinner, though.
Some of the Negroes on the 19th of June, they had taken a
group of them, about twenty I think it was, and marched them
off, taken them off and gave them a big dinner. They told me
they gave them some wine, some candy, apples and auto, and
saki, or whatever you call it, made them drunk, filled then up
and made them drunk. They didn't do the whites that way.
Senator Potter. This dinner was just for the Negro PW's,
the Negro troops?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. They didn't have the white troops with
them?
Cpl. Daniels. No, sir; because the Chinese will say the
Negroes are freed on the 19th of June, so they celebrate the
day. They pick a bunch of Negroes, not all of them, about
twenty of them, and take them out and march them down by
headquarters and give them some wine, apples and candy, and
feed them up like that.
Senator Potter. Were there any speeches or anything at
these dinners?
Cpl. Daniels. I don't know, sir. I never was on one of
them. I never was there.
Senator Potter. The report that you got on this dinner, did
they mention why they had it, why they gave it to them?
Cpl. Daniels. They said they was celebrating the 19th of
June. That is all. That is why I suppose it was. You know,
sometimes Negroes have birthdays over there, and some
cooperated with the Chinese a little bit, and they would have
birthdays, and they would give them a cup of wine, cigarettes
and stuff like that.
Senator Potter. How long were you in Camp 1?
Cpl. Daniels. I was in Camp 1 from May 17, 1951 to August
15, 1952.
Senator Potter. And you were exchanged on Little Switch, is
that right?
Cpl. Daniels. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How did that take place? Would you mind
telling us about that?
Cpl. Daniels. Well, sir, about two weeks before I was
released or taken out of the company, the Chinese called me up
and asked me--well, he talked a long time about different
things, how do I like the Chinese people, what do I think about
the Korean War and so forth, and he talked around. Well, I
cussed them out because I didn't know what they was after, or
what they was after. They finally come to point and asked me
why I was so skinny around there, and I told them they hadn't
given me anything to eat to keep me fat. I also told them that
I was in the hospital during 1944, in World War II, in England.
I was in the TB ward for about three weeks, I think it was, and
I told them that. They taken me down and examined my heart or
something. I don't know what they found. About three days later
they called me up again and asked me how would I like to go
home. I told them I have been wanting to go home since I have
been over here, and I would like it very much, to go home.
So two or three days later I heard over a loud speaker that
all sick and wounded was being repatriated, and I figured then
they must have been trying to pick me out to go home. I was the
last one out of the company, the last one. There was three of
us to choose between, and some of the progressive guys said,
``You don't have anything to worry about. I think maybe they
will send you home.''
But anyway we were on pins and needles, wondering who they
were going to pick. One of the guys, he had a light duty slip
ever since he had been a PW, and this other guy and I we were
both skinny. So he told me I didn't have anything to worry
about. So the morning that they released me from the company,
they sent a runner down there or mail orderly, they came down
and told me that the Chinese wanted to see me. I went up there
and they told me he had orders from the battalion or regiment
headquarters that would release me, and I had twenty minutes to
get ready. I told him I could get ready pretty fast, I don't
have but a blanket, and let's go. That is the way it come
about.
Senator Potter. Then how did they transport you down, by
train?
Cpl. Daniels. No, sir. About a mile, I guess, from the
company to where all the PW's coming from different camps would
meet. We walked down there, and we left there to go to Kaesong.
We went in trucks.
Senator Potter. While you waited to be released, did they
talk to you about what you should say when you got back or
anything of that kind?
Cpl. Daniels. They said I should work for peace, and try to
get the rest of the PW's back home, and try to get the people
to cease fire in Korea, to stop the war in Korea.
Senator Potter. Corporal, you have seen communism working
and have experienced it as few men have, outside of those of
you that have been through the war. Do you have anything you
would like to say about communism as a way of life?
Cpl. Daniels. Well, I don't like it. As far as I am
concerned, there is no way of life there. It is a mighty poor
life. The way they run things, and what the other men say, and
each family over there, from what I have learned, each family
owns a chicken or maybe a cow. If he lives in the house it
belongs to the government, anything else he has belongs to the
government, and when they plant their crops it belongs to the
government, too. I would go on wood detail some time and see a
patch down there and see the government down there measuring
off whose was what, or something like that. I don't think
anything should live like that.
If you don't have God on your side, if you don't believe in
the Bible--that is one thing. In fact, everything is wrong with
it. I don't like it no kind of way.
Senator Potter. And when you have people in our country who
adopt, as you say, a philosophy, an atheistic philosophy, where
the human being, where you as an individual, loses identity to
the so-called great cause of the state, which is the
government, that doesn't make it very pleasant for a life for
the individual?
Cpl. Daniels. No, sir, it doesn't.
Senator Potter. I wish to thank you kindly, Corporal. You
will be on deck in the next couple of three days.
Sergeant Watters?
STATEMENT OF SGT. JOHN L. WATTERS, JR.
Sgt. Watters. Sergeant John L. Watters, Jr., sir; RA
6894755; Unit 701 ASU, Detachment at Fort Myers, Virginia;
resident of Washington, D.C., sir.
Senator Potter. There are a few of you native
Washingtonians left. I am glad to see you.
Sergeant, you have been here and have heard some of the
experiences of the other men. I am sure you are familiar with
the purpose of the hearing.
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Feel free to discuss or bring in any factor
which you think would be material to the hearing. First,
Sergeant, would you tell us when you went to Korea and the unit
that you were attached to?
Sgt. Watters. Well, I hit Korea August 16, 1950. I went to
front-line duty about five days later, sir.
Senator Potter. Who were you with?
Sgt. Watters. When I first went over, with Headquarters,
First Battalion, 38th Infantry, Second Division, and later I
was transferred to Able Company.
Senator Potter. What was your assignment then?
Sgt. Watters. I was communications, sir, I was
communications while I was in Headquarters. I went into Able
Company as a communications man because the communications men
had all gotten bumped off, sir.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, would you briefly tell us the
circumstances under which you were captured?
Sgt. Watters. Well, we had been fighting a day, all day
long, and that night we pushed on toward our objective, and we
had had a little sniper fire that day, and pushed to the
objective that night.
Senator Potter. What area was this, Sergeant?
Sgt. Watters. This was, I would say, approximately eighty
miles northwest of Konarae.
There we were putting out our forward OP, and so on, and
drew fire from the enemy. From there on the rest of the night
we had pretty much of a fight. That morning we had orders to
withdraw. We had already made two withdrawals. We finally got
orders to make the final withdrawal back to our rendezvous
area.
From there we started getting off the mountains, forming
groups and platoons and getting off. We got off of the
mountains about 4:30 that morning, just about thirty minutes
before daybreak, and that is when I got wounded.
Senator Potter. You were wounded by small arms fire?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. I was ambushed by sniper fire with
a burp gun.
Senator Potter. What was the nature of your wounds?
Sgt. Watters. I was hit three times right there, once
through the leg, once through the hip, and one through the
belly.
Senator Potter. And you were captured at that time?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir.
Senator Potter. What happened after you were wounded?
Sgt. Watters. I was left there for being dead. About an
hour later another Chinese came along and shot me again.
Another one right through the hip. So I just laid like I was
dead. I wasn't able to move very much at that time.
At this time the valley was pretty heavily laden with enemy
troops, and I couldn't hardly make a move. Our airplanes were
strafing and bombing all this area through here. So I managed,
after about three hours of laying there, with troops sort of
scattered out, I managed to crawl off about seventy-five yards
into a corn fodder shock.
I crawled into a corn fodder shock and stayed there for
about two days and nights, making attempts to get away. I had
been through this same area a couple of days before, and we had
seen enemy troops in the neighborhood, and they didn't fire on
us. We figured they were waiting for the body of troops and the
body of troops didn't show up.
We were just a small detachment at that time.
It was only about two and a half miles back to the
battalion aid station. I figured I could make it back. When
things quieted down, I went seventy-five or eighty yards and
then blacked out. I tried that for two or three times, and then
got back in the corn fodder shock and stayed another night, and
about half a day.
Along about two o'clock in the afternoon I crawled back in
the shock and thought I might as well give up and let them
finish me off because I was going to die anyway.
My water in my canteen was frozen up, and I had such a
fever and everything, that I was going to give up. I laid there
for about an hour and a half or two hours, I suppose, until a
couple of Chinese came along. One of then stuck a bayonet
against my stomach and I said to myself, ``Here I go.''
While I was doing that, I got my coat and opened it up and
showed him the blood on my stomach. He reached down and sort of
covered me back up. They had then taken off. They said
something or other to each other and had taken off. About two
hours later they came back. They had a bunch of warm rice soup
in an old half a gourd and gave it to me. Then they took off
and came back about dark with an old straw mat on a couple of
sticks and picked me up and carried me to a village about half
a mile from there.
There is where I met quite a few of my old buddies that
were taken within the next three days from the time I was
wounded.
Senator Potter. How long were you in this village?
Sgt. Watters. We stayed in that village one day and night.
Senator Potter. And then did they move you by vehicle?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. We stayed there. I don't know. Our
planes must have known that we were holding a bunch of us
prisoners there because they hit all around them buildings.
There was only one particular building there, and there were a
lot of Chinese troops in and around there, but they didn't
bother about flying in and around this building.
So the next night, just about dark, they pulled us out of
there. There must have been about seventy-five of us, and about
ten of us wounded, and others who couldn't walk. Our own boys
carried us on stretchers, and they slung out guards along, and
they carried us up the road. They carried us all that night and
put us in shacks, all the wounded guys.
The rest of the guys I found out later had been taken on
and had been kept on marching further north.
Senator Potter. How long were you in the shacks?
Sgt. Watters. We were in the shacks for two days and
nights. A big heavy snowfall came, and there was an old Korean
guy, a couple of Chinese and a couple of Koreans that came in
and picked us up and put us on bobsleds with corn fodder shocks
on them, and they tied us on to the sleds, four of us.
They took us for maybe forty or forty-five miles north, and
there they put us in an old shack that had been bombed out, and
everything, and didn't have any doors on it.
In a matter of a week's time there was around twenty of us
all together that they brought in from all over the
neighborhood, all wounded guys.
Senator Potter. During this time had they treated your
wounds at all?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Was your food about the same type of food
as the others have mentioned?
Sgt. Watters. Well, no, sir. The only thing we had was
cracked corn and barley, I would say, up to next June. That was
all we had. And at this point, where I stayed, I stayed at this
one area from December--I got there about the 5th or the 7th of
December, and I stayed there until about March 5 or March 8.
Senator Potter. From the 5th of December to March 8th?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Was your shack heated?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir.
Senator Potter. That was during the winter?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did you have all your clothes or had they
taken some of your clothes?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. They had taken my snow packs from me
and had taken my M-3 overcoat.
Senator Potter. Your snow packs were the overshoes, snow
shoes?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir, real heavy shoes. We had only had
those about three days. They had taken those off from me the
first night. But I was fortunate, I had a pair of OD pants and
OD shirt underneath, and a pair of fatigues on top of that, and
then an overcoat and field jacket. They had taken my gloves, my
overcoat and snow packs.
Senator Potter. During this time, did they try to
indoctrinate you at all or try to get you to sign any
statements?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. At first they asked me what company
I was from. They knew what company I was from, but they asked
me what my job was. I told them I was a rifleman. And then they
kept on and kept on, and I told them that I was a telephone
operator. They wanted to know what kind of telephone. I told
them I didn't know anything about it, but that they had told me
to operate it, and that is what I was doing.
In the meantime, they thought I was commissioned because I
had on a fatigue blouse that had been a lieutenant's fatigue
blouse. It had holes in the collar, and they thought I was an
officer. They grilled me quite a bit for about five or six
months, trying to get information out of me.
Senator Potter. They thought you were an officer that had
thrown away his bars?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. While you were at this one point, did
anything happen? Did they beat you or anything?
Sgt. Watters. Well, at this one village every once in a
while there would be somebody that would come in and take the
thing away from us, and things like that, and they would kick
us around if we didn't move out of the way fast enough for
them.
For instance, one of the Chinese guards took a bayonet and
run it through a guy's arm, who later died from it.
Senator Potter. Did you say he later died from it?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. He died one night in his sleep.
Every once in a while the wound would start bleeding, and we
would put a tourniquet on it.
He was already wounded in the feet and hand from hand
grenades. He lost part of the heel on one of his feet and part
of the muscle from the right calf of his leg.
The guard came in the door and asked him to move over. At
the same time, he didn't move fast enough, and the guard took
the bayonet and slashed him with it. When he did, he just
keeled over, and he sort of kicked him on the rump. He came on
inside and sort of kicked two or three others so he could get
through. We were packed in this small place like sardines.
Senator Potter. After you left there, where did you go?
Sgt. Watters. I left there in March, on March 4, and this
was a pretty heavily concentrated area, right on top of an MSR,
and our planes were strafing and bombing in through this area
all the time. A couple of our boys were killed there, right in
the same shack.
On March 4 I was hit. I had only been on my feet a week. I
had been down all winter. I was too weak to try to get out and
try to get away or anything. I still had intentions of getting
up and trying to leave. All the rest had died off, and there
were only three of us.
I got up and took off, and I managed to get about two miles
away, and they picked me up. They asked me where I was from,
and I didn't tell them. I finally told them I had been a
prisoner for about two weeks. They took me to another prison
camp with about thirty-some days' travel.
Senator Potter. Was that Prison Camp No. 5?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did you get there by marches?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. I wasn't able to walk. They had two
more American boys from one of the other divisions, and they
were along. There was about four Chinese, and two of these
Chinese were supposed to be officers, I think, and they were
supposed to be going back to China on leave, or something or
other. They were supposed to be escorting these prisoners back
to camp.
I couldn't keep up pace with them, and so they managed to
get an ox cart, or an old ox, or any way they could keep me
along, and sometimes they would leave me as high as two and
three days behind, and finally I would catch up with them.
Senator Potter. Would they leave you alone or with the
guard?
Sgt. Watters. Every once in a while they would leave me
because I wouldn't walk faster, and things like that.
Senator Potter. And you would be back there all alone?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. Sometimes I would be back behind
maybe a half mile all by myself. The guards would get mad and
leave me all alone. I wasn't in any shape to go anywhere at the
time.
Senator Potter. What happened when you got to Camp No. 5?
Sgt. Watters. I got to Camp No. 5, and I was only there for
a few days until we started our training at the university, as
they called it.
Senator Potter. That was called the university?
Sgt. Watters. The University Piktong.
Senator Potter. What did your training consist of?
Sgt. Watters. The reading of literature and speeches, and
so on, on communism.
Senator Potter. Did they interview you at the university
first, or what?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What would they try to find out in the
interview?
Sgt. Watters. Well, about my government and what I knew
about communism, and different things like that, and about the
unit, and about the weapons, and so on and so forth, what was
being used, what tactics to use for this and that.
Senator Potter. Did they try to get you to sign statements?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What were some of the statements that they
wanted you to sign?
Sgt. Watters. Well, about different types of equipment, and
such as that. They asked me if I knew anything about the
equipment, and I told them no. But they still figured that I
did, and I got hit over the head several times, and I got
slapped up against the wall.
Senator Potter. That was during the interrogations?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were the interrogations carried on by
military personnel or non-military personnel?
Sgt. Watters. Military personnel, sir, CBV; yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Chinese?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. You said they slapped you around?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. If you did not answer the questions the way
they wanted them answered, they slapped you around?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What were some of the indoctrination
courses or the lectures? What were they on? Were they much the
same as those in Camp No. 1?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir, I imagine they were along the same
line. It was about some of their Communist writers, and
everything of Russia, and Czechoslovakia, and different
countries, telling us about the different countries with
communism and the benefits of it; how the countries benefitted
by it, and so on and so forth, how much better it was than our
government.
Then, of course, along at the same time, I believe we had
some of the biggest arguments that we ever had. Did we like
Chiang Kai-shek, and did Formosa belong to the Chinese or to
who.
Senator Potter. They questioned you about that, too?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. In fact, that went along, I
imagine, for about three or four months. Every once in a while
they would bring the same question up.
Senator Potter. Did they have the Daily Worker there for
reading material?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were the lectures conducted by military
personnel or by non-military personnel?
Sgt. Watters. We had military personnel, sir. In fact, I
believe we did have some non-military personnel at Camp 5 in
the beginning as well as I remember, sir.
Senator Potter. Did you ever see any Russian troops there?
Sgt. Watters. Well, I saw other troops, different from the
Chinese and Korean forces. But I wouldn't know what race they
were. Of course, we would ask the question, and they would tell
us it was none of our business, and sometimes they would say
they were Manchurian, inspecting camps or something of that
type.
Senator Potter. What was your food ration?
Sgt. Watters. Well, there wasn't much of a ration to it. I
would say we would get an ordinary coffee cupful of cracked
corn or barley twice a day.
Senator Potter. Did they have a special confinement place
for prisoners who broke some of the rules of the camp or small
infractions of the rules?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What did that consist of?
Sgt. Watters. Well, if you didn't go along with them on
different things, argue it with them or something of that type,
there would be the place we would call the hole or the dungeon,
which was, I would say, maybe six feet deep and damp, with no
blankets, no straw or anything in the bottom of it. They kept
you there for two or three days at a time.
They also had rooms where they would lock them up, tie
their hands behind them, tie their feet together, handcuff
them, and so on.
Senator Potter. Were you ever thrown in the hole?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir.
Senator Potter. How long would they normally keep a man in
the hole?
Sgt. Watters. Well, if he started going along with them,
they would let him outside in a week. But if he didn't, they
would keep him there for thirty or forty days.
Senator Potter. Thirty or forty days?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. While you were in the prison camp, was
there quite a bit of beating of the prisoners?
Sgt. Watters. Well, I only saw three or four incidents at
Camp 5, and I only saw a couple at Camp 3, and a couple at Camp
4.
Senator Potter. You were at Camp 5 first, is that correct?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How long were you there?
Sgt. Watters. I was there for May, June, July, and I
believe it was August that I left there.
Senator Potter. I assume that was the camp where they sent
them for the special training, and after they had received
their training they sent them to another camp, is that true?
Sgt. Watters. What I understood later on, and they told us
after we went to Camp 3, they were classified as reactionaries,
we were classified as reactionaries, because we didn't go along
with their literature.
Senator Potter. In other words, you did not graduate from
the university?
Sgt. Watters. We graduated without a diploma. In fact, they
told us that. We asked them why we were sent up there, and why
we had to build this and that, and carry wood, and everything
else.
Senator Potter. That was at Camp 3?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir, after we went to Camp 3. Then they
told us, they said, ``Well, when you learn the truth and go
along, things will be much better.''
Senator Potter. I assume, then, that the treatment was much
better at Camp 5 than at Camp 3?
Sgt. Watters. Well, it was after a little while, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How many men were at Camp 5 when you were
there?
Sgt. Watters. Well, there was, I would say, around twenty-
two or twenty-three hundred. That is when I went there, sir.
Senator Potter. Were most of them Americans?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Most of them were Americans?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How many died while at that camp, do you
have any idea?
Sgt. Watters. Well, I would say there was around six or
eight hundred, sir.
Senator Potter. Six or eight hundred?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did most of them die from malnutrition?
Sgt. Watters. Malnutrition and froze to death.
Senator Potter. Did they have medical facilities there?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Were there any Red Cross representatives
there?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. They didn't have nothing whatsoever
there at that time. The only medical care we got there was we
had one American doctor, a captain, who went around and
gathered up bones and things like that and burned them and made
potash out of them and gave it to us, the ones that had
dysentery. A lot of boys died of dysentery and fever,
pneumonia, and everything else.
Senator Potter. The only medication he received was from
the American doctor PW?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. Well, they finally stopped him from
coming around and giving treatment to the men on account that
somebody said something or other that he had said. Anyhow, he
was a rumormonger or spreader, and he was no good, so they
chased him away from the compound, and we didn't see him any
more after that.
Senator Potter. Did they question while there concerning
your home life, about your parents?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir, quite a bit.
Senator Potter. Did they inquire about whether you owned an
automobile, or anything of that kind?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. If you told them that your parents had an
automobile, would they believe you?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir, they probably would believe you,
but it would be best to tell them that you had nothing, that
you were a peasant that lived off the lay of the land, and in
that way they seemed to like the working person better.
Senator Potter. If you owned an automobile, then you were a
capitalist so far as they were concerned?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir, you were a capitalist.
Senator Potter. All right. You were then transferred to
Camp 3?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And how long were you there?
Sgt. Watters. I was there for about one year, sir.
Senator Potter. And where is Camp 3 located?
Sgt. Watters. That is a little out of Changsong,
approximately, eighteen to twenty miles, sir, Changsong,
proper.
Senator Potter. How far is that from Camp 5?
Sgt. Watters. Well, it had taken us all night and a part of
a day to go in a boat. I don't remember, but I think there were
around 160 or 175 of us, and we were on two little boats.
Senator Potter. You went up the river?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And was Camp 3 under Chinese jurisdiction
or Korean jurisdiction?
Sgt. Watters. It was under Chinese jurisdiction.
Senator Potter. How did that differ from Camp 5? I
understand you had more physical duties to perform there. Is
that true?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. They made us get out and build rock
walls, and walks, and we had to build shacks, carry mud, carry
logs, go to the mountains and carry logs in and such as that,
sir.
Senator Potter. Did the indoctrination courses still
continue?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. After we got there and got the camp
built up, after three or four months, then they started back on
their literature and everything.
Senator Potter. Started giving you the works again?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did that differ from the other
indoctrination courses that you had?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. It was practically the same thing.
It was more or less of a review.
Senator Potter. Did they give you assignments and books to
read?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. We had the classes broken down. We
had them broken down like platoons and squads. The rooms were
just about big enough for a squad. They would select one man to
read the book to us and then we were supposed to make written
copies, more or less a report on what we were talking about and
everything.
After he reads it off, we would discuss it, and then we
were supposed to make a report and turn it in.
Senator Potter. Would there be guards there while he was
reading it?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. There were guards all around. We
were pretty well covered. But every once in a while our Chinese
platoon leaders, as we called them, or one of the Honshus,
would come by and if he caught us with a book on the floor,
sitting around batting the breeze, he would sneak up behind the
door and he would come up and raise a lot of Cain, and would
place the ringleaders into the hole and make them stand at
attention.
Senator Potter. Do you want to explain what you mean about
standing at attention?
Sgt. Watters. They stand there and ask questions until they
get the right answers out of them. Some of the guys would pass
out.
Senator Potter. How long have you seen some of them stand
at attention?
Sgt. Watters. I have seen some of them stand at attention
as high as four and five hours, after working all day, or
something like that.
Senator Potter. Did they have you write an autobiography of
yourself?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And did they ask you to change it
afterwards or make any changes, or anything?
Sgt. Watters. No. I more or less used my own head in
writing it up, sir.
Senator Potter. Then you say you were in Camp 3 for about a
year?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And you were transferred then to Camp 4?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Where is Camp 4?
Sgt. Watters. Camp 4 was further north to Waewon.
Senator Potter. How long were you there?
Sgt. Watters. I stayed there until April 16, 1953.
Senator Potter. That would be about how long all together?
Sgt. Watters. We left Camp 3 in August. Wait a minute. We
didn't go directly there. We went to another place where we
stayed for eighteen days, which we called an eighteen-day camp.
We figured everything was blowing over and the peace talks and
everything were being settled, so they were shipping us all
down because they were being pretty nice to us at that time.
They loaded us into some trucks.
At this time we ran across quite a few of the 24th Division
guys, which had been under the jurisdiction of the Koreans, and
they segregated us.
Senator Potter. They would not let you talk to the others?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. They kept us segregated.
Senator Potter. And they treated you pretty well at the
eighteen-day camp, as you called it?
Sgt. Watters. For a few days, until some of the boys broke
camp and went up to see some of the boys in the 24th Division.
Then they tightened down on us and started beating up several
of the guys and throwing them in holes, and so on. There were
several of the guys left there when we left. I don't know
whatever happened to them.
Senator Potter. Were conditions in Camp 4 much the same as
in Camp 5 and 3?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. When we went to Camp 4 we had to
move into a couple of old school houses that didn't have
windows or anything else. One of the places had concrete floors
and we had to sleep on the concrete floors for about four
months. A lot of guys got rheumatism very badly out there from
it, and they managed to get another wooden building for us to
move into.
Then we started to shape it up, and they more or less made
a recreation room out of the one with the concrete floor.
Senator Potter. Was the food about the same in each camp?
Sgt. Watters. The food began to improve all along, sir.
Senator Potter. Getting better?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What about the treatment by the guards and
the prison personnel?
Sgt. Watters. Well, the prison guards themselves, that is
more or less to say the privates and so on, they never did have
very much to say to us. You would have to do something out of
the way before they would jump you. But it was always the
senior instructors, the officers.
Senator Potter. These instructors, were they the ones that
would give you the speeches?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. In Camp 4, did you witness any meetings?
Sgt. Watters. Only two, sir. And that was while we were out
on wood details, out in the mountains, about four miles out. We
would do a little ``Changey'' with an old Korean, and if they
would catch you they would knock you in the head with a rifle
butt, or push you around, or something like that.
Senator Potter. You were at Camp 4 when Little Switch took
place, is that true?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Can you relate to us briefly what
transpired? Did you know how you happened to be selected?
Sgt. Watters. Well, about five or six mouths before, when
news started coming in and everything, they called me to
headquarters interrogating a couple of times. I had a hunch,
and I started playing that hunch. In other words, using a
little psychology on them.
Then, about four mouths later, things kept growing and
looking better and everything. And the food was improving. So I
just kept on playing along with them. They finally called me up
and asked me about different things, how the Chinese treated
me, and all this and that, and asked me if they had taken any
property off of me, and this and that, and I told them no, they
had been awful nice, and all of this and that. They said,
``Well, that is good.'' In a few days they invited me up to the
house, and I had a couple of drinks with them, with cigarettes
and candy, and then, bang, they said, ``Well, pack up. You are
going home.''
Senator Potter. Were most of the men from Camp 4 that were
selected for Little Switch, selected on that basis of the
fellows getting smart?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir. Some of the fellows were in pretty
bad shape.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether they left any badly
wounded prisoners there in Little Switch? Did they take all the
wounded prisoners?
Sgt. Watters. No, sir, they did not, sir. There was a lot
of the fellows back there that were worse than I was.
Mr. O'Donnell. Sergeant, I notice you had a chance to
glance through that propaganda pamphlet.
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know if any of those photographs were
taken at Camp 5?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. They were?
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Bob, I wonder if you can give that to the
Sgt. so he could go into that. [Document handed witness.]
Briefly, of course, this pamphlet was put out by the
Communists to attempt by various photographs to indicate that
American PW's were receiving excellent treatment and were
enjoying themselves. Sergeant, we would appreciate any comments
you have on it and anything specific that you can bring to our
attention.
Sgt. Watters. Yes, sir. Before I came up here, the major
asked me if I would look through this. I just more or less
glanced through it like that, and I had seen quite a bit of it.
Of course, I will make the statement I made a while ago, that I
could tell where it came from. 90 percent isn't what it is
cracked up to be.
Senator Potter. Most of those pictured are posed pictures?
Sgt. Watters. Well, like the picture itself of Camp 5--I
don't know, that was taken probably in the spring of the year
when it was most beautiful around there.
Senator Potter. Like some of our tourist ads?
Sgt. Watters. Yes. Somebody would look at that and say that
would be a nice place for a home, a mansion, and anything else.
Of course, the houses, as it looks in the picture, are nicely
constructed and everything else. But they are nothing but mud
shacks.
Senator Potter. They are noting but mud shacks?
Sgt. Watters. That is all they are sir. Of course, they had
a couple of modern shacks which I haven't been able to locate
here, which were blown right down to the ground by our own
aircraft in January, I think of 1951. They had a candy factory
and something else sitting back up on the hill.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you have any first-hand knowledge of any
of those specific pictures in there, Sergeant?
Sgt. Watters. Well, yes, sir. You take the one on page six,
of the colored fellow shaking hands with the Chinese as he
finished up his journey on his way to the PW camp, and so on.
Mr. O'Donnell. How would that come about?
Sgt. Watters. Maybe the guards treated him pretty nice on
the way up, maybe giving him a cigarette or two, or something
like that, every ten or twelve miles.
Mr. O'Donnell. Would you say that each and every picture in
there was to some extent planted by the Communists, setting it
up?
Sgt. Watters. It has been planted for a reason, yes, sir.
Of course, I have not studied all the pictures. But I can just
pick out maybe a half dozen of them, and I can judge the rest
to be the same way.
Senator Potter. Before you are asked to testify in public
session, we will give you an opportunity to go over some of
those. You might mark some that you can comment on ahead of
time. We will give you an opportunity to look that over prior
to the time that you testify.
Sgt. Watters. Very well, sir.
Senator Potter. Thank you, Sergeant. Do you have anything
you would like to add on your own?
Sgt. Watters. No. sir, I don't think I have anything else
to say.
Senator Potter. All right. You will be notified as to the
day you will appear.
Sergeant Mullins?
STATEMENT OF SGT. ORVILLE R. MULLINS
Sgt. Mullins. Orville R. Mullins, 20-21 ASU, Army and Air
Force Recruiting Station and Induction Station, Cincinnati,
Ohio.
Senator Potter. Will you give us your home address?
Sgt. Mullins. My home address in 4419 DeCorcey Avenue,
Covington, Kentucky.
Senator Potter. You are pretty close to home.
Sgt. Mullins. Yes, sir. I am in Covington on duty.
Senator Potter. That is what we call good duty. Sergeant,
can you tell us when you went to Korea and with what unit you
were with at the time?
Sgt. Mullins. I went to Korea, I left the States January 5,
1951, and joined the Second Infantry Division, the 38th
Infantry Regiment of H Company, some time in the same month of
January. I don't remember the exact date. I stayed with that
until August 27, 1951, when I was captured. My army serial
number is RA 43013189.
Senator Potter. Do you care to briefly tell us how you were
captured?
Sgt. Mullins. We were behind the lines in a blocking
position, over two companies of us. We were a good way back. We
had been back there or we were only supposed to be back there
for three days, and we had been back there ten days. We ran out
of ammunition, and they cut us off. The ROK's were trying to
take a hill, and they took it, and got run off, and pushed way
back.
We were cut off, and they got us in a valley, they got on
both sides of the valley, and behind us, and as we tried to get
out they cut us down. Some made it and some didn't. I was hit
with machine gun fire in the legs.
Senator Potter. You were wounded at the time?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Can you briefly tell us what transpired
after you were captured and where they took you?
Sgt. Mullins. Well, at first I played dead. They overrun us
then. They started moving in on us, and they overrun us, and I
took blood from my leg--I was bleeding badly--and run it on my
face. When the first wave went through I had a bunch of
equipment on me--I had been carrying a machine gun and had
destroyed it, and I had a bunch of binoculars, and things like
that on me--and I took and broke it all and threw everything I
had in the river.
About that time they moved up just across the river with
some more prisoners and stopped over there. I played dead for I
don't know how long, maybe an hour. They moved on, and then I
couldn't hardly walk. I crawled down and got across the little
river and was going up to the road over there. I thought they
had pulled out.
We were only about five hundred yards from our line, and I
could see our tanks and machine guns firing into the area.
There was a heavy artillery and mortar fire coming in. I had
gotten to a house and was still bleeding badly. I had saved my
first aid bandage kit, and I took it and got in the house,
which had been bombed out, and I bandaged my leg.
I got a big stick, and I got up in the road, couldn't see
anybody or hear anything, and it was raining pretty badly, and
I started walking up the road on the stick, I couldn't walk
fast, but I thought the boys up there saw me, or could see me
through field glasses, and could tell I was an American. I
don't guess they did.
I started around the bend, and about that time another GI
was coming around the bend, and I stopped. About that time two
guards captured him, and then they saw me. They took me and
searched me, and saw I was pretty badly shot up, and I couldn't
walk very good.
Artillery was coming in on top of us, so they got him to
help me. We started back down the road, and they got scared of
artillery, and they told him to run on and told me to follow
him. Well, I got me another stick, and I went back toward our
lines instead of following them.
I went up there to within about two hundred yards, and I
had to go around into a cut. They had a road block up there,
and there was a whole company of them, and I walked right into
them before I noticed.
Senator Potter. A company of Communists?
Sgt. Mullins. North Koreans. The Sixth North Korean
Division. I don't know what regiment. I stopped there then, and
they made me lay down on the side of the road. My platoon
leader and a bunch of them were there. I wasn't right where
they were at the time. Artillery came in and hit right among a
bunch of them and killed a bunch of them, where they had some
wounded. They made us stay there until dark that night.
They moved the rest of them from around that little hill to
where I was, and there was a bunch of them, and they stayed
around there. I heard them over there firing into that gully.
There was a lot of wounded over there. They started to move us
out at dark. I thought I could play like I couldn't walk, and
then I thought about them shooting, and I didn't know whether
they were shooting the guys or not.
So I got up and started walking with them. There were
twenty-six of us at the time, and all but eight were wounded.
Senator Potter. All but eight were wounded?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. They took the wounded.
Sgt. Mullins. They took one or two and gave them their
heavy weapons and made them carry them up the hill, and took
the rest of us and made them carry their wounded. They had some
wounded there, and then they took off down the road with us. We
went for about a mile and they had a hole dug on the hill, and
they made us sit outside, and they sat inside and watched us,
and artillery came in until the next morning, and we sat there
like that.
Then we moved the next morning two or three more miles to
headquarters, and we stayed there for two days, two days and
one night, and move out the next night, going north in a group.
We marched for four more days.
Senator Potter. Had they taken any of your clothes or
anything?
Sgt. Mullins. They had taken most of the clothes from the
rest of the guys. Mine was so bloody they didn't.
Senator Potter. Yours were not attractive to them.
Sgt. Mullins. They didn't want them. We got over to this
other headquarters, and they kept us there. When we got there
they gave us, all twenty-six of us, and a South Korean, I
understand--no, two South Koreans joined us then--they gave all
of us about half of a government liner full of rice to eat. We
ate that, and then they took all the first three graders, six
sergeants, over to interrogate us. They told us that they were
going to turn us loose.
We stayed there for two or three days, and moved on out
again one night.
Senator Potter. In their interrogation, was that just on
military interrogation or was it that they would interrogate
you about your home?
Sgt. Mullins. It was all upon my military information, such
as strength.
We moved on over and went into this artillery outfit. We
stayed there one night. That day they moved us up on the hill.
We were wounded badly and they were letting us rest and they
fed us again. They gave us some more. They gave us some horse
meat cooked in some rice. The artillery killed one of their
horses and we got some of that. The, artillery, our artillery
got zeroed in on their artillery and knocked most of it out.
They got scared and they started us out that night up the road,
and we walked--I don't remember--eight, nine or ten days and
nights. We got over to this place and they said we were not
supposed to go there, so they bring us all the way back to the
front.
Senator Potter. They took you back again?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes, sir. They stopped there and then they
started back with us again. We went to Wonsan, and in every
little town they had us march through them in the daytime.
Senator Potter. Did they do that so the civilians would see
a spectacle?
Sgt. Mullins. They used to make fun of us. They would get
us in a town in the evening. They would give us a big bowl of
maize or something like that, and we sat down, and we didn't
have any spoons or anything to wash with, and they would sit
down around you, and you had to eat with your hands. Then the
civilians would stand up around and watch you and make fun of
you because you were hungry.
They took us to Wonsan and from Wonsan we marched back to
Pyongyang to Hodong. That is about fourteen miles northwest, I
think, of Pyongyang. That is an interrogation center.
By that time beriberi had set in, and my leg had swollen up
to twice its size and I could hardly walk. They let us stay
there for a day and a half, and they interrogated us some
there. The next day we were going to move north again, and I
couldn't walk. I couldn't step. So they put me in an ox cart
and started moving me.
Well, we went that way for fifteen or twenty days, and some
days I would have to walk, and some days I would be so bad I
couldn't walk and they would put me on an ox cart.
Up to that time I only had had my leg washed off and a
bandage put around it one time.
We got to what was a Korean prison camp in a big hollow, a
big mining camp. By the time we got there we were all pretty
sick and pretty weak, without anything to eat, and they said we
were going to rest up there. Well, just before that they had
pulled the 26th out.
We left Pyongyang with 162 men. And just before we got to
this Korean prison camp they took the twenty-six that were with
me out and took us to a school house and kept us four days. But
they took the others on to this prison camp. They took us over
there and they kept us, and the first two days they fed us two
times a day and fed us good, and they were trying to get us to
write articles, and questioned us about home and what we owned
and everything.
Senator Potter. That was their propaganda spot?
Sgt. Mullins. They had a general there. He was wanting to
pick out somebody to take to a peace camp that they had at that
time. They had approximately seventy UN prisoners in there that
did nothing but write articles and make radio broadcasts,
propaganda broadcasts.
Senator Potter. How many prisoners did you say?
Sgt. Mullins. Approximately seventy. It was close to the
Pyongyang prison camp where I went to, because we had went to
it. We thought that was where we were supposed to go, and we
got to talk to one that was an artillery officer, a captain who
was in good shape. We talked to two or three of them.
They wouldn't let us talk anymore, and they moved us off.
They moved us down the river and kept us that night. Then we
started to move over to Pyongyang.
After we got to this one place where they interrogated us,
then they kept twenty-six of us there, and took two of the boys
from my group back to this peace camp.
Senator Potter. They did take two of them?
Sgt. Mullins. Two of them wrote a couple of articles and a
couple of letters, so they took them back.
We went on, and we got over to this prison, and there was,
I think they said, six hundred South Koreans there.
By the time we had started dying off, about four or five
had died off from us. While we were there we lost about twenty
men, just from malnutrition and too much walking and no medical
care. They were going to move us out of there, and they had
eight men in this one little room, and they wouldn't let us go
in there. The men were too sick to even eat, and they had
dysentery bad, and it stunk, and it was dirty in there. They
wouldn't let anybody go in there, wouldn't let anybody go near
there. They wouldn't feed them. One morning, the morning we
left, they got them and carried all of them out, and they were
all dead.
Senator Potter. They were all dead?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes. That evening, late that evening, about
four or five o'clock, they got us all together, and we started
north again. Everybody was sick then, and one or two would die
every day or every night.
The first real bad thing that happened is when we were
moving up this valley and we had a long way to go and had
marched a long way that day. We got into this place and I was
in this one room. There was this one tall, slim colored boy who
was with us who did not have any shoes. A bunch of them had no
shoes. His feet turned sore and he couldn't walk. They swelled
up and he was sick.
Well, he had died, and so they dragged him on the ground
for a mile and a-half or two miles, and they dragged him and
pitched him into the room with us.
Senator Potter. Was he dead then?
Sgt. Mullins. He was still just barely breathing when they
brought him in.
Senator Potter. And they dragged him in?
Sgt. Mullins. Just got him by the hands and dragged him in.
We told them afterwards, when we found out he was dead, to let
us put him on the outside so we could have more room, to let us
do something with him. They said no, he stayed there.
We got him and put him up on a thing they had in this room,
laid him up there, and offered a prayer for him that night. The
next morning they moved us out and they said the Koreans would
bury him. I don't know what happened.
We went on up for a ways. We kept on this march until a day
or two before we got to Camp No. 3. I was on an ox cart this
time since I was pretty weak. This day we had stopped and we
had eaten about twelve o'clock. We had not eaten since the day
before, and they fed us about twelve o'clock. I had had a
cigarette. The Korean had given me a cigarette.
These other two boys on the ox cart didn't have any
clothes.
They were pretty bad off. They were alive then because I
had given them part of this cigarette.
They put us on the ox cart and moved us out, and they were
trying to stop us just before dark that night, but our ox cart
broke down and we had stopped and got behind. There were four
or five of us down there, and they had these two boys laying on
them. We moved up and they had them stopped. This Korean
officer, who was some kind of a lieutenant, he spoke a little
English; he told us the boys were dead, that both of them had
died.
Four Korean civilians came down and they went up on the
hill and started digging a grave. They came down and started
taking them off the cart. By the time we pulled around them I
looked at those two boys, and one of them looked at me. He
wasn't dead. I don't know whether the other one was or not. But
he was almost dead.
So we went on around up there, and in about five minutes
this officer and these four civilians, two or four, I have
forgotten for sure, they came on up and I stayed in one of
their houses that night. We stayed there that night, and I was
with a sick group by that time.
The next day we started on out and we moved on out to a
dam. We left about three o'clock by boat, and we got to Camp 3
about ten o'clock that night.
Senator Potter. You went by boat?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes, sir. They put us up by this dam. We went
by boat because we couldn't hardly walk. This one, he was from
one of the English satellite countries, he was the one, and we
were waiting by this boat by the side of the dam. They never
came and we couldn't go. They had a sack of rice there and they
started everybody out to go back up around to some houses to
stay, and they told this one guy, a Scotchman, to carry the
rice and he couldn't carry it. He was too weak and it was too
heavy.
They started beating him, trying to make him carry it. We
went on by and they still had him back there, a bunch of the
guards. Finally they came around with the rice and when they
brought him in they were still beating him, knocking him down,
and then he would get up. Finally he couldn't get up anymore,
and they dragged him on around from where I was, and left him
beside the road there.
I went over to check him, and he was dead then.
They put us in this house down there, and we stayed there
all that night and the next day, and the next night and up
until three o'clock that evening, and then we went to Camp 3.
We got there about ten o'clock that night and were turned over
to the Chinese.
Senator Potter. All this march was by Koreans, North
Koreans.
Sgt. Mullins. North Koreans.
Senator Potter. And then you were turned over to the
Chinese at Camp No. 3?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. You heard the statement, I think, of
Daniels and Matta, I believe, on Camp 3. How long were you at
Camp No. 3?
Sgt. Mullins. I got there sometime the first of December,
and I was pretty sick, and my eyes swelled up and I couldn't
see. My whole head was swelled up and my leg.
They took me to the hospital at Camp No. 3. While I was
there they made an operation on my leg.
Senator Potter. They did operate on your leg?
Sgt. Mullins. About nine inches all the way to the bone. I
found out later, they told me, the blood vein that comes down--
they took one and put it on the other side of my leg.
Senator Potter. Did they give you an anesthesia?
Sgt. Mullins. No, nothing. I went out of my head after
about three hours. It started early in the morning and I came
to that night, and I don't remember. It got bad.
They sent me to Camp No. 5, to what we called the general
hospital, the big hospital, and they cleaned it out and sewed
it up.
Senator Potter. They did fix it up at Camp No. 5?
Sgt. Mullins. At the time they took me to Camp No. 5 I
weighed about sixty-five pounds. I couldn't move and couldn't
walk.
Senator Potter. How long were you in Camp No. 3 before they
sent you to 5?
Sgt. Mullins. Maybe a month at that time. But I stayed in
Camp No. 5 until January, and I returned to Camp No. 3.
Senator Potter. Then you came back to 3?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Apparently medical treatment was pretty
good in Camp No. 5. They fixed up your leg, did they?
Sgt. Mullins. Just sewed it up, sir. But some of the boys
got out, a couple of guys I know pretty well got out and stole
some stuff and I got to eat, and they got me back on my feet.
They gave me some clothes there. Those are the first clothes I
had. They gave me my clothes there. I had none at that time.
They had taken them all away from me. They gave me some clothes
and I got in pretty good shape there. I got back up to about a
hundred. But then they sent me back to Camp No. 3.
Senator Potter. When you got back to Camp No. 3 you were
still too sick to work, were you not?
Sgt. Mullins. I couldn't walk. I never could walk all the
time. My leg was drawed up.
Senator Potter. What did they do with you in Camp No. 3
after you got back?
Sgt. Mullins. They throwed me in the hole there and wanted
me to tell some things and I wouldn't tell them. They kept me
from January 15 until March 28.
Senator Potter. In the hole?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes.
Senator Potter. What did they want you to tell them?
Sgt. Mullins. They wanted me to draw some maps and things
of bases and everything, to tell them where I lived and
everything. And then they came in one morning and I still
couldn't stand up even, my leg was drawed up. The doctor came
down and saw me and asked me would I like to go to the company.
I wouldn't sign anything. He said if I would sign that I would
be a good boy and not get into trouble I could go to my
company. I said I want to go but I can't walk. Somebody would
have to come down and help me get up.
He went and took two poles and split them and made a pair
of crutches out of them. They took me to the company, and I
stayed back there nine days and was really doing good, getting
in pretty good shape, and my leg was all swelled up with
beriberi, and it busted again.
So they took me back to the hospital. I was in bad shape.
It was rotten. They took scissors and hot water and cleaned all
of that out of there, and stuffed it full of rags and left it
like that. Every week they would come and take the rags out and
put more in, and then they would take and wash the others and
have them ready for the next time. My leg never did get well
but I got so I could walk a little.
They sent me back to the company and I stayed there until
August. In July we left for this other camp.
Senator Potter. Camp No. 5?
Sgt. Mullins. Camp No. 4. I made the move with Sgt.
Watters.
Senator Potter. And your stay at Camp No. 4 was the same as
Sgt. Watters?
Sgt. Mullins. I left there, and my leg got bad again, and
they came and got me and they took me back to Pektong on March
24 of 1953. March 28 is when they really gave me some good
medical attention; they gave me a spinal, washed it out all,
and operated on me again.
Senator Potter. That was during truce negotiations?
Sgt. Mullins. Yes, sir. March 24 of this year. My leg never
got well until after I was released.
In April, April 13, they came and read a letter where they
had accepted, talked about peace, I mean about exchanging the
sick and wounded. The next day they said they had not agreed on
anything. On the 14th they read off where they had agreed, and
when they got through reading he called off four names from the
hospital. I was not with them.
Senator Potter. You were not?
Sgt. Mullins. And they told them, ``Pack up. You are
going.'' And they took them off then.
The next day they came up and called another bunch in the
morning, three or four more, and they took them. That evening
they came up and called me and another guy and took us, and we
went down to where they were collecting for this. From there we
came home.
Senator Potter. Did they leave other wounded prisoners in
Camp 5 in Little Switch?
Sgt. Mullins. Very much so. They had one room with four
guys that weighed less than one hundred pounds. They couldn't
even talk, set up or eat. They were sick with TB.
Senator Potter. Well, Sergeant, since you have gone through
this experience, do you think that communism is a form of
government that would appeal to anybody?
Sgt. Mullins. I don't see and never will see why anybody
would talk for such a form of government. It is not a form of
government; it is a form of dictatorship to me.
Senator Potter. Thank you, Sergeant. We will let you know
when you will appear in the public hearing. It will be
Wednesday, Thursday or Friday.
Don Brown?
Will you identify yourself for the record, and give your
name and address?
STATEMENT OF DONALD R. BROWN
Mr. Brown. Donald R. Brown, 231 North Front Street,
Reading, Pennsylvania.
Senator Potter. What outfit were you with during the Korean
conflict?
Mr. Brown. I was with George Company, 23rd Regiment, 2nd
Division.
Senator Potter. Did you go into Korea with the 2nd
Division?
Mr. Brown. No, sir.
Senator Potter. When did you go to Korea?
Mr. Brown. I went to Korea at the end of December of 1950.
Senator Potter. And when were you captured, Don?
Mr. Brown. The 14th of February, 1951.
Senator Potter. The 14th of February, 1951?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Can you tell us the circumstances under
which they broke your arm?
Mr. Brown. Do you want me to start at the beginning when I
first got hit?
Senator Potter. Yes, sir. Give us briefly how you were
captured.
Mr. Brown. We were overrun, our position was overrun, and
there were about thirty men who took a machine gun, threw a
hand grenade in our hole, another fellow and myself, and we
laid there and pretended we were dead because they were looking
around for the ones that were alive and hitting them.
So I laid still and the other fellow laid still, we both
laid still until the Chinese sat on his leg and he hollered
because he had been hit in the leg. Then we both stood up.
They took us to the base of the hill, and there was a man
there that spoke perfect English, and he told me that I was a
prisoner of war and I would be treated as such. He told me to
see the captain.
The captain put out his hand as though he wanted to shake
hands with me.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were you wounded at the time, Don?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir, I was. I had been wounded with a hand
grenade.
Senator Potter. Then they kept sending you back? What
prison camp did you go to?
Mr. Brown. I wasn't sent to a prison camp. I was told to go
up a hill, and I started up this hill and some Chinese came
down the other way. I pointed back and told them there was a
captain there. I don't know if they understood me or not, but
they started going down one way and I turned and went the other
way. Instead of going over the hill I went down the other side
and I stayed in a hole there. They found me.
I was hit in the leg and left arm with shrapnel. Those are
the parts they started hitting me on, on the leg and the arm,
with a rifle butt.
Senator Potter. When they found you again, they beat you?
Is that right?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Is that when they broke your arm?
Mr. Brown. They put me in a fox hole. Yes, sir. There was
snow then. In February we had snow then, about twelve inches I
suppose.
Senator Potter. How did they beat you? Did they beat you
with a rifle?
Mr. Brown. With a rifle butt. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were you on the ground at the time?
Mr. Brown. I was in a hole then. I put my hand up to
protect my face. I got hit in the eye with shrapnel, and my eye
started to shut. Then they hit me with a rifle butt and it shut
more, it shut entirely. Then I put my arm up again and they hit
it and broke it. I couldn't do anything then. I was standing
there holding it, holding my arm, and after a while I had to
urinate and I asked one if he would help me. He told me no. So
I had to go, and I did, and it went into my boots. As a result,
my feet froze.
After a while the American jets came in and started
strafing. There was a mortar not too far from us. When the jets
started strafing I got up and left.
The day before we had seen those colored parachutes that
Flying Boxcars drop supplies in, so I figured that is where the
Americans were.
I waited until that night. I stayed there, and the next
morning when it started to get light I left and ran down the
road and I came to the French troops.
Senator Potter. You got back to the French troops?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir,
Senator Potter. Thank you, Don.
We have a pretty full schedule. We will be holding hearings
for three days now. I do not know whether we are going to be
able to use all the men for the hearing or not. We did not know
whether you were one we would be able to get to or not. I think
probably we will not be using you in this set of hearings. We
have your testimony here, and we may continue the hearings
after the first of the year. If we do we will contact you.
Mr. Brown. Compared to the other stories I heard, nothing
happened to me.
Senator Potter. Thank you very much.
We will now recess until 10:30 a.m. tomorrow morning, in
room 318, Senate Office Building, at which time we will convene
in open session.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to
reconvene in public session, December 2, 1953, at 10:30 a.m. in
the Caucus Room of the Senate Office Building.]
ARMY SIGNAL CORPS--SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE
[Editor's note.--During the years following World War II,
the FBI and military security had periodically investigated
allegations of espionage at the Army Signal Corps laboratories
at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. On October 6, 1953, the army
announced the suspension of several employees at the facility
for security reasons. That number eventually grew to forty-two,
including fifteen section chiefs. In its annual report for
1953, the subcommittee elaborated that ``on the basis of
reliable information received concerning the general subject of
Communist infiltration and specific information relating to
certain individuals, it became apparent that Communist attempts
to infiltrate our Armed Forces and the defense effort, with a
view to limiting their effectiveness, had not been completely
checked. . . . A large portion of the staff was immediately
assigned to this case. Realizing that through the use of their
worldwide apparatus the Communists had already gained many of
our atomic secrets, the staff's attention focused upon what
might well be considered their next field of concentration--our
defenses against attack. Since it was reported that Communists
and their sympathizers and supporters were employed by the Army
at the time of commencement of the investigation, this received
immediate attention. Since radar is such an obvious and
important part of our defense, particular emphasis was placed
upon defense establishments charged with responsibility for
research, development, and manufacture of radar.''
With Senator McCarthy away on his honeymoon, and Democrats
still boycotting the subcommittee, no senators participated in
this ``staff interrogatory,'' whose format resembled a hearing.
Following this session, Roy Cohn apprized the chairman of new
developments in the investigation. Senator McCarthy then cut
short his honeymoon and returned to New York to conduct formal
hearings. He told reporters that Julius Rosenberg (who with his
wife Ethel had been executed for espionage four months earlier)
had organized a spy ring that stole radar secrets from the Army
Signal Corps laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, that
the case had ``all the earmarks of extremely dangerous
espionage,'' and that the spy ring at Fort Monmouth ``may still
be in operation.''
Of the forty-two civilian employees suspended, the army
later reinstated all but two, although most chose not to return
to their former jobs. None of the witnesses on October 8, Paul
Siegel (1919-1995); Jerome Corwin (1919-1976); Allen J.
Lovenstein (1922-1963); Edward J. Fister (1908-1995); William
P. Goldberg; and Jerome Rothstein (1920-1998), testified in
public session.]
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, N.Y.
The staff interrogatory was convened at 11 a.m., pursuant
to call, in room 1401 of the Federal Building, Mr. G. David
Schine, chief consultant, presiding.
Present: G. David Schine, chief consultant; Roy M. Cohn,
chief counsel; Francis Carr, staff director; Karl Baarslag,
research director; Harold Rainville, administrative assistant
to Senator Dirksen; Robert Jones, administrative assistant to
Senator Potter; John Adams, counselor to the secretary of the
army; and Julius N. Cahn, counsel to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
Mr. Schine. Will you state your name?
STATEMENT OF PAUL SIEGEL
Mr. Siegel. Paul Siegel, S-i-e-g-e-l.
Mr. Schine. And your address?
Mr. Siegel. 46 Pinckney Road, Red Bank, New Jersey. That is
spelled P-i-n-c-k-n-e-y.
Mr. Schine. You are currently employed at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Siegel. Yes.
Mr. Schine. What is your position there?
Mr. Siegel. I am a technical writer at the Signal Corps
Publications Agency.
Mr. Schine. Would you speak a little louder, please?
Mr. Siegel. I am a technical writer at the Signal Corps
Publications Agency.
Mr. Schine. And what is your function as a technical
writer?
Mr. Siegel. Well, I work on these technical manuals that
the government puts out.
Mr. Schine. What do these manuals contain?
Mr. Siegel. Well, they contain information on insulation
and the theory of repair and maintenance and so on, of
electronic equipment.
Mr. Schine. Is this classified material?
Mr. Siegel. Well, some of it is; some of it isn't.
Mr. Schine. And this includes radar installations?
Mr. Siegel. Well, radar equipment. We don't have much to do
with installations.
Mr. Schine. Radar equipment.
Mr. Siegel. Yes.
Mr. Schine. How long have you been doing this work for Fort
Monmouth?
Mr. Siegel. I have been there since the end of 1950.
Mr. Schine. The end of 1950. And you have always been doing
this particular job at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Siegel. Yes. That was my position.
Mr. Schine. That was your position when you came to Fort
Monmouth. And it hasn't changed?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Schine. How did you happen to go to Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Siegel. Well, they were advertising. At the time they
were advertising for men. I had been to Japan. I was working as
an instructor, a radar instructor, and I came back in the
summer of 1950. I heard that there were openings at Fort
Monmouth. I went over, and I got the job.
Mr. Schine. Who recommended you for the Fort Monmouth
position when you applied?
Mr. Siegel. Recommended? Nobody recommended.
Mr. Schine. You didn't fill out any form where you had to
state references?
Mr. Siegel. Oh, when you fill out a form, you put down the
names of three people.
Mr. Schine. What were the names of these people?
Mr. Siegel. Let me think. I think I wrote down Joe
Weinberg.
Mr. Schine. Would you spell the name, please?
Mr. Siegel. W-e-i-n-b-e-r-g. And Harry Rieback. That is R-
i-e-b-a-c-k. I was trying to figure out who else I wrote down.
I think the other one was Moses Plotkin. I think it was.
Mr. Schine. Would you spell his name, please?
Mr. Siegel. P-l-o-t-k-i-n.
Mr. Schine. Were any of these individuals employed at
Monmouth at the time?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Schine. They were not. They are friends of yours?
Mr. Siegel. Yes.
Mr. Schine. You say you were a radar instructor in Japan.
When did you go to Japan?
Mr. Siegel. In 1946.
Mr. Schine. In 1946. And for whom were you a radar
instructor?
Mr. Siegel. For the air force.
Mr. Schine. For the air force? What was your position in
the air force?
Mr. Siegel. Well, I was a radar instructor.
Mr. Schine. With what group were you?
Mr. Siegel. FEAF, I guess you call it. Far Eastern Air
Forces.
Mr. Schine. And you went into the air force when?
Mr. Siegel. I went as a civilian.
Mr. Schine. Oh, you were a civilian radar instructor for
the air force in Japan?
Mr. Siegel. Right.
Mr. Schine. How long?
Mr. Siegel. About four years, from 1946 until 1950.
Mr. Schine. And what did you do prior to 1946?
Mr. Siegel. Prior to 1946, I was at Western Electric.
Mr. Schine. What was your job with Western Electric?
Mr. Siegel. No, first I had another one. I hope you don't
hold me to everything I say, because, you know, you forget
things, especially dates.
Mr. Cohn. Just do your best.
Mr. Siegel. I was thinking I was working with Kenyon
Transformer Company.
Mr. Schine. Will you state the years you were employed with
them, and your function?
Mr. Siegel. Let's see. It was 1946 I left. So it was '45
and '46. From the end of '45 until some time in '46 I was with
Kenyon Transformer Company, and I was testing transformers,
chokes, and stuff like that.
Mr. Schine. And prior to that where were you employed?
Mr. Siegel. Prior to that I think I was at Western
Electric.
Mr. Schine. For how long? Will you state the years you were
with Western Electric?
Mr. Siegel. With Western Electric, '44 and '45. I was a
radar trouble shooter. I tested the radar equipment that came
off the line.
Mr. Schine. And what did you do before that?
Mr. Siegel. Before that I was working at Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Schine. Will you state the years you worked at Fort
Monmouth?
Mr. Siegel. That was '42-'43.
Mr. Schine. When you worked at Fort Monmouth in 1942 and
1943, what was your job at that time?
Mr. Siegel. I was a meteorologist.
Mr. Schine. And you were a civilian employee at that time
also?
Mr. Siegel. A civilian.
Mr. Schine. And what did you do prior to that? What was
your job prior to being a meteorologist at Fort Monmouth in
those years?
Mr. Siegel. I was a typist. I was with the Supervisory
Corps Inspector's Office.
Mr. Schine. Would you repeat that, please? I didn't get it.
Mr. Siegel. I was a typist, with the Supervisory Corps
Inspector's Office. I think they had a little office in the
Marine Basin Company in Brooklyn.
Mr. Schine. You worked for the navy at that time?
Mr. Siegel. That was the navy.
Mr. Schine. Yes. Will you state the years you worked for
the navy, and the address of the office you worked for?
Mr. Siegel. Well, it was probably just before that. You
see, all this I put on my application form. But I think it was
two years before. That would make it '40, 1940 or '41, I
suppose.
Mr. Schine. What college did you go to?
Mr. Siegel. City College.
Mr. Schine. City College. And what years did you attend
City College?
Mr. Siegel. 1937, I guess, I started. 1937 until 1945. I
went evening sessions mostly.
Mr. Schine. Were you employed during the years you were at
City College?
Mr. Siegel. Yes.
Mr. Schine. Would you name the companies you were employed
with, to the best of your ability?
Mr. Siegel. Well, I can't remember the names of the
companies. At that time it was pretty difficult to get a job. I
had a job as errand boy, messenger, stuff like that. I don't
think I remember.
Mr. Schine. What courses did you take while you were at
City College?
Mr. Siegel. Well, scientific courses. I went for a Bachelor
of Science.
Mr. Schine. Yes. Would you name some of the courses that
you took?
Mr. Siegel. Well, I had physics, chemistry, mathematics,
electronics; psychology, I suppose; English.
Mr. Cohn. There are several things I wanted to go over,
here. Have you ever worked at Evans Laboratory?
Mr. Siegel. I think when I worked at Monmouth they called
it ``Laboratory.'' They called it something else.
Mr. Cohn. But it was at Evans?
Mr. Siegel. It was located with what is called Watson now,
and then they moved to Evans.
Mr. Cohn. But in other words you were working at a
laboratory which does the work that is now being done at Evans?
Mr. Siegel. That is right, but I was never at Evans's.
Mr. Cohn. How long has Evans Laboratory been there?
Mr. Siegel. I really don't know.
Mr. Cohn. Approximately?
Mr. Siegel. I really don't know when they were transferred.
It was after I left, and before I came back.
Mr. Cohn. What year would that be?
Mr. Siegel. I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. Two years ago?
Mr. Siegel. It would just be a guess, because I really
don't know. It couldn't be two years ago, because I am at my
present job since 1950. It probably was done before that.
Mr. Cohn. Prior to 1950?
Mr. Siegel. I would think so.
Mr. Cohn. Now, let me ask you this, Mr. Siegel. Have any
loyalty charges ever been preferred against you?
Mr. Siegel. Well, no loyalty charges have been preferred.
Mr. Cohn. Or security?
Mr. Siegel. It all depends on what you mean. Some time ago,
last year I suppose, I received an interrogatory, and they
asked me to explain some items.
Mr. Cohn. What items were they? Give us your best
recollection.
Mr. Siegel. They asked me--I think there were three
important ones. One was about the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. They
said that I once contributed.
Mr. Cohn. What else?
Mr. Siegel. The other charge was--I had lived in Vail
Homes. I believe the government had subsidized it. At the time
that I was working there, I lived at Vail Homes. And it seemed
that some girl, Stein, I believe her name was, had circulated a
petition asking that the homes shouldn't be made into quarters
for families. So I had signed that petition. And they informed
me that she was a Communist, and they asked me about her.
Mr. Cohn. What else?
Mr. Siegel. The other item was that at Western Electric I
was active in the CIO.
Mr. Cohn. Well, they just didn't ask about the CIO. What
union were you a member of?
Mr. Siegel. The United Electrical Workers.
Mr. Cohn. Yes. You were a member of the United Electrical
Workers Union. Is that right?
Mr. Siegel. That is right. And that later was thrown out
because it was Communist.
Mr. Cohn. The heads of the United Electrical Workers were
James Matles and Julius Emspak and Fitzgerald; is that correct?
Mr. Siegel. I guess so.
Mr. Cohn. What else?
Mr. Siegel. They asked me to explain that. I think those
were the three major ones.
Mr. Cohn. What else? Weren't there a couple of other things
mentioned? Let me ask you this: Had you ever lived in New
Jersey, prior to your going with Monmouth in '50?
Mr. Siegel. That was in New Jersey.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever sign a petition or any kind of a
document extending greetings to the Communist party?
Mr. Siegel. No, all I remember signing when I received that
interrogatory--a lot I just can't give from memory, but I seem
to remember there was a petition circulated asking the
government not to make dormitories----
Mr. Cohn. Was this petition about which you were asked a
petition in the course of which support was pledged to the
Communist party?
Mr. Siegel. I am pretty sure there was nothing there about
the Communist party.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Siegel. If I had seen anything about the Communist
party there, I wouldn't have signed it.
Mr. Cohn. Now, let me ask you this. Did you ever contribute
to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?
Mr. Siegel. Well, as I said before, that was one of those
things I just couldn't remember.
I remember--I was a young kid at the time--I used to get
literature. And I don't recall the name was the Abraham Lincoln
Bridge. All I remember was somebody asking for money for some
cause. They claimed it was for democracy. They claimed they
were fighting for democracy. And at that time I didn't know any
better. So I must have sent them a dollar or so.
Mr. Cohn. How much did you send them?
Mr. Siegel. I really don't remember, but it was probably
about a dollar.
Mr. Cohn. Now, were you ever a member of the United
Electrical Workers?
Mr. Siegel. Yes, I was a member.
Mr. Cohn. You were a member of that. Did you know when you
were a member of the United Electrical Workers that it was a
Communist-dominated union? Hadn't you heard that?
Mr. Siegel. No. At that time I didn't think it was
Communist-dominated. I knew there were Communists in there. I
mean, Communists managed to get into all the unions.
Mr. Schine. Will you name the Communists you knew were in
the union?
Mr. Siegel. Well, it is pretty hard to say who was a
Communist and who wasn't. You know that is a very difficult
question.
Mr. Schine. You just said you knew there were Communist in
there.
Mr. Siegel. I knew there were Communists in there, just
like you know that there are Communists in all the unions. That
is the point I was trying to make.
Mr. Schine. Will you name some of them that you knew were
Communists?
Mr. Siegel. Well, I really couldn't say if I knew any were
Communists. Perhaps there might be some I thought were
Communists. But I wouldn't accuse anybody, because I have no
way of knowing. I mean, you have no way of knowing. And at that
time, I wasn't aware of the danger of communism. Most people
weren't. Isn't that right?
Mr. Cohn. When was the last time you had any connection
with the United Electrical Workers Union?
Mr. Siegel. Well, when I left Western Electric.
Mr. Cohn. When was that? In what year?
Mr. Siegel. I said it just a minute ago. Let's see. '44-
'45; it would be '45.
Mr. Cohn. When you were in Western Electric, did you have
access to any classified information?
Mr. Siegel. Well, I was working on radar equipment.
Mr. Cohn. That was classified?
Mr. Siegel. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. How about this petition you signed for this woman
named Stein? Did you know her?
Mr. Schine. Steiner.
Mr. Cohn. Steiner. Do you know her first name?
Mr. Siegel. Only from this interrogatory. It hit me when I
saw it, because it just didn't strike any note. Ever since then
I have been trying to think who Vera Stein was, and I can't
place it.
Mr. Cohn. Do you remember the name of the woman who asked
you to sign the petition?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Cohn. Do you remember signing the petition?
Mr. Siegel. I think I signed the petition.
Mr. Cohn. And you did not know the person who asked you to
sign was a functionary of the Communist party?
Mr. Siegel. No, I had no idea.
Mr. Cohn. Now, while you were at City College, did you know
Julius Rosenberg?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Cohn. Morton Sobell?
Mr. Siegel. No.
I would like to make it clear that I have a bad memory. I
don't remember names. Maybe I could remember a picture.
Mr. Cohn. You have seen Morton Sobell's picture in the last
three years, haven't you?
Mr. Siegel. Where?
Mr. Cohn. One of the three people convicted of espionage in
the trial of Julius Rosenberg.
Mr. Siegel. I don't think I would know Sobell.
Mr. Cohn. How about William Muterperl, M-u-t-e-r-p-e-r-l?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Cohn. Vivian Glassman?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Cohn. Aaron Coleman?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever meet Aaron Coleman out at Monmouth?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Cohn. You know who Aaron Coleman is, don't you?
Mr. Siegel. I don't think so. I don't know these people.
Mr. Schine. Some of your classmates at City College are
currently employed at Fort Monmouth; is not that true?
Mr. Siegel. Well I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know anybody at Monmouth you saw at City
College? Have you see any familiar faces around there?
Mr. Siegel. Well, yes. Occasionally I see a familiar face,
and it turns out he was at City College, yes.
Mr. Cohn. Who did some of those familiar faces belong to?
Mr. Siegel. These are difficult questions.
Mr. Cohn. Well, while you are thinking about that, let me
ask you this: Why did you leave the United Electrical Workers
Union, when you left your employment at Western Electric?
Mr. Siegel. Because I was no longer working.
Mr. Cohn. At Western Electric; is that right? What did you
do? Just let your membership lapse in UE?
Mr. Siegel. Yes. Well, I had no purpose in remaining there.
Mr. Schine. Would you answer that other question, who the
faces belonged to?
Mr. Siegel. I can't think.
Mr. Schine. Which classmates of yours that you knew at City
College you now know are at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Siegel. Questions like that are very difficult for me.
I just can't remember names.
Mr. Cohn. Well, Mr, Siegel, what is the difficulty about
it?
Mr. Siegel. Well, now that you asked me the question, if I
bumped into somebody there, I would remember it.
Mr. Cohn. I mean, I would know if you asked me if anybody
in this building went to school with me. I could give you the
names of some people.
Mr. Siegel. I guess you have a better memory. I mean, I
really don't have any point in not telling you that, because I
don't see any point to it.
Mr. Cohn. But you don't recall any. Do you know Harold
Ducore?
Mr. Siegel. No.
Mr. Cohn. Were you disturbed at the allegations of
Communist control of the United Electrical Workers when you
heard them?
Mr. Siegel. Yes. I was disturbed because I had belonged
there. I didn't think it was that bad, that it was Communist-
dominated. And I actually thought they took advantage of me,
you might say, that I was taken in by them.
Mr. Cohn. Through whom did you contribute to the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade? Do you recall that?
Mr. Siegel. I don't recall; it probably was a letter.
Mr. Cohn. In response to a letter, probably?
Mr. Siegel. Yes, in those days we used to get letters all
the time, for all kinds of causes. And, as I say, I don't even
recall if that was the name of the organization. Of course, I
know now it is on the subversive list. Now I wouldn't
contribute to anything unless I knew definitely what it was.
But at that time I wasn't even conscious of the danger.
Mr. Cohn. You say you have no recollection of signing a
petition extending greetings to the Communist party?
Mr. Siegel. Greetings? No. Because I know I wouldn't sign
anything like that.
Mr. Cohn. You say you would not sign anything like that.
Mr. Schine. When you were a member of the United Electrical
Workers, you said you knew there were Communists there, and you
were about to name some of the Communists you knew there.
Mr. Siegel. I said I thought there might have been
Communists. Because I wouldn't accuse anybody. I don't want
anybody to accuse me, either.
Mr. Schine. You discussed communism at that time with some
of the members?
Mr. Siegel. There again, I know there was one man who was
very active----
Mr. Schine. Would you give us his name?
Mr. Siegel [continuing]. In this union. I am not even sure
of his name. I think his name was Rubin.
Mr. Schine. Would you spell that please?
Mr. Siegel. R-u-b-i-n.
Mr. Schine. What was his first name?
Mr. Siegel. I just can't think of his first name.
Mr. Schine. Would you tell us of his activities?
Mr. Siegel. I thought you would ask me. I was trying to
think of his name, but I just can't think of his first name. I
know there were two brothers. I can't recall either of the
first names.
Mr. Schine. Would you describe their activity?
Mr. Siegel. Well, they were just very active in this union
and tried to get everybody to join. This fellow, I think, took
care of all the complaints, you might say.
Mr. Schine. You think he was a Communist?
Mr. Siegel. I think so.
Mr. Schine. He talked about communism frequently?
Mr. Siegel. Not frequently. Well, the thing that makes me
believe that he was: He once tried to get me to subscribe to
the Daily Worker. That is the one thing that made me think so.
He said: ``Well, I will put you on the subscription list.'' I
said, ``I don't want to be on the subscription list.'' I
remember I was afraid that he would put me on the list and I
would receive it, and gee whiz, people would think all kind of
things about me.
Mr. Schine. Why didn't you want to be on the subscription
list?
Mr. Siegel. Well, I had an idea that Communists weren't up
to any good, that they wanted the overthrow of the government.
But it was all sort of hazy. I didn't know exactly what it was
all about.
Mr. Schine. He talked to you about the Communist movement,
didn't he?
Mr. Siegel. The movement?
Mr. Schine. Yes.
Mr. Siegel. No, he didn't talk too much. He just tried to
get me interested, just a couple of times. And I guess I didn't
respond, so he probably dropped me.
Mr. Jones. How long were you a member of the Electrical
Workers Union?
Mr. Siegel. Well, it was during this period.
Mr. Jones. Approximately three years? Four years?
Mr. Siegel. No, a year or two.
Mr. Jones. How often would you attend their meetings? Once
a month?
Mr. Siegel. I don't remember how often they had meetings.
Mr. Jones. Once a month?
Mr. Siegel. I used to attend most of the meetings.
Mr. Jones. Who presided over most of the meetings? You say
it was a Communist-dominated meeting. You just said so a little
while ago.
Mr. Siegel. I didn't say that. It is known now.
Mr. Jones. Who presided over the meetings that you
attended?
Mr. Siegel. There was a fellow there. I think he was a
professional organizer.
If you showed me a picture----
Mr. Schine. You can't think of his name?
Mr. Siegel. I think it was an Italian name. I think he wore
glasses.
Mr. Jones. Did you get the impression that Communists were
in this union by attending these meetings?
Mr. Siegel. Oh, yes. I had the impression there were
Communists in the union.
Mr. Jones. As a result of the meetings; is that it?
Mr. Siegel. I really don't know. Well, let me put it this
way: At that time I had the impression there were some
Communists in all unions, you see. But I didn't think that the
union was run by the Communists. There is a big distinction
there. Right? You know there are some Communists there, but
there is a big difference between that and a union run by
Communists. If there are some Communists there, I mean, that
doesn't mean the union is bad.
Mr. Cohn. Well, what do you think about that union today?
There is a difference between having some Communists there and
having the heads of the union members of the National Committee
of the Communist party.
Mr. Siegel. What was that?
Mr. Cohn. I said there is a difference between having a few
Communists in the union and having a union like UE, where the
heads of it were members of the National Committee of the
Communist party.
Mr. Siegel. That is right. That means that the union is run
by the Communists, and you didn't have a chance to do anything.
Mr. Schine. Mr. Siegel, you knew they held Communist
meetings in the union, didn't you?
Mr. Siegel. Who held meetings?
Mr. Schine. The Communists. You knew they held Communist
meetings in the union?
Mr. Siegel. In the union? I didn't know that. I mean, I
didn't know the conclusion there.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Siegel, what year were you approached, to
the best of your knowledge? What year was it that you were
asked to become a member of the party?
Mr. Siegel. It was either '44 or '45, I guess.
Mr. Jones. Why didn't you join? Or did you join?
Mr. Siegel. I didn't approve of the aims. I didn't know
much about the Communist party, but I know they wanted to
overthrow the government. That was one thing I didn't like.
Mr. Jones. When did they see you the second time? Was it
the following year? To join the party?
Mr. Siegel. What do you mean by ``the second time''?
Mr. Jones. You were approached one time and asked to join
the party. You refused that time. When was the second time that
they asked you?
Mr. Siegel. I think you are putting words into my mouth. I
didn't say I was asked to join the party. This man came over to
me, and he said he wanted to give me subscriptions to the Daily
Worker. And I said, ``No, I don't want any part of it.'' And
then he tried to talk to me. But he never asked me to join the
party. I guess that comes later. I don't know.
Mr. Baarslag. I just wanted to ask one question.
In the time that you were in UE, did you ever meet an
international organizer of that organization by the name of
Willard Bliss, B-l-i-s-s, to the best of your recollection?
Mr. Siegel. No. There was actually only one organizer I
knew, and that is the one that was chairman of these meetings.
And, as I said, I can't remember his name. All I know is that
he was an Italian. I am pretty sure he was an Italian.
Mr. Rainville. I have just one question I wanted to ask.
This radar work is very intricate? It requires a great deal of
detail and accuracy?
Mr. Siegel. I guess so.
Mr. Rainville. That is the thing that confuses me, because
you ``guess''' it does, and yet you are an instructor in it.
You should know whether it does--require technical proficiency
and considerable concentration to make sure that the job is
done properly or not.
Mr. Siegel. Oh, yes, it does.
Mr. Rainville. I mean, I can understand that you use that
as an expression, ``I guess so,'' but I would like specifics
now. It does require great ability to do that particular job?
Mr. Siegel. Well, it requires ability of a certain kind.
Every job requires a certain amount of ability.
Mr. Rainville. You have to remember where this wire goes
and where that wire goes and make sure that you tie them all up
right. Yet you seemed to have an awful lot of difficulty
remembering where you worked for the last couple of years and
the names of men you worked with.
Mr. Siegel. I understand that looks very suspicious.
Mr. Rainville. I am not saying ``suspicious.''
Mr. Siegel. Well, yes. I am saying that. I feel you must be
suspicious. But I have a very bad memory for names. Sometimes I
can remember a picture better. I wish more than you that I
could remember more names, I assure you.
Mr. Rainville. But that doesn't affect you in any way when
it comes to sitting down at a rather complicated mechanism and
handling it with skill, enough skill so that you can instruct
others in the construction and repair and operation of it?
Mr. Siegel. Well, I usually find that when I have to teach,
I review the material first, before I go into class.
Mr. Rainville. And you knew you were coming here today, and
you were thinking about this, and you were trying to remember
Mr. Rubin's name?
Mr. Siegel. That is the one name I managed to remember.
Mr. Rainville. I noticed that.
I don't think I have anything else, Mr. Schine.
Mr. Schine. Mr. Cohn?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Would you step outside for a few minutes, Mr. Siegel, and
would you ask Mr. Corwin to come in for a minute?
Mr. Siegel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Sit down, Mr. Corwin, please.
Mr. Schine. Would you state your full name, please?
STATEMENT OF JEROME CORWIN
Mr. Corwin. Jerome Corwin.
Mr. Cohn. C-o-r-w-i-n?
Mr. Corwin. That is right. Although I changed my name, I
think back in '47. The name was originally Zorwitz, Z-o-r-w-i-
t-z.
Mr. Schine. And your occupation?
Mr. Corwin. I am an engineer, a mechanical engineer.
Mr. Schine. Where are you currently employed?
Mr. Corwin. I am at Evans Signal Corps Laboratory.
Mr. Schine. What is your function as an engineer at Fort
Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. I am chief of the Mechanical Engineering
Section of the Spec and Drafting Branch of Evans Signal Corps
Laboratory.
Mr. Cohn. You work at Evans right now?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Schine. And as chief, what are your duties?
Mr. Corwin. Our group is responsible for all of the
mechanical work at the laboratory in general. We do some
internal work, and also we act as mechanical consultants to the
other groups. We don't have any particular field that we are
responsible for in that sense.
Mr. Schine. And would you describe some of the projects
that the laboratory carries on?
Mr. Cohn. Just in general.
Mr. Corwin. Well, I think you know it covers radar,
meteorology, actually all the stuff that the Signal Corps is
responsible for with the exception of communications, which is
at another laboratory, and component parts, which is at another
laboratory.
Mr. Cohn. Does this Evans Laboratory have a responsibility
in connection with development of devices to protect us against
atomic attack and provide for detection of it, and radar?
Mr. Corwin. They do radar work. There is one group there
that does the radar work, the work on the rest of the
equipment.
Mr. Schine. Guided missiles, too?
Mr. Corwin. I don't know too well the details of it, I
really couldn't say.
Mr. Cohn. The radar work in part would be directed at
detection of atomic attack. Is that right?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I don't know how much I can say. I can
say it is radar work of the Signal Corps type.
Mr. Schine. How long have you been doing this work?
Mr. Corwin. I was first employed in October of 1940. I came
in as a draftsman at that time.
Mr. Schine. And how long have you been chief of the
laboratory?
Mr. Corwin. This is a section. I would say something that
like eight years, something like that in round figures.
Mr. Schine. Where did you go to school, Mr. Corwin?
Mr. Corwin. I graduated from City College back in '37. Then
I just recently got my master's at Rutgers. Rutgers has an
extension college at Fort Monmouth, and they encourage
additional academic background.
Mr. Schine. We meant to ask you: You have access to
classified material?
Mr. Corwin. I am cleared up to secret, as far as I know.
Mr. Schine. And you deal with classified material in the
everyday course of your work?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. Well, it is rather limited, because our
work, as I said, deals with the mechanical field, and most of
the equipment we deal with usually is of an unclassified or
restricted nature. We are not involved with radar in any form.
Mr. Cohn. Have you always had access to classified material
since you have been at Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. So far as I know.
Mr. Schine. When did you enter City College?
Mr. Corwin. I entered in '32. I attended one day session,
and changed to the evening session. That is why it took me five
years.
Mr. Schine. Some of your classmates at City College are
working now at Fort Monmouth, I take it?
Mr. Corwin. Well, if you say ``classmates,'' I don't really
know, because I got out in '37.
Mr. Schine. Well, some City College graduates. Would you
name some of those that you know?
Mr. Corwin. Oh, yes. Well, I know Aaron Coleman, Harold
Ducore, Sam Pomerantz. Actually I would say there are quite a
list of City College graduates there.
Mr. Schine. Would you name as many as you can?
Mr. Corwin. I will try. It is a little difficult.
Mr. Schine. Just take your time and spell the names as you
go on.
Mr. Corwin. Samuel Levine.
Mr. Schine. L-e-v-i-n-e?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Schine. Just continue.
Mr. Corwin. Offhand, I can't think of any others. I am sure
there are more.
Mr. Cohn. Rudolph R-i-e-h-s?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Cohn. A man named Loonie, Bill Loonie?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Was he at City College?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I think he is a graduate of City College.
Let's see. Is his name Lonnie? I think he changed his name.
Mr. Cohn. Did he? I noticed in the City College directory
it was spelled L-o-o-n-i-e, and now it seems to be spelled L-o-
n-n-i-e, and that sort of threw me.
Is that the same fellow?
Mr. Corwin. I think he changed it because it was a very
uncomfortable name, I think he was a lieutenant in the Marine
Corps, and it was uncomfortable to be called a ``Loonie
Lieutenant.''
Mr. Cohn. That is apparently the same fellow, isn't it? How
about Henry Burkhard?
Mr. Corwin. Burkhard? I can't place him.
Mr. Schine. Would you name some of the courses you took
while you were at City College?
Mr. Corwin. Oh, God.
Mr. Cohn. What degree did you get?
Mr. Corwin. Mechanical engineering.
Mr. Cohn. You took the courses leading up to that?
Mr. Corwin. That is right, prescribed courses.
Mr. Cohn. Physics?
Mr. Corwin. Physics.
Mr. Schine. You took mathematics?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Schine. Was Mr. Coleman in your class at City College?
Mr. Corwin. No, he was not.
Mr. Cohn. When he says ``in your class,'' interpret that as
being in any class with you, any section.
Did you take any classes with him?
Mr. Corwin. Not that I know of.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know him at City College?
Mr. Corwin. No, I didn't.
Mr. Schine. Did you take any classes with Mr. Ducore?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know Mr. Ducore at City College?
Mr. Corwin. No, I didn't.
Mr. Schine. When did you first meet Mr. Coleman and Mr.
Ducore?
Mr. Corwin. I met them both at the laboratory, and actually
I met Mr. Ducore first, in chronological order, I think some
time in '41, roughly.
Mr. Schine. You had more than an occupational acquaintance
with him?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I first met him through the laboratory,
and it started purely on a business association but later
become social.
Mr. Schine. It became social, and you became good friends?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Schine. You have known them both, and you have seen
them frequently?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Schine. Through the forties and since that time?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Schine. Socially?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Schine. When you first applied for a position at Fort
Monmouth, you had to state references for your job. Would you
state the names of the references you gave at that time, if you
can?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I lived in New Rochelle, New York, and I
am sure that the references that I chose were local people. I
can't remember all the names. I can only remember one. I think
it was Henry Wissecker.
Mr. Schine. Would you spell that, please?
Mr. Corwin. W-i-s-s-e-c-k-e-r--who has died recently. I
used to work for him in New Rochelle. He had a stationery
store. And I am afraid I can't remember the other names. But I
am sure that they were all residents of New Rochelle.
Mr. Schine. When you were at City College, you knew about
the Communist movement?
Mr. Corwin. Well, to tell you the truth, I lived at New
Rochelle when I attended City College, and I didn't have much
social contact there at all. I went to school and left at night
to come back and work, and I didn't spend much time around the
college area. I didn't really get to know too many people at
that time.
Mr. Schine. You knew some people?
Mr. Corwin. The people in my mechanical group that went
through the four years with me. And, actually, today, I can't
remember a single name. I probably can recognize some, if you
have them.
Mr. Schine. Julius Rosenberg was in your mathematics class
at City College?
Mr. Corwin. Was he? That is news to me.
Mr. Schine. Did you know Julius Rosenberg?
Mr. Corwin. No, I never met him.
Mr. Schine. Did you ever know he was at college at the same
time you were?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, not until, I would say, later on.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever meet him at Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. No, I didn't. To the best of my knowledge I
didn't.
Mr. Cohn. You say you only met Coleman and Ducore at City
College; is that right?
Mr. Corwin. No, at the laboratories.
Mr. Cohn. I am sorry. At Monmouth Laboratories. You didn't
know them before?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Then you obviously couldn't have been a reference
for employment for either Coleman or Ducore, if you didn't know
them?
Mr. Corwin. Not then, no, sir.
Mr. Cohn. And neither one of them could have been a
reference for you?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know a woman named Vivian Glassman?
Mr. Corwin. Not that I can remember.
Mr. Cohn. And you never met Rosenberg at Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. I didn't even know he was there.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever participate in any way in any
Communist activities?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. At City College, were you ever asked to attend
any meetings of the Young Communist League?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Were you ever asked to participate in any
Communist activities?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. I wasn't asked to participate in
anything there, to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever belonged to any organization which
is a Communist organization or Communist-dominated?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Now, how frequently were you with Mr. Coleman out
at Monmouth after you met him?
Mr. Corwin. Well, actually, I first met him--I am afraid I
can't remember the exact years, but roughly about '41. And it
was a very meager contact. I think I was still a draftsman at
that time, and he was a project engineer, a relatively high
position. Then I think that up until the time he left for the
Marine Corps, I didn't know him very well at all. But on his
return he took over some work, which required a lot of our
work, on the mechanical aspect of it, and then our business
acquaintanceship sort of grew into a social acquaintanceship.
And socially, I would say I know him very, very well.
Mr. Cohn. You know him very well?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether or not Mr. Coleman is a
Communist?
Mr. Corwin. I can say that I believe he is absolutely not.
Mr. Cohn. Has he ever expressed any pro-Communist views
that you have heard?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know he was a good friend of Julius
Rosenberg?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, I don't believe he is or was.
Mr. Cohn. Has he ever told you that?
Mr. Corwin. After this Rosenberg case, he has indicated
that he had either met him at school or something like that,
but that he had no other contact with him whatsoever.
Mr. Cohn. Did he ever tell you he went to Young Communist
League meetings with Rosenberg?
Mr. Corwin. He told me that recently.
Mr. Cohn. When did he tell you that?
Mr. Corwin. I would say within the past week or so.
Mr. Cohn. He must have been fairly friendly with Rosenberg
then; isn't that right?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, I don't believe so. That is the way he
expressed it to us.
Mr. Cohn. He was on Young Communist League terms with him.
Mr. Corwin. My opinion is that Coleman must have been a
young person at that time, not mature, and with some curiosity
involved in it.
Mr. Cohn. Do you think he was mature in 1946?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, I imagine he would be.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether he walked off with any secret
documents in 1946?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I know that he had some trouble about
secret documents.
Mr. Cohn. What was the trouble he had?
Mr. Corwin. As I understand it--and, of course, I have
gotten some information from him--but putting it all together,
he had had some documents at home of a classified nature. I
don't know the classification, but they were classified.
Mr. Cohn. Was he suspended after that?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, he was penalized.
Mr. Cohn. Then he was reinstated?
Mr. Corwin. Well, the suspension actually was a loss of pay
for a period of time. I think it is just automatic. You are
still working. I think it is just a penalty, rather than what
we would call a suspension.
Mr. Cohn. Did Coleman tell you he knew Morton Sobell pretty
well?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. He had met Morton Sobell; through
business contacts he met him, at school, I don't know how well.
Mr. Cohn. Was he on Young Communist League terms with
Morton Sobell, do you know?
Mr. Corwin. Not that I know. I don't believe so.
Mr. Cohn. Did he tell you Morton Sobell ever stayed at his
home out in New Jersey?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Did he tell you Morton Sobell visited him eight
times out at Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. He never told me. I wouldn't know about it.
Mr. Cohn. What did he tell you about his association with
Sobell?
Mr. Corwin. Well, in the first place, he had some work with
which I was also connected that I think dealt with the company
named Reeves, Reeves Instrument.
Mr. Cohn. Up on 92nd Street, New York?
Mr. Corwin. That is right. And I think that Sobell was
working for Reeves at that time and was either responsible or
had some connection with the actual work that was being done
for Fort Monmouth, and Coleman was responsible for the entire
program, or something like that.
Mr. Cohn. Then he had dealings with Sobell. Is that right?
Mr. Corwin. So I understand. I don't know how much, or what
the amount of contact was, but he did have dealings with
Sobell, I know.
Mr. Cohn. But you, yourself, never had any dealings with
Sobell?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Cohn. When did he tell you he went to Young Communist
League meetings with Rosenberg?
Mr. Corwin. Just about a week ago.
Mr. Cohn. He had never disclosed that to you before?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Cohn. In other words, after the Rosenberg case broke,
you were discussing Rosenberg and the Rosenberg case, but at
that time he didn't mention it to you?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. He mentioned it to you for the first time within
the past week?
Mr. Corwin. To the best of my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Was this before he was suspended, or after he was
suspended?
Mr. Corwin. Actually it was after, because it was listed as
one of the charges, and that is what started the discussion.
Mr. Cohn. Did he tell you what the other charges were?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What were the other charges?
Mr. Corwin. I can't remember them all, but roughly I think
that it was that he knew Rosenberg and this YPL or whatever it
is.
Mr. Cohn. The Young Communist League.
Mr. Corwin. And that he knew Sobell. I can't remember the
details, but there is something there. Oh, this classified
document entered into it.
Mr. Cohn. What else?
Mr. Corwin. I think he said that members of his family were
members of or had registered at APL or something like that.
Mr. Cohn. ALP?
Mr. Corwin. ALP.
Mr. Cohn. Did he tell you which members of his family?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, it was his mother and sister. And that is
about all I can remember, offhand.
Mr. Cohn. Did he show you the letter of charges, by the
way?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. He did. That went into some detail, did it not,
as to his associations with Morton Sobell?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir. It was a short paragraph. I don't
remember the exact content of that, but it said that he had
relationships with him. I don't remember the exact details.
Mr. Cohn. Now, let me ask you this, Mr. Corwin. Did you
ever take secret documents to your home?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You never did. Is that right?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. It was made very clear to you up at Monmouth that
that was a grave violation of security regulations. Is that
right?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. That was something that was not to be done under
any circumstances without permission. Is that right?
Mr. Corwin. Without permission,
Mr. Cohn. Do you know of any other instances where people
were suspended for taking secret documents home, classified
documents home?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, I don't. There has been loss of pay.
Mr. Cohn. Let's say ``penalties.''
Mr. Corwin. Penalties for leaving them out or leaving
unlocked safes, the usual thing. That has happened there. But I
don't know of any other incident where someone has taken a
document home. The reason I sort of hesitated is that in the
past and some time ago under certain conditions you were
allowed to take classified documents to attend meetings,
conferences, and the like.
Mr. Cohn. That was for a specific purpose and with specific
permission?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Did Coleman tell you when he last saw Sobell?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. He didn't. Not the exact date or
anything like that. I could guess.
No, even a guess wouldn't be good, because I know he was
working around a certain time on some equipment that would
bring him to Reeves.
Mr. Cohn. We can agree it wasn't within the last two years.
He hasn't visited him in jail, has he?
Mr. Corwin. I would say absolutely not. He probably would
have told me.
Mr. Cohn. Were you surprised when he told you he had gone
to Young Communist League meetings with Rosenberg?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, I was, because I didn't see the point of
going even. He told me he had attended just one meeting and saw
what it was all about and was, in his own words, pretty
disgusted with the whole set-up and left.
Mr. Cohn. Did he tell you Rosenberg was the man he had
taken to that meeting?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Carr. That is what he told you in 1953?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. That is what he told you last week.
Mr. Corwin. With respect to this meeting, yes,
Mr. Cohn. Were you pretty friendly with Harold Ducore?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. He and Coleman were pretty friendly, too. Is that
right?
Mr. Corwin. I could say yes. Lately they had some
misunderstandings.
Mr. Cohn. When was the misunderstanding?
Mr. Corwin. Well, they bought a house together.
Mr. Cohn. When was that?
Mr. Corwin. Oh, gosh. I guess in '41 or '42.
Mr. Cohn. Where was that house?
Mr. Corwin. Wait a minute. It was about four years ago.
Mr. Cohn. In the late '40's. Isn't that right?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Where was that house located?
Mr. Corwin. It is on Branch Avenue and Long Branch.
Mr. Cohn. Then they had some misunderstanding over that;
isn't that right?
Mr. Corwin. That is true.
Mr. Cohn. They made up after that, didn't they?
Mr. Corwin. As far as I know, their social relationship
never got back to the original closeness they had.
Mr. Cohn. Now, did you continue your friendship with Ducore
nevertheless?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, although my friendship tapered off, too,
and, actually, I guess people get married and they have other
interests and start to drift apart. We drifted as far as the
Ducores were concerned, but we didn't drift as far as the
Colemans were concerned.
Mr. Cohn. I see. Have you talked to Mr. Ducore lately?
Mr. Corwin. Only over the phone. He is part of my car pool,
and he called me one night to say he couldn't come in.
Mr. Cohn. Did he give you any of the details of his
suspension?
Mr. Corwin. He gave me a little bit. I think he indicated
that he had been a member of some union out there, I don't
remember the exact name of it. Is it the United Public Workers,
or something like that? And also that his wife was a member.
That is all.
Mr. Cohn. Did he tell you he was a friend of Rosenberg and
Sobell?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. So far as I know he didn't know them.
So far as I know.
Mr. Cohn. I don't think I have anything else.
Mr. Carr. You say Ducore was a member of your car pool up
until he phoned you and said he would not be going in to work?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Carr. So you have been seeing him every day for the
last several years?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Carr. To get back to the documents, do you consider it
a serious matter to have classified documents in your home?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. Well, was it in only one instance, to your
knowledge, that Coleman was reprimanded for this?
Mr. Corwin. So far as I know, just once.
Mr. Carr. Was he ever reprimanded for leaving documents in
unsecure places in the office?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Were you ever reprimanded for that?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. What did that situation involve?
Mr. Corwin. I think I left out a classified document, and I
was penalized a day's pay, or maybe it was two days' pay for
that.
Mr. Carr. Do you recall what the classified document was?
I don't mean what it was, but what it was classified as.
Mr. Corwin. I believe it was secret.
Mr. Carr. When you say you left it out, does that mean you
were working with it during the day and you forgot to carry it
back to its repository?
Mr. Corwin. That is correct. Actually, I didn't return to
my office that night, and unfortunately the person that was
supposed to clean up missed it. I took the penalty, because I
didn't tell them in detail that it was there, so it was really
my responsibility. But I did not get back to the office at the
closing time.
Mr. Carr. When you say you took the penalty, does that mean
you ``covered'' for the person who actually left it out?
Mr. Corwin. Not actually. I felt I was responsible for not
having made sure to tell him to pick it up. I didn't cover up.
Mr. Carr. If you left such a document out at your desk, or
at the place where you work, would anyone in the building have
access to it?
Mr. Corwin, Well, I guess they would. It is on the desk.
Although people coming in, in an office, usually, unless we
know who they are, would be watched carefully, or would be
asked what they are doing there, and so on. I have an office
where the two of us, two engineers, myself and an assistant and
some girls, keep all our classified documents, although we
don't keep very many because we don't have much access to it.
Mr. Carr. What was the date of this?
Mr. Corwin. This was quite some time ago. I would guess in
'49 or something like that.
Mr. Carr. In '49. Could you give us a little bit of
information concerning what you would do with a classified
document? You, in the course of your work, have need for a
classified document?
Mr. Corwin. Occasionally.
Mr. Carr. Occasionally. Where do you obtain that document?
Mr. Corwin. When we work on a request for some group, they
supply the necessary background information that we may need to
do the job. They may supply this particular document. They hand
it to us, and we have to sign a receipt for it, and my girl
takes it and sets it in the file and puts the receipt on it.
Anybody that takes it out of the file sign for it and returns
it every night, and so on.
Mr. Carr. Is there a central repository for the classified
documents?
Mr. Corwin. Well, there is a central----
Mr. Carr. I mean within your office, your building.
Mr. Corwin. Yes. Within my office we take care of all the
documents for our particular people that are associated with
us, and they are all in at night and locked in the safe and so
on.
Mr. Carr. Who has the primary responsibility for that?
Mr. Corwin. My secretary takes care of the details and
keeps the route sheets, to indicate who has it, and so on.
Mr. Carr. So, in effect, it is your responsibility?
Mr. Corwin. Oh, yes, definitely.
Mr. Carr. I am not talking about merely a document that
obtained, but a document obtained for your office.
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Carr. It becomes your responsibility. You become a
security officer concerning that document?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir. I don't know if the exact term is
right, but I am responsible for all documents.
Mr. Carr. For anyone in your office.
Mr. Corwin. That is right, I am responsible for the whole
section, all the people involved.
Mr. Carr. As for that document, as long as you need it, you
are responsible for it; as long as it is needed in your
particular office, your section, you are to keep it under
secure conditions. Is that a locked safe?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, combination lock.
Mr. Carr. When do you return that document to either the
agency that gave it to you in the first place or the security
officer? When does that happen?
Mr. Corwin. Well, when we no longer have need for it.
We return it immediately, because there is no point in
keeping it.
Mr. Carr. All right. Do you return it immediately to any
central place, or to a security officer in the building?
Mr. Corwin. There has been a recent change in the handling
of secret documents and the like.
Mr. Carr. How recent?
Mr. Corwin. Oh, I would say about a month or more. But
actually we have very seldom had secret documents. Most of our
stuff was of a confidential or restricted nature. With this new
stuff, the secret stuff is only handled from a central
laboratory repository, delivered and transmitted in that
manner. The reason I say this is because I haven't had any
secret material for quite a while.
Mr. Carr. Since the new arrangement on the documents. Now,
this new arrangement was only set up in the past month, or
month and a half?
Mr. Corwin. Well, let's say two or three months, roughly.
Not too long ago.
Mr. Carr. What was the old system?
Mr. Corwin. The old system was to get receipts from people.
But it could be sent through a special messenger from one group
to another without having to go through the top security lab
set-up.
Mr. Carr. But now it works how?
Mr. Corwin. The secret stuff must go only to the top
security officer, and then can be transmitted to anyone.
Mr. Carr. So now the same situation is true. The security
officer then would deliver the document to you for use in your
section, and then you become the security officer for the
document?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Carr. And when you are finished with it, it is returned
to the security officer?
Mr. Corwin. I think that is correct.
Now, the reason I am a little puzzled by it is because I
read the regulations, but I haven't had any secret documents in
quite some length of time. And truthfully, my girl keeps a
check on it, and I get together with her before we do anything
of that type.
Mr. Carr. When you return such a document to the security
officer, is your receipt given back to you, and is it entered
in the log?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. I understand they have both the log and
the receipt. You sign for this, and your receipt is returned to
you when you bring back the document.
Mr. Carr. Is the new set-up that has been put into effect
more secure, do you think?
Mr. Corwin. Oh, yes, very much so.
Mr. Carr. Prior to that, the document would flow through
many hands before it got to you?
Mr. Corwin. Well, with all classified material of a secret
nature, there were always receipts. The restricted didn't have
that check. There were always receipts, but it didn't have to
go through any security office before it got any place, and I
don't think logs were kept in its transit too well. That is,
there were logs in each office saying when they had it and----
Mr. Carr. Was there an incident that led to this new
change?
Mr. Corwin. I would guess that the number of violations of
all natures were increasing slightly, or they felt the
percentage was too high and some drastic steps had to be taken.
But that is a guess on my part.
Mr. Carr. In other words, there were too many of these
instances like your case and Coleman's case, where documents
were left out, or they were taken home?
Mr. Corwin. I would say as far as documents being taken
home, I don't recall any other incident.
Mr. Cohn. This Coleman incident: there is a big difference
between something lying around and something being taken home.
Mr. Corwin. It is a secured area. It is well protected.
Mr. Cohn. We can agree there is a big difference between
having a couple of documents out and taking documents to your
house.
Mr. Corwin. I think if you would check all the people at
the laboratory they probably have had some violation of that
nature, I am not trying to look it down----
Mr. Carr. Is this considered a serious offense at Monmouth,
leaving documents out insecure?
Mr. Corwin. Oh, yes.
Mr. Carr. Now, the penalties are stricter than they were
prior?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I think they are slightly stricter. It
all depends on the circumstances which surround the particular
incidents.
Mr. Carr. What is the usual suspension? One day, such as
you received in '49?
Mr. Corwin. No, I think the secret category starts with
two, or maybe it is a week now. I don't remember. And then, of
course, if it happens more than once you would be fired.
Mr. Carr. Of course, if the document was really of a highly
confidential nature, or such as to be classified secret or even
top secret, it would only have to be left out for ten minutes
to cause harm.
Mr. Corwin. Yes. Although there are some other
circumstances that surrounded my incident and a lot of others.
We have been a little delayed in reducing the classification of
a lot of our documents.
Mr. Cohn. You mean down-grading?
Mr. Corwin. Down-grading. It is because it is a physical
problem, and we never have had enough people to do the work
that we are responsible for. So it has created a problem.
Mr. Schine. Mr. Corwin, what are Mr. Coleman's functions at
Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. His functions were----
Mr. Schine. Or ``were''?
Mr. Corwin. He was chief of the System Section of Radar
Branch.
Mr. Cohn. Chief of the System Section of Radar Branch?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Schine. And as such, what did he do?
Mr. Corwin. He was responsible for certain radar
equipments. They are of a classified nature.
Mr. Schine. He had access to classified material and plans?
Mr. Corwin. Yes; the details of which I really don't know.
Mr. Cohn. He had an awfully sensitive job, didn't he?
Mr. Corwin. I would say it is rather sensitive, yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. He had that up until last week?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, I think he was--shall we say his
clearance was taken away for quite a period of time.
Mr. Cohn. What did he do after his clearance was taken
away?
Mr. Corwin. I think they put him in a so-called non-
sensitive area where no classified material is around. And he
told me this: that he was writing instructions for books, or
something. The army has a correspondence school for soldiers,
and he was preparing lessons and questions.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time was he chief of
this radar section?
Mr. Corwin. For quite a period of time. It is hard to
remember the exact dates. Eight years or some considerable
amount of time.
Mr. Schine. Approximately when did he take this secret
document home with him?
Mr. Corwin. I will have to guess. I don't remember.
Mr. Schine. Was it 1946?
Mr. Corwin. That would probably be right.
Mr. Schine. If a document of this nature got into the hands
of Soviet Russia, could it be of value to them?
Mr. Corwin. I really couldn't say. I don't know what he
had. I don't even know what the classification was. All I know
was that they were classified.
Mr. Cohn. Let's put it this way. Mr. Coleman was head of
the section of radar, dealing with highly classified material.
If he had turned over papers which came into his possession to
the Soviet Union, would they have been of any benefit to the
Soviet Union, do you think?
Mr. Corwin. I would guess they would be. It is hard for
me----
Mr. Cohn. There is no doubt about that, is there?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I guess so. I don't know how much they
know or we know.
Mr. Cohn. Don't let's assume that other people have given
them stuff before. Let's assume that we think they don't know
anything.
Mr. Corwin. These were classified documents. They certainly
shouldn't have gotten into the hands of any other country.
Mr. Cohn. And radar was certainly an awfully sensitive
thing. That is one thing we are relying on in the way of
defense to atomic attack. Isn't that right?
Mr. Corwin. I imagine so. I don't really know enough about
it.
Mr. Schine. He didn't discuss with you just what the
document was that he had taken home with him?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether he took documents home on any
other occasions?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, I really don't know.
Mr. Schine. What was Mr. Coleman's attitude about taking
the document home with him, being reprimanded for it.
Mr. Corwin. Well, he felt he deserved a reprimand.
Actually, he is a very conscientious and very able engineer. I
think he has done a tremendous job at the place.
Mr. Schine. He is a good first class engineer?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Schine. He isn't in your car pool, is he?
Mr. Corwin. He was before his clearance was taken away.
Mr. Schine. Mr. Ducore was in your car pool at that time,
too?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir. They lived together.
Mr. Cohn. As I understand it, you did not know either
Coleman or Ducore before going to Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. You met them first at Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Schine. In your car pool; who else was in the car pool,
by the way?
Mr. Corwin. Sam Levine.
Mr. Cohn. He was at City College with you, of course?
Mr. Corwin. He went to City College, too.
Mr. Cohn. He was in the class with Coleman?
Mr. Corwin. I believe so.
Mr. Schine. And who else was in the car pool?
Mr. Corwin. Louis Volp, V-o-l-p.
Mr. Cohn. And he is another City College man?
Mr. Corwin. He is another City College man.
Mr. Carr. In the same class?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. I don't know what year he got out.
Mr. Schine. Who else was in the same car pool?
Mr. Corwin. I think that is all, because there were five of
us, and there wasn't room for anybody else.
Mr. Schine. Levine, Ducore, Coleman
Mr. Corwin. Volp.
Mr. Schine. How do you spell that?
Mr. Corwin. V-o-l-p.
Mr. Schine. And being in the car pool means you drove to
work together each day and drove home each night?
Mr. Corwin. There are some variations. This had gone on for
a number of years. We dropped somebody and picked somebody else
up. But there was a period of time during which these five
people including myself rode together.
Mr. Schine. During what years did this car pool take place?
Mr. Corwin. From 1950 on. Perhaps earlier than that.
No, about 1950. I got married, and then I started going
back into the pool. I and my wife both worked at the laboratory
for a short period of time. We drove every day.
Mr. Schine. Now, being in this car pool, you would have
very good knowledge of just how careful your associates were
and what they took home and what they didn't take home?
Mr. Corwin. Well, to tell you the truth, we never spoke of
any classified stuff even in the car; just general chit-chat
and engineering discussions of general nature.
Mr. Schine. But they all took home materials with them,
didn't they, in their briefcases?
Mr. Corwin. Occasionally, but I never knew what it was. I
never knew what was involved.
Mr. Schine. What was Mr. Ducore's attitude about taking
material home with him? He had a briefcase or something of that
sort?
Mr. Corwin. To tell you the truth, I remember Ducore
carrying nothing home. I mean, that is the impression I am left
with.
Mr. Schine. He never carried stuff home?
Mr. Corwin. That is as I remember it.
Mr. Cohn. Who would carry stuff home?
Mr. Corwin. I think Coleman. That is about all I can
remember.
Mr. Schine. And in the car he sometimes would pull things
out of the briefcase and refer to them?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. I don't know how often he took it, but
that is the only picture I have.
Mr. Schine. He just didn't keep the briefcase shut up all
the time. You were aware of the contents of the briefcase from
time to time?
Mr. Corwin. I can't remember ever seeing it open.
Mr. Schine. He never opened the briefcase in the car?
Mr. Corwin. To my knowledge. Let me put it this way: I can
picture a briefcase and Coleman carrying it, and that is about
as far as I can picture.
Mr. Schine. But he never wanted you to see what was inside
of it?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Rainville. He never referred to it?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Cohn. He never referred to anything in connection with
``What happened today?''
Mr. Corwin. No, the fellows were pretty security conscious.
He also went to school, and he might have been bringing home
his books and lessons, I went to school, too, and I might have
been bring home books in myself. We got a pass for the books
and that is the way it operated.
Mr. Schine. He was very careful never to let you see what
was in the briefcase?
Mr. Corwin. I never saw the briefcase open, to my
knowledge.
Mr. Rainville. But if they were school books, he might have
discussed his class work with you?
Mr. Corwin. We were interested in what was happening in the
field, and that is enough to keep you interested.
Mr. Rainville. You get stuck by a problem in class, and
somebody else might have the answer. Did that never occur in
the car?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir.
Mr. Schine. Mr. Corwin, obviously, on your way home at
least on a number of occasions you must have stopped somewhere.
Did you lock up the car when the briefcase was in the car, or
did he always carry his briefcase with him?
What I am trying to ascertain is just how cautious he was
about the briefcase.
Mr. Corwin. I have no impression of caution or anything
else, to be honest with you. We never stopped for anything
except to drop off members of the pool. We had no need to stop
for any other purpose.
Mr. Schine. Did you ever ride home with him in 1946 or
1947?
Mr. Corwin. Let's see if I can remember. I may have. Yes.
You see, I lived with him for a while. I am trying to
remember when that was.
Mr. Schine. Did you ever have a regular system of riding
home with him in those years?
Mr. Corwin. The earlier years?
Mr. Schine. With Mr. Coleman.
Mr. Corwin. At that time I think he was going to school,
and he used to go in after work, something like that. So there
was no pool. I think I rode in with a couple of other fellows.
We didn't have a very well organized pool. This was a five-day
pool. It was really something to get into, because it meant you
used the car but one day a week.
Mr. Schine. Can you imagine the circumstances under which
Mr. Coleman might have brought himself to bring secret
documents home and break security regulations?
Mr. Corwin. Well, this particular incident that we were
discussing before--I know he was doing it in order to try and
get work done, things that he thought were needed in a hurry,
and he didn't have enough time during the day to do it. He felt
they could accomplish the work at home.
Mr. Schine. Isn't it true he brought a number of documents
home with him, though?
Mr. Corwin. That is my understanding. I know they were
classified. I don't know exactly what the classification is.
Mr. Schine. Would he possibly need a number of bulky
documents at home to catch up on some work he might have had in
one specific job that he was doing?
Mr. Corwin. I can imagine it is possible. I didn't know
enough of the details of his job to really answer. But I can
imagine so. Because some of the documents are called technical
manuals, that describe other pieces of equipment, and they may
just come in bulk. You don't need the whole thing, but you
can't excerpt any part of it, so you use the whole thing.
Mr. Schine. Would you try to give us the names of two or
three individuals with whom Mr. Coleman is friendliest besides
yourself at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. Well, outside of his business associates, I
would say he probably knows Sam Levine very well.
Let's see. There are other people who are not employed at
Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Schine. Would you name their names, please?
Mr. Corwin. I have it on the tip of my tongue, and I just
can't think of it.
Mr. Schine. Go to the next one, and then come back to that.
Mr. Corwin. I know these people rather well. I don't know
them socially as he does.
Mr. Schine. Try to give us some of their names.
Mr. Corwin. Benjamin Bookbinder.
Mr. Schine. Who else?
Mr. Corwin. Jack Okum.
Mr. Schine. Would you spell it?
Mr. Corwin. I think it is O-k-u-m. I am not sure.
Mr. Schine. Those are his closest friends?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I don't know if you could say that. Okum
is a very close friend of his.
Mr. Schine. Is Mr. Coleman very friendly with somebody else
socially that he also works with at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. Additional people?
Mr. Schine. Yes. Does he have other close friends socially
who also work at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. Offhand, I can't remember any more than the
names I have given you.
Mr. Schine. Bookbinder?
Mr. Corwin. Bookbinder. Okum doesn't work at the
laboratory.
Mr. Schine. But Bookbinder does?
Mr. Corwin. Bookbinder does, and Sam Levine.
Mr. Schine. What is Bookbinder's job at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. He is employed in the same section.
Mr. Schine. He is employed in the same section.
Does he work for Mr. Coleman?
Mr. Corwin. He did.
Mr. Schine. What about Mr. Ducore? Do you know the names of
some of his close friends, some of Mr. Ducore's close friends
who work at Fort Monmouth, and who are also close to him
socially?
Mr. Corwin. To tell you the truth, I don't know. Our social
contacts with the Ducores have dropped off in the last couple
of years. We don't get together with them.
Mr. Schine. Do you know of any close associates he has with
whom he is friendly socially?
Mr. Corwin. I can honestly tell you I don't know. Of
course, there is one man we all know. When I say ``all,'' I
mean Coleman and Ducore and myself. That is Bob Martin, Bernard
Martin.
Mr. Schine. Who is Bernard Martin?
Mr. Corwin. Who is he?
Mr. Schine. Yes.
Mr. Corwin. Well, he was employed at Fort Monmouth, and his
clearance was taken away. He has recently been suspended, too.
Mr. Schine. Why was his clearance taken away?
Mr. Corwin. You see, he went through a loyalty hearing. I
guess it has been a year ago.
Mr. Schine. He discussed this with you?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, I attended the hearing. I came as a
character witness.
Mr. Schine. What is his last name?
Mr. Corwin. Martin, M-a-r-t-i-n.
Mr. Schine. Would you tell us briefly what the charges
against him were?
Mr. Corwin. As I remember--I wouldn't be able to give it to
you word for word--he was a member of the AVC. That is the
American Veterans Committee, I believe. And there was something
about that he I think had a job in the air force at Watson
Laboratory before they moved, and he was the security officer,
something like that, not an official of the army but a civilian
counterpart, and had a lot of documents under his control.
Mr. Schine. Classified documents?
Mr. Corwin. Classified; although I don't know about the
document in question. And that he had given some information or
given a document to a man who later was, so the statement said,
found to be a Communist.
Mr. Schine. What was the name of the man?
Mr. Corwin. I think it was Ullmann.
Mr. Schine. How do you spell that?
Mr. Corwin. U-l-l-m-a-n, or something like that.
Mr. Cohn. That is William Ludwig Ullmann. Is that correct?
Mr. Corwin. Gee, that doesn't sound right, I don't know.
Mr. Schine. What were the other charges?
Mr. Corwin. Those were the only two charges.
Mr. Schine. What did Bernard Martin tell you about his
giving these classified papers to William Ludwig Ullmann?
Mr. Corwin. Well, whatever his name is, that man was
cleared for secret at the time he requested the documents,
because everybody in the installation had been cleared. To
Martin's knowledge, and I think he checked on it, this man was
cleared at that time. Whatever happened about this man happened
at some later date.
Mr. Schine. Where was Ullmann working?
Mr. Corwin. I guess he was out there with him.
Mr. Schine. At Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. This isn't Fort Monmouth.
Mr. Schine. Where was this?
Mr. Corwin. The air force had taken over Watson Laboratory.
They released that to go to Rome or something like that. It was
when they were employed by the air force.
Mr. Schine. And did you know Ullmann?
Mr. Corwin. I met him, but I didn't know him.
Mr. Schine. What is Martin's address, now?
Mr. Corwin. He lives at 855 Woodgate Avenue in Elberon, New
Jersey. I know that, because I lived there with him before I
got married.
Mr. Schine. And have you seen Martin lately?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, I think within the past week I have seen
him. Yes.
Mr. Schine. And have you discussed all of these loyalty
cases and suspensions with him?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. You see, I know these people very well. I
have lived with him.
Mr. Schine. What does Bernard Martin have to say about all
of this?
Mr. Corwin. Well, as I explained in the second charge at
the time that he gave the document, the classification nature
of which I don't know, at the time he gave it this man was
cleared by the air force people, and to his knowledge he had
access to this equipment.
Mr. Schine. Did Bernard Martin say that Ullmann was a
Communist party member?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. Not at that time.
Mr. Schine. He knows now that he is a Communist?
Mr. Corwin. He read the charge, and he is assuming the
charge is correct. I don't know, as far as so-and-so being a
Communist is concerned.
Mr. Schine. Martin is a friend of Ducore's, too?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Schine. Are they close friends?
Mr. Corwin. I don't know. His friendship is closer than
mine, let's say, but I don't think they are intimate friends.
Mr. Schine. They are not intimate?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Schine. Do you know the names of the intimate friends
of Ducore?
Mr. Corwin. No. You see, we are not close enough with them
to know.
Mr. Schine. Do you know the names of some of the friends he
had when you were close to him?
Mr. Corwin. We were all part of his friends at that time.
Mr. Schine. Are there any other names you haven't given us?
Mr. Corwin. No. To tell you the truth, I don't know.
Mr. Carr. Do you know Herman Schoenwetter?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Carr. You don't know him at all?
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Schine. Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. Just a few questions. Prior to the enactment of
this new security system there, you said that you had in your
safe at several times secret documents?
Mr. Corwin. I guess so. They are classified documents.
Mr. Jones. How many would you have? How many of these
documents would you have there at one time?
Mr. Corwin. Well, let's say quite a number of the
classified confidential type. But just to give you a little
background, our group does not deal directly in a lot of this
equipment. We are people who do the mechanical aspects of the
job, and the information given to us is all that we need in
order to do our job.
Mr. Jones. And under the old system your secretary was
responsible for those papers? In other words, she assigned them
out and all that?
Mr. Corwin. She knew where they were, could lay her hands
on them, had a signature from any person who borrowed the
document or was using it.
Mr. Jones. How many people were in your office under your
immediate supervision?
Mr. Corwin. Let's say my section consists of roughly forty
or forty-two people.
Mr. Jones. Forty-two people, each of whom had access, if
they wished to, for their particular project, to this secret
information?
Mr. Corwin. If they were working on a particular project.
Mr. Jones. All they had to do was go up and sign with your
secretary?
Mr. Corwin. She knew what they were working on, and she
would release the information to them. They are all cleared, of
course. Everyone in the area is.
Mr. Jones. Approximately, then, forty persons under your
immediate supervision?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. But not all of them read the classified
documents, since a number of the people are, shall we say,
mechanics, people who don't normally have any need for
classified information. But our engineers would.
Mr. Jones. But may I ask you this? It would be possible for
anyone, we will say, skilled in the use of a small camera to
actually photograph any of these documents?
Mr. Corwin. Well, in the first place, they had to get in
with it.
Mr. Jones. Get in with what?
Mr. Corwin. The camera, or whatever you are talking about.
Mr. Jones. A small camera?
Mr. Corwin. Well, if he got through our guards, who I
understand are pretty efficient, it would be rather difficult
unless he stood over somebody's shoulder. And what would he be
doing in our place if we don't know him? We would look at
anybody that came in, to find out if he was a member, if he had
a badge and so on.
Mr. Jones. I mean it would be possible for any of the
employees to do that, would it not?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I guess so, if they knew the person well
enough.
Mr. Jones. Say I took out this document from your safe and
brought it over to my desk. It would be possible for me, I am
sure, without anybody even seeing me, to take a picture of that
document.
Mr. Corwin. I guess it would.
Mr. Jones. Has there ever been an incident, to your
knowledge, that occurred where a camera was used in the plant.
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, not that I know of. As a matter of
fact, in the beginning we were cautioned never to bring in
cameras.
Mr. Rainville. You said: If he could look over his
shoulder. But I think Mr. Jones is referring to one of these
forty-two people that you have under you. They, themselves,
could take pictures?
Mr. Corwin. As far as we are concerned, we check with
security to find out what these people are cleared for, and if
they are not cleared they can't come into our area.
Mr. Rainville. But any one of those forty-two people could,
in the normal course of the day, come into your office with
something which you were to sign, or to leave it on your desk?
Mr. Corwin. You see, the classified documents now are
brought to the girl in transit even between our own people.
Mr. Rainville. That is the new system. I mean prior to
this, at any time. These people worked for you, and they are in
this department, and they have problems that you sometimes have
to answer. Any one of these forty-two people on any given day
at any given time might walk in and say, ``Mr. Corwin, may I
sign this?'' or ``May I have permission to do this?'' or any
one of a number of routine things. And they all have security
clearance.
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rainville. All top security clearance?
Mr. Corwin. Well, there is another level called top secret.
We don't have it, because we don't need it.
Mr. Jones. How many in your section have this secret
clearance?
Mr. Corwin. Everybody.
Mr. Jones. The entire forty? Even the mechanics?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rainville. So that when you left this classified
document on your desk, it would be perfectly all right for
anyone in there to see it and read it?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. But I must explain that we are careful in
the way we handle our documents. If someone comes that doesn't
need the information, the tendency is to put it to one side and
turn it over. We are careful. Because there have been
violations. It is enough to make anybody----
Mr. Rainville. But you said one other thing. You said it
was unusual even in these days.
Now, you haven't had any secret documents, but in these
days it was unusual to handle top secret documents?
Mr. Corwin. We never handled top secret documents at all.
Mr. Rainville. But even to handle secret documents was
unusual?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, because we don't need the knowledge.
Mr. Rainville. But the fact that it was an unusual thing--
wouldn't that make you realize that you had left that document
out?
Mr. Corwin. As I said before, I think the document had been
officially downgraded, but I had never gotten around to doing
anything about it.
Mr. Rainville. But despite that you were penalized for
leaving it out?
Mr. Corwin. The story is that you are going to be penalized
for what it says on it, because if you didn't take care of it
you should be penalized for not doing it. How should I put it?
It is not exactly your fault you didn't do it, but it should
have been done. It could have been really secret, too. So,
therefore, you are penalized.
Mr. Jones. In this car pool, then, Mr. Corwin, you say that
only Coleman carried the briefcase, and only once in a while?
Mr. Corwin. I will say that is all I can remember.
Mr. Jones. He would take that briefcase inside the plant
and take it out again. Is that it?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. During a period of time there, some of our
people were cleared to take in and out classified documents,
and they had a special pass signed by the commanding officer.
Mr. Jones. Coleman was one of these?
Mr. Corwin. I am sure he must have been, according to the
work that he did. I am pretty sure.
Mr. Jones. In other words, then, he could walk into the
plant and leave the plant without having his briefcase
inspected?
Mr. Corwin. I believe that they did some inspection. To me
it was always a little confusing, because I guess the guards
are cleared for secret, too, so I suppose they did look to see
what the classification was on these sheets. And they examined
this pass, which stated exactly what they were allowed to take
out.
Mr. Jones. Now, does that still hold true today?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. That stopped a number of years ago.
Mr. Jones. A number of years ago?
Mr. Corwin. So far as I know.
Mr. Rainville. There is one other thing I would like to ask
about Mr. Coleman. You said only once had he taken classified
documents home that you knew of, and that was when he got this
reprimand.
Mr. Corwin. Let me put it this way: I knew about the
reprimand and knew that he took out documents. I don't know how
many.
Mr. Rainville. You assumed that that was the only occasion
when he took out something when he was not supposed to?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. When I say ``occasion''--he may have taken
them out over a period of time or something. I don't really
know.
Mr. Rainville. The point I was getting to is that you
stressed the fact that he was a very conscientious, hardworking
fellow, that he was a good engineer, and didn't like to see his
work pile up, and he took it home with him when he felt he had
to. Of course, those are all things you wouldn't know unless he
discussed it in the car with you that he was taking them home,
that it was actually work that was in that briefcase?
Mr. Corwin. When he got the penalty, of course, we knew he
was suspended, since we didn't take him in.
Mr. Rainville. But you say you didn't know what was in the
briefcase, it was never opened, in your memory, there was never
a discussion of what was in it, no reference, and yet you say
he took work home because he was a conscientious, hardworking
engineer that wanted to finish up the details left on his desk
at night, and that he processed them even to the point of
taking them home to work on them. Well, presumably, if you
didn't know what was in the briefcase, and he didn't discuss it
in the car with you, you are a little bit psychic to know what
he was doing?
Mr. Corwin. Well, maybe I am not giving you these things in
any chronological order. That is to say, when he got the
penalty, he discussed what had happened to him.
Mr. Rainville. And then he told you he was conscientious
and that he took his work home to process?
Mr. Corwin. We said to him, to be frank with you: ``You are
pretty much of a damn fool to do anything like that.''
We knew, though, that his work had been falling behind, and
he told us.
Mr. Rainville. That he had been doing that?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. I may not have been giving these
statements in any kind of an order.
Mr. Rainville. I was merely going to say, then: This could
have been the one time that he was caught. Like the guy that is
caught speeding, and the one time he is caught is when he just
barely broke the speed limit, instead of when he was going a
hundred miles an hour.
Mr. Schine. It could have been.
As well as you know him, it is entirely possible he could
have taken secret documents home on other occasions?
Mr. Corwin. I think that is possible. With the pass and
everything else. I don't even know why the pass existed at that
time. Because it didn't make sense to me. Now it certainly
doesn't make sense.
Mr. Jones. Have you ever seen a miniature camera?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. How miniature?
Mr. Jones. Oh, about this size [indicating].
Mr. Corwin. Only in the movies.
Mr. Jones. You have never actually seen one, then?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, not physically.
Mr. Jones. At any time in traveling back and forth, has any
one of then men in the car had a camera with him of any nature
at all that you recall?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. Because, as I say, we certainly
wouldn't bring a camera to work. There is no point. You can't
bring it in.
Mr. Jones. Not a large camera, obviously.
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Rainville. Because they are not camera bugs. None of
the fellows you know make a hobby of taking pictures and
photography?
Mr. Corwin. As far as Sobell is concerned, he is the fellow
I know least. I have no social contact with him.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know this fellow, Dr. Yamins?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir. I don't believe he has gotten his
Ph.D.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Yamins. He has been chief of the radiation
laboratory?
Mr. Corwin. I don't think so. I think his position is
liaison engineer for our people.
Mr. Cohn. Liaison between your place and MIT. Is that
right?
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. And your installation up at MIT. Now, have you
spoke to Mr. Yamins lately?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. I haven't seen him in quite a while,
actually since he went to Boston.
Mr. Cohn. Have you been told about any of the charges
against him?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, I haven't.
Mr. Cohn. Was he pretty friendly with Mr. Coleman?
Mr. Corwin. Well, I would say they were friendly. I don't
think they had much social contact.
Mr. Jones. Friendly in what respect, then?
Mr. Corwin. Well, they worked together, and it was a
companionship.
Mr. Jones. Scientific companionship more than a social
companionship?
Mr. Corwin. I would say so, yes, sir.
Mr. Schine. Mr. Corwin, you lived with Mr. Coleman, didn't
you?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schine. Would you give us the years you lived with him?
Mr. Corwin. I will try, I think it was in '46 or '47, I am
not too sure. We lived in a place called Port-au-Peck.
Mr. Schine. The address, please?
Mr. Corwin. I think it was Vreeland Place, and that was
Port-au-Peck, New Jersey.
Mr. Schine. Was anybody else living with you at that time?
Mr. Corwin. Martin. The three of us.
Mr. Schine. Incidentally, what is Mr. Martin doing now?
Mr. Corwin. Up until the time he was suspended, he was with
Coleman.
Mr. Schine. What is his present job? Do you know what he is
doing?
Mr. Corwin. I don't quite understand. You mean at the
moment what is he doing? Probably nothing.
Mr. Schine. You and Mr. Coleman and Mr. Martin all lived
together in 1946 and '47?
Mr. Corwin. Somewhere around then. It was for a very short
period at the time, but I was sort of moving around from group
of fellows to group of fellows until I ultimately got married.
Every time a fellow got married, there would be a breaking
apart of the household, and we would keep on re-forming.
Mr. Schine. Did you ever see classified documents around at
that time?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir, I don't remember seeing any.
Mr. Cohn. Did Martin tell you this man, Ullmann turned out
to be a member of a spy ring?
Mr. Corwin. I read it in his charges. The charge was that
he was found to be a Communist, words to that effect. I don't
think Martin knew the fellow very well.
Mr. Cohn. Was Ullmann's name ``William Ludwig Ullmann''?
Mr. Corwin. That doesn't strike a responsive chord.
Mr. Cohn. Where was Ullmann working?
Mr. Corwin. That was at Watson Laboratory, which was part
of the air force at that time.
Mr. Cohn. Part of the air force; not at Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. No, they had nothing to do with Monmouth.
Mr. Cohn. Where is it located?
Mr. Corwin. It is close to Monmouth. It is right outside of
Red Bank.
Mr. Schine. When you lived with Martin and Coleman, did
they ever discuss anything about the Communist movement at that
time?
Mr. Corwin. Not very much, I am afraid. I think our only
conversation was of a social nature. I guess we wanted to get
married, and our primary interest at that time was meeting
girls and keeping our social contacts up. We certainly weren't
very politically-conscious, or I would have remember some
discussions.
Mr. Schine. How do you spell Okum's name?
Mr. Corwin. I don't know, I think I said it. Was it O-a-k-
u-m? Something like that.
Mr. Schine. Did he ever work at Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir, he worked for Coleman.
Mr. Schine. He worked for Coleman.
Mr. Corwin. That was quite a number of years ago,
Mr. Schine. Do you know the year specifically?
Mr. Corwin. No, I don't. I think it was up until the time
that Coleman enlisted in the marine corps.
Mr. Schine. Was it around '45 of '46?
Mr. Corwin. No, I guess it was earlier.
Mr. Schine. Earlier?
Mr. Corwin. Maybe '42, somewhere in there.
Mr. Schine. '42. What was Okum's job?
Mr. Corwin. I think he was some kind of a clerk, that he
did a clerical job.
Mr. Schine. Do you know what he is doing now?
Mr. Corwin. Yes, sir. I don't know in detail, but I think
he is working for a local electronics outfit somewhere around
our area.
Mr. Schine. When was the last time he was employed by the
government?
Mr. Corwin. Well, when Watson Laboratory, which was part of
the air force moved to Rome, at lot of people who were employed
there did not want to go up with them, because there were a lot
of physical hardships, so they quit.
Mr. Schine. That is Rome, New York?
Mr. Corwin. No, they quit here at Watson.
I think he left at that time and found himself a job.
Mr. Schine. And he had access to classified material at the
time?
Mr. Corwin. At the time he was----
Mr. Schine [continuing]. Working for Coleman?
Mr. Corwin. Yes. And I suppose when he worked for the air
force he also had clearance. Now, he also went through a little
problem, too.
Mr. Schine. Yes, he discussed that with you, didn't he?
Mr. Corwin. No, I didn't know him very well. Coleman told
me about it.
Mr. Schine. What did Coleman tell you?
Mr. Corwin. Well, he told me that his clearance had been
taken away, and I think Coleman came up as a witness on his
behalf.
Mr. Schine. Why was his clearance taken away?
Mr. Corwin. That I don't know.
Mr. Schine. Did you know some of the charges that were
against him?
Mr. Corwin. I think it had to do with the local federal
union, the Union of Public Workers, or something like that;
that he was a member.
Mr. Schine. He was a member. And what were some of the
other charges?
Mr. Corwin. I don't know. That is the only thing we heard.
Because it seemed so odd to just be a member of the union, or
whatever it was.
Mr. Schine. There must have been some other charges against
Okum.
Mr. Corwin. I suppose so.
Mr. Schine. Where did you say Okum is now?
Mr. Corwin. Well, he is out in that area.
Mr. Schine. He is working for some small electronic outfit.
What was his first name?
Mr. Corwin. Jack Okum. Jack, as far as I know.
Mr. Schine. How do you spell that?
Mr. Corwin. That makes the third try. I will not swear to
it. Maybe it is O-k-u-m.
Mr. Schine. How long has he been out of Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. Well, the last place he left was the air force,
to my knowledge.
Mr. Schine. That was Watson Laboratories?
Mr. Corwin. Watson Laboratories.
Mr. Schine. And you don't think he has been employed by the
government since that time?
Mr. Corwin. I don't believe so.
Mr. Schine. When did he leave Watson Laboratories?
Mr. Corwin. I don't know. I would say '49 or '50, maybe
'51. Somewhere in that time.
Mr. Schine. And has he been employed at Fort Monmouth?
Mr. Corwin. He was, way back.
Mr. Schine. Besides that early time when he worked for
Coleman?
Mr. Corwin. Not that I know of. No, he wasn't.
Mr. Schine. What was Coleman's reaction to the fact that
Okum had his clearance taken away? When he discussed it with
you, what did he say?
Mr. Corwin. Well, he felt that there was no reason for it.
Okum, of course, was cleared.
Mr. Schine. Oh, he was cleared.
Mr. Corwin. Oh, yes, definitely.
Mr. Schine. But he didn't go back to work?
Mr. Corwin. No, sir. He went back to the air force and
stayed with them up until this move. Yes, he was cleared, went
back to work with them, stayed until this move started, and
left.
Mr. Rainville. The only question that ran through my mind:
As I recall it now, Coleman, Martin, and Okum are the three
people that were very friendly with you.
Mr. Corwin. No.
Mr. Rainville. Not Okum so much as Coleman and Martin, with
whom you lived?
Mr. Corwin. Yes.
Mr. Rainville. And Okum, you said, was very friendly with
Coleman, worked for him, and you said was probably one of his
best friends not now working at the plant.
Were there any others besides those three that were
suspended?
Mr. Corwin. That were friends?
Mr. Rainville. Yes, I mean that were in that group. I am
trying to go through my notes and pull them together. I thought
maybe you could simplify it for me.
Mr. Corwin. I don't know what you mean, sir.
Mr. Rainville. The only point that kept recurring to me is
that almost every time you came up with the name of somebody
who was very friendly, or in the car pool, you came up with the
fact that he was suspended. I thought maybe I was exaggerating
it, so I wanted to pull them all together.
Mr. Corwin. No, to my knowledge Harold Ducore, who was in
the car pool, and Aaron Coleman, in the car pool, have been
suspended.
Mr. Rainville. And Martin, who lived with you, was
suspended.
Mr. Corwin. That is right.
Mr. Rainville. And Okum, whom you knew, even though he was
a close friend of Coleman rather than your own?
Mr. Corwin. He was never suspended. His clearance was taken
away, and then he was cleared. That is not suspension. There is
a big difference. There is a monetary difference, too.
Mr. Rainville. But it is the same all picture, a
questioning of their security.
Mr. Corwin. Well, clearing up----
Mr. Rainville. A questioning of their security.
Mr. Corwin. If you want to call it that.
Mr. Carr. I guess that is all, Mr. Corwin.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., a recess was taken until 2:00
p.m.]
afternoon session
[2:00 p.m.]
Mr. Cohn. May we get your full name for the record, please?
STATEMENT OF ALLEN J. LOVENSTEIN
Mr. Lovenstein. Allen J. Lovenstein, L-o-v-e-n-s-t-e-i-n.
Mr. Schine. Your occupation?
Mr. Lovenstein. Electrical engineer, sir.
Mr. Schine. And where are you currently employed?
Mr. Lovenstein. At Evans Signal Laboratory, Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey.
Mr. Schine. That is the army laboratory?
Mr. Lovenstein. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schine. And what are your duties there?
Mr. Lovenstein. I am a project engineer and in charge a
subsection of the Radar Equipment Section of the Radar Branch
at Evans.
Mr. Schine. And, as a project engineer, what do you do?
Mr. Lovenstein. I am responsible for development work on
classified and unclassified ground radar equipment.
Mr. Schine. What is this ground radar equipment for?
Mr. Lovenstein. It is for use by the different services of
the army.
Mr. Schine. It involves--?
Mr. Lovenstein. It involves classified information.
Mr. Cohn. Some of it, in general terms, involves
antiaircraft defense?
Mr. Lovenstein. No, sir, it doesn't.
Mr. Cohn. Does any radar work done at Evans involve that?
Mr. Lovenstein. I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. But your section doesn't?
Mr. Lovenstein. In one way it does. I can't give you the
connection.
Mr. Cohn. I don't want the detail. I just want to speak in
general terms when referring to classified information.
Mr. Lovenstein. Could you repeat the question?
Mr. Cohn. You say in one way it does relate to
antiaircraft.
Mr. Lovenstein. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. That is enough.
Mr. Lovenstein. I can be more explicit than that.
Mr. Cohn. I don't think it is necessary. It is highly
classified work?
Mr. Lovenstein. Some of it is secret, yes.
Mr. Schine. Radar, of course, can cover anything from ships
to airplanes to many other projects about which the general
public doesn't know; is that not true?
Mr. Lovenstein. Yes, sir, that is true.
Mr. Schine. How long have you been doing this work?
Mr. Lovenstein. I first became employed at Evans on the
17th of November, 1947.
Mr. Schine. And were you employed as a project engineer at
that time?
Mr. Lovenstein. No, sir, I wasn't. I attained successfully
higher positions of responsibility.
Mr. Schine. What did you do prior to 1947?
Mr. Lovenstein. Upon graduation from college----
Mr. Schine. Which college?
Mr. Lovenstein. The College of the City of New York. City
College.
Mr. Schine. What year was that?
Mr. Lovenstein. Actually, I received my degree as of August
of 1943. I was registered for summer courses during that year,
to finish my credits for the degree. I didn't quite finish.
However, they gave me the credits. They were non-essential
courses. And I wanted to go in the army.
Mr. Schine. What did you do? Just describe your occupation
since you left college.
Mr. Lovenstein. Following those months of army experience,
I went to work for the Hammarlund H-a-m-m-a-r-l-u-n-d-
Manufacturing Company. I believe the address was 460 West 34th
Street. I am not sure of the address. It was on West 34th
Street almost at Tenth Avenue. Working for them, I did bench
testing on that Hammerlund ``Super-Pro.''
Mr. Schine. How long did you work for them?
Mr. Lovenstein. I believe I started working for them some
time during the summer of 1946. I had been discharged in
February, February 11, I believe it was, of 1946. And I worked
for them until a lay-off I believe shortly after the first of
the year, sometime around the first of the year 1947.
Mr. Schine. Yes. Roughly a year?
Mr. Lovenstein. It was short of a year, yes,
Mr. Schine. And when you worked for them, did you handle
government projects?
Mr. Lovenstein. No, sir, I didn't.
Mr. Schine. Did they handle work for the government?
Mr. Lovenstein. Yes, sir, they did.
Mr. Schine. But you had no connection with the work they
handled for the government?
Mr. Lovenstein. No, sir, I didn't.
Mr. Schine. What were your functions in the army?
Mr. Lovenstein. I was an enlisted man. I was sent to Camp
Crowder, Missouri, and received my basic training there. I was
there, I think, something like five weeks, and I was sent to
Fort Monmouth, to the Signal School at Fort Monmouth. I went
through the elements of radio, the elements of electricity, and
then I was sent, on the 18th of February, 1944--I believe that
is the correct date--to a camp in Pennsylvania. The name
escapes me. It was a staging camp. It was outside of Sharon,
Ohio. I remember that town. And from there I went to a camp at
that time--I don't know whether the information is classified
now or not. I wasn't supposed to give the name of the camp at
that time, and I haven't been told otherwise.
Mr. Cohn. In connection with the atomic project?
Mr. Lovenstein. Oh, no, sir. This was a port of
embarkation.
Mr. Schine. And what were your duties in the army?
Mr. Lovenstein. I was trained as a radio repair man. I was
sent over along with seventeen other enlisted personnel, two
captains, and one lieutenant colonel. His name was Lieutenant
Colonel Edwards. We were sent as a special detachment, and we
had been led to believe that we were to be sent to the CBI. We
landed in North Africa in May of 1947. We left the United
States--I am sorry. I said '47. It was '44. We landed sometime
late in April or early in May in North Africa, and from there
we proceeded to Bombay, and then across India to Calcutta, and
I was on temporary duty at an installation at Kancharapara in
India--K-a-n-c-h-a-r-a-p-a-r-a--I think it is, which was
nothing more than a staging area.
At that point, the eighteen in the group and the two
officers were broken up, and six of us--if it is important I
can make sure of that number; I am not sure whether it was six
or eight-six or eight of us were sent to a tank unit, the First
Provisional Tank Group. One battalion was operating in Burma.
One battalion was in reserve at Sedyia, S-e-d-y-i-a, in India.
I was sent with the second battalion.
Shortly thereafter, we moved into the combat zone in Burma.
We were kept in reserve.
After the war in Burma was concluded, I was sent back to
the signal outfit I had been attached to, the Ninety-sixth
Signal Battalion, and then after that the 988th Signal Service
company. We went over the Lido and Burma Roads by truck, and I
was assigned to the Northern Chinese combat area command,
something like that, in Kunming, China, where I worked as a
transmitter maintenance man at a radio station, servicing the
Kunming command station.
I was there until, I believe, early in December 1945, when
we were thrown back across the hutch to Calcutta, to
Kancharapara, the staging area.
We boarded ships in Calcutta. I remember that very well. I
finally came down with malaria. I had been taking atabrine.
When I came off it, I got it. I came across the Pacific, landed
at Portland, came across the country, and was discharged at
Fort Dix, on, I believe, the 11th of February 1946.
Mr. Schine. What was the name of the company you went to
afterward?
Mr. Lovenstein. The Hammarlund Manufacturing Company.
Mr. Schine. And you were there until the first part of
1947?
Mr. Lovenstein. Yes. Then I went to work for the Pilotless
Planes Division of the Fairchild Aviation Corporation.
Mr. Schine. What were your duties there?
Mr. Lovenstein. My duties were as a technician, or it might
have been called a junior engineer, in the development of test
equipment for their product.
Mr. Schine. They did work for the army?
Mr. Lovenstein. For the navy.
Mr. Schine. And some of it was classified work?
Mr. Lovenstein. That is why I said, ``product,'' yes, sir.
Mr. Schine. How long were you at this job?
Mr. Lovenstein. I was there until some time late in the
summer. I don't remember the exact date. A strike was called.
Mr. Schine. Yes?
Mr. Lovenstein. I had very mistakenly joined the union at
the time the strike was called. I, along with what I thought
was a majority of t